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Abstract 
 
This research examines the internationally coordinated, state-led response to the 2007-
2008 economic and financial crisis. It addresses the construction of ‘alternative 
narratives’ which encompass a partial revision of the economic paradigm, with a 
particular emphasis on the role of international financial regulatory authority, its rules and 
institutionalization. The meta-theoretical theme at the centre of this thesis involves the 
manner in which severe crisis episodes provoke and also reveal the underlying tension 
and contestation between ‘market authority’ and ‘state authority’ in relation to the 
regulation of the world economy, financial system and firms, with the goal of ensuring 
maximization of long-term systemic stability and crisis prevention. The construction of 
alternative crisis-driven narratives is in part a reaction to the previous ideological 
hegemonic domination of laissez faire neo-liberal beliefs as  applied to deregulation (i.e., 
of self-regulation by markets and private sector actors in the financial sector). The thesis 
identifies and examines a paradigm shift in response to the crisis: a move from the 
dominance of market authority to the reassertion of state authority over financial markets 
and actors. It addresses the way in which crisis narratives are constructed in response to 
such episodes and the policy implications of paradigm shifts when they occur. 
 
The thesis empirically examines the elite state-level crisis response and its policy 
consequences, with particular emphasis on the institutional reforms most important to the 
construction, post-crisis, of a ‘new global financial architecture’. A principal argument 
within the thesis is that the severity of the financial crisis precipitated a rapid shift in the 
policy narrative held to by the central banking epistemic community, which constitutes a 
paradigm shift, and which led to a series of institutional and policy reforms addressing the 
application of state power and regulatory authority over global financial markets and 
firms. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Goals and content of the thesis 
 
This research examines the internationally coordinated, state-led response to the 2007-
2008 economic and financial crisis. It involves the examination of the construction of 
‘alternative narratives’ which encompass a rejection of the laissez faire neo-liberal 
paradigm, with a particular emphasis on the role of international financial regulatory 
authority, its rules and institutionalisation. The meta-theoretical theme at the centre of this 
thesis involves the manner in which acute and severe crisis episodes such as this case 
provoke and also reveal the underlying tension and contestation between ‘market 
authority’ and ‘state authority’ in relation to the regulation of the world economy and 
especially the financial system and firms, with the goal of ensuring maximisation of long-
term systemic stability and crisis prevention. The construction of alternative crisis-driven 
narratives is in part a reaction to the previous ideological hegemonic domination of the 
laissez faire ‘neo-liberal beliefs as  applied to deregulation (i.e., of self regulation by 
markets and private sector actors in the financial sector).  The thesis identifies and 
examines a paradigm shift underway in response to the crisis: A move from the 
dominance of market authority to the reassertion of state authority over financial markets 
and actors. It addresses this crisis as an instance of the greater set of historical cases of 
severe financial crises which transmute into economic crises. It addresses the way in 
which crisis narratives are constructed in response to such episodes and the policy 
outcomes of a paradigm shift when they occur. 
 
The thesis empirically examines the elite state-level crisis response and its policy 
consequences, with particular emphasis on the institutional reforms most important to the 
construction of a ‘new global financial architecture.’ Calls for a new architecture have 
occurred in the past; there were similar demands following the 1997/98 global and East 
Asian financial crisis. A principal argument within the thesis is that the severity of the 
financial crisis in this case precipitated an important shift in the policy narrative, a 
paradigm shift, and a series of policies designed to collectively apply and internationally 
coordinate regulatory authority over global financial markets and private sector actors in a 
more robust manner. 
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The research draws upon a series of 34 high-level, qualitative interviews with many of the 
governmental, central bank, and supervisory principals present and active in key decision-
making meetings and roles from 2008 onwards. The insights gathered from these key 
actors regarding the narratives adopted and the policy shift these resulted in add 
meaningfully to the understanding of the G20 leaders forum, the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), and the reforms underway within the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This 
research illuminates the rapid evolution of the new architecture and its operation in a time 
of crisis. It identifies the dialectic at work. As the crisis abates, in part due to the crisis  
management collective action of state leaders and their regulatory surrogates within these 
new forums and institutions, tensions return and outer limits of the new policy consensus 
are reached, and state diplomatic actors’ positions diverge once more. 
 
1.1.1 The context of the study: Economic cycles, crises, response, and relapse 
 
Global and national economies and markets operate in cycles of growth that, when 
unrestrained, can turn into booms, which are eventually punctured by busts resulting in 
recessions of varying severity (Galbraith, 1954; Kindlberger and Aliber, 1978; Minsky, 
2008). During the boom phase, few remember economic history, believing this time is 
different (Rogoff and Reinhardt, 2009; Schiller, 2006), but it never is, and booms always 
eventually turn to bust. Global economic cycles operate on a longer frequency than 
national cycles, because it is rare that the credit expansions and contractions of national 
economies align to create a synchronous collapse of the global economy as a whole. 
Normally, a national recession or a banking calamity in one part of the world is balanced 
partially by growth and prosperity elsewhere. 
 
The rhythm within these cycles is not only economic but also conceptual and ideological. 
‘Constructionists’ are right: ideas do matter in the political and economic calculus of 
policy making. Economies are underpinned by and linked to ideological narratives, a 
prevailing policy consensus that places limits on policy actions and options and 
constitutes a dominant worldview or paradigm. 
 
In some, but by no means all, financial crises, a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962) can be 
triggered and becomes part of the cycle and process, particularly in severe economic 
crises. For instance, economic failures and stagflation in the United Kingdom (UK) (a 
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slow-motion bust) in the 1970s paved the way for the Thatcher victory in 1979 and a 
significant ideological and economic policy shift that impacted the UK for decades 
thereafter (Blyth, 2002). 
 
On the international level, as with economic cycles, the ideological cycle is also of a 
longer frequency, measured in decades, not years. But when a sufficiently severe 
exogenous event or economic and financial crisis occurs, it can shake the prevailing 
worldview. More rarely still, a shock may result in a paradigm shift in ideological and 
regulatory concepts held by leaders and policy makers. In such cases, a rapid evolutionary 
burst of action and reform, a shift in the policy consensus and worldview can occur. 
 
In 1971, one economic and financial paradigm, embedded liberalism and the system of 
globally managed exchange rates (Ruggie, 1982), ended with U.S. president Richard 
Nixon’s closure of the gold window. The end of that era gradually gave birth to another, 
which over time came to be characterized in part by laissez-faire neo-liberalism (Gamble, 
2009, pp. 71-86), or market fundamentalism (Stiglitz, 2008), and later by the Washington 
Consensus (Wade, 2008; Williamson, 1993, 1994). This ideological worldview involved 
a championing of deregulated, unfettered global markets and firms. This shift moved 
economies and the financial system away from a rules-based system (Elson, 2011, pp. 
208-209), to competing based on flexible exchange rates and fostering the success of their 
national economic models within increasingly globalised markets reliant on (it was 
assumed) efficient markets (Wade, 2008, p. 2). The series of policy decisions and 
nondecisions that flowed from this deregulatory narrative took shape in the late 1970s, 
gathered strength in the 1980s, and thundered forward in the 1990s and early years of the 
21st century. 
During the decades before the 2007-2008 financial crisis, governments allowed and 
facilitated the erosion and diffusion of state power to other actors—a weakening of state 
power coupled with a retreat of the state’s willingness to supervise growing global 
markets and firms (Strange, 1986, 1996). Markets grew. Governmental acts or refusal to 
act were underpinned by the ideological and economic belief in unregulated markets 
rather than state regulatory power (Ackerlof and Schiller, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa, 2010a; 
Stiglitz, 2010). Firms grew and morphed from national retail banks into global behemoths 
with operations interconnected across the globe. The size, impact, and influence of these 
firms rapidly grew, as did the complexity of markets and instruments (Maclean and 
Nocera, 2010; Tett, 2009), the leverage seen (Turner, 2009), the risks taken, and levels of 
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compensation paid to their employees (FCIC, 2011; Johnson, 2010). The dominant neo-
liberal laissez-faire paradigm supported these trends and resisted those that pointed to 
anomalies, questioned the worldview (Rajan, 2005; White, 2008), or sought to warn of 
dangers ahead. 
As in other previous ideological and economic cycles, the existing worldview blotted out 
historical memory amongst leaders and technocrats. Deregulation and self-regulation (the 
latter now viewed as an oxymoron) was the norm. During this period, the frequency of 
national boom and bust cycles grew (Allen and Gale, 2007), and the number and severity 
of national banking crises rose (King, 2011a), but few paid attention. The Anglo-Saxon 
paradigm and narrative worshipped by political leaders and regulators precluded actors 
from seeing the ‘black swan’, or the extreme exogenous event or crisis coming (Taleb, 
2010); instead, a great moderation was supposed to be underway. 
 
In this manner, the worldview provided ideological justification for the boom of the 
1990s and 2000s. It fostered the creation of markets, firms, and instruments that would in 
2007 rapidly transmit price declines in houses and condos in Nevada and Florida sold to 
poor, credit-challenged Americans to banks in the UK and Germany, and then around the 
globe. As the credit crunch and economic contagion spread, the panic grew, and leaders 
faced the most significant economic and financial crises since the Great Depression in 
1929. 
 
Confronted by a crisis of historic proportions, old solutions were insufficient. A 
breakpoint occurs and ‘the possibilities for major change are particularly great and scope 
of possibilities and outcomes is unusually wide’ (Ikenberry, 1992, p. 318; see also 
Helleiner, 2009a, p. 16). But the U.S. could not fashion the solution alone or solely with 
its G71 colleagues and allies, as it had in the past. The days when two men, Paul Volcker 
and Robin Lea Pemberton, could do a deal on bank regulation that was pressed upon the 
rest of the world were long gone (Goodhart, 2011; Kapstein, 1992). 
 
In 2008, U.S. hegemonic power was in decline, and rising powers, especially China, 
Brazil, and India, demanded a voice and a role, and they had the reserves to back their 
demands. Emerging countries had to be included. Recognising this reality and making the 
switch to a larger leadership grouping at the topmost tier of international economic and 
                                                 
1 The Group of Seven is composed of leaders, finance ministers and central bank governors from the 
following countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and U.S.. 
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financial diplomacy would be necessary to make any possible solutions truly global in 
impact, and to ensure the legitimacy of the decisions taken in response to the crisis. As a 
result, while the crisis response in 2007-2008 exhibits common elements with prior 
cycles, the constructs created as a result of the architectural impulse would be markedly 
different, indicative of the evolution of geopolitical power relations and balances since 
the last major shift in 1971. 
 
In summary, this research recognises that the internationally coordinated collective 
response in 2008 is part of this history of cycles of booms and busts, crisis management, 
and reform and relapse. The research will posit that this especially severe crisis forced a 
financial regulatory paradigm shift in worldview amongst government leaders, states, and 
their technocratic central banking community, that there was a rapid evolution in the 
collective policy-making narrative, which underpinned the new and refurbished 
international political, regulatory, and architectural constructs. This is ‘a new phase’ 
(Wade, 2008, p. 3), it and entailed the rejection of key aspects of the laissez faire neo-
liberal worldview and its assumptions.  
 
In 2013 the consensual certainties of the past have been jettisoned and a paradigm shift in 
G20 and financial and regulatory policy is under way. But as with such major shifts in the 
past, the shift takes time to form. It is a fluid process. Today, this shift remains partly 
formed, in dispute, and is still to be defended. The research will highlight the fluctuating 
strength of the policy output and reform impulse. This is to be expected because this type 
of major shift, this Kuhnian wave in ideological, and financial regulatory approach, takes 
years to solidify. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
The main question of this thesis is: 
 
 How should the observer view and understand the construction of the 
new global financial regulatory architecture commenced by leaders and 
their proxies in response to the 2007-2008 crises?    
 
In answering this core research question the research examines: the shift in ideas, the 
emergence of the G20 and its summitry; the creation and actions of the FSB; the reform 
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of the IMF; and the outer limits to the process of financial regulatory construction 
underway.  
 
This focus on the economic and regulatory narratives and the policy shifts seen, leads to a 
number of other related questions. 
 
 Is there a reassertion of Westphalian state power in the global economy 
via the G20 and FSB, and how has the power of key state actors been 
affected by the growth in importance of the G20 and FSB? What role are 
emerging market players performing? 
 
 Are there parallels to be drawn from the cycles in past national financial 
crises and responses and the rise of the G20 and FSB? 
 
 Can we gauge how effective they are as forums and in their broader 
policy goals—that of enhancing economic and financial stability? 
 
 What challenges and limitations do these forums face as they move from 
crisis management to financial reform, and to confronting the return of 
tension between the new consensus and renewed dissension among 
actors? 
 
 Does the phenomenon that led to the sudden emergence of the G20 and 
FSB—a robust reassertion of state power—complicate their further 
evolution post-crisis? 
 
 How was the IMF affected and reformed in response to the crisis and 
what role does it play in the new architecture? 
 
 What do the reform responses in the G20, the FSB, and the IMF signal 
for the future evolution of the global financial architecture? 
 
The research aims to contribute to the understanding of the conceptual, ideological, and 
policy dynamics behind states’ crisis responses. This response resulted in a significant 
collective reassertion of state power over markets and firms through new forums (the G20 
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and FSB) and reformed institutions (the IMF). The effects of these new constructions on 
the regulation and operation of global financial markets and firms are still being felt 
globally today and they have yet to markedly diminish in strength. 
 
1.3 Key analytical and theoretical frameworks 
 
The research will employ a series of analytical frameworks and embed empirical 
interview results within existing literature to illuminate the crisis response cycle, the 
dynamics behind the creation of the G20 and the FSB, their policy output, and the 
reforms in the IMF. In doing so, the research aims to address existing academic gaps in 
the understanding of these events, their meaning, their potential impact, and the 
ideological and policy narratives behind them. 
 
The research utilizes three frameworks to dissect the summitry and regulatory rebuilding 
being seen,  First, the research utilizes the concept of paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962), as 
developed and applied to economic policy (Hall, 1993). It takes Hall's formulation of 
first, second, and third order changes and applies them to the events and outcomes being 
observed. Second, the research uses Putnam's ‘two-level game’ framework within the 
crisis altered diplomatic and technical policy making space (Putnam, 1988). The evidence 
will suggest the crisis affected the negotiating stance and win sets of level one 
negotiators, while also enlarging possible win sets and impacting level two blocking 
power from domestic lobbies. Third, the research applies the concept of epistemic 
communities (Haas, 1992a), their characteristics, operation and limitations, to the 
technical policy making processes led by the central banking community, drawing out the 
importance of this small, elite transnational policy network in the construction of the new 
global financial architecture. 
 
1.4 Research design 
 
The following lays out the research design and methodological approach used to answer 
the research questions and to identify patterns and shifts behind the international crisis 
response The research is based on a series of 34 interpretative qualitative research 
interviews of key principals, actors, observers, protagonists, and academics engaged in 
the creation of the G20, the birth of the FSB, and the recapitalization of the IMF. The 
research draws on Kvale and Brinkmann’s conception of qualitative research interviews 
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as the social production of knowledge, a conversational relationship which is ‘contextual, 
linguistic, narrative and pragmatic’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 18). In this process, 
the researcher is ‘Putting oneself in the place of the other’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 76). 
 
In commencing interpretive qualitative research, the investigator is interested in how 
people interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what meaning 
they draw out of the events in question (Merriam, 2002). A series of qualitative 
interviews can, according to the interactionist tradition, ‘give an authentic insight into 
people’s experiences’ (Silverman, 2001, p. 87). The research is also in the constructivist 
tradition in that its is assumed that political and economic-regulatory ideas matter in the 
policy process, particularly in the creation of common narratives during periods of crisis, 
in which rapid shifts of the consensus position are more likely to occur (Blyth, 2002). 
 
The focus of the interviews was threefold: the genesis and evolution of the G20, the 
creation and operation of the FSB, and the reform of the IMF. All the actors selected had 
direct personal experience of the crisis management from 2007-2008 onwards and of the 
response since then that is the focus of the research. In many instances, the interviewees 
were present during pivotal events being studied and were major actors in the decision-
making process. Subjects were selected depending on the seniority of their role in the 
G20-FSB-IMF reform process. Care was taken to secure balance within the sample, 
including G20 and non-G20 voices from states outside the process as well as critical 
external and academic voices. 
 
Ultimately, the interviews were an ‘active’ process (Holstein and Gubrium in Silverman 
2004, p. 144). The data gathered as a result of qualitative interviews and research 
processes cannot be considered as fact; rather, the material remains observations whose 
subjective worth may be strengthened if they are repeated by numerous actors or reflected 
in the views of others also present in key meetings and summits. 
 
Fundamentally, it is these policy narratives, their strength, their weakness, the disputes 
seen, and policy outcomes observed that are central to the research. Economic and 
regulatory narratives matter when individuals respond to a major crisis. The research 
looks at the extent to which a common narrative and policy consensus emerges and can 
be linked to the strength of the outcomes observed. The views expressed by interviewees 
were subjective and influenced by the community in which they reside. Nonetheless, 
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these subjective narratives held collectively by senior policy makers impacted the actual 
outcomes of the process and the future robustness of the structures created and reformed 
during the financial architectural redesign post-2008. 
 
Interview subjects were drawn from 16 states—11 G20 and five non-G20 countries. 
Those interviewed include presidential and prime ministerial advisers; four current and 
former G20 finance ministers; G20 sherpas (the G20 sherpa is the senior finance ministry 
official or presidential adviser who leads a country’s negogiation team prior to and during 
G20 summits); numerous senior current and former G20 finance ministry officials; 
current and former G20 central bank governors and deputy governors; current and former 
principal supervisors; members of the leadership, steering committee, plenary, standing 
committees, and working groups of the FSB; one-third of the Executive Board of the 
IMF; and academic observers. Interviewees were recruited on a voluntary basis and their 
anonymity has been preserved. 
 
Interviews took place during August 2011 through June 2013 in the U.S., Canada, France, 
the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and 
made anonymous. The recordings, transcripts, and interview code were stored in 
password-protected computers in Newcastle and Washington, D.C.. Interview subjects 
signed interview waver forms releasing the anonymous material for use in this and future 
research by the writer. In some cases, second follow-up interviews were conducted with a 
participant, to drill down on a subject. 
 
In total, globally, the principals number no more than perhaps 150 individuals 
(comprising G20 leaders and actors, FSB members and leaders, IMF policy makers, and 
key outsiders). In combination with other official documentary and academic sources, 
careful selection and interviewing of a large fraction of this small group of actors (34 
interviews in total) captured the nature of the common post-crisis financial, economic, 
and re-regulatory endeavour, its narratives, disputes, and outcomes. 
 
The seniority of those interviewed for the research resulted in numerous insights into the 
political economy and diplomatic factors behind the evolution of the post-crisis 
international architectural and regulatory policy response, through the creation of the 
G20, the creation of the FSB, and within the more limited IMF reforms. Seniority matters, 
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especially when analysing an opaque, elite, leader-driven diplomatic and technocratic 
policy-making process with relatively few key actors and players. 
 
 
1.5 The contribution of the thesis 
 
A great deal has been written on the causes of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, and 
the faults and failings of those who did not see what was right in front of them (see, for 
instance, Ackerlof and Schiller, 2009; Admati and Hellwig, 2013; Bair, 2011; Blanchard 
et al., 2012; Blinder, 2013; Brown, 2010; Cassidy, 2010; Darling, 2011; De la Dehasa, 
2010; FCIC, 2011; Gills, 2008, 2010; Gorton, 2010, 2012; Johnson and Kwak, 2010; 
Maclean and Nocera, 2010; Padoa-Schiopppa, 2010a, 2010b; Paulson, 2010; Pettifor, 
2006; Rajan, 2005; Roubini, 2010; Schiller, 2006; Sorkin, 2010; Stiglitz, 2008, 2009; 
Taleb, 2010; Tett, 2009; Turner, 2012). This research will not concentrate on that well-
tilled ground. 
 
Prior to the crisis, the architecture of financial regulation had been analysed, most notably 
by Davies and Green (2008). This work laid out the outlines of the architecture ‘as was.’ 
Other authors provided commentaries on national systems of supervision and oversight 
(Group of Thirty, 2008). Certain individual facets of the old structure, such as the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision, (Goodhart, 2011), or the Financial Stability Forum, 
(Bluestein, 2012), were subjected to historic review. The work on aspects of the global 
architecture either functioned as primers for national regulators laying out the bare 
structure in brief without dissecting the diplomatic and political economy dynamics 
behind the operation of the various organizations, their actors, and communities, or went 
into great detail in particular areas from an historic perspective. Since the crisis others, 
such as Elson (2011), have added to this space, addressing the strains in the international 
architecture and the need for reform, but have not addressed the G20’s and the FSB’s 
central role in the financial regulatory redesign. 
 
This thesis makes a significant and original contribution to knowledge in several related 
areas concerning the international, state-led cycle of crisis response, reform, redesign, and 
finally a revival of dissension during the period of 2008 to 2013. The architectural 
constructs created since 2008 are viewed as the output of political processes, and the 
motivations and dynamics are directly addressed. 
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The research focuses on the creation of the G20 and its summits, the creation and 
operation of the FSB, and the reform of the International Monetary Fund. These were the 
key forums and institutions activated by leaders and their technocrats at the peak of the 
crisis and they have been central since then to the emerging global diplomatic, financial, 
regulatory, and institutional architectural response and redesign.  
 
First, the research offers an account of the creation and the unfolding of the G20 summits 
from the outset during 2008 through 2013, and the tensions, dynamics, and motivations 
driving key leaders and states during this multiyear process, by drawing on the 
recollections of actors present during the summits. Academic and other commentary on 
the G20 has been extensive since the first 2008 summit. Assessments of individual G20 
summits and their outcomes have varied in type. They have been supportive and 
laudatory of the outcomes (Bradford, 2009; Dervis, 2010); critical and dismissive 
(Aslund, 2009; Johnson, 2010, 2010a; Stiglitz, 2010; Wolf, 2010); and many have been 
episodic, that is, focused on particular summits and their goals and declarations 
(Goldstein, 2009; Kirton 2011; Kirton and Guebert, 2009; Trichet, 2010c). Others have 
addressed the G20 summits, the perceived declining hegemonic power of the U.S., and 
the rise of emerging countries (Beeson and Bell, 2009; Kirton, 2010; Subacchi 2008, 
2009, 2010). 
 
Notwithstanding the considerable commentary that exists, a gap remains in that relatively 
few have sought to address the political dynamics behind the G20’s creation by viewing 
the series of summits as an ongoing process (Eichengreen, 2008). A rhetorical question 
has been raised: is this the start of a Bretton Woods II? (Subaachi, and Cooper 2010; The 
Economist, 2010) This research seeks to illuminate the G20 process as a whole, drawing 
on narratives from key participants to add to knowledge of how the summitry operates not 
simply in isolation as a diplomatic exercise in cooperation, coordination and, later, 
discord, but instead in relation to the architectural and reform impulses in which the 
summit decisions play such an important role, namely via the creation of the FSB and the 
reform of the IMF. In doing so, the research seeks to analyse the unfolding process and 
the crisis response cycle, and to draw conclusions on the nature and scope of the political, 
ideological, and financial regulatory shift underway. 
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Second, the research adds to knowledge by focusing on the creation and operation of the 
FSB, a subject about which literature on the dynamics behind the institutional and policy 
impulse is lacking. This is because the Board is relatively new and operates as an 
extremely opaque, obscure forum—whose modus operandi remains closed to almost all 
outsiders, including academics. 
 
Existing literature on the FSB addresses the founding Charter and its formal structure 
(Griffith-Jones, Helleiner and Woods, (eds.) 2010), but not its internal dynamics and 
leadership processes. There is commentary on individual facets of the FSB policy output, 
such as their Peer Review policy implementation oversight process (Porter, 2010, p. 39-
42), the relationship with the IMF (Momani, 2010, p. 36-38), and surveillance and macro-
prudential issues (Walter, 2010, p. 32-35; Turner, 2010, p. 43-48). Initial analysis of the 
FSB has suggested it is an historical reversion away from universal institutions (Pauly, 
2010, p. 15), raising questions of illegitimacy and exclusivity (Bluestein, 2012; 
Vestergaard, 2011; Vestergaard and Wade, 2010). Others take the view that its creation 
addresses some of the legitimacy issues that hampered its predecessor, the Financial 
Stability Forum (Griffith-Jones and Helleiner and Woods, (eds) 2010, p. 28). There have 
also been proposals for governance reform and enlargement (Brookings Institution, 
2011). Much of this initial work has been brief and speculative, and has not been based on 
accounts from participants inside the FSB and its leadership. 
 
As of September 2013, the actual dynamics and functioning of the FSB and its political 
and institutional processes have not been the subject of close analysis and scrutiny, and 
none utilise the lens provided by the epistemic community framework fashioned first by 
Haas (1992), and since applied to many areas of international technical policy making by 
other transnational policy-making communities. (See the section on epistemic 
communities and financial reform in Chapter 2 for a definition and discussion of 
‘epistemic community’). This lens is directly applicable to, and particularly useful in, 
understanding and dissecting the processes of the FSB. 
 
In summary, the research seeks to add to knowledge by addressing directly and in detail 
the creation and policy output of this highly opaque, elite policy-making forum and 
process during its first years of operation, drawing heavily on first-hand accounts from 
many of the Board’s leading figures engaged in all aspects of the FSB’s creation and 
work, an area where ‘no systematic comprehensive studies’ exist (Baker, 2010, p. 19). 
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Finally, this research analyses the modest reforms made to the IMF at the behest of the 
G20 leadership and analyses the potential effect that these resource, voice, and vote 
reforms may bring. There is a very large, deep, and broad literature on the nature of the 
IMF, its institutional politics, and the drivers behind the decision-making processes. 
 
The history and evolution of the IMF has been discussed in detail by many authors (see 
Babb, 2007; Bluestein, 2001; Fischer, 2005; Group of Thirty, 2009b; Helleiner, 1994; 
James, 1996; Kenen, 2002, 2007; Peet, 2010; Thacker, 1999). 
 
Much research has also been done on the internal decision-making processes. Existing 
research on IMF lending dynamics indicates that politics and economics intrude into the 
lending process (Steinwand and Stone, 2008); political influence and links to key 
shareholders matter (Bird and Rowlands, 2001), as does a member state’s relative size 
and Executive Board representation in the IMF (Barrow and Lee, 2005; Thacker, 1999). 
The conditions attached and the type of loan monitoring can be affected by a country’s 
ideological links to the U.S. (Williamson, 1994). 
 
Work addressing the IMF’s governance and surveillance processes is also extensive. Core 
nations are shown to control the IMF (Frattani and Patison, 2004; Truman; 2011), 
exercising ‘bloc holder power’ (Kahler, 2006, p. 259). Surveillance is seen to bend to the 
demands of the more politically influential states (Fratzscher and Reynaud, 2010; Mussa, 
2007). Given the above research, the goals in this area are more limited because the space 
for a contribution is correspondingly smaller. 
 
This research, drawing on interviews with approximately one-third of the national 
shareholder leadership within the IMF, seeks to draw tentative conclusions on the impact 
of the G20 on the reform process within the IMF, in terms of resources and lending, 
governance (i.e., the emerging country voice and votes), and on surveillance policy and 
outcomes. The research will show that the IMF has been strengthened in terms of 
resources, but that its position in the global financial architecture has been downgraded, 
with the G20 and FSB now leading on financial reform. It will further be suggested that 
the reforms within the IMF have made the organization relevant again, and has drawn 
emerging countries back into an engagement with and commitment to the organization. 
But the reforms are nevertheless much less significant than those seen undertaken by the 
G20 and FSB, and are at most first and second-order incremental changes. 
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1.6 The structure of the thesis 
 
Following on from this introduction, chapter 2 presents the analytical framework used in 
this research. It explains the selection of a multifaceted framework through which to view 
and understand the response of leaders and technocrats of the advanced and emerging 
countries from 2008 onwards. The chapter demonstrates that applying the concept of 
paradigm shift to the events from 2008 has utility and draws out the importance of a shift 
in the regulatory policy consensus and narrative. It underscores the particular applicability 
of the concept of epistemic communities to the process being analysed. The chapter also 
highlights the usefulness of Putnam’s ‘two-level game’ in understanding the summitry 
and high-level technical negotiations during the crisis period (Putnam, 1988). 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the genesis of the G20 leaders’ forum in the heat of the crisis and on 
the summitry since then. Rather than looking at the summits as discrete events in 
chronological order, the summitry is viewed thematically as a process. The chapter 
divides the summitry into three phases: (1) crisis management, (2) concrete reform, and 
(3) a return to dissension among states. The chapter suggests that at the diplomatic level 
of the G20, leaders adjusted their views but did not themselves jump to adopt a full 
paradigm shift in their global macro-economic approach. But leaders did rely heavily on 
the technocratic expert central banking epistemic community to delineate the scope of 
new re-regulatory structures and a related new paradigm applied to markets and firms. 
The chapter analyses who leads the summitry process and the role of emerging country 
leaders. It finds that the G20’s emergence and the phases are dialectic. The state power 
that is applied effectively at the outset and during a rapid period of reform and 
consolidation ultimately results in a return to relative calm, this allows dissension and 
national interests to reemerge as the outer limits of a new paradigm are reached. 
 
Chapter 4 explores the political dynamics behind the creation of the FSB, its structure and 
functioning. The chapter illuminates the nature and operation of this new forum that sits 
right at the centre of the new global financial architecture. It dissects how this elite, 
opaque, obscure body functions as the central coordinator backed by reformers composed 
primarily of hawks from the central banking epistemic community. It addresses how the 
Board was fashioned and is still evolving as a nascent but powerful international 
institution, one dominated by a central banking and supervisory community, a community 
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which is essential to the creation and maintenance of the financial re-regulatory paradigm 
shift that is observed. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses a series of FSB policy outcomes. In the end, the durability of the new 
re-regulatory paradigm depends on the actual policies enacted that turn ideological goals 
agreed by the G20 and FSB leadership into facts on the ground. The research shows that 
the policy output fluctuates and is stronger in some areas and weaker in others, ranging 
from Hall's first, to second and third-order changes (Hall, 1993). Viewed in their entirety, 
however, the policy reforms suggest that the ideological shift, although lumpy in effect, is 
being made real on the ground. But it is still to be completed, and must be defended and 
maintained by its community. 
 
Chapter 6 dissects the reform of the IMF and its position within the new architecture. The 
research suggests that unlike other reforms that are the focus of the thesis, IMF reforms 
are less significant. In 2013, the institution is once again relevant and recapitalized, with 
recommitment and re-engagement from emerging countries. But the organization and its 
leadership operate in an existing institutional framework, and they did not go through a 
paradigm shift. As a result, reforms are incremental and evolutionary. 
 
Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the research and explains how they relate to the 
research questions.   
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Chapter 2. Analytical Framework 
 
‘The Western financial system is rapidly coming to resemble nothing  
so much as a vast casino’. 
 (Strange, 1986, p. 1) 
 
‘If the years before the crisis were years of over-reliance on markets and mistrust in 
government – or, more simply put, too much market and too little government – what we 
have seen in 2008 and 2009 has been a spectacular comeback of government’. 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2010b, p. 8) 
 
'The G20 has led to a new paradigm in multilateral cooperation'.  
(G20, Los Cabos Declaration, 2012) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This research addresses the burst of architectural redesign of the global financial 
architecture involving the G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) which began in the fall of 2008 and continued through the end of 
2012. The research employs a number of existing analytical frameworks to explain the 
events under consideration, which are of a multifaceted, highly complex nature, with 
different types of actors involved, and policy areas addressed. The overall approach will 
be described in brief and then each analytical framework used in the initial research will 
be discussed individually with reference to its particular utility to the subject in question 
and existing academic work in the field. 
 
2.2 A meta-theoretical approach 
 
The research underscores that for several decades there has been a decline in the relative 
power of individual states accompanied by a simultaneous rise in the size, complexity, 
and power of global financial markets and the firms that operate within those markets. 
This decline was cemented by a laissez-faire neo-liberal ideology that legitimized 
deregulation and the growth of unrestrained and opaque global markets. ‘Casino 
capitalism’ grew and spread (Gamble, 2009; Pettifor, 2009; Strange, 1986). The research 
starting point is the work of Susan Strange on the nature of state power and the study of 
the political economy of international relations. Her work laid out the changing nature of 
state power and challenges to its effective use decades before the current period of 
increasingly severe multiple global economic and financial crises catalysed by an 
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interconnected, large, and complex system of financial markets and firms spanning the 
globe. It will be argued that the events of 2008 and since show that the extent to which 
state power had withered was overstated. In response to the crisis, G20 leaders and 
technocrats made a leap in their willingness to use collective state power to re-regulate 
global markets and firms. 
 
The analytical and theoretical framework will draw upon the concept of paradigm shift 
(Kuhn, 1962) applied to economic policy making (Hall, 1993), the financial crisis, and 
the international response. Kuhn developed his seminal concept of sudden paradigm shifts 
in worldview. The shifts he described were due to the build-up of contradictory anomalies 
and evidence that cannot be dealt with by an existing worldview. Ultimately, the process 
results in the emergence and acceptance of a new alternative theory that is better suited to 
explain and understand scientific phenomena. The new theory overturns the previous 
worldview and constitutes a paradigm shift. Kuhn underscored that scientific revolutions 
are not about immutable objective facts, but are a struggle over the explanatory utility of 
different scientific worldviews, and that science takes place within a somewhat fluid 
universe of competing ideas and theories. 
 
Kuhn’s concept of paradigm shift resonates with what occurred in 2007 and since then 
with the onset of the financial crisis. Major economic and regulatory actions and reforms 
require state leaders and in particular technocrats to reject previous truths and to adopt of 
a new, more activist, more interventionist worldview—more state power and regulation 
and greater restrictions on markets, firms, and their power. 
 
The 2007-2008 crisis created conditions in which the prior worldview’s anomalies 
became starkly obvious. The policy-making community responded by reevaluating their 
consensus and moves to adopt a new narrative that would signal a paradigm shift—a new 
worldview centred on the merits of global re-regulation of financial markets and firms. 
Reforms are begun and new institutions are created, and policy shift commences because 
of this ideoligical and narrative shift. Such ideological changes are seen in earlier periods 
of significant economic policy turmoil (Blyth, 2002). 
 
Through this crisis response and paradigm shift, leaders and technocrats rejected parts of 
the laissez-faire neo-liberal ideological stance and worldview of the previous decades and 
adopted new policy positions based on aggressive re-regulation of financial markets and 
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an architectural redesign of the regulatory superstructure. The G20 consensus approach 
significantly expands the centrality of international mechanisms for coordination and 
cooperation in the re-regulation of global financial markets and considerably widens the 
scope of regulation. Once leaders commit to a reassertion of state power to arrest global 
economic collapse, they are aided by a few score central bank and supervisory 
technocrats who rapidly design and build a new regulatory structure and formulate its 
associated policies from 2009 through 2012.  
 
Drawing on documentary and interview results, the research will posit that a new 
paradigmatic policy consensus (McNamara, 1998) is being formed and championed by an 
empowered central banking and supervisory community. This community is composed of 
a core group of officials and actors numbering perhaps a few dozen people from advanced 
and emerging countries. They act in concert driven by a feeling of fellowship (Dore and 
Whittaker, 2001), and a broad general agreement on the required shift and reform 
measures. McNamara (1998) developed the concept of policy consensus to describe 
monetary politics and the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union within the 
European Union (EU). In this case, what we witness is a partial rejection of aspects of 
that neo-liberal worldview, a new G20-FSB policy consensus on the need for a 
reassertion of collective state power. It is centred on re-regulation and monitoring of 
global markets, a rejection of self-regulation by leading firms, and an extension of central 
bank responsibilities to include not only price stability but also macro-prudential goals 
which are designed to mitigate the worst effects of boom and bust cycles. 
 
The subject of this research is an elite, opaque, exclusive process of economic diplomacy 
involving a few score leaders and policy makers meeting in private behind firmly closed 
doors at the G20 summits and FSB. This community sought to agree a new common 
narrative, without which successful policy making in the G20, the FSB, and IMF would 
be more difficult to secure. The research will demonstrate that when a common narrative, 
or policy consensus, in McNamara’s (1998) parlance, does arise, albeit circumscribed by 
the nature of the G20 and FSB processes and fluctuating power politics, policy action of a 
robust form is possible. Where, in contrast, narratives are fractured or in dispute amongst 
members of the G20 and FSB, the policy outcome is weakened and the results are less 
satisfactory from a global supervisory and regulatory standpoint. The research will 
demonstrate that the paradigm shift that is being seen, and the creation of a new policy 
consensus and narrative, underpins the financial reform and redesign undertaken by the 
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G20 and the FSB. The policy outcomes are still underway, are fluid and not uniformly 
strong and robust in all dimensions or policy areas simultaneously; some policy reforms 
that result from the shift are stronger than others. Where the paradigm shift is more 
marked and the policy consensus more cohesive, the outcomes are stronger. Where the 
paradigm shift is less effective and policy aims in dispute, first-and second-order changes 
result. 
 
The research will show that the construction of the G20-FSB-IMF reforms and the 
associated paradigm shift and policy consensus are a matter of debate, dispute, and 
negotiation. A dominant but declining hegemon (the U.S.), its supportive but competitive 
allies (in Europe), and rising emerging powers (China, India, Brazil, and to a much lesser 
extent, Russia) all negotiate within the new, reformed G20-FSB-IMF structures. This is a 
materially significant change in international economic and regulatory diplomacy and a 
recognition of evolutionary changes in relative state power, a permanent downgrading or 
sidelining of previous inadequate structures (such as the G7). However, U.S. and 
European leaders and their technocratic elites continued to dominate the policy-making 
process in its formative years (2008–2012), even as more room is made around the table. 
Emerging powers will be seen to have had an impact; they are gradually asserting their 
prerogatives, but their ability to drive the agenda is limited at the outset. 
 
By reaching out to the emerging countries, the G20’s leading state powers are able to 
craft policy outcomes in line with their agreed goals and with a global impact backed by 
new powers whose leadership had differing degrees of influence at the G20 summits and 
technocratic policy making and implementation process below that. 
 
The research further hypothesizes that the outcomes observed in the international policy 
process driven by the G20 and it progeny, galvanized by a paradigm shift, was and 
continues to be impacted by the cohesiveness of the particular transnational policy 
networks and epistemic communities (Adler and Haas, 1992; Haas, 1992a) that control 
the policy-making process. An epistemic community is a network of professionals with 
particular policy competence. Such communities can be transnational and are composed 
of technocrats in particular fields with demonstrable expertise recognised by their 
community and by political leaders. The communities share common understandings, 
ideologies, methodologies, and approaches, which create collegiality and group 
cohesiveness. This lens will prove particularly useful as the research seeks to analyse the 
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technical-level financial reform agenda and outcomes below the G20 leaders forum led by 
the FSB and the standard-setting bodies (see the Figure 2.1 p. 33), and the role and 
operation of theses epistemic communities within the G20 and FSB-led process. It will be 
observed that when the epistemic community is strongest, agrees on a policy consensus, 
and controls national-level policy levers, the results are qualitatively different. Where the 
epistemic community is weaker and does not control the policy outcome (perhaps because 
of legislative and regulatory gaps that must be bridged), the policy outcome is less 
satisfactory. It will be shown, in addition, that if epistemic communities clash and the 
policy consensus is therefore lacking or in dispute, a strong epistemic community can 
defend the status quo and resist paradigmatic change demanded by others. 
 
The research will show that not only have transnational epistemic communities seen their 
importance buttressed as a result of the G20-led process, but they have also, in certain 
cases, most notably via the FSB (and its key standard-setting body, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision), become perhaps key actor or actors in the creation of the new 
re-regulatory paradigm, policy consensus, and reform agenda. It will be shown that the 
policy consensus was driven by a relatively small number of actors who all knew each 
other, lived through the crisis together, and had a clear conception of the problem and 
desired solutions, over and above traditional national policy stances. The G20 empowered 
those expert communities to act for the G20 and under the aegis of the G20, drawing 
these overlapping, sub-state, standard-setting bodies into the state-to-state economic 
diplomacy process underway. 
 
The research will also utilize one other analytical framework when dissecting the process 
of G20-led global architectural redesign. An assessment of the G20 summitry would be 
incomplete if the research did not draw upon the two-level diplomatic game which is 
underway and which was identified by Putnam in other negotiating circumstances 
(Putnam, 1988). It will become clear that each player at the G20 and FSB table has 
international goals and national interests to consider and domestic pressures to contend 
with, and that these impact the negotiations and policy-making process. The research will 
show that when negotiators are forced together in the heat of the crisis win sets open up. 
In contrast, as the crisis wanes, interests diverge and normal national domestic interests 
begin to reassert influence. 
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Finally in addressing the nature and evolution of institutional politics within the IMF, the 
research will draw on existing work on the political economy and functioning of the IMF 
as an institution. It will be seen that the established internal political dynamics evident in 
the IMF still operate, notwithstanding modest G20-led reforms, and they result in a very 
slow-moving institution that still largely reflects a neo-liberal ideology as a 
creditor/lending body. It will be suggested here that although the IMF has been 
recapitalized by the G20 process, and is much stronger as a result, there is no paradigm 
shift inside the IMF; it is national politics as usual in the Executive Board, with emerging 
creditor nations slow to change the internal dynamics of the IMF. 
 
To summarize, the research meta-theory and analytical framework is grounded in the 
interpretative power and force of Strange’s work on financial markets and state power 
(Strange, 1986, 1996, 1998). It rests on the overlapping frameworks of paradigm shift in 
economic policy to analyse the policy changes witnessed in the G20, FSB, and IMF 
(Kuhn, 1962; Hall, 1993). Both concepts describe how narratives are constructed, 
defended, and overthrown. The research will also take into account the changing power 
relationships as U.S. relative hegemonic power declines, and emerging countries’ 
influence and power rises within the various forums and institutions. The research will 
furthermore utilize the concept of epistemic communities to aid in understanding the 
operation of the FSB-led technical reform agenda. Finally, the research will also draw 
upon other lenses, specifically, Putnam (1988) and the two-level game of international 
economic diplomacy. 
 
2.3 Revisiting Casino Capitalism 
 
Strange, in Casino Capitalism (1986) firmly grasped the potential risks to states and their 
populaces of unrestrained and growing global financial markets whose scale and 
operation even then were becoming somewhat disconnected from the real (i.e., goods-
based) economy, potentially exacerbating market volatility, sudden flows of capital, and 
the frequency of financial crises (Allen and Gale, 2009). Since Strange identified the 
dangers these markets and financial actors posed, the size of global capital flows, the 
levels of risks, the levels of leverage, and the size of the financial flows within complex 
securities markets have grown exponentially. Complex securities markets are today of a 
scale unimaginable in the 1980s and 1990s when Strange began her work and states did 
not regulate these markets as they grew during those decades. Thus, daily turnover of 
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foreign exchange contracts were a staggering US$6 trillion in June 2012. Notional total 
value of all OTC derivatives contracts outstanding in June 2012 stood at US$638 trillion 
(BIS, 2013).  
 
The numbers involved are almost inconceivable and far dwarf the output of the real 
global economy, leading some to question the economic and social utility of some of 
these new markets and socially worthless products (Turner, 2009a). As Strange described, 
many of these esoteric foreign exchange securities, and others that were invented since, 
such as Credit Default Swaps, are nothing more than bets that a stock, bond, or other 
instrument (which the investor often does not own) may rise or fall (Strange, 1986). 
 
Originally, these products were seen as a form of insurance, but today they do not in 
general perform that function. Other complex securities, such Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs), CDOs squared, CDOs cubed, and synthetic CDOs, multiplied the 
risk associated with products (in particular, home mortgages in the U.S.), and obscured 
the risks contained within them. These securities were difficult or impossible to value or 
price in times of crisis since there was no transparent marketplace; in fact, many of the 
instruments proved worthless as the crisis unfolded in 2008 and began to be referred to as 
toxic assets (Roubini, 2010). 
 
Strange was right; global, highly complex securities markets do resemble casinos in 
which vast sums of money, unconnected but herd-like in action and interconnected 
through counterparty risk, are placed as bets with huge potential upsides and downsides, 
both individual and societal, depending on how the chips fall (Lewis, 2010; Maclean and 
Nocera, 2010; Tett, 2009). The growth of these unregulated, unsupervised, and 
interconnected financial markets and capital flows has increased the frequency and 
amplitude of financial and banking crises over time; indeed, the frequency of highly 
destructive banking and financial crises now mirrors the harrowing period before World 
War II (King, 2011a). The 2008-2009 financial crisis and the subsequent ongoing 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe are the latest manifestations of this phenomenon of severe 
volatility—market crises, financial collapses, and destruction of individual and societal 
wealth across the globe—for few states or individuals are safe from the ill effects of 
spillover. 
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Strange and state power proponents viewed the development or failure or refusal to 
develop effective international financial regulation and related structures as best 
explained as being driven by changes in state power, and the power and interests of key 
state actors (Helleiner, 1994; Helleiner, Pagliari, and Zimmermann, (eds.) 2009; Strange 
1986, 1997, 1998). Strange maintained some states more than others have seen a 
weakening or diffusion of their power as national and international financial markets 
grew in size, complexity, and influence, and further developed this analysis of the 
weakening of state power in The Retreat of the State (Strange, 1996). Strange identified 
decisions and nondecisions destructive of state power and which contributed to this 
retreat of the state and diffusion of state power. 
 
However, unlike the period in the history of international political economy about which 
Strange was writing, when the financial crisis commenced in 2007 and reached its initial 
crest in September 2008, state power was aggressively collectively and individually 
reasserted. The research identifies a series of collective actions by G20 leaders and central 
banks the economic and financial size of which had never been seen before and which 
continues to a degree today. Central banks of the G20 nations stepped in as lenders of last 
resort and provided massive infusions of liquidity to underpin the system. Governments 
seized control of the situation, outlining a series of major steps to stabilize the system and 
reform global financial markets. What we see is a reapplication of international and 
national supervisory power over markets, firms, and actors via the G20-FSB process. 
 
State power became more diffuse and retreated in decades of blind adherence to the 
previous paradigm, what Padoa-Schioppa called economic ‘radicalism’ unrestrained by 
reasoned consideration and historical reflection (Padoa-Schioppa, 2010a, p. 4). The 
emergence and evolution of the G20 and of the FSB and the related financial reforms that 
are the focus of this research will, however, show that states ultimately collectively 
reassert their legal and regulatory power to set new rules and establish new frameworks 
for financial markets and investors when they were forced by the financial crisis to do so. 
The period since 2007-2008 has seen a historic collective reapplication of state power by 
the G20 governments. States, which had permitted their power to wither in the face of 
growing financial markets and multinational actors, stepped forward as a group to halt a 
global economic collapse of monumental proportions. They demonstrated the willingness 
and the ability to reassert state power over markets nationally and internationally via a 
series of G20 summits and the accompanying financial regulatory reform processes which 
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continue today. In conclusion, Strange was perhaps too pessimistic. Crises beget action, 
and a severe crisis can precipitate dramatic paradigmatic third-order change. 
 
2.4 The financial crises, paradigm shifts, and reform 
 
‘Changing paradigms is not easy. Too many have invested too much in the wrong models. 
Like the Ptolemaic attempts to preserve earth-centric views of the universe, there will be 
heroic efforts to add complexities and refinements to the standard paradigm. The 
resulting models will be an improvement and policies based on them may do better, but 
they too are likely to fail. Nothing less than a paradigm shift will do’. Stiglitz, 2010 
 
‘The G20 has led to a new paradigm in multilateral cooperation’.  
G20, Los Cabos Declaration, 2012 
 
In analysing the success or failure of the redesign of the financial architecture by the G20, 
its progeny the FSB, and the recapitalization of the IMF, the research will draw upon the 
concept of paradigm shift developed by Thomas Kuhn in his seminal work The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (1962), and further developed and applied within the economic 
policy-making context by the work of Peter Hall (1993).  
 
Kuhn describes the development of scientific worldviews, within which facts and 
discoveries move as waves resistant to change for long periods until a sudden revolution 
or paradigm shift takes place. A shift occurs when anomalies arise that can only be 
effectively described, answered, and dealt with by new hitherto controversial explanations 
(theories) and an accompanying worldview. Only after a paradigm shift occurs does this 
series of different truths take their place at the centre of the new worldview constructed of 
new scientific facts and a new orthodoxy. Thus: The Sun revolves around the Earth; 
observational anomalies develop; Copernicus makes the key discovery supported by 
others (such as Galileo); a paradigm shift occurs; the new orthodoxy is adopted that the 
Earth revolves around the Sun. 
 
This research will utilize Kuhn’s paradigm shift concept as further developed in particular 
by Hall (1993) and others to dissect the G20 summitry since 2008. Hall applied the 
concept of paradigm shift to describe and analyse intellectual and political forces centred 
on economic policy making in Britain and a dramatic shift from established Keynesian 
norms to neo-liberal monetarist supply-side economics in the 1980s; this was the 
construction of a new policy paradigm. He posited three orders of change. 
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First-order changes are forms of normal policy making, ‘a process that adjusts policy 
without challenging the overall terms of a given policy paradigm’ (Hall, 1993, p. 279). 
These are everyday adjustments or small changes in focus and direction within an agreed 
narrative construction. Existing truths are not challenged and are not in dispute. Second-
order changes are moderately more significant where the instrument of a policy is 
adjusted but not the overarching policy. Both first- and second-order changes are 
characterized by incrementalism (Hall, 1993). Third-order changes reflect radical changes 
to the overarching terms of the discourse and indicate a paradigm shift is occurring. They 
involve the accumulation of anomalies, experimentation, failures, and a reappraisal of 
existing truths. The process is likely to be contested. An intensification of debate about 
economic issues will occur. Issues of authority (i.e., power) are central. Third-order 
change, the paradigm shift described by Kuhn in the scientific world and Hall in the 
economic context, is a revolutionary reappraisal, an event at least an order of magnitude 
greater than first- and second-order changes. 
 
Many authors have addressed the concept of paradigms and paradigm shifts within the 
political economy. They observe that political economy paradigms can become 
institutionalized until challenged by crises and growing anomalies (Weir and Skocpol, 
1983; Wilson, 2000). Hall focused his analysis on national policy making and action, but 
paradigms and paradigm shifts can be international in scope. 
 
Economic and other paradigms can be reflected in international forums and institutions 
(Ruggie, 1982, Babb, 2013). They can be championed and promulgated by small groups 
of transnational experts and networks (Porter, 2011; Skogstad, 2011; Slaughter, 1997), 
operating in epistemic communities (see Haas, 1992a; Adler and Haas, 1992). Paradigms 
can be observed being constructed and defended in different sectors, from accounting to 
vehicle safety standards (Porter, 2011), to nuclear disarmament (Mitchell et al., 2007), to 
the banning of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (Haas, 1992b). 
 
Robust policy consensus can be institutionally grounded. The IMF, for example, the 
leading global macroeconomic lending institution, has since the end of the Bretton Woods 
system, through the adoption of what became known as the Washington Consensus, 
maintained and defended an intellectual, political, and institutional paradigm (Babb, 
2013), which could also be described as embedded liberalism (Ruggie, 1982) but which is 
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more often described as neo-liberal (Gamble, 2009). This neo-liberal paradigm came 
under attack after the Mexican and Asian crises of the 1990s (Stiglitz, 2008, 2009, 2010), 
but its validity was generally maintained within the IMF by its neo-liberal economists and 
a small number of key creditor states, led by the U.S., that control the organization. 
Paradigms tend to be championed by leaders, experts, and transnational actors and are 
characterized by periods of stability followed by abrupt episodes of substantial change 
(Wilson, 2000). For a policy paradigm shift to take place, policy-making actors must be 
challenged by model failures and growing anomalies (Weir and Skocpol, 1983). The 
paradigm or era can be said to end when its basic illusions are seen as false. The financial 
crisis created conditions for a paradigm shift because the dominant laissez-faire neo-
liberal deregulatory model of financial architecture of the last two decades was 
compromised (Bhide, 2010; Wade, 2008). This allowed the intellectual economic beliefs 
behind the prevailing paradigm to be increasingly challenged (El-Erian, 2009; Stiglitz, 
2009a, 2010), based on the failings of economic ideological positions hitherto adopted as 
scientific truths (Reinert, 2012). This led some to suggest the Anglo-American 
deregulatory laissez-faire, neo-liberal, neoclassical economic paradigm has become 
exhausted (Palley, 2009). A strong challenge to the dominant worldview is then possible 
because the severe economic crisis creates a transformational opportunity, a paradigmatic 
moment (Assenza, Sokolickova and Martynau 2011; Fergusson et al., 2009; Soros, 2008). 
 
But not all new narratives lead to paradigm shifts. Leaders, policy makers, or experts may 
be too far ahead or outside of the consensus position within their community (Bhide, 
2010; Fergusson et al., 2009; King, 2009b; Padoa-Schioppa, 2010b; Turner, 2009a). A 
critical mass or consensus is needed; the anomalies and pressures must be such that 
sufficient numbers of actors alter their position and break with and reject the past 
orthodoxies in question.  
 
Moreover, a major paradigmatic shift does not always result in the rejection of all 
previous truths or adoption of the most radical solutions. This will be seen to be the case 
in the international response to the crisis. An international regulatory paradigm shift can 
be identified. But many facets of neo-liberal economic belief remain in place.  Radical 
solutions, while sometimes rationally persuasive, may lack the necessary backing in a 
community of actors. In fact, a paradigm shift can be limited and exclude certain ideas 
and agendas and be beyond the limits of a new community consensus. 
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A paradigm shift may be an abrupt break with the past or it can unfold over a protracted 
period. Thus, the neo-liberalism so clearly evident in Margaret Thatcher’s Britain post-
1979 did not occur in a single moment in time, even though there was, in retrospect, a 
paradigm shift. Instead, it was composed of a series of actions which collectively amount 
to the shift we now see so vividly. This research suggests that this process occurred in the 
financial reform space; a swift paradigm shift in some policy areas, but less dramatic 
change in others. Taken as a whole, however, and viewed over a longer time period, it is 
possible that the G20 and FSB response to the financial and economic crisis during 2008-
2013 will be seen as a broader financial and regulatory paradigm shift. 
 
2.4.1 A paradigm shift in state oversight of global financial markets 
 
When fundamentally challenged, shaken by events, by repeated and destabilizing 
anomalies, and confronted with imminent economic catastrophe, the worldviews of G20 
political leaders and central banking technocrats altered significantly. In 2008-2009, we 
see and can dissect third-order change of the type identified by Hall (1993)—change that 
is international in scope—a paradigm shift in the global regulatory approach to fianncial 
markets (Turner, 2010). The shift was one in which decades of laissez-faire neo-liberal 
orthodoxy was proved wrong (Turner, 2012), rejected, and replaced with a new 
worldview.  ‘September 2008 was to market fundamentalism what the fall of the Berlin 
wall was to Communism’ (Stiglitz, 2008). Or, as Mohamed El-Erian, chief executive 
officer of PIMCO, a global investment management firm and one of the world’s largest 
bond investors put it, the crisis broke the spell of the ‘mystical Anglo-Saxon model of 
liberalization and deregulation’ (El-Erian, 2009). 
 
The research will show that in a relatively short period, G20 leaders and their proxies in 
the international technical forums chose to reassert their collective sovereignty and 
regulatory power over global financial markets, a power they had retained in theory but 
which had been progressively undermined and which was in retreat in practice from 1971 
to 2008. Leaders seized back control of the regulation of global financial markets. There 
is visible amongst G20 leaders, and in particular amongst a subset of their technocrats, 
specifically the central banking and supervisory community, a paradigm shift in 
worldview and in their approach to the re-regulation of global financial markets and 
firms. The crisis drove action and reform, and the result is a reassertion of state power 
through re-regulation of global financial markets. This narrative shift underpins a new 
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technical re-regulatory policy consensus, which enables a series of reform proposals to be 
agreed and commenced within months, with tight timelines and deadlines attached. 
 
The G20-led process rests on a policy consensus (McNamara, 1998). McNamara 
developed the concept to describe a historically unprecedented convergence of beliefs—a 
neo-liberal worldview (McNamara, 1998, 2006). McNamara analysed how ideas about 
economics shape how state actors interpret and act on their interests, outlining the shift 
towards neo-liberalism that helped create the new consensus around the goal of monetary 
union, which began to move theoretical debates towards being implemented in 1999. 
McNamara identified policy paradigms (including a prevailing belief in monetarism and 
price stability) as key to the creation of the political and economic consensus behind 
economic and monetary union. 
 
McNamara’s identification of the central importance of the development of an agreed 
policy consensus for successful multi-state diplomacy also holds true in the G20 and FSB 
cases. Indeed, protagonists describe the process as a ‘convergence’ or an ‘alignment’, 
echoing McNamara’s construction (Blanchard et al., 2012; Interview 32, 2012, p. 31; 
Smaghi, 2008). The research will show that the G20’s most effective policy consensus, 
and as a result international coordination and rule-making activities that emanate from it, 
is underpinned by a new narrative which required a partial rejection of the laissez-faire 
neo-liberal worldview, the earlier paradigm described by McNamara. 
 
The creation of a new policy consensus can be quite rapid—a sudden shift in stance 
precipitated by a crisis and a common consensus about its causes and possible solutions. 
Alternatively, the build-up of anomalies, crises, and the process of paradigm shift and 
consensus creation may be a multiyear exercise in deliberation and dispute. In other 
words, changing the policy consensus can be fast or slow. The creation of this common 
worldview and consensus viewpoint enables movement from a second-order change to a 
third-order change and paradigm shift is seen in the 2008-2012 financial reform process. 
 
2.4.2 Constructing a new paradigm, worldview, and narrative 
 
Prior to the 2008 eruption of the financial crisis, the political and central banking 
communities’ worldview was neo-liberal. It was strongly tilted against regulatory rigour 
and in favour of an Anglo-Saxon (i.e., a U.S.- and UK-led) light touch, hands-off, neo-
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liberal deregulatory approach. Policy makers opposed those who sought to circumscribe 
or limit global financial markets (such as Brooksley Born then Chair of the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission), actors and firms in any meaningful manner. 
Laissez faire neo-liberal ideological economic truths formed the foundation of this 
worldview, held sway, and were believed by many key state powers, the private sector, 
and most regulators. 
 
There were voices raised against the dominant paradigm. Until the crisis began, however, 
they did not alter the worldview. This macrolevel neo-liberal narrative defended 
questionable economic truths and orthodoxies, blocked historical memory of previous 
crises, allowed regulatory laxity, overlooked the ‘capture’ of the regulators by the 
regulated, permitted dangerous market and firm-level risks to build up, and resisted action 
to mitigate the worst effects until the crisis was all but upon us. 
 
As the number of anomalies and economic shocks mushroomed in 2006 and 2007, and 
mutated they generated dangerous economic contagion, and regulators began to recognise 
a clear and present danger to the global economy. Faced with imminent collapse of the 
global economy, the old deregulatory worldview had demonstrably failed. In the heat of 
the crisis, the only solution for the G20 leaders was a collective reassertion of state and 
government power and central bank intervention, and a re-regulation of financial markets. 
The view of key leaders, central bankers, and supervisors shifted in how they viewed the 
proper use of state power to oversee financial markets and firms.  
 
The research will show that when a strong common policy narrative is in place, 
underpinned by an agreed paradigm of how to view the financial system’s weaknesses, its 
faults and possible solutions, a policy response can be more robust. When conflicting 
policy narratives remain and clash within the G20, the possible consensus that emerges is 
weaker and less robust, with the outcome being incremental changes and policy 
adjustments (i.e., first- and second-order changes á la Hall). This process of building an 
agreed policy consensus for action is characterized by competing narratives jockeying for 
dominance. 
 
The research will underscore that what was proposed by the G20 and acted upon in 2009 
and since could not have been accomplished without a shift in worldview. Moreover, this 
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paradigm shift was most pronounced and most sustained amongst a small group of 
technocrats that constituted their own epistemic community. 
 
2.5 Epistemic communities and financial reform 
 
This research not only concerns summitry at the G20 level; it is also focused on the 
technical-level policy outcomes agreed in principle by the G20 but designed and executed 
by communities of supervisory technocrats and the central banking community. To 
address the policy-making process below that of the G20, it is useful to gaze through the 
analytical lens of epistemic communities developed by Haas (1992a) and Adler and Haas 
(1992) and debated in detail in a seminal issue of the journal, International Organization, 
in 1992.  
An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
policy competence and knowledge in a specific field. While all members of the 
community need not come from the same speciality, community members share in 
common (1) a set of normative and principled beliefs, which underpin the interaction of 
the community; (2) causal beliefs based on an analysis of the shared problems they 
confront, possible policy actions, and desired outcomes; (3) notions of validity, of 
intersubjective, internally defined criteria for judging knowledge in their area of 
expertise; and (4) they will be engaged in a common policy enterprise addressing the 
identified common problems related to their area of expertise which they believe will 
result in improvements to the commonwealth (Haas, 1992a, p. 3). 
Research has described the development and operation of national and international 
epistemic communities of experts and technical policy actors. These communities are 
identified in a great many different fields, such as accounting and vehicle safety standards 
(Porter, 2011), CFC elimination (Haas, 1992b), nuclear arms control (Mitchell et al., 
2007, see also Adler, 1992), international telecommunication regimes (Cowley, 1990), 
pollution control (Haas, 1989), in the creation of economic and monetary union (Verdun, 
1997), and acid rain policy (Zito, 2001), for example. 
 
The significance of the transnational context within which these communities and 
organizations operate, and through which groups of experts can influence and implement 
policy, (G30 2009b, 2010, 2012; Porter, 2011; Tsingou, 2009) has been previously 
commented on. These communities, which are also known as transnational policy 
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networks (TPNs), can have a significant effect on international and domestic policies and 
outcomes (Keohane and Nye, 1972), in some cases limiting or opposing the national 
governmental policy of individual states. This process, in which individual elements of 
the state and individual policy makers interact directly with their counterparts through 
TPN-epistemic communities creating lasting links and relationships, has been described 
as a new, transgovernmental order (Slaughter, 1997). Their existence has led some to 
conclude that, in recent decades, as power became progressively dispersed, a myriad of 
non-state transnational actors filled the gap, and ‘much contemporary international 
cooperation is not international at all; rather, it is occurring amongst discrete, specialized 
agencies’ (Raustiala, 2002, p. 2). According to this view, TPNs and their epistemic 
communities can develop their own objectives, and community stances which directly 
impact policy making over and above the adoption of purely national stances reflective of 
domestic interests. 
 
Epistemic communities as transnational policy networks often share certain structural and 
common internal cultural features. These include: members may be sub-state actors and 
may not represent national governments; they may be informal in nature and have no 
international legal standing; they tend to have a more flexible internal structure and lack 
binding constitutive documents; they have small bureaucracies and small budgets; their 
decisions have ambiguous legal force and do not create rights, obligations, or binding 
duties on members; and decision making is normally taken by consensus (IMF, 2010a). 
 
The above analytical framework of epistemic communities of varying strengths and 
cohesiveness operating within a transnational context as TPNs has considerable 
investigative utility when analysing the process of international financial reform, because 
much of the detailed policy generation and implementation process by necessity takes 
place below the political level of the G20 leaders’ forum, amongst groups of national 
specialists and experts. The G20 leaders relied on precisely these types of epistemic 
communities of central bank policy experts and technocrats to identify the needed reforms 
which they only then agreed to. Leaders lack the skill set to fashion and implement 
changes, and in most cases they defer to technocrats’ solutions. In certain cases, leaders 
also demand action when technocrats do not seek it, on compensation, for instance. 
 
To identify and implement reforms, the G20 created a new forum of technocrats and 
backed others, some of which have proved more effective and some less so. The G20 
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backed the FSB, a new broadened, empowered, forum supported by an elite epistemic 
community predominantly composed of principal central bankers and supervisors. The 
broader community already existed (Helleiner, 1994), in the membership of the Bank for 
International Settlements and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), but 
post-2008, it has been reinforced and reinvigorated by the G20 and elevated through an 
empowered FSB. The FSB is charged with the responsibility for policy coordination and 
oversight of the financial regulatory reform agenda and multiple work streams identified 
by the G20 in 2008-2009 (many of which are still underway today). 
 
This complex task of reform and regulation is further delegated to a number of other 
transnational policy networks, including the BCBS, the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), international standard-setting bodies which are drawn into the new 
architectural structure created by the G20 (see Figure 3.1, p. 79).  
 
This research utilizes the concept of epistemic communities as transnational policy 
networks to dissect aspects of the financial reform process driven by the FSB and 
communities of technocrats and experts. The relative success in a particular reform 
endeavour will be seen to relate to a particular community’s recognition of anomalies, its 
cohesiveness and international and national policy-making strength, and its sense of 
common policy narrative. These combined factors influence the relative success or failure 
of policy reforms pursued by epistemic communities in particular cases and the degree of 
paradigm shift visible. 
 
In general, it will be observed that the G20 process has empowered the FSB and other 
TPNs or standard-setting bodies and communities and drawn them into cooperation on 
the financial reform agenda in a way not previously seen. Epistemic communities led by 
the FSB are tasked with delivering for the G20 leaders, and they all connect to the new 
architecture via their own work streams and through the FSB. The communities are 
pressed, collectively and as individual national regulators, to deliver the agreed G20 goals 
by specified deadlines. This responsibility galvanizes action from community members 
and forces change.  
 
In conclusion, utilizing the concept of epistemic communities will demonstrate that the 
FSB and other TPNs are key to the design and implementation of many of the reforms 
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identified and backed by the G20 that make the re-regulatory narrative paradigm shift real 
and meaningful.  
 
It is useful at this point to combine the discussed analytical tools graphically, as is done in 
Figure 2.1 These tools are: 
 
1. The build-up of recognised critical anomalies in the system (top X-axis); 
2. The strength of the epistemic community in policy making and implementation 
(bottom X-axis); 
3. The strength of the policy consensus seen in the policy area (right-hand Y-axis); 
4. The Kuhn/Hall paradigm shift and first-, second-, and third-order changes (left-
hand Y-axis). 
 
The sloping line running diagonally through the chart represents different policy 
outcomes. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptualizing Paradigm Shifts and the Role of Epistemic Communities  
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In Policy A: The number of collectively recognised anomalies is small. The epistemic 
community is weak in the policy area. The resulting policy consensus is also weak and 
the results are first-order changes. The combination of these factors (too few anomalies, a 
weak or conflicted policy community, and a weak consensus) together produces poor 
policy outcomes.  
 
In Policy B: A greater number of anomalies are recognised. The epistemic community is 
stronger in the policy arena. The policy consensus is more robust. The resulting policy 
outcome can therefore be stronger and of second-order magnitude.  
 
In Policy C: Huge anomalies are present and are recognised by a majority of the 
community and actors. A strong epistemic community is in control of policy and 
recognises the anomalies. A strong new policy consensus is agreed. The community has 
power and influence in the policy area. This results in a third order, paradigm shift.  
 
What the chart underscores is that it is the combination of these different factors that 
results in different policy outcomes and orders of change or degrees of paradigm shift. 
Bearing this schema in mind will prove useful in Chapters 4 and 5 when analysing the 
growth and impact of the FSB and the relative strength or weakness of the policy 
outcomes seen. 
 
2.6 Additional analytical lenses 
 
In preparing to analyse the creation of the G20, the FSB, the reform of the IMF, and the 
construction of a new global financial architecture, the research will also draw upon, 
where appropriate, other potential lenses through which aspects of the process can be 
critiqued and dissected: (1) hegemony, hegemonic decline, and competition; (2) in the 
G20 context the important work done on two-level games (Putnam, 1988) as applied to 
the multinational summitry and economic diplomacy. 
 
2.6.1 Hegemony, hegemonic shift, decline, and competition 
 
In analysing the creation of the G20 leadership forum and summitry process since the first 
meeting in Washington, D.C., in November 2008, the concepts of hegemony, hegemonic 
shift, decline, and competition can be used. Hegemony is defined as ‘leadership or 
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dominance, especially by one state or social group over others’ (Oxford, 2012). 
Kindleberger (1986) applied hegemony, or the lack of hegemonic power, to the years 
between World War I and World War II. He suggested that the economic chaos in this 
period was due to the fact that Britain had ceased to be the global hegemon and the U.S. 
was refusing to assume the role of world leader, and he concluded that the stability of the 
global system requires a hegemon to promulgate and enforce the rules of the system. This 
was subsequently defined as the hegemonic stability theory. Much subsequent work has 
been done by (Gilpin, 1987, 2001; Keohane and Nye, 1972, 1974; Keohane, 1984) on 
hegemony and stability. 
Today, some view the U.S. as the undisputed global hegemon in a unipolar world and 
believe that the end of the Cold War left America more dominant rather than less 
(Ikenberry, 2002; Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wholforth, 2008). Those who hold this 
view are joined by other antideclinists (Kagan, 2012; Lieber, 2012). According to this 
view, the continuing unipolar power of the U.S. is said to create stability (Wholforth, 
2008), and it remains the global hegemon (Nye, 1990, 2002). 
Other political scientists and historians instead detect a cyclical process of hegemonic rise 
and decline, under which the dominant state’s power (in various forms, cultural, political, 
economic, and military) gradually weakens and declines. A hegemon’s rise and fall may 
correlate to available resources and economic durability, and to military expenditures. Its 
eventual relative decline can occur if the latter outpaces the former (Kennedy, 1989), or 
its decline can be due to other factors. 
America’s dominance and unipolar power is said to be in decline (Jacques, 2009; Layne, 
1993, 2006) for numerous reasons. Aggressive use and overextension of U.S. military 
power (Bacevich, 2005) is seen as counterproductive. Hypocrisy in U.S. policy making 
and human rights actions has weakened U.S. soft power legitimacy as the hegemon 
(Finnemore, 2008). Domestic American political and economic malaise since the 2007-
2008 crisis has also led to discussion of the possible decline in U.S. hegemonic power 
(Brzezinski, 2012), to which the failure of the domestic political system is said to have 
contributed (Mann and Ornstein, 2012). 
Such failings lead to a reorientation of state power, accompanied by the rise of new 
regional and global powers (Layne, 1993, 2006), such as China (Jacques, 2009; 
Subramanian, 2011), or Brazil (Rhoter, 2010). Hegemonic competition and the rise of 
other powers is described as part of an inevitable process (Gilpin, 1981; Layne 1993) and 
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is cyclical. But just who will be the next hegemon is not always clear. In the 1980s it was 
Japan, but two lost decades ended that. Now China’s rise is said to be inevitable. 
How useful are concepts of hegemony, hegemonic shift, competition, and possible 
decline in understanding the creation of the G20 and the FSB and recapitalization of the 
IMF since 2008? The concepts certainly illuminate possible motivations behind the G20-
FSB-IMF financial reform process and the possible reasons why the U.S. and its allies 
chose to create new bodies (the G20 and the FSB) to take forward collective policy 
consensus goals and the agreement to change the voice, votes, and funding of the IMF. 
The G20 consensus-based summitry process will indicate the U.S. recognises it must 
secure agreement from the EU, Japan, and major emerging countries to achieve its global 
financial regulatory goals. At present, the U.S. remains a system maker and privilege 
taker, but it can no longer count on getting its own way (Mastanduno, 2008). 
In addition to being an explicit recognition of the rise of emerging countries, by 
championing the G20 process, U.S. policy makers may blunt calls for even more radical 
redesign solutions post-crisis. It will be seen that American leaders were able to modestly 
strengthen their position and blunt certain European (in particular, German and French) 
demands for an even more extensive rewrite of multilateral state-based regulatory 
systems. 
By including emerging countries, the U.S. could strengthen its relative position despite a 
secular decline in its relative power vis-à-vis different rising state actors. The U.S. may 
also pull those actors into a greater commitment to new rules that are global in reach, yet 
stop short in most cases of binding rules with direct effect (in the legal sense). 
Below the level of the G20, in the FSB-led technical process, the research will suggest 
that the U.S., despite being an economically weakened hegemon, and the Europeans, as 
key allies, together retained a technocratic edge and considerable control over the expert-
led policy-making process in the early years from 2009 through 2012. There is a co-
opting of the emerging powers into a process which they did not control or design; it is a 
U.S.-European construct, led from 2009 through 2012 by almost exclusively western 
‘hawks’. The U.S. and the EU do appear to surrender policy-making levers to the rising 
powers in the early stages of reform; at that point, policy making remained largely 
controlled by a small group of G20 leaders and technocrats from North America and 
(especially) Europe, supported by emerging countries, amongst which the proposed 
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solutions—more state regulation of markets not less—has considerable obvious 
ideological resonance. 
The evidence will show diplomatic moves by a slowly declining U.S. hegemon and its 
European allies to implement the new rules before they handed over more control of the 
G20 presidency and agenda to emerging countries at the end of 2011. The U.S., whose 
soft power and ideological appeal has been damaged by the crisis, agreed to a series of 
imperfect consensus-based multilateral G20-FSB-IMF policy solutions that leant away 
from an Anglo-Saxon laissez faire neo-liberal approach towards more robust re-regulation 
of global financial markets, rather than risk a head-on bilateral competition with rising 
hegemonic powers, in particular China, but also Brazil and India. The current hegemon 
and its allies benefited. They brought emerging country powers within the reformed 
international structure of cooperation and coordination, and they agreed to an 
enhancement of their roles within the IMF. In doing so, emerging country leaders and 
technocrats are pressed to play by a Western rulebook, albeit one that had some chapters 
paradigmatically rewritten and others subject to considerable reinterpretation post-crisis. 
It is too soon to determine whether the continued championing of multilateral policy 
narratives and solutions by the U.S. will begin to weaken if there is a shift towards 
bipolarity (U.S. balancing China), multipolarity (U.S.-China-Brazil-Europe), or more 
intense direct hegemonic clash (U.S. versus China), which some suggest might herald 
greater tensions or—less likely—war (Wholforth, 2008). But it is possible that in these 
scenarios, multilaterism and internationally coordinated cooperative consensus-based 
solutions formed within the new and reformed structures could be more important, not 
less, to the U.S. as a declining hegemonic power intent on cementing the rules now, while 
its leverage remains relatively effective. 
Alternatively, it could be that as the crisis wanes, (in phase three of the G20 evolution), 
the very success of the G20-led process in phases one and two (crisis response and 
reform) may have laid the foundation for a return to national policy narratives, 
international state competition, disputes, and discord between a declining power, the U.S., 
and rising powers, particularly China, and to a lesser extent Brazil, but not yet India. 
It may also be the case that we are viewing developments in too short a time frame. 
Hegemonic conflict and change occurs over decades as one power weakens and new 
powers rise. Given this, what we observe during 2008-2013, namely the evolution of a 
 38
more assertive emerging market voice, currently circumscribed by the declining powers, 
could be part of a process which still has a long period to run and is far from complete. 
 
2.6.2 The two-level game 
 
An assessment of G20 summitry would be incomplete if the two-level financial and 
economic diplomatic game which is underway was not considered (Putnam, 1988; 
Putnam and Bayne, 1984). Putnam used game theory to design a model in which 
international negotiations between states comprise simultaneous negotiations at the 
international level, between governments (level-one negotiations), and at the intranational 
level, or domestic internal negotiations between actors (level-two negotiations). In the 
domestic negotiations, the government weighs demands by actors and constructs 
coalitions. At the international level, the government seeks to address demands without 
committing to anything that could prove unacceptable to major domestic interests. 
Agreements in summitry are composed of what Putnam calls ‘win sets’, which occur 
when the positions of the actors at both the international and national levels overlap and 
permit agreement. There is clear applicability of the two-level game analytical framework 
to the G20 process. 
 
In the case of the crisis and reform phases of G20 summitry, this research will show an 
increase in the international overlap of level-one policy goals and objectives at a time 
when national positions (macroeconomic and especially technocratic and regulatory) 
were forced to converge because of the severity of the crisis and the need for collective 
action or, alternatively, are muted. During a crisis period, there is a temporary weakening 
of the influence of national actors and level-two players, i.e., financial firms and banks 
that would otherwise negatively impact the overlap of policy positions. At critical 
junctures G20 leaders and central bankers did not consult with business interests or 
engage in the normal lengthy back and forth level-two talks that could have shrunk the 
win-sets and undermined possible agreement. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the two-level game in non-crisis periods and in a period of economic 
crisis. In non-crisis periods, level-one negotiation positions of A and B may have limited 
overlap. Each actor’s position is distinct and may be in conflict. For example, in non-
crisis periods, U.S. negotiators rarely see overlap with the level-one goals of their Chinese 
counterparts. In normal times, domestic interests on both sides also drive them apart, 
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creating little if any win sets. For example, domestic U.S. demands for market access by 
major U.S. financial firms to Chinese markets falls on deaf ears in Beijing because this 
conflicts with the position of China’s state-owned banks to restrict new entrants into the 
domestic market. Result: No level-one or level-two win-set space and no progress. 
 
In a period of severe economic crisis, the diplomatic negotiating calculus changes 
considerably. The goals of level-one negotiators in country A and country B converge or 
overlap. Win sets open up as domestic interests either temporarily diminish in importance 
or can be overridden by level-one goals. Result: A consensus and policy actions can be 
agreed and acted upon. 
 
In the areas where most progress on re-regulation was seen—capital regulations and 
Basel III—we see a correlation identified by Putnam: ‘the greater the autonomy of central 
decision makers from their level two constituents the larger the win set’ (Putnam, 1988, p. 
449). G20 leaders are negotiating and agreeing to deals, fashioned by central bank and 
supervisory technocrats, who are independent and face no electoral pressure. These 
officials in a crisis are able to take positions opposed by their own level-two constituents 
(i.e., the banks). 
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Figure 2.2 Two-level Games in a Non-crisis Period 
and during a Period of Economic Crisis 
 
In other more contentious reform areas, we observe Putnam’s two-level game also 
operating. Where the G20 technical negotiators go back and seek legislative solutions to a 
problem agreed to at the macro-G20 level, and therefore engage in parliamentary and 
national negotiations with domestic interests, the complexity and difficulty of securing 
final ratification, and agreement amongst national actors, and thus implementation, 
increases. 
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In line with Putnam’s approach, it is also possible to view the preference of G20 policy 
makers in contentious areas to opt for principles rather than rules-based solutions as a 
drive to widen the win sets and the extent to which we see overlap of level-one and level-
two negotiations; G20 work on compensation would be an example of this. In yet other 
areas, level-one G20 negotiators may be seen to be limited by level-two concerns and the 
small size or total lack of a win set. 
 
2.6.3 IMF reform  
 
To effectively address the recapitalization of the IMF (Chapter 6) and its important 
although not lead role in the crisis response and financial reform process commenced in 
Washington in 2008, the research will draw on the considerable literature on the history 
of the IMF, its institutional politics, lending, and surveillance (see, for instance, Bluestein, 
2001; Chen, 2010; Chwieroth, 2010; Dixit, 2000; Eichengreen, 2007, 2008; Fratanni and 
Patisson, 2004; Griffiths, 2010; G30 2009b; Lombardi and Woods, 2007; Mussa, 2007; 
Peet, 2010). 
 
This research will show that the IMF emerges from the crisis and reform periods, and 
from phase three materially strengthened. It undergoes a process of gradual evolution, 
with the relative power and authority of emerging countries increasing within the 
institution. Creditors make the rules, and as emerging countries become leading creditors 
within the IMF, their voices will be seen to become more distinct and influential. 
However, the U.S. retains considerable dominance at present. 
 
The research will suggest that the IMF, its staff, and leadership did not experience a 
paradigm shift of the type seen amongst the G20 leaders and central banking and 
supervisory community, in particular. While the IMF is now driven by the G20 leadership 
and follows the agenda set by the G20, the institution itself did not undergo fundamental 
ideological and operational change. The operation of the IMF, while enhanced, does not 
undergo a third-order change in worldview or approach as a lender and macroeconomic 
surveillance organization. Post-crisis it was simply tasked with more conditional lending 
and more surveillance, but with very minor adjustments in approach. 
 
In contrast to the rapid pace in the G20 and FSB, the IMF’s existing internal narrative, 
essentially a neo-liberal view, is retained, with some French refinements to its anti-
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Keynesian bent and hostility to capital controls, in particular. The analysis will show that 
the IMF post-crisis is larger, better financed, and relevant once more, but it remains a 
fundamentally conservative lending institution with the associated creditor mindset. 
Looking ahead, it is too soon to ascertain whether the rising emerging country 
representation within the IMF will make a qualitative difference in the organization’s 
worldview in the years ahead. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The meta-theory and analytical framework just described will be used in this research to 
add to the knowledge by illuminating the nature of an internationally coordinated crisis 
response led by key states faced with the particularly severe and rare economic and 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. Table 2.1 presents the three principal frameworks, their 
dimensions, and their applicability to the subject areas being studied. 
 
Framewok Dimensions Application
Paradigm Shift
(Kuhn/Hall)
Epistemic Community
(Haas and Adler)
Two-Level Game
(Putnam)
Narratives and Worldview
First, Second, Third Order policy changes
[After a third order shift occurs the 
dimensions and scope of the shift can 
fluctuate from weak to strong]
International
National/Domestic
[Crisis impacts game & size of win sets 
available to negotiators by increasing 
overlap of level-one & two goals or by 
affecting level-two actors’ input]
International
National/Domestic
[The stronger the community consensus, 
the more they control the policy agenda 
and implementation, the stronger the 
potential policy outcome]
G20 summitry
FSB creation
FSB policy outcomes
IMF reforms
G20 summitry
FSB creation
FSB policy outcomes
IMF reforms
G20 summitry
FSB creation
FSB policy outcomes
 
 
Table 2.1 Principal Frameworks, Dimensions, and Applicability to the Subject Areas 
Studied 
 
The meta-theory used in the research is of necessity multifaceted; it must be in order to 
capture and aid in the understanding of the ideological paradigm shift and diplomatic and 
state-power-based struggles and two-level games at the G20 summits. The epistemic 
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community lens will be useful in dissecting the role of the key technical community at the 
heart of the policy shifts underway. The events being analysed are part of a crisis and 
response cycle, which itself impacts the outcome of the two-level game, and the role 
played by the epistemic community. The selected analytical frameworks and conceptual 
lenses permit the effective illumination of the cycle of crisis management, reform, and a 
return to dissension among states that is observed. 
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Chapter 3. The G20, Global Summitry, and Financial Reform 
 
 ‘The formation of the G20 group of world leaders is likely to be the most lasting 
institutional consequence of the global financial meltdown of 2008’. 
(The Economist, 2009) 
 
 ‘The G20 has evolved into the closest thing to a board of directors  
for the world economy’. 
(Davis and Poletta, 2010) 
 
‘No longer the CEO of Free World Inc., the United States is now the largest minority 
shareholder in New World Order LLC’. 
(Jones, 2011).  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the rapid emergence of the Group of Twenty (G20) forum and 
leadership summits as the principal political and diplomatic vehicle behind the response 
to the financial crisis and the reform of the global financial regulatory architecture. It 
seeks to answer why and how an informal, ad hoc, relatively exclusive forum, with no 
staff and no treaty or legal basis underpinning it successfully seized the initiative and 
became the epicentre of the global economic policy-making process, a position the G20 
retains today. The summitry process will be dissected to identify the political economy 
drivers within G20 summitry, and the diplomatic capital and leadership provided by the 
G20 states that permitted the forum to temporarily overcome narrowly defined national 
interests that would in Non-crisis circumstances make major regulatory reforms difficult 
or impossible to achieve.  
The research finds that the new forum’s leaders moved to a partial rejection of the 
prevailing laissez-faire neo-liberal or market fundamentalist (Stiglitz, 2008) worldview, 
which championed unrestrained and unregulated financial markets operating with as few 
barriers as possible. Leaders begin to lean away from this Anglo-American or 
‘Anglosphere’ ideological stance (Gamble, 2009). In its place we will see an embrace of 
the re-regulation of global financial markets, firms, and instruments, with key input from 
the Western central banking epistemic community (see Chapters 4 and 5). The scope and 
magnitude of this re-regulatory paradigm shift and the policy response will become clear 
during this chapter and the analysis of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and its output. 
The research indicates that the G20’s actions amount to a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962) in 
the approach of the leaders, and especially of the technocratic central banking 
 45
community, towards regulation and oversight of global financial markets and firms. This 
paradigm shift in the policy consensus is not instantaneous. It does not have an equal 
effect across all points in time and all policy areas. It can be ‘lumpy, jerky, and uneven in 
important respects’ (Biesterker, in Payne, 2005, p. 75). As with other paradigm shifts—
scientific (Kuhn, 1962), atmospheric (Haas, 1992b), nuclear (Mitchell et al., 2007), 
economic (Hall, 1992; Blyth, 2002), economic development (Gore, 2000)—the shift 
occurs over a longer period of time and can be spasmodic and fluctuating in different 
policy areas. 
This shift has various elements. Anomalies build up and can be institutionalized until 
challenged by crises (Weir and Skocpol, 1983; Wilson, 2000). The current worldview 
cannot explain the failures and loses utility. A new worldview and policy consensus 
(Blyth, 2002; MacNamara, 1998) takes shape and begins to be championed by more 
actors. A tipping point occurs—for the purposes of this research, the peak of the 
economic crises occurs in September 2008—and over a period of time, months and years, 
the new worldview is clarified, solidified, and made actual on the ground, step by step. 
This chapter argues that, taken in its totality, the creation of the G20 and the structural 
redesign and policy actions the leaders agreed in a series of summits (and which are 
carried out and led by technocrats) suggest that: ‘The G20 has led to a new paradigm in 
multilateral cooperation’ (G20, 2012). This most severe financial and economic crisis 
precipitated a greater shift in worldview than previous more minor crises (in the 1990s, 
for instance). This fraught and fluid environment allowed the rejection of previous 
regulatory truths. A new consensus (political and technical) took shape within which the 
G20 acted, summits took place, and policy goals were formulated. As Blyth and other 
constructivists note, ideas matter and they help shape the effectiveness of the G20 process 
and policy making that commenced in 2008 and which continues today. The scope and 
breadth of reforms that commenced in 2008 support the view that a shift is underway, and 
that it amounts to a possible third-order change in the international regulatory architecture 
(Hall, 1993), even as some individual policy changes viewed in isolation from one 
another are first or second order in nature.  
The creation of the G20 in the midst of global economic crises is a significant and lasting 
alteration in the practice of international economic diplomacy. In the first five years of its 
existence, the G20 has emerged as a ‘board of directors’ for the world economy (Wall 
Street Journal, 2009). In the corporate world an effective board, must establish the 
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culture, set the strategy, agree to the firm’s risk appetite, and then direct the firm’s senior 
management to get on with the job (G30, 2012). This is essentially what the G20 sought 
to do. The new forum would begin a cultural shift, grasp the crisis, set the agenda, 
identify key priorities, and clamp down on risks. The ‘culture’ in this context is a new 
consensus worldview of the necessity for state oversight and regulation of global financial 
markets and the financial actors and firms within it. 
G20 summitry and the developing policy consensus and regulatory agenda that the 
meetings produced, especially in the earlier gatherings, are evidence of an unambiguous 
reassertion of collective state power and a signal that the retreat of the state (Strange, 
1986, 1996), so long underway, has stopped and reversed direction. States, acting 
together, buttressed the world’s economy and global financial markets with public funds, 
providing bailouts and guarantees that amounted to 27 percent of the developed world’s 
GDP (Trichet, 2010a). G20 leaders, in return for the public’s largesse, would take back 
control over markets and institute much more aggressive supervision and re-regulation as 
the quid pro quo. This dramatic reassertion of state power over global financial markets is 
led by the leaders of the established powers, principally from Europe and North America, 
aided by emerging powers in the forum. All understood the depth of the economic chasm 
before them in September 2008, and the real risks they still faced in 2009, and the G20 
summit outcomes reflect this.  
Utilizing Putnam’s two-level game (1988) applied to the financial crisis (see Figure 2.2., 
p. 40) events in 2008 force level-one negotiators together. There is an increase in the 
degree of level-one policy agreement and overlap amongst state actors. Meanwhile 
normal level-two processes that act against accord, i.e., divergent national interests, are 
temporarily overridden by the severity of the events and by the pressure for action based 
on the common leader-backed and technocrat-driven policy viewpoint. Recent events 
underscore again that financial and economic crises force national negotiators together 
and create such win sets. Thus, the latest wave in the crisis, this time a sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe, forces the G20 leadership to strike a US$461 billion firewall deal in an 
attempt to arrest the Eurozone crisis in the spring of 2012, even though public policy 
tensions are much more apparent by that juncture. 
G20 summitry results strengthen the position of the U.S., which is operating as a 
gradually declining hegemonic power (Layne, 1993, 2006). By taking the initiative to set 
up the new structure and rules, the U.S. shores up its position and those of its key allies. 
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The U.S. draws the emerging powers further into the new architecture and into its 
reformed forums and institutions, which are designed largely by technocrats from Europe 
and North America based on their norms and, albeit altered, rules. In this manner, the 
summits lock the rising powers into the reformed architecture. The summits may 
therefore help postpone, or alternatively institutionalize, an otherwise more potentially 
disruptive direct clash between the declining power—the U.S.—and the central rising 
power—China—as well as others—such as Brazil and India (Jacques, 2009; Rhoter, 
2010; Subramanian, 2011). Having emerging-country leaderships reinvested in the altered 
structure’s success, politically and financially, may have the effect of extending rather 
than diluting U.S. influence as the declining power. 
Finally, to further illuminate the birth of the G20, the research uses a thematic approach 
to divide the chapter’s narrative and analysis, because the summits are better viewed as 
part of a process rather than as discreet events on a calendar. The three phases are (1) 
crisis management; (2) concrete reform; and (3) a reemergence of tension between the 
new consensus and dissension among G20 states. The thematic approach aids the reader 
in understanding the fluid process underway. It will be seen that the response starts with 
frantic crisis management efforts. Actors then move onto an analysis of what went wrong 
and how to fix things, i.e. the construction of a common narrative or a policy consensus 
(McNamara, 1998) and the reforms that logically follow from this new worldview (Blyth, 
2002). As the crisis abates and matters return to relative policy normalcy, national 
political disputes, differences, and potential dysfunction reappear, only to be temporarily 
arrested by the need to react to the crisis in the Eurozone. In this particular case, both the 
partial success of the summits and the widespread relative economic weakness still seen 
during 2010–2013 also create new tensions in the G20. 
This chapter does not address in detail the principal regulatory reforms given political 
backing by the G20 summits and coordinated by the FSB and the IMF. A detailed 
assessment of both and their respective roles in the architectural redesign will be 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 (FSB structure and outcomes) and Chapter 5 (IMF). 
3.1.1 Background 
In the years prior to the financial crisis, leaders and their governments allowed and 
facilitated a progressive erosion and diffusion of state power to other actors, through a 
series of deliberate decisions and nondecisions (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Strange, 
1986, 1996). Governmental acts or refusal to act were underpinned by ideological and 
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economic beliefs, a paradigm that championed unregulated markets ahead of state 
prerogatives (Ackerlof and Schiller, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa 2010a; Stiglitz, 2010). There 
was a weakening of state power and a gradual retreat of the state’s desire and authority to 
regulate a rapidly growing global financial system and bank and non-bank actors as a 
corollary to this deregulatory neo-liberal paradigm (Strange, 1986, 1996).  
As state power retreated, there was a concomitant increase in the size, impact, and 
influence of the liberalized financial sector, and within that of systemically important 
interconnected financial firms and banks, and the levels and magnitude of the 
compensation of their traders and investment bankers spiked upwards (FCIC, 2011; 
Johnson, 2010). Unregulated or underregulated, the shadow banking sector grew 
simultaneously with a series of unregulated new complex markets, firms, and products 
that increased leverage and magnified risk (Helleiner, 2010; Lewis, 2009; MacLean and 
Nocera, 2010; Tett, 2009). This financial engineering brought the illusion of wealth but 
did not support genuinely sustainable growth (Maclean and Nocera, 2010). 
These extremely complex global markets, firms, and the leveraged products of financial 
engineering they constructed proved highly destructive to the commonwealth when 
confidence in the markets disappeared and investors panicked. During this period of 
excess credit, liquidity, and the worship of the deregulatory gods, the magnitude and 
frequency of boom and bust cycles grew (Allen and Gale, 2007) and the number and 
severity of banking crises rose to a level last seen in the pre-World War I era (King, 
2011a).  
A deregulatory, laissez-faire, neo-liberal Anglo-Saxon paradigm and narrative 
championing economic markets over regulatory vigour underlay these developments (El-
Erian, 2009). This was parroted by leaders, such as Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and 
Gordon Brown, and major regulators such as the U.S. Federal Reserve and the UK 
Financial Services Authority. Markets were said to be self-correcting and would always 
return to stable equilibrium unaided. Excessive risk, speculation, manias, and dangerous 
booms and busts were a thing of the past, or so many policy makers believed, blind to 
economic history (Kindleberger and Aliber, 1978; Minsky, 2008). A ‘great moderation’ 
was said to have begun (Bean, 2009). In theory, financial risk was spread. In reality, no 
one could gauge the risk or who held it. Few regulators lost any sleep over or thought to 
question this worldview or to consider the dangers they might engender. Those who did 
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express concern, such as Raghuram Rajan, former IMF chief economist, or the officials at 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), were not heeded (Rajan, 2005; BIS, 2008).  
This deregulatory paradigm and largely Western and Anglo-American narrative provided 
intellectual justification for the progressive erosion of conservative prudential supervision 
of major financial institutions and actors in major markets, including the U.S. and the UK, 
in particular, as regulators became ‘captured’ by those firms they regulated, i.e., the major 
financial market actors. Neoclassical economic beliefs, in market equilibrium, in rational 
actors, in the efficiency of liberalized markets, were championed and behavioural 
economics languished, notwithstanding the latter’s greater explanatory power regarding 
booms and busts (Ackerlof, 1970; Acklerlof and Schiller, 2009; Stiglitz, 2008, 2010). The 
historical memory of the behavioural drivers of individuals and investors, of the 
commonalities in past boom and bust cycles, was forgotten. Just as in past booms, ‘this 
time’ was thought to be ‘different’. It was not (Galbraith, 1954; Kindelberger and Aliber, 
1978; Minsky, 2008; Rogoff and Reinhart, 2009). Ultimately, the latest, largest, most 
interconnected, highly leveraged, opaque credit and U.S.-real-estate-driven boom, fuelled 
by a great many market and regulatory failings, turned to bust. The mania turned to panic 
and near global economic collapse (FCIC, 2011).  
In 2007-2008, the global economy faced the worst economic crisis in 80 years. The 
autumn of 2008 saw the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the U.S. government takeover 
of American International Group (AIG), the forced merger of Merrill Lynch with Bank of 
America, and action to secure the remaining two American investment banks, Goldman 
Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2008). Scores 
of other large banks and financial firms closed their doors (FDIC, 2013). Elsewhere 
across the globe other giants of finance were already wards of the state, such as the RBS 
and HBOS.  
By September 2008, the global financial system was under huge stress and the economic 
crisis in the U.S. had accelerated. Credit remained tight or almost nonexistent. 
International trade flows had collapsed (OECD, 2009). Markets and investors were in a 
panic. Certain types of asset classes or ‘socially worthless’ instruments (Turner, 2009a; 
Cassidy, 2010), composed of poorly underwritten subprime mortgages sold in the U.S. 
and securitized, had collapsed in value or could not be sold at any price. The overnight 
repo market had frozen (Gorton, 2010, 2012). The U.S. plunged into its most severe 
contraction in 80 years. Families saw a loss of a greater proportion of their net worth than 
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occurred in the Great Depression, and jobs disappeared at the rate of 800,000 per month 
(Goolsbee, 2011). Many other nations, such as the U.K., China, France, and Spain, also 
faced economic contractions that would develop into full-blown recessions. 
Policy makers confronted ‘the limits of unrestricted globalization [and] … the intrinsic 
tension between global financial markets and sovereign states’ (Subacchi, 2010a, p. 258). 
Leaders faced ‘not only with the collapse of a financial system, but also with the collapse of 
a worldview’ (Assenza, Sokolickova and Martynau, 2011; Fergusson et al., 2010). 
Laissez-faire neo-liberalism confronted a legitimacy crisis (Chorev and Babb, 2009; 
Helleiner, 2010), and the spell of the ‘mystical Anglo-Saxon model of liberalization and 
deregulation’ was broken (El Erian, in The Economist, 2009). As a result of the crisis, a 
change in the paradigm of regulatory and economic governance began (Constancio, 
2010). 
Leaders, galvanized, seized upon an elevated G20 forum to be the coordinator and 
decision-making centre for international economic diplomacy and their crisis response. 
Through it, leaders would fashion a new policy paradigm, alter the regulatory 
architecture, and reassert national state power over, and supervision and regulation of, 
financial markets and firms.  
3.1.2 A thematic approach 
 
To shed light on the recent history of the G20 summits as the principal leadership forum 
on international economic diplomacy, the analysis will be broken into three thematic 
phases which encapsulate and reflect the forum’s emergence, evolution, and maturation 
since the first emergency meeting in November 2008. Rather than discuss the summits as 
a series of individual chronological events, this thematic analysis helps illuminate the 
G20’s evolution, which is similar to the crisis and reform cycle observed during national 
financial crises. The thematic approach used in this chapter divides the G20 summitry 
into three phases through which to view it: (1) crisis management; (2) concrete reforms 
and redesign; and (3) the reemergence of dissension among G20 states and leaders, and 
the rise of emerging country leaders within the process.  
1. Crisis management: Phase one is marked by a focus on emergency global crisis 
management efforts, with national leaders seizing upon the G20 forum and 
elevating its status from a finance ministers’ forum to provide a hastily arranged 
venue for leaders to debate and address a still unfolding financial crisis. Phase one 
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is limited to the first summit in Washington, D.C., in November 2008. During this 
global crisis management phase, much of the corrective and economic stimulus 
activity is nation-state-focused; it is bilateral and ad hoc. Broad-based 
international solutions are only partly formed or in the initial design stages.  
Many of the officials present during this period use similar imagery. They talk of 
recognising the chasm ahead, of standing on the cliff’s edge, or having no 
alternative (Interview 5, 2011; Interviews 13, 17, and 31, 2012). Government 
leaders faced a real and present danger. They knew they had to be seen to act and 
to deliver a modicum of calm, to begin to take charge as the ‘board of directors’ of 
the global economy in Washington, and they arguably succeeded in doing so. 
Importantly, this natural crisis management reaction was coupled to an immediate 
recognition that the response should be a process, (Interview 5, 2011; Interviews 
18 and 20, 2012)—i.e., the start of reform, not the end. This first phase would 
have objectives and deliverables of a breadth and complexity not seen in previous 
summit-based crisis management by weaker forums, such as the G7.  
2. Concrete reform: Phase two is the period of maximum G20-directed reformist 
zeal, underpinned by a clear policy consensus and policy narrative, and the 
political capital of the G20’s leadership. It marks a reassertion of state power by 
the core and emerging-country G20 leaders over financial markets and firms. It 
unfolds principally during the leadership of the UK and the U.S. in summits that 
occurred in London and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 2009. With the immediate 
financial crisis morphing into a real economic threat, and with global economic 
output slumping, a series of major stimulus moves are announced. These joint and 
several fiscal stimulus and financial rescue measures show states working in 
tandem via the G20 forum at this juncture. Crucially, phase two also sees the 
identification and enumeration of a great many key institutional and regulatory 
reforms by the G20 leaders, prompted by the assertive central banking 
technocratic epistemic community, which would be central to the post-crisis 
financial architecture. 
In this phase, the G20 begins the architectural redesign and reform with vigour. 
Leaders agree the outlines of and direct international and national regulatory 
actors and agencies to begin to negotiate the details of the financial reform 
agenda. The G20 is confirmed as leading the international economic policy-
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making process. The FSB is created. The reform, major recapitalization, and a 
rebalancing of voice and voting power between the North and South and the East 
and West within the IMF is commenced. 
In phase two, the urgency for action is clear, and G20 leaders seize the regulatory 
reform initiative. It is widely recognised that this period of the G20’s evolution 
constitutes the apogee of the forum’s effectiveness. Big solutions were needed. 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, U.S. President Barak Obama, and others, 
closely advised by key central banking and regulatory figures, set forth an 
ambitious agenda. During this phase, a broad G20 policy consensus on action can 
be identified even as differences are seen (over stimulus and exit strategies, for 
instance). Overall, the G20 in this phase adopts a wide-ranging agenda and 
ambitious work programme goals. The narrative and its policy products result in 
state power beginning to be reasserted over markets across many policy areas. 
3. A reemergence of dissension among G20 states and leaders, and the rise of 
emerging country leadership: Phase three sees a return to dissension among G20 
actors, interrupted by the need to construct a response to the Eurozone crisis in 
2011-2012. The period 2010-2013 is a time of increasing dissension and 
divergence within the G20 over new policy goals, assumptions, and reassertion of 
national and regional interests. As the immediacy of the crisis begins to wane, and 
the redesign and reform process continues at the technical level, attempts to 
further extend the policy narrative and paradigm to new areas (such as global 
imbalances) proves impossible.   
In phase three, the G20’s focus turns to deeply intractable perennial global 
macroeonomic issues that resurface as blocks to global accord coordination and 
further action. Uppermost amongst these are matters centred on global imbalances 
(i.e., between deficit and surplus countries), the future of the international 
monetary system, and the role of the dollar as a reserve currency. Competing 
paradigms of national political economy in these areas are reasserted by major 
G20 actors, as these sensitive topics rest on competing nation-state narratives 
related directly to the management of national economies, fiscal policies, and 
trade policies. As a result, securing a G20 consensus on an expanded agenda 
becomes much more difficult. The very state power that is reasserted to 
considerable effect in phases one and two becomes an impediment to possible 
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agreement as increasing disagreement is seen and the challenge of finding 
solutions to recurrent global macroeconomic problems looms large. This 
dissension among G20 states is also in part explained by national governments’ 
perceptions and the two-level game; i.e. the growing impact of domestic politics 
and national interests as level-two blocking factors that stop the creation of 
additional win sets that might extend policy solutions beyond the fianncial 
regulatory and to the economic. 
Phase three begins with the Toronto Summit (2010) and continues through the 
Seoul (2010), Cannes (2011), and Los Cabos (2012) Summits. It would be wrong 
to suggest that phase three sees no regulatory progress; to the contrary. 
Commitments made in phases one and two continue to be addressed and 
developed at the technical FSB level. But the macroeconomic policy consensus 
starts to fray at the G20 level as it is stretched too far. 
A cycle or dialectic can be identified. Disputes sharpen and the policy consensus 
weakens compared with phases one and two. As in previous national financial 
crises, the window of opportunity for action is relatively short. Once a modicum 
of economic and financial stability returns, in part due to actions taken in phases 
one and two, more narrowly defined national state interests and the demands of 
domestic lobbies confront political leaders, all of whom face re-election pressures 
and the nature of political cycles, and appealing to national audiences and interests 
occurs. In addition an understandable desire for economic growth presses many 
G20 leaders to seek to export their way to that goal by devaluing their currencies, 
but with too many states taking that route, currency tensions escalate. 
This dialectic and the dissension in phase three are temporarily interrupted by the 
severity of a new episode of the financial crisis, namely the sovereign debt crisis 
in the Eurozone and on its periphery. Faced by market pressure and panic in 2012, 
the G20 leaders are once again forced towards a policy consensus and action, via a 
massive commitment of bilateral funds channelled through the IMF. Crisis once 
again focuses minds, forces compromise, and galvanizes leaders. The G20, again, 
shows that as a forum it operates at its best in crises. 
Finally, in phase three we can also identify the changing role of the emerging-
country members of the G20, as they begin to take a more assertive role in the 
negotiations and also take over the Presidency of the G20. 
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At the end of each thematic section presenting the political dynamics and results of G20 
summitry, an analytical commentary will place events within the broader analytical 
framework.  
3.2 Structure and membership of the G20 
Membership: Membership of the G20 is comprised of the following countries: Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom 
and the U.S.. The European Union (EU) is represented by the rotating European Council 
presidency and the European Central Bank. Other institutional participants are the 
Managing Director of the IMF, the President of the World Bank, and the chairs of the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee and Development Committee (World 
Bank).  
 
A small number of other countries’ leaders have a seat at the table, either because of their 
institutional position or simply because of the influence of the individuals and 
governments in question. Thus, the head of the European Council attends. The Prime 
Minister of Spain attends as a ‘permanent guest’.  
 
The G20 membership is not set in stone; it has increased slightly from 2009, and in 2013 
has a fluctuating membership and is actually the ‘G20 plus five’, The membership now 
includes Ethiopia and Benin (representing the African Union), since the Seoul Summit; 
Cambodia (representing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]); and 
Chile (representing a broad constituency of others ‘left outside’ the forum). 
 
Summit Presidency: The country that chairs a summit acts as President of the G20. It sets 
the agenda and writes the draft declaration, action plans, and communiqués. The country 
in the chair has significant influence on the outcome because, according to participants, 
other members tend, within limits, to defer to the chairing state’s leadership (see 
Interview 5, 2011; Interviews 12 and 18, 2012). After the first summit, the declaration 
agreed at each summit contains consistent themes, i.e., follow-on work from previously 
agreed policy actions, some omissions, and additions made by each chairing country as 
that leader and his or her ministers strive to create a successful summit that addresses 
matters of particular concern to the chair, both domestic and international (Interviews 16 
and 18, 2012).  
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Decision making: At a summit and at the ministerial pre-meetings during the year, all 
decisions are taken on the basis of consensus. This is a strength and a weakness. In times 
of crisis, events push level-one negotiators together and decisions are brisk, win spaces 
open up amongst the leadership, and the creation of a policy consensus is easier. This 
occurred in 2008 and 2009. Once a crisis passes, especially in phase three, a consensus is 
harder to secure. The quality of the declaratory and decision-making output of the G20 
can also decline in non-crisis periods, because the compromises required to switch the last 
‘no’ to a grudging ‘yes’ dilute the results. 
The European voice: European leaders retain a loud voice in the G20. Eight of the 26 
principals around the table are European leaders. It would be an oversimplification to 
suggest that this means, in a consensus-based forum, that Europeans dominate. But the 
evidence suggests that the Europeans, especially when in accord with the U.S. and 
Canada, do largely determine the content of declarations. In total, as many as 42 nations 
with a direct or indirect presence are included as a result of EU representation (Payne, 
2010).  
Therefore, there remains a North America-EU de-facto co-dominance within the G20. 
European leaders have leverage over and above their numerical advantage because of 
their economic and financial importance. Moreover, EU leaders can and do pursue their 
individual pre-summit goals bilaterally, and they also adopt joint EU positions prior to 
summits, increasing their collective impact in this manner, as well. In general, European 
leaders are very well versed in international interstate diplomacy—they practise it 
constantly in the EU—and this may give them an advantage in the G20 forum. 
The emerging-country voice: Key emerging countries — Brazil, China, India, Mexico, 
and Russia—are included in the G20. Others are included for geopolitical as well as 
economic reasons, such as Indonesia (the world’s largest Muslim nation), Saudi Arabia 
(for oil revenues and sovereign wealth fund cash), South Africa (as the dominant sub-
Saharan economy), South Korea, and Turkey (a regional giant in Central Asia). The G20 
inclusion of major emerging powers of global and regional significance is a lasting 
innovation and one which cannot be reversed; once a state is admitted, it cannot easily be 
ejected.  
Anomalies arise. There are only three African states. There is only one Arabian or Persian 
Gulf state. Turkey is elevated without explanation. Argentina is included (Peru has as 
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good or better claim to a seat at the table than Argentina). Other candidate countries have 
merit but are outside the process, for now.  
Other participants: G20 leaders’ meetings include finance ministers, deputy finance 
ministers, central bank governors, and ‘Sherpas’, who act as the drafters, coordinators, 
and protectors of each country’s respective positions. 
Legal personality, resources, and frequency of summits: The G20 is an informal 
grouping, not an institution. It has no legal personality, resources, or institutional solidity 
besides that conferred on it by the seriousness with which the leaders treat its gatherings 
and policy outcomes (Interview 3, 2011). It is not a treaty-based organization. The G20 
has no founding document, there are no specified government signatories, it has no 
formal power, creates no obligations, and has no resources of its own. It is simply a forum 
for periodic meetings staffed by national officials of the country chairing the next summit, 
assisted by the IMF and World Bank. The 2011 Cannes Summit affirmed this approach; 
during this summit, leaders rejected calls to create a separate secretariat distinct from the 
national leadership of the summits. 
The G20’s effectiveness year-to-year rests, in part, on the power of the Presidency and the 
chairing country and its leadership. The more powerful (i.e., politically and economically 
dominant) countries can achieve more than the smaller, less influential countries (such as 
Canada or even South Korea). The G20’s effectiveness also depends on the ability of the 
host country leadership to harness the collective will of the leaders present and to foster a 
policy consensus regarding the particular issues the G20 seeks to address at any one point 
in time. This, in turn, is impacted by what phase the G20 is in at the time. Consensus is 
always easier to create during a crisis; it is difficult to create and sustain when the crisis 
abates. As a result, dissension amongst participants can be seen. 
G20 summitry is controlled by the national actors themselves (in reality, certain powerful 
governments), and they therefore maintain the buy-in of leading states. This structure also 
results in the effectiveness of summits varying somewhat due to a country’s ability to 
staff the summit process, the political weight of the country in question, and the urgency 
of the global economic matters set before the leaders. For some states, such as Mexico 
and South Korea, hosting is a large task—one that, according to finance ministry and 
central bank officials, stretches institutional capacity and resources (Interviews 16 and 18, 
2012).  
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G20 leaders at Cannes in December 2011 cemented the summit process into a Troika of 
leadership to include the immediate past country chair, the current country chair, and the 
next summit chairman, similar to the long-standing EU Council process prior to the 
appointment of a permanent Council President. In doing so, leaders aim to improve 
continuity and allow smooth institutional handovers from one summit to the next. This 
approach shows the continued European influence in the G20 form and construction. 
Preparatory meetings: The first G20 summit and subsequent ones are buttressed by 
ongoing multilateral and bilateral exchanges and multilevel ministerial discussions that 
assist in preparing the agenda, declarations, and action plans. To help prepare these 
summits and press the agenda forward, G20 finance ministers, G20 sherpas, and central 
bank governors continue to meet several times a year, including on the fringes of the 
spring and annual meetings of the World Bank and the IMF. Progress on declaration 
drafting is monitored by the finance ministries, and the work feeds into the leadership 
summits. Working Groups are established to formalize this process and monitor 
deliverables. By the time of a leaders’ summit, according to a U.S. G20 sherpa, the 
content of the declaration or communiqué should be ‘pretty much pre-cooked’ (O’Toole, 
2009), with most policy differences ideally greatly minimised. 
3.3 Phase one: crisis management - the G20 emerges 
In tackling the global financial and economic crisis, leaders and states began to make a 
paradigm shift. The first G20 summit marked the return of the state or the swinging of the 
pendulum (Gills, 2008) away from laissez-faire neo-liberalism. Leaders signalled the start 
of an evolution of their policy worldview on the desirability of comprehensive global and 
national supervision and regulation of financial markets and major financial firms. 
Individual national governments, unable to deliver a return to economic stability alone, 
decided to act collectively and globally in order to regain control and restore a degree of 
market confidence and economic stability. Leaders sketched the outline of a new 
approach toward application of state power to regulate markets and firms more 
comprehensively and in a much more coordinated fashion than previously witnessed. 
States did so via a hastily convened G20 leadership forum (in Washington, D.C.) in 
November 2008. The summit brought together, for the first time in decades, leaders 
representing 85 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), from developed and 
emerging economies, to identify a way out of the crisis. Few commentators at the time 
expected much from the forum, believing it to be a weak enlarged G7 clone.  
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At the G20 summit in November 2008 governments began to reassert a significant degree 
of state power and authority over financial markets. They signalled the intention to 
commence a redesign of the global regulatory architecture. States, in moving to re-
regulate finance with the backing of the G20, demonstrated that the erosion of state 
power, informal and formal, had been overstated. The crisis and the G20 response to it in 
November 2008 underscore that, ‘the state is irreplaceable as a risk manager of last resort 
and as a regulator of irretrievable imperfect markets’ (Constancio, 2010, p. 3). 
A new paradigm and policy consensus began to take shape. G20 governments moved to 
regain control over underregulated and deregulated financial markets. A rebalancing of 
formal hard state power exercised individually and collectively over financial markets 
and firms commenced. But the severity of the crisis in phase one meant that much of the 
focus had to be on a series of immediate steps to be taken to stimulate the economy, 
essentially neo-Keynesian policy actions, in a drive to halt the slide and rebuild 
confidence. More detailed reform plans would follow later. 
3.3.1 An emergency summit takes shape 
The move to address the crisis through an emergency summit in 2008 was not carefully 
thought out. In a crisis, decisions need to be made quickly. Many leaders urged action, 
proposing different configurations. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown all called for some 
type of emergency summit (Rieffel, 2008). Sarkozy floated the idea of an emergency 
summit of heads of state using a ‘G8 plus five’ structure (Interview 5, 2011), and Merkel 
leaned towards the old G7-G8 format (Interview 4, 2011).  
According to one former official, U.S. President George W. Bush and his Treasury 
Secretary, Hank Paulson, worried that a summit meeting could degenerate into a platform 
of grandstanding (Interview 12, 2012). Bush suspected that the participants would attack 
the existing global economic and financial system, which he did not see as broken 
(Interview, 5 2012). Bush and Paulson struggled over the issue of who would attend and 
what the goals would be, and decided to avoid that problem by elevating the G20 finance 
ministers’ forum into a leaders’ summit, because they knew the forum and believed a 
conversion was the simplest route (Interview 5, 2011).  
 
This was a pragmatic solution (Interview 18, 2012). Finance ministry officials in the 
forum could rapidly act as Sherpas for the new G20, smoothing planning and 
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coordination. In addition, there would be fewer complaints from emerging countries that 
their inclusion was an afterthought, as might happen with the Sarkozy proposal. Bush was 
joined by Brown, who agreed that using the G20 format would involve the least 
complexity and avoid the need to create an entirely new body and the diplomatic 
difficulties that would ensue. In the end, Merkel also came on board and backed the 
Brown-Bush jump to the G20 (Interview 4, 2011). The hastily convened summit would 
bring round the table almost all the major global economic powers including the 
leadership of key emerging economies (Brown, 2010; CSIS, 2009, p. 21; see also 
Interview 5, 2011; Interviews 8 and 12, 2012). The G20’s creation sent the message that 
the prior institutionalized format (G7 or G8, in particular) was inadequate to the task 
(Cooper, 2010).  It was a recognition that the U.S. as a weakened hegemonic power and 
its allies can no longer drive the process alone (Beeson and Bell, 2009). 
Emerging country leaders supported the calling of a G20 leaders’ summit. They were 
eager to become full members of a new forum, rather than ad hoc additions to an existing 
smaller grouping. The rhetoric was sweeping. Brazilian Finance Minister Guido 
Mantegna stated that they were, ‘creating a new international economic order ... a new 
international economic architecture that has the G20 at the top of the pyramid, providing 
guidance and support to international financial institutions’ (IMF, 2009a, p. 2). With 
hindsight, Minister Mantega would be proved largely correct.  
The G20 proposal to include emerging economy leaders from Brazil, China, India, and 
Russia, as well as other influential players such as Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and 
Turkey, was an explicit recognition of the severity and global nature of the crisis, and of 
the need to bring the leaders of both creditor and surplus states to the table as equals 
(Interview 13, 2012). This time, however, the creditors were emerging economy players 
and the debtors were in the G7, a role reversal from prior financial and banking crises that 
historically erupted more frequently in emerging economies (Rogoff and Reinhardt, 2009, 
p. 160). Expressed most simply, it was a recognition of the reality that ‘we ought to have 
new institutions that reflect the world we live in’ (Traub, 2009, p.4).  
Boosting the role of key emerging economies had been a long-standing U.S. Treasury 
goal, and the crisis afforded an opportunity to hasten that change (Interview 12, 2012). To 
the watching world of nervous voters and panicking investors, a summit of the G20 could 
also signal it was ‘no longer business as usual’ (Financial Times, 2008) and might help 
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rebuild economic, market, and investor confidence. But the change would still leave the 
core members calling the policy shots. 
3.3.2 The Washington Summit delivers more than expected 
A ‘Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy’ took place in Washington, 
D.C., on 14-15 November 2008 (White House, 2008). President Bush had relatively 
limited goals for the meeting. He saw it, as did his Canadian counterpart, Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper, as the start of a process (Interview 5, 2011; see also Kirton and Guebert, 
2009, p. 7).  
U.S. policy makers were correct in suspecting the summit would be used to mount an 
assault on free market orthodoxies. Brown and Sarkozy took direct aim and began 
sketching their own outlines of the future. Brown styled the meeting a ‘Bretton Woods II’ 
conference, an opportunity to reform global financial institutions (Kirkup and Waterfield, 
2008; Giles and Parker, 2008). Sarkozy, joined by Merkel, called for a ‘new constitution’ 
for world financial markets and for the construction of a new regulatory architecture 
(Kennedy and McKee, 2008) and wanted financial regulation to be centre stage (Benoit, 
2008). Europe’s leadership hoped for a major breakthrough at the summit, while the 
White House was less ambitious, with Bush operating as a lame-duck president, albeit 
one who was willing to act.  
Outside observers were not optimistic. The late Peter Kenen, Senior Fellow in 
International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of Economics 
and International Finance at Princeton University, observed that the original Bretton 
Woods meeting in 1944 was preceded by careful planning over a number of years 
involving economists and officials, not government leaders (Rieffel, 2008). The Bretton 
Woods conference was underpinned by a concentration of state power, an expert 
consensus, and wartime conditions, all of which helped secure the desired outcome 
(Helleiner, 2010). Lacking these underpinnings, there was a risk the Washington summit 
would result in broad policy statements and calls for reform but no action; simply a G20 
version of a G7 post-summit communiqué; nice language but no real action. In the end, 
the cynics were too pessimistic, and the crisis pushed the G20 leaders and their 
technocrats together and forward into a multiyear refashioning of the structure of 
financial regulation. They would extend the power of the state, expressed collectively via 
the G20, and recast the structure of new and existing forums, institutions, and regulatory 
bodies in a significant and long-lasting manner. 
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The arguments before the first summit showed the tension between those (predominantly 
Europeans) whose narrative understanding of the crisis recognised a series of major 
market failures. They demanded a strong reassertion of state power, commitments to 
stimulus, a shift towards a re-regulation of markets, and an abandonment of laissez-faire, 
neo-liberal self-regulatory tropes. The host president was reluctant to agree. Ultimately, 
the pressure forced the two groups together, but, as will be seen, on balance the re-
regulators won and the redesign began.  
The crisis forces Putnam’s level-one negotiators together, but it did so by creating win 
sets more favourable to those calling for state supervisory and regulatory action. During 
this crisis stage, there was no real evidence of level-two impacts on the hasty 
deliberations. Interest groups were not part of the process. Market events were moving 
too quickly. It was left to the leaders and officials to fashion an agreement. This would 
also prove to be largely the case in phase two.                                                                                        
3.3.3 Broad political direction now, detailed plans later 
The first G20 leaders’ summit and the crisis management phase saw the securing of a 
series of agreements and commitments that were preparatory in nature, but nonetheless 
more concrete than expected. According to one participant, leaders and their Sherpas 
were galvanized by a ‘sense of crisis and responsibility’ (Interview 5, 2011, p. 8). 
Another former official characterized it as a ‘fire-fighting summit’ (Interview 24, 2012, p. 
3). All leaders understood they could not return home to an unfolding economic crisis 
with nothing to show for it. To have done so would have risked worsening market panic 
and accelerating the collapse of investor confidence (Kirton, 2009, p. 15; Interview 20, 
2012). 
 
During the negotiations, Sherpas rejected a last-minute effort by the French to substitute 
their own five-point text, and held onto the more detailed, more specific, less incendiary 
U.S. language (Interview 12, 2012). The U.S. sought to blunt criticism of the market 
economy model, and this was backed by an Indian intervention in favour of more 
balanced language. Overall, U.S. negotiators were successful in retaining control of the 
drafting process, and the outcome was ‘far more measured than the rhetorical build-up’ 
(Interview 5, 2011, p. 10). 
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The declaration was nonetheless a relatively robust reassertion of state prerogatives and 
of the essential nature of nation-state fiscal and regulatory intervention in times of 
economic crisis. It appeared to be an assertion of an emerging new re-regulatory 
paradigm, a common narrative, which was at odds with market fundamentalist, the old 
norms of self-regulation and deregulation. The Washington summit started a paradigm 
shift and a financial reform and architectural redesign process that still shapes global 
markets five years later.  
There is little doubt the leaders understood the broad parameters of what needed to be 
done in Washington: first, send a message that world governments were acting 
collectively via a collective and bilateral stimulus to halt the slide into another great 
recession (Stevens, 2008); and second, signal that an era of re-regulation would begin, via 
a series of specific actions and reforms (Interview 5, 2011).  
By focusing on specific goals, this first G20 summit avoided the pitfalls of past summits, 
which descended into acrimonious ideological disputes (Reynolds, 2009) or meaningless 
platitudes. Specifying timelines and tasking other institutions with deliverables was also a 
key development. Deadlines concentrate minds and provide impetus for process-based 
progress towards known goals.  
In the communiqué, leaders stressed the goal of restoring economic stability via joint and 
several stimulus actions, and of planning for post-crisis reforms, the details of which 
would be determined later. They underscored their belief in ‘market principles, open trade 
and investment regimes’ (G20, 2008a; p. 1), a fillip to the U.S., and then turned to the 
need for economic stimulus and a re-regulation of markets. Addressing the 
macroeconomy, summit leaders agreed to ‘take whatever further actions are necessary’ to 
stabilize the financial system, supporting that recovery with monetary and fiscal measures 
to provide markets with liquidity (G20, 2008a; p. 2). More economic stimulus, tax and 
interest rates cuts (Elliot, 2008), together with central bank liquidity would be provided 
by each country where needed. The leaders of Britain and Canada moved to increase the 
existing stimulus, for instance, as did others, following on from passage of the US$700 
billion U.S. Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) program a few weeks earlier 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2008), and China’s announcement of a US$586 
billion stimulus package just before the summit (Lander, 2008). President Obama, for his 
part, would act once in office with a further stimulus of US$887 billion in February 2009 
(ARRA, 2009). 
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As part of the move to boost economic stability and stimulus, leaders committed to 
provide more resources to the IMF, after strong pressure from then-IMF Managing 
Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn. The World Bank and other multilateral development 
banks (MDBs) would also see a resource boost. 
Turning to financial reform and regulation, the leaders agreed on five broad parameters 
and 47 specific steps, which current and former central banking sources present during 
the debate and drafting say drew upon earlier analyses by the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) (FSF, 2008; G20, 2008b; see also Interviews 9 and 11, 2011; Interview 12, 2012). 
But the declaration was tougher, the language stronger, and it specified goals and 
deadlines that were absent from the earlier, weaker, FSF discussion paper. The crisis 
acted as a galvanizing external force, and the G20 reacted by empowering the technical 
and central banking community, which seized the initiative and enhanced their own 
position and they set the policy agenda. 
The outlines of the reforms (and the new narrative they represented) agreed in 
Washington and championed by the U.S. and its European allies were a significant 
innovation, but were also a fundamentally Western project. As one participant observed, 
‘what you got was you got all the emerging markets to sign up to our whole financial 
regulatory agenda. Pretty damn good deal’ (Interview 12, 2012, p. 11). In Washington, 
the leaders agreed to: 
 Strengthen transparency and accountability: This meant principally work on 
strengthening of accounting standards, with an ultimately overly optimistic 
goal of global accounting standards. 
 Enhance sound regulation: The FSF and IMF would begin work on macro-
prudential standards, prudential oversight, surveillance of national financial 
systems, and risk management. 
 Promote integrity in financial markets: Regulators were urged to coordinate 
more closely on threats to market stability. 
 Reinforce international cooperation: This was to be achieved via the use of 
strengthened cross-border crisis management. 
 Reform international financial institutions: The FSF was to be expanded. The 
IMF was to increase surveillance and review lessons learned from the crisis. 
Leaders also committed to a reform of the IMF ‘to more adequately affect the 
changing economic weights in the world economy’ (G20, 2008a, p. 5). 
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Working Groups including ministry officials would be assisted by experts and 
international and national agencies in drawing up particular recommendations in these 
key areas by the next summit in April 2009, in London. Leaders signalled that their 
technocratic epistemic central banking community (which had crafted large parts of the 
declaration itself) would also take over much of the formulation of the detailed work 
streams to be considered by the political leaders at the next summit. Just as Hall 
describes, we see a deferral to recognised expert epistemic communities (Hall, 1992). By 
passing key preparatory work down to national technical agencies and bodies, the leaders 
increased the likelihood of progress. Leaders recognised they could not make these 
detailed judgments; instead, others would do so with their strong backing.  
Two decisions embedded within the Washington Declaration under the rubric of 
‘reforming the international financial institutions’ were highly significant for the future 
shape of the global architecture: (1) the decision to enlarge the FSF to include emerging 
countries; and (2) the commitment to reform the IMF, to boost emerging market 
representation and IMF resources. 
Both these reforms underscored that the old system run only by the few to the exclusion 
of the many was at an end and that, henceforth, the process of international financial 
regulatory redesign would involve input from more states and governments. Emerging 
economy leaders would now sit around the table. Their representation and voice in the 
FSF and IMF would be enhanced, gradually rebalancing power in the IMF. 
Behind the proposed enlargement, the state actors pivotal to reform were U.S. and 
European leaders, essentially the old core players acting within the G20, who sought to 
ensure that regulatory reform and oversight would be outside the control of the IMF 
(Interview 12, 2012). The IMF had urged the G20 to entrust it with regulatory remit and 
early warning, as well as with its usual balance of payment responsibilities, but this was 
rejected at the outset. Instead, the G20 decided the leadership of the reform process would 
reside in a system of ‘networked governance’(Helleiner, 2010; see also Chapters 4 and 5) 
led by the G20 and overseen by an enlarged FSF. Both bodies would be dominated by 
European and North American voices. The end result refashioned and reinforced the 
western powers’ influence within the new architecture which they themselves would be 
largely responsible for building. In this manner, the universal treaty-based IMF was 
strengthened monetarily and in its governance, but was simultaneously downgraded 
structurally within the new architecture with the agreement of the leading and emerging 
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powers, suggesting that the renewed legitimacy of a reformed IMF only goes so far 
(Chorev and Babb, 2009). 
As the G20 process developed from November 2008 onwards, it would become clear that 
an enlarged FSF would coordinate, manage, and play a central role in the regulatory 
reform process. This process would include but would not be controlled by the IMF. 
Mario Draghi, then-Chairman of the FSF, had seized the initiative to the benefit of core 
states and their central banking and supervisory community, in particular (Interview 9, 
2011). In fact, a relatively small number of national regulators would go on to retain great 
influence within the enlarged FSF-led process of financial reform during its first years of 
work from 2008 to 2012 (Interviews 9 and 11, 2011). 
In conclusion, the Washington declaration, by its broad nature and considerable detailed 
specificity—47 deliverables and timelines—and by its delegation of authority and tasks, 
eclipsed G7 documents of the past. It is striking because of its depth of content. By 
international standards, the G20 had started off with a hyperactive plan for supervisory 
and regulatory action that would be detailed and enumerated still further in subsequent 
summits (Cooper, 2010, p. 745).  
The crisis fighting exercise in phase one worked if measured by polls, market, and 
leadership reactions. National leaders benefited domestically from their time on the world 
stage. Externally, the summit played well. President Bush got a modest uptick of 2 
percent in his approval rating (Rasmussen, 2008). Prime Minister Brown saw his approval 
rating jump 10 percentage points after the summit, from 31 to 42 percent 
(UKPollingReport, 2008), but the boost would be a fleeting one. Each leader stressed 
slightly different versions of what was achieved. Reviewing the discussions, Bush 
Administration officials underscored the pro-stimulus and pro-growth message and saw in 
it an ‘affirmation of free market principles’ (G20, 2008b) and a defence of the status quo. 
Prime Minister Brown lauded the ‘route map to the global economic recovery and the 
stimulus’ (Elliot, 2008), also choosing to stress stimulus rather than regulation as the 
main takeaway. In contrast, German and French leaders underscored the perceived 
victory against markets and the commitments to ensure that ‘all markets, products and 
participants are regulated or subject to oversight’ (G20, 2008a).  
The Sarkozy and Merkel position mirrors most closely the tone before, and detailed 
content of the declaration and the regulatory reform agenda actually agreed (Benoit, 
2008; Kennedy and McKee, 2008). Whole sectors of global financial markets hitherto 
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unregulated would face regulation or oversight. ‘Self-regulation’ was criticized, and 
closer supervision of financial markets and actors would take place in many sectors and 
national financial markets.  But the narrative shift would still be limited. It did not 
encompass a rejection of neo-liberal economics, only of laissez faire neo-liberal 
aprroaches to markets and regulation. 
Overall, the summit’s conclusions and the breadth of the regulatory reform project made 
clear that the G20 leadership believed the process was not a cosmetic exercise or simply 
first-order changes. Indeed, the process London started would result in a substantial re-
regulation of key global financial markets and firms, backed by political capital pooled by 
the G20. The summit results were a concrete manifestation of a reassertion of collective 
state authority indicative of the changing policy consensus and paradigm regarding the 
desirability of internationally coordinated re-regulation of financial actors and markets. 
The reforms would be directed by an elite network or community that would drive policy 
convergence and harmonization (Holzinger and Knill, 2005). 
In phase one, the G20 achieved more than many expected. The Economist opined that the 
summit had, ‘permanently changed the machinery of international economic 
cooperation’, adding ‘rich countries will no longer set the agenda on their own’ (The 
Economist, 2008). Some, such as former IMF Chief Economist Simon Johnson, 
disagreed, saying this was ‘plain vanilla stuff they could have agreed upon without 
holding a meeting,’ i.e., it was objectively unnecessary and national in substance—but not 
actually very radical (Lander, 2008). Viewed with hindsight, the critics were unduly 
pessimistic.  
3.3.4 Why Washington mattered 
During phase one, crisis management and the birth of the G20 as a leaders’ forum, the 
fire-fighting and other decisions taken in Washington were to prove crucial in a number 
of concrete respects. There was a ‘convergence of political, national priorities, followed 
by collective action’ (Interview 21, 2012, p. 8). The new forum became ‘the premier 
forum for global economic governance’ (Cooper, 2010, p. 741). It acted to arrest the crisis 
and help restore a degree of calm. Through the summitry process started in Washington, 
‘collective leadership and institutions emerged in unforeseen ways as governments 
intervened in a myriad of rescue efforts’ (Subacchi and Cooper, 2010, p. 607). Leaders 
debated the policy narrative through which to view the failures and solutions to the crisis. 
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The end result outlined a paradigmatic shift in approach to the re-regulation of global 
financial markets, firms, and instruments. Leaders from France, Germany, China, and 
even Britain, demanded a reappraisal of laissez-faire neo-liberal norms and approaches to 
financial market regulation (Lander, 2008; MacGregor, 2010; Interview 13, 2012). 
Europeans and others who sought a reapplication of the power of the state in large part 
won the argument, despite protestations from the U.S., and they began fashioning 
elements of a new policy paradigm. The G20 defended globalization and sought to restore 
calm, led by leaders from the old core (Beeson and Bell, 2009) while including emerging 
country leaders. But the G20 leaders went further and made an ideological shift from 
which followed a series of major reforms over the following months and years. 
After this qualified victory in phase one for the re-regulatory forces and their evolving 
new policy consensus, the debate and the G20 financial reform agenda would focus on 
the extent, speed, and depth of global re-regulation and financial markets reform, not 
whether such action should be taken at all. This policy consensus, this commitment to re-
regulation, was signposted in the detailed plan presented in Washington, where the heat 
of the crisis helped create space for the new consensus. National leaders and their 
technocrats were literally living through the nightmare of 2008 together. They were the 
people bailing out the system and providing liquidity. As a result, the need for lasting 
regulatory reforms, the solidifying concrete basis for a new policy paradigm, based 
around agreement on less leverage, more capital, more oversight of markets and firms, 
and vigilance on systemic risks appeared clear to almost all the key leaders and their 
trusted technocrats. 
G20 leaders understood that their countries faced terrible interlinked crises, and the 
solutions they reached for went beyond the expected and further than in previous 
financial crisis response episodes from the 1990s. This time, they formulated plans for a 
more ambitious reform of the global financial architecture. The severity of the crisis was 
a crucible for action. It forced clarity upon leaders and removed extraneous influences. In 
Putnam’s terms, the crisis created level-one win sets while level-two concerns were 
muted (Putnam, 1988). When everyone is in danger, voices of narrow-minded national 
self-interest carry less weight or converge and overlap. Phase one of the evolution of the 
G20 and the reform process it started would ultimately result in meaningful substantive 
changes in financial markets and the supervision of those markets. As Kirton and Guebert 
observed, the leaders fashioned ‘an ongoing summit-guided, multilevel process ... 
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promising to produce a permanent G20 summit institution at the centre of global financial 
economic governance’ (2009, p. 4). 
In addition, the creation of the G20 signalled an explicit recognition by North American 
and European leaders that the number of seats around the table would increase 
permanently, with key emerging-country states becoming part of the process. Those states 
supported the new re-regulatory consensus and paradigm. In return for a seat at the table, 
emerging countries committed their political and actual capital via bilateral stimulus and 
commitments to IMF reform and recapitalization in Washington. In phase one, however, 
emerging countries would not lead the G20 crisis management response. 
The G20 was led by U.S. and European actors who sketched out the outline of a stimulus 
and reform agenda. The agenda would be pursued by a strengthened FSF and a 
reinvigorated IMF, with the former going on to dominate the international coordination 
and implementation of post-crisis global financial reform and redesign. 
The G20 in phase one made what would prove to be a pivotal decision: they turned to 
their central banking and supervisory regulators, a group that this research shows 
constitutes a distinct expert epistemic community (see Chapters 4 and 5), to design the 
mechanisms and the detailed reform agenda. The key recommendation in phase one was 
the enlargement of the FSF, which Mario Draghi - an Italian central banker, economist 
and Chair of the FSF, who went onto succeed Jean-Claude Trichet as the President of the 
European Central Bank –championed and the G20 leaders then endorsed, according to 
those present. Much of the G20 summits’ future detailed policy prescriptions and agenda 
would go on to be based on work done by the self-same Financial Stability Forum (soon 
to become the FSB) also chaired by Draghi (Interviews 9 and 10, 2011; Interview 12, 
2012; see also Bluestein, 2012).  
Through this gambit, a central banking community which was deeply culpable in the run-
up to the crisis and in the mishandling of the global economy pre-crisis, succeeded in 
grasping the opportunity to determine the plan of the new regulatory structure and 
presented it to the leaders. From that point onward, a small coterie of principally North 
American and European central bankers would go on to dominate the policy-making 
process to an extent which remains striking even today. So Washington mattered a great 
deal. Decisions taken then signalled how the reform process in later phases would be led 
and would proceed. 
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3.4 Phase two: concrete reform 
In phase two of the evolution of the G20, the extreme severity of the immediate financial 
crisis morphed into a new economic challenge as the global economic outlook 
deteriorated and many industrialized economies entered severe recessions (IMF, 2009). 
What had been seen as a U.S. subprime problem rapidly became everybody’s economic 
problem (Interviews 14 and 17, 2012). G20 leaders moved to commit to further major 
economic stimulus even as disagreements over the scope, form, and duration of stimulus 
began to emerge. G20 leaders turned their focus to the causes of the crisis and fleshed out 
ambitious institutional and financial reform proposals. The G20 Action Plans unveiled in 
this period would build upon the broad parameters sketched out in Washington as actors 
begin to build a new regulatory structure. 
Much was achieved in phase two because, as with many past national financial crises, the 
period immediately following a crisis permits a process of critical self-examination, a 
search for a narrative through which to understand the causes and lessons to be learnt, 
matched by a desire amongst the policy-making elite to repair identified gaps in the 
regulatory system and redesign the structures that they believe had failed.  
 
Kuhn describes this process of paradigm shift. Existing truths fail to explain new or 
current phenomena properly or account for anomalies. Triggered by events and 
discoveries, actors seek new narratives and different explanations and solutions to 
increasingly commonly recognised anomalies. Just such a process of critical self-
reappraisal occurred through discussions and debates and are reflected in official sector 
reports such as the Turner Review (Turner, 2009b) and Run on the Rock (House of 
Commons Treasury Select Committee, 2008) reports in the UK undertaken by key policy 
makers. It was also seen in various individual national reform financial proposals. 
Mervyn King called for the consideration of ‘utility banking’ (King, 2010). Paul Volcker 
called for limits on banking practices and heavily influenced the Obama Administration’s 
response (G30, 2009b) and in doing so changed the scope of banking activities in the 
U.S.. Philipp Hildebrand, then Governor of the Swiss National Bank, increased capital on 
Swiss banks and reasserted the bank’s supervisory policy-making prerogative over banks 
that had threatened the Swiss economy (Hildebrand, 2010). In the above cases, and in 
many others, supervisors and central bankers went through a collective process of 
identifying failures and causes and prepared to seize back the levers of control from the 
market actors. Note that it is not the G20 leaders themselves who engaged in this process 
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as much as it is the technical central banking community, who act as their expert advisers. 
Leaders did not have time for such navel gazing. What they sought was considered advice 
from trusted advisors. The central banking community in phase two provided that. 
 
Phase two allowed a critical space for self-examination and reform due to a temporary 
weakening of the normal influence of domestic interests, Putnam’s potentially pernicious 
level-two interests and their power over the policy and governmental decision-making 
processes. This outcome is because at this point, as the economic crisis unfolded, many 
major commercial banks were silent or were temporarily wards of the state (like AIG and 
Citigroup, for instance). The widely felt effects of the crisis meant that domestic 
institutional and private sector opposition was temporarily silenced, allowing 
governments, transnational policy networks, and regulators more room to manoeuvre and 
more policy options. The developing policy consensus also helped supply the level-one 
win sets Putnam speaks of (Putnam, 1988). It is for this reason that President Obama’s 
chief of staff observed that ‘you never want a serious crisis to go to waste’ (Emanuel, 
2008). What the FSF could not do pre-crisis the FSB could do post-crisis because of a 
new urgency and clarity of mission and purpose from the leadership of the G20 and the 
central banks. There was also a change in the power relationship between public versus 
private actors in favour of the state.  
 
This second phase of concrete reform and the work of the G20 encompasses both 
outcomes from the April 2009 summit chaired by Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 
London and the subsequent September 2009 summit chaired by President Barack Obama 
in Pittsburgh, with the former being the apogee of reform zeal and the latter being 
concerned more with moving agreed reform measures forward to the extent possible 
while papering over policy differences as leaders began to diverge gradually over their 
economic plans and exit strategies from the great recession.  
 
3.4.1 Clear deliverables in London: but first some big numbers 
 
At the London summit in April 2009, Prime Minister Brown and the G20 leaders had one 
overall aim: to restore a degree of calm and confidence to markets and to underscore their 
commitment to support growth and restore economic stability. To succeed in that goal, 
big numbers were needed, and just how large was an area of some controversy prior to 
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the meeting. Domestically, Prime Minister Brown also wanted to demonstrate his stature 
on the world stage and burnish his political popularity with a major success in London. 
 
In the run-up to the meeting, there was disagreement over what exactly constituted 
stimulus (Bradford, 2009). Each player wanted to trumpet their economic stimulus in the 
most effective manner; U.S., U.K. and Chinese ministers suggested only discretionary 
measures should count (tax cuts, investment and expenditure increases) (Darling, 2011). 
European officials disagreed and stressed automatic stabilizers should also be factored in, 
namely their much more generous unemployment and social welfare provisions which 
acted to cushion the public from the destitution seen during the Great Depression of the 
1930s. At its most basic, this was an optics issue. This was a false debate (Bradford and 
Linn, 2010). 
 
Combined discretionary and automatic stabilizers amounted to 2.6 percent of global GDP, 
more than the IMF said was necessary at that time, which helped defuse the issue. 
Ultimately, this compromise approach was agreed and G20 leaders announced that 
collective fiscal and economic commitments, discretionary and automatic, amounted to 
US$5 trillion in 2009, the ‘the largest fiscal and monetary stimulus and the most 
comprehensive support programme for the financial sector in modern times’ (G20, 2009a, 
p. 2), a huge amount but a figure still dwarfed by the expansionary and war-related 
expenditure during World War II.  
 
G20 leaders also struck a deal to boost resources of the international financial institutions 
(IFIs). The final number announced was impressive: US$1.1 trillion in new resources for 
the IFIs. G20 leaders also struck a deal to boost resources of the international financial 
institutions (IFIs). The final number announced was impressive: US$1.1 trillion in new 
resources for the IFIs. This included a new Special Drawing Right (SDR) (SDRs are how 
IMF contributions are calculated and held) allocation of US$250 billion, US$500 billion 
under the New Arrangements to Borrow, US$100 billion of additional lending by the 
multilateral development banks, $250 billion of support for trade finance, and IMF gold 
sales for concessional lending (G20, 2009b, 2009c).  
 
Such huge numbers were agreed after both the UK and U.S. leadership pressed for 
maximum ‘shock and awe’ from the summit participants. U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner, for example, rejected out of hand an NAB allocation proposed by his own 
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officials of US$250 billion. Instead he insisted, against their pleading, that the NAB be 
doubled to US$500 billion. He was acutely aware that leaders needed the maximum 
impact from the announcement, and the bigger the number the greater the impact on 
market sentiment (Interview 12, 2012). Tim Geithner, Larry Summers (Chairman of 
President Obama’s National Economic Council), and Gordon Brown understood that 
during a crisis, to restore calm, the size of the action must exceed that which is expected 
or assumed. Doing so can change the market dynamic and reaction from panic to calm or 
to positive in tone. It does not matter if all the funds are used in the end—only that the 
amount is massive and its use clearly articulated at the outset. It is, in contrast, notable 
that Europeans failed to learn this lesson during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and 
instead in 2010–2011 repeatedly announced proposals that were seen as too small, too 
late, or too incoherent for the desired market impact. 
 
The G20 leaders followed the stimulus pledges with a series of detailed, highly specific 
financial reform proposals for the financial system post-crisis. Principal amongst these 
were agreements on the following. 
 
The Creation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB): G20 leaders agreed to create the 
FSB, to replace the FSF. It would include all G20 countries, FSF countries, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and the European Commission. The FSB would be the principal 
coordinating body for the raft of regulatory work specified in a two-part expanded Action 
Plan agreed in London. The FSB staff would double its staff from seven (as the FSF) to 
15. It would grow rapidly into the principal forum for international economic diplomacy 
and financial coordination, backed by a broad G20 mandate for action. It would have a 
complex institutional structure and modus operandi much closer to that of a formal 
international institution than to its ad hoc predecessor, the FSF (see Chapter 4). 
 
Financial Reform: A series of highly specific deliverables were identified in the Action 
Plan that was unveiled in April 2009 in London and which continues to provide the focus 
for reform from that point forwards to the Pittsburgh summit and beyond. Almost all the 
G20 workload would be overseen and where necessary actually carried out, by the 
members of the FSB. The G20 tasked the FSB with coordination roles that included 
assessing vulnerabilities affecting the financial system; acting as principal coordinator of 
an information exchange forum; undertaking strategic reviews of the policy development 
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work of the international Standard Setting Bodies to ensure they delivered on G20 goals 
(G20, 2009b).  
 
The above makes clear that in London the new FSB was placed at the very centre of the 
regulatory reform. The scores of tasks it was given responsibility for coordinating would 
not be easy, and they would be quite contentious. Much of the work stream coordinated 
by the FSB would be dealt with by technical bodies and international agencies, such as 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), but all would be overseen by the FSB. These aggressive 
regulatory goals were backed by a series of precise timelines, targets, and institutional 
responsibilities. The G20 leadership had taken the 47 steps agreed in Washington in 2008 
and made them yet more concrete, more specific, and actionable by particular 
international and national agencies led by the FSB. 
 
Reform of the IMF: G30 leaders recommitted themselves to implementing the package of 
IMF quota and voice (i.e., governance and representation) reforms agreed in April 2008, 
followed by a major review of quotas by January 2011. Leaders signalled that a 
reapportionment of voting and representation in the IMF would occur so that it more 
closely reflected the importance of emerging market powers. In a further nod to the new 
geopolitical reality, leaders agreed 'that the heads and senior leadership of the 
international financial institutions should be appointed through an open, transparent, and 
merit-based selection process' (G20, 2009a, p. 9). So they would continue reforms at the 
IMF, but this would be subsidiary to their financial reform goals, and the IMF would be 
following G20 directions. 
 
The initial reaction of participants and observers to London reforms as a whole was 
highly supportive. Prime Minster Brown lauded the ‘largest fiscal expansion ever seen’ 
(Weisman and Macdonald, 2009) which when coupled with a reshaping of capitalism 
meant ‘the old Washington consensus is over’ (BBC News, 2009a). President Obama saw 
London as ‘a turning point for global economic recovery’ calling the collective action 
‘unprecedented’ (BBC News, 2009b). President Sarkozy applauded regulatory reform. 
Chancellor Merkel called it a ‘historic compromise’ (BBC, 2009c). Clearly key actors 
saw the summit outcome in dramatic and significant terms; the degree of policy 
consensus and the large total committed collective state resources and the specific 
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quantified reform measures had an impact. Markets rose immediately after the end of the 
summit. London’s FTSE 100 index closed up 4.3 percent, Germany’s DAX index gained 
6.1 percent, and France’s CAC 40 rose 5.4 percent on the ‘G20 factor’ (BBC News, 
2009d). For The Economist, the summit ‘marked a turning point in investor and business 
confidence’ (2009). One commentator forecast, ‘In coming years, the London G-20 
Summit will be seen as the most successful summit in history’ (Linn and Bradford, 2010). 
If London was about aggressive action, big numbers, and bold construction of the future 
architecture, Pittsburgh was about maintaining those gains and incremental but important 
steps. 
 
3.4.2 The Pittsburgh Summit - an affirmation of the G20 role 
 
President Obama at the Pittsburgh Summit continued to support stimulus expenditure and 
press for and support the technical work underway. Leaders signed a ‘Framework for 
Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth’, and much of the document reads like a 
progress report on technical work underway on new Basel capital and liquidity standards, 
FSB compensation standards, OTC derivative clearing, accounting standards, and cross-
border resolution (G20, 2009d). 
 
Pittsburgh’s most notable institutional achievement, coming as the crisis appeared to 
moderate, was the decision to make the G20 the permanent forum for their international 
economic diplomacy and cooperation—a key message of the forum’s consolidation and 
dominance (Cooper, 2010). This was perhaps the most ‘profound development in global 
governance since the creation of the World Trade Organization’ (Patrick, 2009). Obama 
was indicating that G20 summits had permanently eclipsed the G7 and G8. This change 
made concrete what Subbachi, had already noted, namely the centrality of the more 
inclusive G20 process and the shift away from weaker forums (Subacchi, 2009). There 
would be no backsliding or the exclusion of major emerging powers via the old, less 
legitimate groupings. Even though leaders outside the G20 still viewed its work with a 
jaundiced eye, since the forum was exclusive and self-appointed (Interview 6, 2011), the 
wider membership further solidified the G20’s leadership position atop the global 
architecture. 
 
The summit’s toughest and most controversial debates took place over global economic 
imbalances and pitted deficit-financed contracting economies (such as the U.S.) against 
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creditors with surpluses (such as China and Germany). This conflict was a variant of the 
perennial debtor/creditor-importer/exporter clash (such as the petrodollar disputes in the 
1970s and the U.S.-Japan conflict in the 1990s), and it would arise repeatedly, especially 
during phase three of the G20’s evolution and its return to dissension among members. 
President Obama pressed surplus nations to increase domestic demand to boost global 
demand as U.S. consumers retrenched (Reuters, 2009; G20, 2009d, 2009e). Matters were 
further complicated because of differences over exit strategies and stimulus. Chancellor 
Merkel disagreed with President Obama, who continued major fiscal and monetary 
stimulus, as did the Chinese on an even larger scale. 
 
As in later summits, the divide over imbalances proved practically impossible to bridge. It 
was not part of the new policy consensus. As Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then-IMF 
Managing Director, said, there simply was no general agreement over ‘what the long-term 
growth model will be’ (Guha, 2009). Major powers in the G20 could not agree over 
whom to blame for the imbalances. Creditor nations criticised profligate debtors and their 
consumers. Debtors complained of currency manipulation and excess savings. In the end, 
Obama struck a modest compromise: G20 leaders agreed to the creation of an IMF-
monitored mutual assessment program (MAP), which would monitor national economic, 
fiscal, and monetary policies, which might contribute to imbalances, and report to the 
G20. Unfortunately, reporting and monitoring are the refuge of the weak and show the 
lack of agreement, yet again, over imbalances and what to do about them. The IMF was 
given no new enforcement powers. The IMF could only name and shame. The developing 
dispute over imbalances, papered over in Pittsburgh, would be mild compared to that 
which would erupt forcefully in phase three. 
 
One other issue roiled the summit: European leaders, led by France and Germany, wanted 
action on bankers’ bonuses and compensation levels. Indeed, President Sarkozy 
threatened to walk out if no deal on bonuses was secured (Guebert and Shaw, 2009). He 
did not do so, but Sarkozy’s threat did force the G20 to direct reluctant technocrats in the 
FSB to take up the issue, after the U.S. team led by Treasury Secretary Geithner refused 
to address compensation at the summit (Interview 12, 2012). Chapter 4 will address the 
policy results in this area.  
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3.4.3 The apogee of reformist zeal 
 
By the end of phase two and of 2009, many of the main parts of the new regulatory 
structure were in place (such as the FSB) or were being built (a reformed IMF) and ‘a 
rapidly developed, internationally coordinated reform agenda’ took shape (Helleiner, 
2010, p.632). The G20 processes could not deliver on all aspects of reform in 12 months, 
and many reform agenda items remained to be addressed. But during phase two, the main 
agenda items were set and tasks were distributed within the new superstructure overseen 
by the FSB. New coordination processes were implemented by the end of 2009 that did 
not exist less than 18 months earlier and which could potentially deliver results, albeit 
ones limited by the degree of policy consensus. The agenda set in this period would form 
the bulk of the regulatory reform workload. With the benefit of hindsight, phase two is 
viewed as the apogee of reformist zeal, the near crest of the wave of the new financial and 
regulatory paradigm shift, amongst national political leaders and their regulatory 
surrogates. This impression is backed many of those interviewed for this research, 
including those critical of the G20 output. 
In this phase, there emerged a new policy consensus which recognised the need for a 
state-power-driven, widespread re-regulatory agenda. The G20 backed this shift closely 
advised by the central banking community. This policy narrative and consensus on action 
was strongest amongst the community of officials, regulators, and technocrats who 
designed the details of the new coordination structure (i.e., the FSB) and advised on the 
broad work programme demanded by the G20. Those officials would lead the FSB, staff 
the new forum, and chair the work streams emanating from phase two. 
At the G20 level, decisions were largely driven by a relatively small group from North 
America and Europe, but the inclusion of the emerging market countries whose 
leaderships were supportive should not be discounted, because the new policy consensus 
shifted towards many of their statist/state corporatist viewpoints and preference for 
greater regulation and stronger regulatory systems. 
3.4.4 The emerging countries’ voice 
The loud North American and European voices in phases one and two in the debates over 
the creation of the new structures partially obscured a significant change in the global 
architecture of economic diplomacy that would become even more visible in phase three: 
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the permanent inclusion and enhanced role of major emerging powers within the G20, 
FSB, and IMF. This inclusion is no trivial matter. Prior to 2008, none of these emerging 
state powers had regularly been included in discussions over global stimulus or the 
regulation of the global financial system and markets. Now that they are at the table, they 
can no longer be ignored. Others may be added in the future, but none can realistically be 
uninvited. In fact, much like any successful exclusive club, the G20 must now resist the 
siren calls of those still outside clamouring to be admitted. In the first phase after the G20 
was created, there was little evidence of emerging market leaders having an impact, 
except at the margins, and initially the emerging powers’ voices were somewhat muted. 
But this is not surprising. Emerging economy voices were drowned out by the existing 
powers who were leading and chairing the process, whose errors and omissions had led to 
the crisis and within whose markets the most needed to be done to re-regulate and restore 
a new balance between the state and markets. 
As new members of a club, emerging country leaders entered the room with varying 
degrees of familiarity with summitry, and some were at a disadvantage because of a lack 
of knowledge, technical capacity, or political room to manoeuvre to engage effectively 
(Interview 16, 2012). A former finance ministry participant recalls a Chinese 
representative at an early summit reading a position paper at the outset of the 
proceedings, and then reading exactly the same paper hours later at the conclusion of 
negotiations (Interview 4, 2011). 
But the relative silence from the new actors in phases one and two is also due to another 
key factor. The paradigm shift underway by 2009 moved the debate towards the stance 
already occupied by a number of those leaders. China’s leaders, for example, were 
supportive of greater financial regulation and control of firms (they directly control all 
their major domestic banks). China also already had tougher capital and prudential 
standards than were being demanded by the G20 and FSB and which would be fashioned 
by the BCBS starting in 2009. Other emerging country leaders, including Brazil, India, 
and Russia, were also critical of the U.S. failures prior to the crisis and were supportive of 
a move away from the previous Anglo-American approach and towards the re-regulation 
of financial markets. In other words, a lack of audible stridency by emerging countries in 
phases one and two should not be read as a lack of support for the paradigm shift that 
commenced in 2008. Indeed, in phase three those voices are now louder and sometimes 
discordant as emerging countries begin to take a greater public role in the G20.  
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Overall, the new structures and the agenda commenced in phase two constituted a shift in 
the agreed consensus approach to the oversight and regulation of financial markets, and 
also in the role of emerging markets in the diplomatic process. Phase two signalled that 
the new normal would henceforth always include emerging as well as existing powers in 
all major forums and institutions. 
At the end of 2009, the G20-led process had achieved a great deal in a short time. Based 
on this shift in worldview, they had agreed on an ambitious new regulatory structure and 
state-power-driven re-regulatory reform agenda. But certain political economy issues still 
remained beyond the boundaries of this new policy consensus and paradigm. Thus, strains 
started to be seen over imbalances. But this is no surprise. Such issues could not be solved 
in such short order, if ever, as phase three would demonstrate. Instead, the boundaries of 
what may prove to be a semi-durable policy consensus and narrative are limited to 
financial regulatory issues and state and central bank oversight and re-regulation of 
financial markets and firms. That is not to belittle the achievement. The G20 and its 
surrogates backed by this new consensus designed, in 2009, a structure and agenda that 
cannot be considered as a ‘G7-plus’. In its entire history, the G7 never produced this type 
of burst of post-crisis regulatory activism of such a robust design. 
To conclude, the G20-FSB-IMF reforms started in 2009 collectively amounted to the 
beginning of a shift in worldview and policy consensus, and a major rebalancing of the 
state versus markets and regulator versus regulated, backed not only by the core members 
but also by emerging states. As will be seen, the process would not diminish or end in 
phase three. 
Chart 3.1 graphically displays the new triangular global financial architecture as built by 
the G20 in phases one and two. It shows which forums and institutions are at the core of 
the structure, and which have grown in size and impact as regards supervision and 
regulation of financial markets. 
 
3.5 The new global financial architecture - the G20 at the centre 
 
At the top of the structure is the G20 (dark blue oval), a leadership and governmental 
forum providing political leadership, capital, and collective state power reasserted to 
deliver financial regulatory reform in a way not seen prior to the crisis. The G20 is the 
key political forum in the new design. To a considerable extent, the new architecture’s 
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effectiveness depends on the strength of the consensus in the forum and the ability of the 
G20 leaders to provide direction on the global macro policy and other major issues they 
confront. However, Chapters 4 and 5 will demonstrate that once the policy action is 
delegated to the technical community, reforms can continue even if there is discord over 
outstanding controversial macro issues at the G20 level.     
 
 
Source: Organization websites; see also Davies and Green, 2008. 
 
Figure 3.1 The New Global Financial Architecture 
 
Note: 
 Dashed lines indicate information exchange and communication, with lines of 
communication between FSB and SSBs stronger than between SSBs 
themselves. 
 Red lines with arrows indicate directional authority and control.  
 Double-faced red arrows indicate two-way authority and control. 
 Note overlap of responsibilities between the FSB, IMF, and (to a much lesser 
degree) the BIS on matters related to the mutual assessment process, peer 
review,  and early warning. 
 
Nation-state-level actors (such as the U.S. Treasury), and sub-state agency actors (such as 
the SEC), are not included in the chart but participate in certain levels of the international 
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regulatory structure. For instance, the U.S. Treasury participates in the G20 leaders and 
finance ministers meetings, while the SEC is a member of the FSB through IOSCO. 
 
BCBS = Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; BIS = Bank for International 
Settlements; FSB = Financial Stability Board; G-SIFI = Global Systemically 
Important Financial Institution; IAIS = International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors; IASB = International Accounting Standards Board; IMF = International 
Monetary Fund; IOSCO = International Organization of Securities Commissions; SEC = 
Securities and Exchange Commission; SSB = standard-setting body. 
 
3.5.1 The key FSB role 
 
The new structure includes the empowered FSB (large green circle) playing the central 
coordinating role. The FSB is directed by the G20 and tasked by the G20 to oversee all 
major aspects of the financial reform process started in November 2008 and continuing 
through 2009 and beyond. It includes principals from all G20 members, central banks, 
and finance ministries, and also the leaders of standards-setting bodies. The FSB is a 
small forum, fighting above its weight because it reports directly to the G20 summits (not 
through finance ministries). Its strength lies in this tight linkage, coupled with the 
commitment of key FSB leaders to oversee the financial reform process. The board has 
the key coordinating role at the centre of the structure. It is led by powerful central 
banking regulatory ‘hawks’—i.e., those most supportive of re-regulation. Practically all 
leadership roles, the main working groups, and standing committees during its formative 
period in 2008-2009, through the end of 2012, were occupied by leaders more critical of 
the past regulatory paradigm, such as Mark Carney (Chairman of the FSB), Adair Turner 
(former principal supervisor in the United Kingdom) and Jaime Caruana (General 
Manager of the BIS) (See Figure 4.1, p. 127). All were ‘hawks’ and supportive of the 
change in worldview and shift they themselves directed and commenced. The Board’s 
leadership roster was not an accident and it had implications for the robustness of key 
policies the community adopted. 
 
The Board lacks a formal treaty basis, powers, and responsibilities. But the power of the 
actors that lead it and their straight communication channel to the G20 leadership more 
than compensates for this formal weakness. It will be shown that the Board’s creators 
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rapidly give it an internal structure more akin to an institution, rather than a mere talking 
shop (see Chapter 4 - Chart 4.1, p. 120).  
 
Note, moreover, that the BIS plays an important parental and supporting role regarding 
the FSB, which it hosts and which it (post the Los Cabos Summit) finances. This 
underscores the power of the central banking community in the new structure. It 
dominates the leadership of the FSB. The BIS—and by extension the community as a 
whole—provides the forum’s financing. The BIS is backing the Board in a direct, 
tangible, and ongoing manner, potentially ensuring its continued future relevance and 
strength. 
 
3.5.2 Enhanced and coordinated Standard-Setting Bodies 
 
The new architecture shows significant changes below the level of the FSB, which 
coordinates the reform agenda and the related work of international standard-setting 
bodies (SSBs). SSB memberships are drawn from state regulatory agencies. Today, they 
in large part carry out work delegated to them by the G20. Not only does the FSB monitor 
deliverables, but it also provides the forum within which the leadership of these bodies 
interact and collaborate. The FSB determines whether the SSBs are following the G20 
summits’ mandate. The FSB is delivering a degree of coordination that was not 
previously evident. This is shown via the almost solid lines of communications between 
the FSB and SSBs, which remain independent, but which have been elevated and 
incorporated into the state-based system of technical cooperation and policy making. 
 
The FSB is central to rapid progress in the deepening of the coordination amongst actors 
and amongst SSBs. The FSB technical-level talks rely on and play to the strengths of the 
core members and the talks are heavily influenced by European and North American 
principals as leaders of the process, because it takes ‘impressive expertise and stamina’ to 
staff and operate multiple work streams (Cooper, 2010, p. 744). Larger emerging 
economies, such as China, can handle the demands, but others, such as South Africa, may 
be straining their capacity to contribute to the complex debates underway. This capacity, 
if lacking at present, will grow as G20 members engage on a regular basis in these 
debates and discussions and become more familiar with them.  
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To conclude, the SSB transnational policy networks until 2009 often worked alone, at 
odds with, the work of one another. There was no coordinating body of the strength and 
robustness of the FSB in which all participated (a Joint Forum did exist but it was weak 
and ineffective). Today, the FSB draws the SSBs and their memberships inside the state-
led reform drive. SSB leaderships insist they are independent from the FSB. This may be 
so in formal terms, but in practice their agendas are being dictated by the G20, and the 
SSBs report to and are coordinating their work through the FSB. This is a level of 
coordination not previously seen amongst SSBs and marks a clear shift. In forcing this 
structural reform, the G20 created direction and coordination amongst an obscure 
alphabet soup of organizations where little previously existed. This was a little-noted 
achievement by the G20 and FSB leaderships as they sought to build a more cohesive, 
comprehensive, harmonised global regulatory structure. 
 
3.5.3 IMF, bigger, better but below the G20 
 
The IMF, which would previously have been placed in the centre in such a structure, is 
instead lower down. It is in part directed by the G20. As regards resources and staff, the 
recapitalized IMF is certainly stronger today and much more representative than it was 
pre-crisis, thanks to G20 government commitments. It has vastly more staff and monetary 
resources than the FSB. Its agenda and reforms, however, are shaped by the G20. The 
IMF is reinforced by the G20 but also in a real sense led by the G20 members, albeit 
wearing different hats and working in a different institutional context (see Chapter 6). 
 
Note that the Global Head of Supervision (GHOS) meetings feed into the FSB process. 
The grouping is more exclusive than the FSB and only includes central bank governors 
and principal supervisors. It provided another small forum within which the key 
leadership community could debate new policies during the crisis and response period. 
 
Finally, observe that neither the G8 nor the G7 is central to the new global financial 
architecture. The loose groupings remain in existence and do function and meet, but they 
are less important than in the past, and have been eclipsed by the G20 (Subacchi, 2009). It 
is reasonable to assume that the G20 and FSB cannot swiftly be downgraded or pushed 
aside from their currently now dominant position. Neither the G8 nor G7 are where the 
economic and diplomatic power rests at the end of 2013. 
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The new global financial architecture represented in Figure 3.1 constitutes at least a 
second-order change in international coordination and economic diplomacy. The G20 in 
2008-2009 laid the foundations and began to construct the new policy consensus and 
narrative during the crisis management and reform phases, including these institutional 
alterations and changes. But the G20 leadership could not identify the technical agenda 
and objectives (they would not know a macro-prudential hammer from a micro-prudential 
screw driver) or achieve them alone. So they relied heavily on the FSB, whose expert 
membership is dominated by hawkish North American and European central bankers and 
supervisors operating as a distinct community. It is this group that leads the push to make 
the evolving policy consensus real via an aggressive agenda of actual policy reforms that 
they design or would task others with devising. The crisis and reform phases created a 
window of opportunity, enlarged win spaces, and permitted leaders and their technical 
surrogates to go much further than would be possible in normal Non-crisis circumstances. 
G20 leaders turned to their experts for the framework and solutions. Emboldened 
technocrats proposed a reform agenda that the G20 agreed which the central bankers 
could not previously have dreamed of securing. 
  
3.6 Phase three: a reemergence of dissension within the G20 
A crisis can galvanize reform, but the window of opportunity for action is limited. Phase 
three encompasses the debates at the Toronto (June 2010), Seoul (November 2010), 
Cannes (November 2011), and Los Cabos (June 2012) Summits. Phase three in the G20’s 
evolution is characterized by a reemergence of dissension as the outer limits of the policy 
consensus is tested. G20 members, as the crisis begins to lessen in severity, bicker and 
argue over macroeconomic and fiscal policies, between stimulus and austerity. This is not 
surprising. Leaders are united going into a common crisis, but they are much less 
cohesive as each national economy exits at different speeds and may require different 
applications of the brake or accelerator. Attempts are made to extend the policy consensus 
to perennial global macroeconomic matters, such as currency disputes and managing 
global imbalances. But this effort results in visible disputes and no breakthroughs, as 
national narratives and political and economic goals clash rather than converge. This 
return to dissension is most evident at the Toronto and Seoul Summits. 
External pressures interrupted this growing discordance among leaders and focused minds 
once more on the unfolding Eurozone crisis dominating the Cannes and Los Cabos 
Summits. The French and Mexican G20 Presidencies are forced to grapple with the 
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Eurozone troubles above all else as the crisis becomes increasingly acute with Ireland, 
Portugal, and then Greece facing possible national insolvency and default, and needing 
exceptional measures by the European Central Bank and emergency IMF funds, 
predominantly from EU member states, to survive. Through 2011 and 2012, G20 summits 
took place against a backdrop of increasingly frantic activity aimed at shoring up the 
Eurozone and the stability of the euro. This was a new and different wave of the financial 
crisis, this time centred on the EU. The Eurozone crisis recreates dynamics seen earlier in 
phase one of the G20’s existence. That is to say, the crisis dominates the policy debate 
and forces negotiators together, providing win sets, temporarily muting the effect of 
domestic interests enough to fashion a deal and a US$461 billion IMF firewall for the 
Eurozone. The deal alone does not arrest the crisis in 2012, but it demonstrates that the 
G20’s maximum utility is in crisis circumstances: A forum that places all the principals 
around one table can help get a deal done in extremis. 
Phase three is a time of increasing dissension and disagreement at the summits. This 
period also demonstrates the flipside limitation of summitry. Summits generally do not 
deliver much when normality returns. At that point, negotiators diverge over goals, and 
domestic interests reassert themselves, and thus win sets shrink.  
National economic and fiscal policies were not, at the start, and are not today, part of the 
shift in regulatory worldview championed by the G20 and fashioned by the FSB. Hence, 
there is no consensus in that area. The policy shift and reforms agreed by the G20 in 
phases one and two are centred on how states and central banks regulate global financial 
markets and firms, not on concepts of national political economy and domestic fiscal 
policies. The paradigm shift in worldview does not stretch so far as to encompass the 
latter. 
However, the tensions and discord we see in the G20 during phase three is not reflected to 
the same degree amongst technocrats in the FSB, who continue their work, less affected 
by political disputes above them; their policy consensus remains largely intact. The 
paradigm shift in worldview and regulatory approach signalled in 2008 and made actual 
in 2009 continues to be constructed and strengthened by the FSB and SSBs in 2010 and 
beyond, as the agreement on Basel III in Seoul makes clear. 
Phase three in the G20 summitry also includes an important but gradual increase in the 
profile of and leadership responsibilities for emerging market countries. Over time, this 
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will have implications for the summitry process. It marks a new period of summitry and 
draws these actors further into a commitment to the reformed architecture. 
3.6.1 Divergence and disputes as the consensus begins to fray 
During the period encompassing the Toronto (2010) and Seoul (2010) Summits, attempts 
to extend the consensus narrative amongst G20 leaders to still more areas fails, and the 
consensus fractures to a greater degree as domestic policy differences increasingly 
reemerge to block progress. The very state power and interests expressed and framed 
collectively and applied during crisis management and the concrete reform phases begins 
to force leaders apart instead of towards the same goals. The remaining issues on the table 
facing the leaders in this period were especially difficult, long-standing, complex, and 
divisive, and not amenable to addition to the common regulatory narrative crafted in 
2008-2009. As the G20 turned to matters such as global imbalances and the reform of the 
international monetary system, splits occurred between the actors, and a semblance of 
accord on high-level aims was no longer evident. With such complex and difficult 
subjects under discussion, it would have been naive to expect otherwise. 
Divergent views on the causes of these imbalances, excess Chinese savings versus excess 
U.S. consumption; the dollar’s role, safe haven, or unfair benefits of seignorage; and the 
fault lines in the global financial system, East versus West or developed versus emerging, 
which began at Toronto and became more severe in Seoul, meant that the nature of the 
summit debates changed from consensus building to finger pointing, and domestically 
fuelled G20 disputes over policy options and solutions. These arguments are almost 
identical to those that played out during an earlier era of tension—that between the U.S. 
and Japan in the 1980s (Gilpin, 1987). Tensions in the G20 reflect similar paradigm 
maintenance and conflict (Wade, 1996, 2008), which have been seen over aspects of the 
international political economy narrative in the past. But a growing discord and 
disagreement over perennial insoluble global macroeconomic issues did not mean the 
technical regulatory reform agenda was jettisoned in this phase of G20 evolution. 
Work on agency-level financial regulatory reforms remained underway in phase three, 
closely coordinated and overseen by the FSB conducted by other SSBs and national 
agencies. However, the reforms already on the table in this period faced more sustained 
criticism, with efforts by opponents of reform to chip away at the new regulatory 
standards and their application in each jurisdiction. Bankers, suffering from exceedingly 
short memories, commenced a counterattack, seeking to weaken or rewrite the new 
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regulatory rules, country by country. As previously discussed, these lobbies were dormant 
during the crisis management phase and were only slowly reawakened during the earlier 
period of concrete reform. By 2010, the financial community rebounded on the back of 
below-zero real interest rates supplied by the central banking community of the world, 
and turned towards undermining regulatory action. In the U.S., efforts by lobbyists to stop 
or scale back the Dodd-Frank Act were underway. Thus, in 2010, over US$468 million 
was spent trying to influence the legislative outcome (Centre for Responsive Politics, 
2010).  
During this period, leading voices in finance began to object publicly to the re-regulation. 
One UK banker, Bob Diamond (since resigned), declared: ‘The period of remorse needs 
to be over’ (Moore, 2011). A U.S. bank CEO (since fired) called for a renegotiation of 
Basel III rules (Jenkins, 2010; Pandit, 2010).  
In phase three, transnational communities and actors began to find their goals and work 
programme impacted by diverging national policy stances and national positions. The 
sense of urgency began to dissolve and domestic interests once again pressed their 
respective cases, and the prior relative comity on goals, and the implementation of agreed 
international norms came under greater strain, was harder to sustain and, above all, to 
deliver upon. 
3.6.2 Toronto - stimulus or austerity? 
In Toronto, G20 leaders disagreed over progress on financial regulation and on the 
amount of economic stimulus that was still needed. As a result, the message that emerged 
from the Toronto Summit was muddled (Interviews 17 and 18, 2012). Toronto’s narrative 
contradicted the pro-regulation, pro-stimulus message that had come from Pittsburgh only 
a few months earlier. Certain G20 leaders, including those from Canada and Australia, 
neither of which had suffered a financial crisis due to the conservative prudential 
supervision of their banking and housing sectors, had begun to view the ongoing U.S.-
European regulatory drive within the G20 with some hostility, (Interview 19, 2012). 
Canadian Prime Minister Harper warned against ‘excessive, arbitrary or punitive 
regulation’ of the financial sector (Guebert, 2010). French President Sarkozy warned 
against ‘giving in to unilateralism, to every man for himself, [which] would also be an 
economic, political and moral error’ (Chokshi, 2010). Harper and Sarkozy’s alarm over 
the direction of financial regulation was sparked by President Obama’s move to back the 
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so-called Volcker Rule, which sought to ban proprietary trading by commercial banks–a 
move aggressively opposed by the financial sector (G30, 2009b). 
 
Splits emerged between surplus and deficit countries, creditors, and debtors. By 2010, the 
South Korean and German economies were experiencing accelerating economic growth; 
Germany faced the prospect of bailing out the Eurozone. Both states’ leaders disagreed 
with talk of sustained stimulus and urged those countries with high current account 
deficits to rebalance their economies and commence austerity moves. In addition, the UK 
leadership changed in May 2010, and the country was suddenly a stalwart supporter of 
austerity as opposed to stimulus. Participants in Toronto recall what a difference this 
made to the balance of the debate between Keynesians and those calling for austerity. The 
U.S. was more isolated, still backed on the need for stimulus by France, but opposed by 
German Chancellor Merkel and a victorious Prime Minister David Cameron, who 
revelled in championing austerity and lecturing G20 participants (Interviews 12 and 22, 
2012). Meanwhile, China was managing the inflationary effects of their massive 2009 
domestic stimulus. Needing to cool its economy, it remained deaf to complaints from the 
U.S. on currency levels, imbalances, and surpluses. As a result of all these factors, at the 
Toronto Summit, national domestic regulatory and economic preoccupations and 
concerns created splits among states over the issues still on the negotiating table and 
shrank the level-one and level-two win sets. 
 
The Canadians tried to balance disparate and conflicting goals, and the declaration 
stressed the need to ‘sustain the recovery, create jobs and to achieve stronger, more 
sustainable and more balanced growth’, while also communicating ‘growth friendly’ 
fiscal consolidation with numerical goals for deficits (G20, 2010a, p. 2). Overall the 
declaration was evidence of the growing divergence between debtor and surplus states. It 
called on the former to boost national savings rates to address their deficits and the latter 
to reduce their reliance on external demand while opening markets. The Toronto 
Declaration was an exercise in the triumph of hope over actionable policy prescription. 
Given the disagreements over exit strategies, austerity, and rebalancing growth, any 
progress in Toronto was destined to be incremental.  
In conclusion, the Toronto Summit moved the financial reform agenda gradually forward, 
but the other results were underwhelming. The summit highlighted national differences, 
not commonalities. Coordinating exit strategies—deciding on when stimulus should halt 
and austerity should start—is a disjointed and by its nature a state-by-state matter. The 
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difficult perennial nature of the remaining issues at hand, in particular the issue of 
imbalances and currency values, meant it was too much to expect continued 
breakthroughs. As one participant observed, not every summit can announce major 
achievements (Interview 17, 2012). Finally, a diminished sense of crisis and ‘summit 
fatigue’ was by now setting in (Dong-Hwi, 2010). If Toronto sent mixed messages on 
stimulus versus austerity and imbalances, the Seoul Summit saw much louder disputes as 
the ‘G2’, i.e., China and the U.S., clashed head-on over imbalances.  
3.6.3 Seoul and imbalances – the G20 has no solution 
 
The Government of South Korea, the first emerging-country Presidency of the G20 
process, strove to succeed where the Canadians had failed. But the public G20 debate and 
private disputes in Seoul were particularly strident. The South Korean Presidency had to 
referee a dispute between the declining hegemon (the U.S.) and the rising power (China), 
made more complex because of electoral matters on the one hand and internal disputes 
within the leadership on the other. 
 
A single issue above others dominated the pre-summit and summit debates in Seoul: a 
dispute between key G20 members, and in particular the U.S. and China, over the causes 
of and cures for global imbalances and currency mismatches. This clash created an 
impasse. U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner took aim at China, alleging the renmembi was 
undervalued to boost exports and limit U.S. imports. He criticized the piling up of 
excessive reserves, the Chinese trade surplus, and the resulting imbalances in the global 
economy. It was midterm elections in the U.S. and Geithner’s position reflected a need to 
get tough with China. Geithner urged G20 leaders to adopt targets for maximum 
permitted surpluses and deficits and pressed China to allow its currency to appreciate 
more rapidly. His proposals echoed previous international economic disputes. They 
echoed Keynes’s plan of the 1940s to manage the global financial system (Skidelsky, 
2010). Historical comparisons continued to resonate when the two states’ ministers 
clashed. 
 
The Seoul Summit was not the first time a deficit-burdened U.S. administration sought an 
accord aimed at managing imbalances, but this time it was China, not Japan, that was the 
alleged culprit. In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration proposed currency targets, with a 
similar goal. On that occasion, the U.S. and Japan ultimately signed the Plaza Accord, 
which managed a devaluation of the dollar. But the deal failed to alter significantly the 
 89
U.S. trade deficit with Japan, which still persists today (Gilpin, 1987, p. 163). Geithner’s 
attack on China was reflective of short-term political considerations, but it also echoed 
historic phenomena which remain unresolved. 
  
The imbalances dispute in Seoul was complicated by other dynamics. The South Koreans 
sought a way out, but it proved to be a dead end. They approached China’s central bank 
with a specific numerical target of a current account surplus maximum of 4 percent, 
which the central bank had earlier supported, and to which they agreed as a compromise 
(Interviews 17 and 18, 2012). However, the Chinese leadership rejected the 4 percent cap 
in the draft communiqué at the summit itself (Interviews 12 and 17, 2012). As a 
diplomatic and practical matter, because the People’s Bank of China proposal was ex post 
facto championed by Geithner, for domestic political reasons, the Chinese political 
leadership reacted negatively and strongly. They could not be seen to give in to external 
American pressure and demands. Thus, the ‘currency war’ that broke out at the Seoul 
summit reflected different national economic narratives, and behind the failure to solve it 
was also an internal struggle within the Chinese leadership, which the Chinese central 
bank lost. Finally, the dispute was made worse by political grandstanding by Geithner, 
who mishandled the diplomacy. 
 
The Chinese leaders at the G20 summit rejected Geithner’s demands, countering that 
excess consumption and lax U.S. monetary policy (and dollar devaluation) was at fault. 
According to this narrative, the imbalances were not caused by China’s currency 
management, its cheap labour, and assembled goods (Yang, Chen, Monarch, 2010). It 
was, instead, America’s profligacy and the desire of its government and population to live 
beyond its means that was to blame. Behind this was the reality that Beijing leaders focus 
on the need to keep a growing population employed while restraining inflation (PBOC, 
2009). An appreciating renmenbi does not help the former, and quantitative easing in the 
U.S. was fuelling the latter. In addition, quantitative easing was driving down the value of 
the dollar and increasing other exporters’ pain as well, causing an alleged rapid 
appreciation of Brazil’s real, for example. 
 
Thus, China’s leaders had allies in its rejection of the U.S. imbalances narrative. 
Opposition to a cap on mercantilist growth strategies also came from other major export-
oriented, surplus country leaderships, including Germany and Brazil. They accused the 
U.S. of its own currency manipulation and of embarking on a managed devaluation of the 
 90
dollar, and they rejected calls for numerical targets for surplus and deficits. To make 
matters yet more rancorous, British Prime Minister Cameron chastised the U.S., opining 
that ‘I am not one, and Germany is not one, who says growth and fiscal consolidation are 
contradictory’ (Chen, Stolberg, and Sanger, 2010).  
 
The South Korean Presidency found it impossible to negotiate a real compromise between 
fundamentally opposing positions. Geithner’s gambit had failed (Chen, Stolberg, Sanger, 
2010). This meant that no substantive progress in this area was possible. In the G20 
context, a lack of a common narrative means no progress. It therefore led to a weak 
declaration. The Seoul Declaration committed G20 leaders to simply monitoring matters, 
via an FSB-IMF Mutual Assessment Process (G20, 2010b). In this manner, leaders 
kicked the imbalances can down the road.  
 
3.6.4. Summit disunity: but real progress in the regulatory sphere 
 
Notwithstanding the rancour over exit strategies, imbalances, currency values, and global 
macroeconomic disputes that mushroomed in the period encompassing the Toronto and 
Seoul Summits, regulatory reform measures continued. Of particular note were 
breakthroughs on bank regulation, capital, and IMF reforms.  
 
Financial reform: In Seoul in 2010, G20 leaders agreed the Basel III accord, which had 
been supported by work done in Toronto and which was negotiated by the FSB and 
BCBS in a very rapid 12 months (Interview 20, 2012). As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, 
this single multifaceted deal, coordinated and driven by the FSB expert technocratic 
epistemic community, constitutes evidence of a third order (Hall, 1993) paradigm shift in 
the regulation and supervision of global financial markets and of systemically important 
banks.  G20 leaders at Seoul signed off on a deal fashioned by a small epistemic 
community led by hawks who agreed a cohesive new macro-prudential policy paradigm 
and narrative. G20 political leaders backed a deal over which they had had essentially no 
input and were presented with a fully formed agreement in Seoul. Sources indicate that 
leaders and their finance ministers did not at that time fully comprehend the scope and 
impact of the deal (Interviews 13 and 17, 2012). This conclusion is supported by the 
subsequent demand for a ministerial role in the FSB leadership structure from 2011 
onwards. G20 finance ministries felt the deal was a regulatory overreach and did not want 
a reoccurrence (Interview 13, 2012).  
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IMF reform: In 2010, leaders agreed to double quotas from 238.4 billion to 476.8 billion 
SDRs, equivalent to US$750 billion. The G20 was significantly recapitalizing the IMF as 
agreed at earlier summits. Leaders also agreed to voting reforms, and to an eventual shift 
of over 6 percent of quota shares from overrepresented to underrepresented member 
countries, in particular moving the quotas to dynamic emerging economies and 
developing countries. The reforms and adjustments would result in China’s quota and its 
voting power in the Executive Board doubling to over 6 percent, approximately 40 
percent of the U.S. quota level (of 16.5 percent, in line with China’s economic position 
globally). This would make China the third-largest member country in the IMF. In 
addition, three other major emerging economies—Brazil, India, and Russia—would also 
be pushed into the top 10 shareholders in the IMF (IMF, 2011a). 
 
The reforms were backed by the U.S. and emerging countries, and were reluctantly 
supported by the Europeans. In agreeing the reforms, Europe’s leadership went only so 
far and no further. They supported quota increases and greater resources for the IMF, with 
part coming from existing leading member states and the rest from emerging market 
countries. In taking this stance, they avoided the full burden of recapitalization of the 
IMF. The U.S. got what it wanted, a rebalancing away from Europe and a recommitment 
of emerging states to the institution. They drew the rising powers into an organization that 
they dominate but which was in need of rejuvenation and renewed relevancy. The cash 
injections and reforms could eventually result in slow evolutionary change, but would 
contain disputes within the existing institutional system. They also strengthened the 
organization.  
 
The principal powers reformed and recapitalized the IMF. They rejected using the IMF, 
however, as a vehicle for global financial reform, hence its demoted position in the new 
architectural structure (Figure 3.1, p. 79). G20 leaders rejected a leadership role for what 
they saw as a bureaucratic, slow, universal organization, which some emerging countries 
still viewed as lacking in legitimacy, despite the recommitment. Leaders already had their 
preferred vehicle, the FSB, which would remain largely under their national technocrats’ 
control. 
 
Thus, even as disputes on outstanding irresolvable macroeconomic and fiscal matters 
were publicly aired and became much more marked, regulatory and reform processes 
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agreed in phases one and two continued successfully. This outcome underscores that the 
paradigm shift we observe, in worldview, policy reforms, and prescriptions is 
predominantly a supervisory and regulatory community-led shift. Effective policy 
response is limited to those areas over which these individuals collectively recognised 
critical anomalies, the strength of the epistemic community charged with policy design 
and implementation, and the degree to which a strong policy consensus exists as to action 
(see Figure 2.1, p. 33). This broad theme and hypotheses will be developed further in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
3.6.5 A degree of progress but a lot of discord 
 
In conclusion, the Seoul Summit saw strident, nationally sparked arguments and disputes 
over the functioning of the international monetary (non) system coupled to real progress 
(led by the FSB epistemic community) towards the existing agreed regulatory reform 
goals.  
 
On global macroeconomic matters, consensus was a thing of the past. It had become 
every country for itself.  Malloch-Brown, identified the emergence ‘of a new pecking 
order' in which the U.S. plays a more diminished role as China rises (Malloch-Brown, 
2010). That rise, he added, would not be easy, and the G20 risks, ‘being reduced to the 
sum of its feuding parts as structural trade imbalances, currency wars and very different 
views of each other’s relative economic prospects drive stakes into the enterprise’. Larry 
Summers, then-Chairman of the U.S. National Economic Council, took a slightly 
different view, noting that ‘the world is more divided today than it was in London 
because nations not facing the prospect of a depression have that luxury’ (Sanger, 2010). 
It was clear that the ‘fellowship of the lifeboat’ was gone, replaced by conflict 
(Vestergaard and Wade, 2010). Not everyone was giving up on the G20. Kemal Dervis 
argued that the IMF-led monitoring of imbalances was major notwithstanding the lack of 
hard targets, maintaining that the process could yet succeed and that we should give it a 
chance to work (Dervis, 2010). 
 
If a mark of policy effectiveness is the sound of screams of anger from its targets, then 
this phase of G20 work was impactful, notwithstanding public macroeconomic disputes. 
Loud whining could be heard across the globe as bank CEOs realized tangible common 
equity capital levels would increase to at least 7 percent or to more than 10 percent if a 
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firm was a risk-taking, globally systemically important financial institution. Banks 
confronted the immediate need to raise capital. CEOs warned of the negative impact on 
growth. But this was disputed by the BIS, which estimated the costs at as little as 0.6 
percent of GDP, a small price for fewer panics and crashes (The Economist, 2010). The 
position that Basel III was a good deal was underscored by the hawks who crafted the 
accord. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada, countered that the accord could 
save the G20 US$12.9 trillion, ‘30 percent of GDP in present-value terms’ (AFP, 2010). 
He was joined by BCBS Chairman Stefan Ingves and by Jaime Caruana, General 
Manager of the BIS, who made clear there would be no backsliding on Basel III. 
 
Where one stood on the success of the G20 at the end of 2010 was impacted by where one 
sat, which nation one represented, whether a state was in or out of the club, whether one 
was a U.S. or Chinese negotiator, and whether one was a banking regulator working 
feverishly behind the scenes at the FSB or the CEO of a regulated firm. Voices were 
raised and collegiality around the negotiating table was lacking, but reforms still 
continued at the technical level. 
 
In Toronto and Seoul, the G20 reached the outer limits of the new policy consensus 
paradigm. This was balanced by continued technical success in actual regulatory policy 
making. National governments disagreed over exit speeds and over stimulus versus 
austerity. Leaders, especially but not only the U.S. and China, playing to domestic 
interests and electoral and economic demands, clashed loudly over insoluble global 
macroeconomic differences and goals.  
 
These thorny issues are not new and they were not amenable to compromise and solution, 
because the G20 states’ national narratives of causes and solutions clash and diverge.  
Numerous actors and policy makers recognise the international monetary system was and 
is dysfunctional (The Economist, 2010). As Padoa-Schioppa noted, ‘Those eager to 
envisage the post-crisis era in constructive terms need to promote the reconstruction of a 
fully fledged international monetary order’ (Padoa-Schioppa, 2010b, p. 8). But periodic 
reform proposals have led nowhere (Palais Royale Initiative, 2011). The failure to design 
a new Bretton Woods is because the policy consensus and narrative does not extend to 
such highly contentious politically and economically sensitive issues. Neither level-one 
nor level-two win sets exist and the U.S. has neither the wish nor the power to force the 
new architecture into this space. This is not the end of World War II and Bretton Woods 
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II; power is much more diffuse now (Cohen, 2008a) and the hegemon weaker, even if still 
primus inter pares.  
 
Instead, the policy consensus remained confined to financial regulatory reform matters, 
where it was possible to discern the many fingerprints of the Western central banking 
community on the G20 declarations and agenda as it was progressively crafted and 
implemented in this period by those same individuals and their agencies. So while public 
discord is the overriding acoustic note heard at both Toronto and Seoul, behind the scenes 
the regulators continued their work, agreeing deals that could strengthen the system and 
potentially also change the nature of the institutional politics in the IMF in favour of the 
rising emerging powers in the future. This public divergence on global macroeconomic 
issues would be interrupted by the crisis in the Eurozone in 2011 and 2012. 
3.6.6 Cannes and Los Cabos: Dealing with the Eurozone crisis 
In 2011 and 2012, divergences amongst G20 leaders would continue to be seen, but 
events in the Eurozone force the actors to confront this latest manifestation of the 
financial crisis. President Sarkozy would see his planned G20 agenda sidelined by the 
crisis, and would almost make a breakthrough on the Eurozone. The Mexican G20 
Presidency, confronted by an even greater sense of urgency, would get a deal done in Los 
Cabos and once again prove the utility of the G20 as a global crisis management forum. 
 
Originally, President Sarkozy had started 2011 with a broad and highly ambitious agenda 
focussed on numerous structural global macroeconomic issues (Interview 17, 2012). 
Sarkozy had hoped to take action on issues that included commodity markets, capital 
flows, the perennial problem of global imbalances, and weaknesses in the international 
monetary system. The French agenda was broad and sweeping—too broad, according to 
critics (Interview 5, 2011) who maintained he reached too far looking for grand schemes 
on the global economy (Beattie, 2011).The French G20 Presidency showed the difficulty 
of seeking to make major breakthroughs in areas where G20 states have divergent 
interests (Dadush and Suominen, 2011). The harsh reality of the Eurozone crisis 
intervened. 
 
Sarkozy reached well beyond the edges of the new policy paradigm into areas that were 
highly controversial, but the weakness of this agenda was not tested as external events 
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derailed the ambitious plans, from the arrest of his main socialist rival Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, to the (far more important) crisis over Greece and a possible sovereign 
default. As a result, the French G20 Presidency focused primarily on the crisis in the 
Eurozone and Greece, not on other matters. This was to be expected since the G20 works 
best as a forum for rapid political action in extremis, and the crisis in Greece galvanized 
the leaders present. 
 
3.6.7 Greece dominates everything 
 
The French G20 Presidency and summit focused squarely on the crisis in Greece and the 
steps necessary to arrest the threat of a disorderly default in the Eurozone and possible 
contagion. But at this stage, the U.S. and Europeans were unwilling to do a deal offered 
by emerging-country leaders. 
 
Faced with the Greek and Eurozone crises, emerging countries went to Cannes offering to 
further increase SDR commitments at the IMF as a backstop; Brazil, China, and Russia 
supported the call for more quota resources (Interviews 20 and 21, 2012). But other 
leaders balked. U.S. officials argued there was no need for more IMF resources—that the 
EU had the funds and could solve its own problems (Interviews 14, 20 and 21, 2012; see 
also Blackden, 2012). This was correct. It was an internal political and fiscal matter—
whether Germany would pay—to save the Eurozone; but it was more complex than that. 
The U.S. resisted a further change in SDR quotas and votes that would have come with 
yet more emerging market cash, and U.S. officials knew they could not get further 
financing from Congress (Interview 21, 2012). Europeans also did not wish to deal with 
more changes in the balance of power at the IMF, which would logically also diminish 
their votes and voice (Interviews 21 and 22, 2012). The end result was that money was on 
the table from emerging countries but no deal on further finances for the IMF was 
reached at Cannes. A full deal would have to wait. 
 
The G20 Cannes Declaration reflects the forced change of focus caused by the Eurozone 
crisis and a failure to advance on other fronts. On global macro issues there was no major 
breakthrough on the monitoring of imbalances, but there was some modest progress on 
the metrics of the monitoring process (G20, 2011). Language on commodities, capital 
flows, and the international monetary system is included, but is weak and unspecific, as 
were other statements on a burgeoning list of issues from climate change to the marine 
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environment to social cohesion to the dead global trade round. Sarkozy reached for much 
at the outset and ended up with a declarative anodyne outcome which failed to live up to 
the start of his G20 Presidency. Despite a general lack of movement on global macro 
matters at the Cannes summit, with French leadership, the G20 did make progress on five 
architectural matters of future import. 
 
First, leaders determined there would be no G20 secretariat. The G20 would continue to 
be informal and driven by the chairing country and national Sherpas. Finance ministers 
saw this as a positive, because it retained the direct commitment by national leaders and 
ministers who would staff and act as negotiators on summit texts, deals, and outcomes 
(Interviews 12 and 17, 2012). National officials view the rejection formalization as 
preserving the forum’s flexibility and safeguarding its usefulness to political leaders 
while preserving state control over the process. 
 
Second, leaders agreed there would be a Troika of immediate past, current, and future 
G20 Presidents to enhance coordination and smooth transition from one country to 
another. This is a new and fitful construct currently, in that the current President and 
future Presidency both tend to resist sharing information about their drafting and plans 
(Interview 17, 2012). This may gradually improve and should help with continuity and 
assist those states less able to host the talks and the meetings that are needed around each 
summit. Once again, European fingerprints can be seen; this is exactly the same format as 
historically operated within the European Council.  
 
Third, leaders agreed to ‘the establishment of the FSB on an enduring organizational 
footing’ (G20, 2011). Even as G20 leaders rejected greater formalisation and 
institutionalisation of their own ad hoc forum, they agreed on strengthening the technical 
coordinating body central to cement success on financial reform. This was a clear 
indication of the G20 leaders’ support of the Board. It also reflected the continuing 
impact of the central banking community and the FSB Secretary General, who had 
pressed for a stronger legal foundation, against the complaints of some (Interview 15, 
2012). 
 
Fourth, Cannes included a barely noticed but potentially significant structural 
breakthrough on the monitoring of established FSB compensation practices and 
principles. Leaders agreed the creation of a Bilateral Complaints Handling Process (FSB, 
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2012a). This is a formal dispute settlements procedure similar to (yet less robust than) 
that used in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The implication of this small but 
important move will be dealt with in Chapter 4. It is yet more evidence of stealthy 
institution building by the central banking expert community, even as public disputes 
appeared to dominate Cannes. 
 
Fifth, Cannes marked the G20 leadership handover to non-core states. In Cannes, leaders 
agreed that, going forward, future summits would be led by Mexico in 2012, Russia in 
2013, Australia in 2014, and Turkey in 2015. After 2015, leadership of the G20 will be 
chosen from rotating regional groups, starting with the Asian grouping comprising China, 
Indonesia, Japan, and Korea (Cannes, 2011). Thus, Cannes signalled non core largely 
emerging countries would begin to take the lead in the G20. European and North 
American states would step back, providing an opportunity for emerging market 
leadership and recognition of changing state power dynamics. But it may also result in 
possible gradual partial disengagement of the core from G20 commitments once 
economic stability is established. However, this possibility would not arise imminently. 
 
In conclusion, Cannes was a failure if evaluated on Sarkozy’s ambitious goals, few of 
which he achieved. The summit also failed to secure a deal on the Eurozone, although it 
came close to doing so. However, leaders took a series of institutional decisions that 
solidified state control over G20 summitry, and simultaneously strengthened the 
institutional foundation of the FSB, and its dispute settlement procedures, and laid out the 
future role of emerging markets. In the end, the Cannes outcome was mixed to positive.  
 
3.6.8  Finally, a firewall 
 
Mexico took over the leadership of the G20 in 2012 but confronted the same fundamental 
problem as the French: the need to halt the market panic and restore some calm in 
markets so as to allow time for the solution of the troubles in the Eurozone. Ultimately, as 
a junior partner, the Mexican G20 Presidency could do little but try and referee disputes 
among the principal G20 powers as they grappled with the Eurozone panic. 
 
Obama Administration officials by 2012 were increasingly angered by the continuing 
failure of EU states and the ECB to halt the panic. Obama’s election prospects rested, in 
part, on the economic outlook in America, and a recession in Europe could prove 
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economically and, thus, electorally, costly. Europeans reacted angrily to the lecturing 
from Washington. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso lashed out, 
complaining that the crisis was originated in the U.S. and contaminated Europe’s 
financial sector, adding we are ‘not coming here to receive lessons from nobody’ (BBC, 
2012). The criticism stung because it hit the mark. European leaders were consistently 
behind the curve in dealing with the market panic and repeatedly failed to send a clear 
message of action and resolution. 
 
In hurried negotiations that built upon an outline deal formulated earlier at the April 2012 
spring meeting of the IMF, the U.S. stressed that Europe must deal with its own crisis; 
they had the resources and they should act first (Interviews 14, 19 and 21, 2012; see also 
Blackden, 2012). At that point in 2012, the administration had no room domestically and 
could not provide more IMF funding; U.S. negotiators had no negotiating space. U.S. 
leaders wanted a deal but they could not act because of opposition from level-two actors 
(i.e., Congress). Emerging market leaders were again willing to fund a firewall, but 
Europeans opposed additional finance from emerging countries if the cost was quota and 
voice reductions in the IMF (Interviews 20 and 21, 2012). The U.S. also opposed any 
further shrinkage of their voting power. Emerging countries, however, could not be 
excessively generous without changes in quotas and votes to assuage their own voters, 
who had no interest in bailing out the rich and foolish of the West (Interview 21, 2012). 
 
Ultimately, a deal was forced by the urgency of events in Los Cabos. The threat of a 
default in Greece cascading into Spain and Italy focused minds. Forced together by crisis 
events, G20 leaders agreed a massive US$461 billion package of additional bilateral 
funds. This was a success for both the G20 and IMF. Cash came from Europe (US$200 
billion-plus) as exceptional bilateral financing and from emerging and other economies, 
especially Japan. It had the Europeans self-finance their bailout with the fig leaf of a 
potential IMF program for ailing economies without any further reforms of IMF 
governance, thus dodging immediate fights over governance. On balance, in Los Cabos, 
the crisis made the G20 agree a workable deal with a large additional resource boost. 
 
Once again, this was not the only area of progress. Just as in Cannes, central bank 
technicians were busy in the FSB, building their structures, and sending them to the G20 
for their imprimatur. Two areas are worth a brief comment. 
 
 99
First, the FSB Charter was further clarified and the internal structure enhanced and 
detailed. Second, the FSB was put on a solid financial footing with five years of financing 
agreed by the BIS, avoiding the need to return to the G20 states every time they required 
resources. These incremental but important first-order changes underscored how 
influential the FSB’s central banking backers remained as the leaders, agenda setters, and 
now direct financiers of the key coordinating forum and community within the global 
financial architecture. 
 
3.6.9 Emerging country voices 
 
Phase three was a period of increasing discord interrupted by the need to address the 
Eurozone crisis. It is also notable because of the rising volume of the emerging country 
leaders’ voices and their greater influence and willingness to act and negotiate hard, for 
example, on the IMF deal that was almost struck in Cannes. China’s leaders repeatedly 
clashed head-on with their U.S. counterparts over imbalances and related global macro 
issues, national political economy goals, and drivers. Other emerging countries raised 
their voices in 2011 and 2012. Differences became more marked and public, but the 
disagreements are taking place inside the G20 structures. They are contained within a 
relatively new existing process not taking place outside or entirely bilaterally, where the 
chances of a rapid and damaging escalation of claim and counterclaim can be much 
higher.  
 
Not only are emerging country voices easier to discern in phase three, but they are 
beginning to take a formal leadership role in the presidency of the G20. The leaders of 
South Korea and Mexico both acquitted themselves well. The former refereed an 
imbalances shouting match between the G2 and still continued financial reform with the 
landmark signing of Basel III under its leadership, and the latter got a deal on the 
Eurozone firewall. These are not minor successes. Thus, two emerging country powers 
delivered major breakthroughs even during a time of increasing public diplomatic tension. 
 
The impact of individual emerging countries varies. This ranges from increasingly 
effective interventions from the Chinese (Darling, 2010; see also Interview 8, 2011) to 
what is seen as sporadic but sometimes effective engagement from India (Interview 12, 
2012), and general silence and ‘disengagement’ from Russia (Interview 18, 2012). The 
latter is notable given that Russia is President of the G20 in 2013, despite having very 
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little input prior to this leadership role. Such differences in influence and impact are to be 
expected. The emerging country leaders are not cohesive (or indeed a real group at all). 
The leaders come to the table with divergent views, cultural and political economy 
approaches, and varying degrees of interest in the economic and financial matters placed 
before them. Unlike the discernible EU voice, there is no one emerging economy view. 
Instead, what can be observed are competing national perspectives voiced with different 
degrees of forcefulness and effectiveness. 
Finally, irrespective of issues around individual leader’s capabilities and those of their 
officials and governments, given the nature of consensus decision making, an 
unwillingness to change position or a refusal to agree in the G20 remains a powerful tool. 
It is one used by emerging countries such as China to stall G20 policy developments 
when they see fit to do so.  
In conclusion, phase three demonstrates the paradigm shift’s limitations: re-regulation, 
yes; global macroeconomic breakthroughs on currency levels and international monetary 
system management, no. The period sees increased national posturing and defence of 
national economic policies and positions against G20 encroachment. It is also marked by 
emerging countries growing into the process and increasingly asserting their influence 
and taking leadership roles within the structure, a positive change with implications for 
the future. Phase three shows the limitations of summitry as national differences reappear. 
But it also demonstrates the forum’s continued utility in crisis situations where 
negotiators’ win sets open up, allowing for additional breakthroughs. 
Behind the bluster and G20 posturing over divergent national economic polices and 
interests, the re-regulation of financial markets continued. Dissension at the G20 level did 
not translate into paralysis at the technical level. At that level, the leadership from the 
core continues to build out structures born in 2009. The FSB’s status was formalized. Its 
financing for the next five years is set. The internal structure is delineated in greater 
detail. This is institution building up close and carefully done. At the very birth of the 
FSB, ‘If it had had any power it would not have been created’ (Interview 28, 2012, p.25). 
But since 2009 and through phase three and the end of 2012, the central banking 
leadership in charge of the FSB has more than made up for that weakness with step-by-
step adjustments designed to create a lasting institution at the centre of redesign by 
stealth. 
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On the policy front, phase three of the G20 evolution has also been marked by 
considerable steps towards self-imposed goals—on Basel III, on compensation, on 
derivatives, and in other areas. The policy objectives sketched out in 2008-2009 
continued to be actively worked on from 2010 to 2013. This reform wave is still 
underway and yet to peak and subside. The narrative shift commenced in 2008-2009 is 
still being translated into policy output. This is being done by largely the same principals 
and experts from the core as was the case at the outset. As stated in the Introduction to 
this thesis, policies are not uniformly strong in all directions. Indeed, the further away 
from direct control of the central banking community, the weaker they sometimes appear. 
But there is no doubt that at the close of 2012, the policy actors are still engaged to a 
degree that prior to the crisis would not have been imagined. Today, they are working on 
policy formulation and also on paradigm maintenance and defence. But that also is 
normal, because after a paradigm shift, a community must still defend that which it has 
implemented. 
3.7 Conclusion: watching a paradigm shift take place 
 
The creation and evolution of the G20 since 2008 is marked by a narrative and 
paradigmatic shift in worldview in regulatory policy objectives, and more gradually, 
actual outcomes. Leaders fought over and began to construct a new worldview in 2008-
2009 which rejected certain laissez-faire neo-liberal truths and self-regulatory tropes. The 
new paradigm views self-regulation as an oxymoron. Going forward, financial markets 
would be re-regulated and supervised more aggressively. A new era of international 
regulatory activism was ushered into existence. The power of the G20 member states, 
long in retreat, was brought to bear to re-regulate global finance to an extent, scope, and 
depth not seen since the 1970s and the end of the Bretton Woods system.  
 
The new worldview could not take shape in an instant. It took time to create and make 
more solid and lasting through the building of new forums and through the reform of 
institutions and their resources. Making the shift real and lasting also required significant 
policy changes and reforms. To achieve this and to carry out detailed reforms, the G20 
backed, relied on, and empowered a particular epistemic community—the same central 
bankers who had failed to see the crisis coming in the first place. But the central bankers’ 
culpability was not necessarily an impediment to action, because the community 
collectively grasped a new worldview. 
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G20-sanctioned reforms were designed, enumerated, and led by this chastened but re-
empowered central banking community. They had gone through the crisis with the G20 
leaders and had a particularly acute common perception of the failures of global financial 
markets and the dangers posed by too much market and not enough state power applied to 
the regulation of those markets. The community, in particular, had a clear sense of the 
nature of the regulatory paradigm shift in worldview they believed was necessary to 
deliver financial stability going forward. They began to build the new architecture headed 
by the FSB and commenced re-regulation swiftly in 2008-2009. There was a burst of 
construction followed by a process of gradual policy work and additions that appear 
designed to strengthen the new forums and structures to make the new paradigm 
progressively more robust. The process of making the worldview actual on the ground is 
yet to be completed in 2013. This is potentially a sign of the durability and nature of the 
shift that began in 2008 and which continues today. 
 
The creation of the FSB was the G20’s technical-level financial reform masterstroke. The 
FSB is clearly at the centre in the new global architecture. Its senior national state-level 
technical leadership and its own staff leadership have leveraged its position into the 
central coordinator reporting directly to the G20 leadership. Today, the FSB is the most 
effective transnational policy network; its sits right at the centre of all G20 regulatory 
action and coordinates and reports on all major work streams, including those it does not 
undertake and which are tasked to others. Because of behind-the-scenes construction 
steps (sanctioned by the G20) from 2008 through 2013, institution building by stealth, 
today the FSB is increasingly solid, permanent, and robust. The longer it occupies this 
space, the stronger it may become institutionally. But it remains driven by its principally 
Western members and by the G20 leadership. A dearth in leadership or disputes at the 
G20 level could dilute its influence, but this seems unlikely to happen soon.  
 
3.7.1 Perspective matters 
 
Critics (such as Johnson, or Stiglitz) maintain that what the G20 did in phases one, two, 
and three does not amount to the outline of a meaningful paradigm shift, that the changes 
do not go far enough, that the same actors are in charge, and that the adjustments are not 
radical enough. This ultimately depends of the perspective and the time frame through 
which events are viewed. Looked at from a greater distance, there does appear to be a real 
shift in the policy consensus, and in the underlying re-regulatory narrative, a partial 
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rejection of the laissez faire neo-liberal worldview amongst leaders and the elite level 
technocratic community. The structures and actual policy outcomes that flow from the 
new narrative during the evolution of the G20 reflect this shift. These architectural and 
policy changes commenced in phases one and two, are being tested in phase three. The 
changes are not yet complete; they remain partially formed and are being disputed by 
opponents. Taken as a totality, however, the change in worldview and the reforms 
commenced are indicative of a paradigm shift in approach to international economic 
diplomacy and re-regulation that is visible and actual in ongoing processes and summitry. 
As a result, ‘whether the task is developing ideas, reaching consensus on their  
desirability, or moving from ideas to implementation, the G20 which has working groups 
active in all these areas is where the action is’ (Eichengreen, 2009). 
 
The outline of a new financial regulatory worldview and associated new and rebuilt 
structures (G20-FSB-IMF) are becoming visible. If the scope of the shift is still somewhat 
indistinct to critics, this is because they are viewing events from the wrong perspective 
and over too short a time frame.  
 
Previous international and national shifts are instructive. International and national 
economic paradigm shifts take a long time to become fully apparent. Just as the ‘Bretton 
Woods system did not emerge from a single moment but rather from a much more 
extended historical process’ (Subacchi and Cooper 2010, p. 607), so a similar pattern is 
observed in this case. National paradigm shifts are similar in their pace of evolution.  
 
The Thatcherite revolution ‘did not spring upon the world fully formed and fully armed’ 
(Payne, 2005. p. 74); it took years to be ideologically conceptualized (by thinkers such as 
Milton Freidman, Sir Keith Joseph and others) it was then gradually realised via policy 
shifts. The winter of discontent, 1978-1979, in the UK created crisis conditions that set 
the stage for the election of Mrs. Thatcher. She was swept to power and began 
contentious reforms. But the extent, scale, and long-term impact of her changes in Britain 
were not immediately apparent. Mrs. Thatcher tackled some policy areas (the trade 
unions) and not others (the National Health Service). But a new consensus did take shape. 
Looked at in totality over a longer period, it is now widely recognised that there was a 
Thatcherite revolution, a neo-liberal paradigm shift in certain economic ideas and policies 
sparked in 1979 (Blyth, 2002; Gamble, 1998; Hall, 1993).  
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A partial answer to critics of the G20-led process is, therefore, to suggest they look at the 
process and reforms underway with a different, longer, and broader, perspective. When 
one does so the paradigm shift can be seen to first emerge as a change in the ideological 
stance of G20 leaders and to a greater extent policy making technocrats vis-à-vis the merit 
of regulation of global markets and firms and application of collective state power to that 
task. That narrative consensus is then applied to the difficult task of policy making. 
 
Drawing on Kuhn’s work, it is useful to view the crisis and the G20-led paradigm shift as 
waves (see Figure 3.2). The crisis peaks first in 2008. Policy makers rush to react in 
Washington, London, and Pittsburgh, creating their own wave of reformist shift in 
worldview and policy actions through 2009, 2010, and beyond, the full outlines of which 
are not yet visible. The peak of the economic disaster is now past. The amplitude of the 
reform wave is greater still and may not be fully appreciated at this point in time, for that 
is the nature of a large wave that has yet to crest. The lone surfer cannot fully determine 
the size of the wave when they are riding it.  
 
Note: LTCM = Long-term Capital Management collapse. 
Figure 3.2 The Regulatory Reform Wave 
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In case A in the figure, the paradigm worldview and policy shift continues beyond 2013, and 
the G20 and its regulatory surrogates maintain vigilance and continue constructing the new 
architecture, not as frenetically as in phases one and two, but still in a diligent manner in 
phase three. The central banking technocrats leading the FSB, which direct much of the 
policy implementation of financial reform, continue the work started in 2009 and act to 
maintain and defend the paradigm. This is, in fact, what the evidence discussed in this chapter 
suggests is happening throughout phase three and through 2013.  
 
Certainly in phase three there is evident public discord at the G20 summitry level. But 
paradigm maintenance continues nonetheless. In phase three, leaders are determined to 
maintain the G20’s flexibility as an informal state-led forum controlled by themselves and 
their finance ministries (i.e., not to institutionalise the forum or extend its membership too 
far). At the same time, however, G20 leaders also back a further series of measures that 
strengthen the institutional structure of the FSB and processes below them. Thus, leaders 
retain flexibility for the political forum while they are engaged in institution building, which 
continues led by the epistemic central banking community backed by the G20.  
 
In case B, the policy paradigm and policy outcomes its produces lessen in strength beyond 
2013, and the reform wave weakens in response to various factors, including G20 discord, 
national-political-economy-driven clashes, slow global growth and, potentially poor 
implementation of agreed standards. Outcome B cannot be dismissed at this stage. However, 
the indicators are that the paradigm shift and policy reform wave and redesign begun in 2009 
is continuing today if measured by regulatory impact and other indicators, within certain 
boundaries. 
 
It is important to recognise the limits of the new paradigm. All such shifts take place within 
particular science or policy universes and are subject to constraints based on the strength of 
the discoveries and the consensus narrative that compelled their adoption in the first place, 
and supports their maintenance once a shift has occurred. It should not be expected, and the 
evidence does not show, a G20 paradigm shift that is constantly growing in size and volume; 
this is not an economic big bang and ever accelerating policy universe. 
 
What is seen are clear limits to the expansion of the G20 and FSB-led paradigm shift. The 
shift is a rejection of laissez-faire neo-liberal truths and the adoption of a state-power-backed 
aggressive, re-regulatory approach and programme, not a complete abandonment of current 
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free market structures and economic norms. According to Padoa-Schioppa, ‘If the years 
before the crisis were years of overreliance on markets and mistrust in government – or, more 
simply put, too much market and too little government – what we have seen in 2008 and 2009 
has been a spectacular comeback of government’ (Padoa-Schioppa, 2010a, p. 8). That 
comeback, that reassertion of collective state oversight and control, is real, but the shift has 
limits. 
 
It does not extend to include perennial global macroeconomic issues such as imbalances or 
national economic or currency policies. As this chapter has shown, there is no G20 policy 
consensus visible there, only discord. And, as has been shown, a paradigm shift does not 
occur if there is a lack of consensus on anomalies, failures, and solutions. Instead, what 
occurs are disputes and the maintenance of the status quo. Such clashes are not necessarily a 
weakness of the G20-triggered shift itself, but are instead the outer limits of it. Beyond that 
boundary, elements of ‘paradigm wars’ and paradigm conflict still exist.  
 
What is notable in the case of the G20’s creation, process, and evolution is not how limited 
its policy effect may become, but how fast it has proceeded and how many areas it is 
impacting. Bankers themselves (admittedly self-interestedly) complain of the huge effect of 
the multiple national and international regulatory processes started by the G20. But they are 
correct that this is a significant multifaceted and possibly durable re-regulation process; 
central bankers deliberately designed it to restrict risk taking and decrease the danger of 
another crisis; it is meant to make banking and risk taking more costly and less appealing, 
and it is not meant to be temporary.  
 
It is to be expected that the impact of actual policy changes begun by the G20 and FSB 
fluctuate and currently lack consistency area to area and country to country across the globe 
in mid-2013. Policy making is a messy process, after all. Viewed in isolation, individual 
policies promulgated as a result of the G20-led and FSB-championed shift may look more or 
less strong. But viewed in totality and within the wider cultural context, the fundamental 
hypotheses that what we see is underway is a G20 directed, central bank-designed, and still 
being constructed series of concrete policies underpinned by the narrative and policy 
consensus paradigm shift among regulators and central bankers . In 2013 the new consensus 
is being translated into first, second and third order changes in coordinated international 
financial regulatory policies (Hall 1993). Once again, perspective matters, and the observer 
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may be too close to events that continue to unfold to fully appreciate the nature of the change 
in worldview started by the G20 and the FSB leadership in 2008–2009. 
 
3.7.2 What type of paradigm you get depends on who leads 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the creation of the G20 forum brought together old 
leadership from North America and Europe plus the leaders of the major emerging economies 
in a manner not previously seen and to an extent that will have a significant impact in the 
future. This change was not and is not temporary window dressing and it cannot be rescinded. 
Today, the leadership forum of global international economic diplomacy is now permanently 
larger. However, especially during phases one and two of the forum’s evolution, the burst of 
activity and the reform agenda was driven by North American and European leaders. The 
crisis was their fault, and weaknesses in their supervision, their regulation, and their markets 
needed to be addressed. Emerging market leaders agreed with this assessment and did not 
oppose G20 reforms and action plans which would predominantly impact regulation of 
markets at the core. They permitted the core in the G20, advised by their central banks, to 
devise the redesign and reform agenda in 2008 and 2009.  
 
Crucially, principal officials from those states directing the detailed re-regulatory programme 
tended to be hawks—i.e., supportive of state power reassertion and aggressive re-regulation 
of global finance. It will become clear in Chapter 5 that the detailed financial reform agenda, 
within the FSB and within the SSBs during phases one and two, and arguably even in phase 
three, also reflect these actors’ goals and not those of a smaller grouping (from France, 
Germany, and Japan) seeking weaker responses.  
 
U.S. and European powers moved away from a reliance on the G7-G8 groupings in favour of 
a still exclusive but much more inclusive collectivist (Germain, 2001) process over which 
they continued to retain a pivotal degree of influence and control. They expanded the 
collectivism of the wider forum but also simultaneously used the G20 as an instrument of 
‘hegemonic incorporation’ of emerging countries within a new architecture still largely 
designed by and led by members of the G7 ‘as was’ (Beeson and Bell, 2009, p. 67) 
 
This dominance by those at the core has led some to suggest the G20’s emergence and its 
leadership entrenched ‘the institutional leadership of the advanced imperial powers of old’ 
(Kirton, 2010, p. 13), or in other words, the G7 (Porter, 2000; Soederberg, 2002). Perhaps in 
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phases one and two it could be concluded that this was the case. The shift, reform agenda, 
and its policy prescriptions turned out to be a Western package addressing Western failings 
and designed by Western leaders and their more hawkish technocrats. But the emerging 
countries’ roles and approach to the G20 process was itself evolving, and not much should be 
read into their relative silence at the start of the process, when they were brand new members 
of this still exclusive club. They were still around the table for the first time, every time, with 
their voices finally being heard to a notably greater degree than in the past, and were in 
support of the direction of the paradigm shift.  The G20 does not signify a wholesale change 
in power relationships. But change it is, and over time, the effect will become more and more 
apparent.  
 
3.7.3 Emerging countries growing into their roles 
 
In 2008 and 2009, key emerging economy players were getting much of what they wanted. In 
the first instance, that was a seat at the G20 table and an enhanced voice within the FSB and 
IMF. Having secured this, emerging market leaders would engage gradually, to different 
degrees, and on different topics, depending on their familiarity with the subjects at hand and 
their relative economic power and assertiveness. Importantly, the G20’s policy direction was 
sympathetic to some of the emerging state leaders’ economic goals and ideological stances. 
China, for example, was supportive of greater financial regulation and control, higher capital 
standards, and macro-prudential oversight; it was already implementing such policies 
internally, and its policy makers had made it clear they saw the financial crisis as having 
illuminated the flaws in the U.S. system. They underscored the need for increased regulation 
and a move away from the Anglo-Saxon model (MacGregor, 2012). Sitting in the Forbidden 
City in Beijing, it would be reasonable for officials to see the policy shift as being a positive 
one worthy of support. Thus, a lack of opposition to this redesign and re-regulatory agenda in 
phases one and two by China and others is not necessarily surprising. This relative silence 
also changed markedly in phase three. 
 
Emerging-country voices are not only critical but also increasingly additive and strategic in 
phase three. This is very obviously the case in the talks over a Eurozone firewall in 2011 and 
2012. Emerging-country leaders came to the table with solid offers, cash, and reasonable 
quid-pro-quo demands. That they ultimately were rejected by the core states guarding their 
positions inside the IMF is less important. More significant is that the emerging countries 
actively engaged to an extent not seen in phases one and two. In doing this, they were 
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negotiating within the new G20 process advocating their own political and power goals. They 
took positions that showed an increased commitment to the G20 process and, not 
incidentally, to the IMF itself, an institution that a mere five years earlier they had practically 
abandoned because of what they saw as its almost total lack of legitimacy. This is clear 
evidence of the G20 process fostering change and the emerging countries buying into the 
process and engaging in a way they would not have done in the absence of the G20 structures 
and summitry. 
 
In summary, after the Washington summit, and as a result of each subsequent interaction, it 
appears that emerging countries and their leaders are becoming more used to the process, 
supportive of the framework, and assertive within the structure. Certainly, the G20 is still 
exclusive, but the table is larger and many more key players are present. This club, founded 
as a leaders’ state-to-state diplomatic construct, will not satisfy critics (Aslund, 2009). But it 
is broader and more representative than previous forums (Bradford, 2009a; Subacchi, 2009), 
and it is more legitimate as a result (Subacchi, 2010b). It can therefore be seen as a relative 
improvement. 
 
3.7.4 Inclusion postpones a head-on clash 
 
Instead of a head-on clash between the rising powers and a slowly declining global hegemon 
outside of existing structures, as could have occurred without the latter’s inclusion in the new 
superstructure, disputes are now internalized and modified by the processes that are in place. 
Most of those processes and reforms have been constructed largely by western leaders and 
their officials, albeit backed by the emerging powers and paradigmatically redesigned. Now 
what exists is a U.S.-backed empowerment of the leadership of emerging countries in the 
structures, and in return the U.S. may prolong its own centrality in the process within 
institutions that it helped construct and now maintains.  
 
As emerging countries take over the leadership of the G20, they will take a larger and larger 
role, indicative of this permanent but gradual adjustment in power relationships within the 
new architecture. North American and European voices may still dominate for the short to 
medium term, but the balance of power is changing within the flexible G20-led architecture.  
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3.7.5 The G20 as a flexible leadership response to the crisis 
 
The G20’s success after its hasty creation and during its formative and early reformist period 
has depended not only on the pressure of events and the urgency of action, but also on the 
nature of the forum itself. Part of the forum’s success is due to the flexibility provided by the 
G20 meeting format. In crisis, placing all leaders in one room is effective and can produce 
results. It did in London when Gordon Brown locked the door until a deal was done (Darling, 
2010). Creating a forum where leaders can confront major issues head-on, even when they 
are in dispute, is invaluable because leaders, face-to-face, can strike a deal when Sherpas 
cannot. Even when a deal cannot be done, small, incremental steps are still often taken. Other 
more formal settings, such as the International Monetary and Financial Committee, do not 
replicate the tension, the degree of urgency, or this action-oriented format (Interview 21, 
2012). 
 
The evidence analysed from the summits shows that the G20 forum, because it is ad hoc, still 
relatively small, and has only the major old big and new big players at the table, does indeed 
produce relatively rapid decision making in times of crisis. The Washington Summit lasted 
less than 24 hours and the London Summit only marginally longer, and a general accord 
amongst key actors and consensus was reached swiftly. The G20 as a relatively small, 
nimble, non-rules-based forum was able to make a rapid economic impact and force 
regulatory progress in 2008-2009 and in 2010 (in Seoul on Basel IIII), despite very public 
spats and ‘currency wars’. In the G20, there is a necessary trade-off between legitimacy, 
representation, and effectiveness (Patrick, 2009). What is seen in the G20 is an updated 
concentration of state power designed to more closely reflect 21st century geopolitical 
realities.  However, critics are not easily assuaged by small adjustments in relative power in a 
still exclusive forum that was admittedly nimble in the face of the crisis. 
 
3.7.6 Legitimacy still matters 
 
What is obviously necessary in a crisis and accepted even by those excluded in an 
emergency, when a great many risk almost all if nothing is done, appears much less appealing 
when the wave of the crisis dissipates and the chosen forum continues to exclude the many 
and the small (Vestergaard, 2011; Vestergaard and Wade, 2010). Complaints that the G20, 
the architecture, and the process it has constructed are illegitimate continue to be heard. 
Critics warn that it ‘represents an extraordinary regression in international governance to 
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Prince Metternich’s concert of great powers in Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars in 1814–
15’ (Aslund, 2009). Aslund and other champions of universal institutions reject the ‘small 
and flexible’ defence. They retort that the G20 represents a retreat to the power politics of the 
past. It still excludes 150 of 192 countries and is not universal (Payne, 2010). It is condemned 
as a shift towards a ‘plurilateralism of the big’, with the smaller states still frozen out of the 
informal summitry processes (Vestergaard, 2011, p. 7). 
 
The G20 is, it is said, usurping the sovereignty of those excluded from the process. Just such 
a concern pushed UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to counter with his own, much less 
successful, forums (Cooper, 2010). Excluded national leaders, such as former Danish Prime 
Minister Lars Rasmussen, concur and have voiced concern about a sustained move away 
from universal institutions in favour of a G20 exclusive state-power-based, informal forum 
(Rasmussen, 2011), even as they recognise the forum’s effectiveness in 2008–2009 and its 
improvement over the G7-G8 approach (Vestergaard and Wade, 2010). 
The critics are right. The rise of the G20 and FSB process is a reassertion of state power and 
more informal political structures and processes in place of universalism. Their complaints 
about the process of selection and the forum’s lack of regional representation and balance are 
also reasonable. This route was chosen in part because key actors did not want to use the IMF 
because of its own perceived failings and weaknesses.  In addition, the resort to an elevation 
of the G20 was a sudden move, unplanned and forced by events in 2008. 
The wave of policy making and institution rebuilding and reform that result from the crisis, 
and the decisions that are made in such times, are never perfect and seldom please even most 
of those consulted, let alone all of those left outside the room. That was the case in 
Washington, and it remains the case today. The G20 was hastily formed from a previous 
body and so exhibits, as most similar constructs would, its own, new, legitimacy gap. To be 
sure, small steps are being taken to increase communication amongst a wider grouping (it is 
now really the G20 plus five).  
However, by increasing the membership, its breadth of agenda could undermine the G20’s 
identified strengths. It works now because of its flexible and small nature, and expansion, if 
excessive, would be foolish and counterproductive. Such steps could diminish its 
effectiveness or just drive the decision makers to select other mechanisms to pursue common 
policy goals. But the G20 is not going to become a permanent free-standing resourced 
universal international body. Decisions taken at the Cannes Summit make it clear it will not 
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evolve into a body with the features of a global universal institution, like the IMF or WTO. 
Membership creep may still occur, via the technical bodies, in particular, but universality is 
off the table. Given that fact, those outside will need to find others ways of impacting an 
evolving process rather than simply demanding admittance.   
The G20-FSB-IMF reforms are a response to a particular, especially severe, global financial 
and economic crisis. The forums continue to evolve and the process and cycle have elements 
of dialectic contained within them. 
 
3.7.7 Dissension and the dialectic of crises response and reaction 
 
The recent history of the creation and early growth of the G20 follows a similar trajectory as 
responses to past national financial crises. There is a crisis response phase in 2008; a concrete 
reform phase in 2009; and a tension between the new consensus and dissention among states' 
leaders from 2010 to 2013. Today, the evidence suggests that, at the G20 level, but not yet at 
the technical level, public disputes have become increasingly vocal and strident. As a degree 
of economic normalcy returns, in part thanks to actions in stages one and two, the benefits of 
collective action seem less compelling to G20 leaders. This, too, should be expected. The 
limits of the paradigm have been reached. 
 
The issues left on the table are those that are not part of the agreed crisis-formed policy 
consensus. They are grounded in competing national paradigms of growth and economic 
policy. Still, the negotiators grapple with the issues, almost always unsuccessfully, 
particularly as regards imbalances. Historical antecedents can be seen, with similar disputes 
occurring repeatedly over time—especially over currency, trade, and surplus matters. With no 
consensus on causes, solutions, and actions in these areas, no progress is possible. Now, with 
the crisis behind them, G20 leaders grapple with difficult, potentially insoluble, global 
political economy issues. The very state power that was centripetal in the crisis and reform 
phases now is centrifugal in phase three because their macroeconomic and currency goals 
cannot be reconciled. 
 
Thus, we have the dialectic: crisis management, reform and results, leading to a consequent 
return to nations pursuing their own national interests and the consequent increase in public 
disunity due to this greater economic stability. So the cycle continues.  A period of some 
years of relative calm may occur. A gradual amnesia will occur amongst the regulators and 
(certainly) amongst the regulated banks as to the lessons of this most recent crisis. Troubles 
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will build once again. An unanticipated crisis will occur, and the cycle of crisis management, 
concrete reform, redesign, and eventual dissension amongst actors will commence again. 
 
Putnam’s model (Putnam, 1988) applied to the crisis and to the G20 and its evolution follows 
a similar fluctuating rhythm. In phase one, national negotiators are forced together by the 
severity of global economic events. Level-one goals overlap. Level-two blocking interests of 
each side are muted or overlap. Win sets are enlarged and accessible. Thus, there is the basis 
for a policy consensus and swift action post-crisis. In phase two, there is construction of the 
policy consensus and continued overlap of level-one goals. At this time, regulators 
collectively move swiftly without reference to their level-two goals and constituents. Win 
spaces are still clearly seen and seized by the central banking community to make the new 
consensus concrete via specific policy changes backed by level-one actors. In phase three, as 
economic normalcy returns, in part because of the effective and aggressive collective steps 
taken in phases one and two, reforms already agreed continue at a technical level, but 
disputes driven by level two domestic issues and lobbies reemerge. National actors begin to 
reassert their own distinct goals, blocking further consensus or further adding to the still new 
re-regulatory paradigm. Policy consensus and overlap disappears (for new macroeconomic 
and nontechnical issues). It is back to business and bickering as usual. 
 
The changes wrought as a result of the 2007-2008 crisis are real. The severity of the crisis 
forced the beginning of a paradigm shift worldview among technocrats and in certain 
regulatory areas and a series of interrelated reforms that continue today. But the economy 
goes through boom and bust cycles, and the response by policy makers operates in cycles, as 
well. 
Eventually, as in previous lesser economic crises, when the crisis dissipates, the urgency 
evaporates and state commitment to the process will tend to weaken. It is unlikely, therefore, 
that a further extension of the policy consensus is possible post-crisis. To the contrary, 
completing national narratives, national interests, and national objectives are again becoming 
the norm, and the G20 is becoming hamstrung. In addition, when external pressures are 
removed, or a summit’s leadership proves ineffectual, summitry is less effective. Since it is a 
non-rules-based, ad hoc, consensus-driven forum, the G20 is most effective in a crisis. It will 
tend to lose focus and drive in normal, less economically fraught periods, and disputes at 
summits will increase. This is the nature of the forum and of episodic global summitry that 
responds to external crises and events.  
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The G20 is, however, a permanent addition to the top of the architecture of international 
economic and financial diplomacy. State-to-state, power-based diplomacy is back and is here 
to stay. Critics of the process therefore need to seek other ways to impact policy making 
indirectly, (through the IMF, for instance), rather than just demanding admittance, or they 
should look to the policy process below the G20 summit declarations—that is to say, inside 
the FSB. It is this new institution which has taken the consensus in the G20 and made the 
paradigm shift real and potentially long lasting. It is this body, a direct creation of the G20 in 
2009 and their central banking community, which acts as the central contractor of financial 
reform and whose decisions and policy pronouncements change the financial rules and reality 
for banks and investors across the globe, developed and developing, North and South, East 
and West. 
 
The following two chapters analyse the FSB and its policy output. It is this forum and its 
community which is the most important actor and institutional product of the G20-led 
response to the 2008 financial crisis. It is at the heart of the G20’s crisis response and reform 
drive. The success and resilience of the elite driven focused re-regulatory paradigm shift 
depends on the actions and output of the FSB-coordinated process begun in 2009 and which 
is still underway. Such shifts are indeed ideologicial shifts. To become real and lasting, 
however, they require that actual third-order policy changes be constructed, defended and, 
when necessary, further added to. It is for this reason that the role of the FSB is pivotal in any 
attempt to judge the long-term impact of the creation of the G20 and its policy agenda since 
2008. 
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Chapter 4. The Financial Stability Board: Its Creation and Structure 
 
‘Institutional change only makes sense by reference to the ideas that inform agents’ 
responses to moments of uncertainty and crisis’. 
(Blyth, 2002) 
 
‘The FSB is the fourth pillar in the system of global governance’. 
(Geithner, in Helleiner, 2010) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The G20’s enlargement of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to include emerging countries, 
and its decision to refashion it into an empowered Financial Stability Board (FSB), is the 
most significant reform of the global financial architecture undertaken by the G20. This 
chapter will outline the central role that an elite, expert, tight-knit epistemic community 
(Haas, 1992a; Helleiner, 1994), primarily composed of central bank principals from a few 
Western states, played at the Board’s creation and in delineating its structure and the scope of 
its activities going forward. Not only are members of the FSB the recipients of the G20’s 
political capital, but they also play a highly influential role in fashioning the reform mandate 
that the G20 agreed in 2008-2009 and subsequently. 
 
This community of officials, it will be shown, is essential to the creation and maintenance of 
a paradigm shift focused on state regulation of financial markets firms, and to the diffusion of 
policy (Levi-Faur, 2005; Lazer, 2005) observed in 2008 and 2009. That shift continues to be 
gradually strengthened by this community even during phase three of the G20’s existence. A 
transnational policy community that largely failed to anticipate the financial crisis in advance 
(Perlman, 2012; Vanoli, 2010) succeeded in seizing control over the reform and redesign via 
the FSB and to comes out of the process reinvigorated and more powerful than before the 
crisis. 
 
From its birth in 2009, the leadership of the FSB rapidly developed the Board’s structure of a 
permanent institution, even though the forum started with no formal power and today still 
lacks some of the aspects normally expected of an international organization. This new and 
complex multilevel structure did not exist before the crisis. Yet, in 2013, the FSB is the 
dominant coordinating forum, underpinned by the financial regulatory transnational policy 
network and epistemic community. It is led by principal central bankers, supervisors, and 
(post the 2011 Cannes Summit) finance ministry officials. In the short to medium term, the 
organizational impact of the FSB is considerable in terms of increasing the intensity and 
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efficacy of international cooperation and the coordination of the policy output of the actors 
and standards-setting bodies involved. 
 
The findings presented here indicate the FSB’s creation increased by at least an order of 
magnitude the level and intensity of the international technical state-level agency-to-agency 
coordination and cooperation amongst central banking and supervisory communities. This 
enhanced and increased cooperative endeavour is required because the reforms identified and 
agreed by leaders at G20 summits are very detailed and broad based (as crafted by the FSB 
actors themselves). The G20 move to create the FSB and the processes it oversees is, 
therefore, a potential third-order change (Hall, 1993) and constitutes part of the concrete 
realization of the paradigm shift begun by the G20 in 2008. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner called the FSB ‘in effect, the fourth pillar in the system of global governance’ (in 
Helleiner, 2010, p. 6). The financial regulatory reforms agreed by the G20 and are overseen 
and directed by the FSB. The forum’s members and its processes are at the heart of the 
transformation of a paradigm shift in the consensus technical re-regulatory narrative into 
policy shifts visible gradually in outcomes, which are still underway in phase three. 
 
By 2013, the Board had four years of dedicated resources, but was awaiting a distinct legal 
identity and had no underlying enforcement power or capabilities, raising continuing 
questions about the strength of the underlying structures. Today, the forum is being built by 
stealth, brick by brick. In phase three, the process is facing opposition from within the 
membership (Interview 15, 2012), and ambivalence among some G20 officials and former 
officials over the desirability of creating a still stronger forum separate from national agency 
leadership. Ultimately, the forum’s success remains linked in part to efficacy and strength of 
the G20. Even after the Cannes and Los Cabos Summits, which further built its structure, the 
Board remains an institutional infant, albeit a precocious one carefully nurtured by its central 
banking parents. 
 
In analysing the FSB structure and functioning and who exerts the greatest power, who leads 
the organization, and who influences and controls its deliberations and policy making, the 
evidence will suggest the FSB is stronger, more dynamic than its predecessor, more inclusive, 
and activist. But the information gathered in the interviews also indicates that the Board was 
created by, and is still largely directed by, predominantly hawkish officials from a small 
group of key advanced economies who from 2009 to 2012 led the organization, chaired many 
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of the committees and working groups, and determined key work streams (Interviews 7, 8, 9, 
and 10, 2011; Interviews 15, 22, 24, 25, and 34, 2012). 
 
Although it is a more inclusive Board, in 2013 a relatively small number of European and 
North American central banking and supervisory technocrats still wield significant power 
even as the leadership roles change. In essence, key actors responsible for major markets in 
leading G20 states continue to dominate the reform deliberations and will likely do so going 
forward. Emerging economy voices are being heard, for instance, at the outset in support of 
the new re-regulatory paradigm (Interview 7, 2011). These actors participate, and their 
engagement is quantitatively and qualitatively greater than in the previous exclusionary 
structure. On occasion, their input can tip the balance in favour of a particular policy solution. 
But especially in the key formative years, the Board’s organs and policy levers remained in 
the hands of a few from the core. This leads to some consternation over governance issues, 
such as, who leads and who chairs what (Interview, 15, 2012). In 2013, emerging economy 
members have an enhanced role but are not yet central actors. 
 
The Board is a relatively new institution and it has been the focus of some academic analysis. 
This includes work by Lombardi on structure and governance (Brookings Institution, 2011a, 
2011b). Its creation and governance have also been addressed by Helleiner (Helleiner, 2009a, 
2010; see also Griffith-Jones, Helleiner, and Woods, N. (eds), 2010; Bluestein, 2012). Not 
everyone is enamoured of the new forum. Critics view the Board as a historical backsliding 
away from universal institutions and ‘not a good development’ (Pauly, 2010, p. 16). Can it 
perform all the tasks it is assigned? Critics suggest it will not be up to the surveillance and 
monitoring tasks it has been set (Momani, 2010), that much remains to be done on amplifying 
its peer review functions (Porter, 2010), and that its macro-prudential policies also remain to 
be tested (Turner, 2010). However, notwithstanding this scholarship, the Board remains 
relatively obscure, opaque, and little understood. 
 
The Brookings Institution notes that ‘there is extremely limited knowledge as to how the FSB 
operates and is governed’ (Brookings Institution, 2011a, p. 3). This view is supported by 
Baker, who observes: ‘No systemic comprehensive studies’ have been conducted and, 
moreover, that ‘most of us have only an anecdotal appreciation of what goes on behind closed 
doors’ (Baker, 2010, p. 19). The Brookings Institution and Baker lament of a lack of 
understanding about the Board and how it operates are legitimate and justified. The FSB’s 
precise role and modus operandi are quite obscure to outsiders. The forum is far less 
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transparent or open to civil society than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World 
Bank, for instance. This is despite its position at the very centre of the post-crisis redesign of 
the global financial regulatory architecture. In 2013, in comparison to the existing 
international financial institutions (such as the IMF), it has been subject to relatively little 
academic analysis, principally because of its novelty and its closed mode of operation. Ex 
post, the forum’s output can be read on the web, but this gives the researcher practically no 
contextual depth as to the reasons behind particular outcomes, the policy narratives driving 
them, or the actors’ possible motivations. 
 
In this chapter, on the FSB’s creation and structure, and in chapter 5, which addresses the 
Board’s mandate, key FSB responsibilities, and tentative policy results, the aim is to enlarge 
the understanding of the new forum. This is done by analysing its creation and its role in the 
redesign and financial regulatory reforms started in 2008. The analysis employs conceptual 
lenses which highlight the paradigm shift witnessed and the extent to which this is 
underpinned by a new policy consensus among an elite community of senior policy makers 
within a distinct expert community. 
 
The chapter will draw out the new policy consensus and paradigm shift adopted by the 
western powers’ central banking community supported by emerging country regulators. It 
will show the conceptual shift, toward a support of re-regulation. As in the past a policy 
failure and crisis drives action (McNamara, 1998). The crisis response was centred on the 
creation of the G20 and then the FSB forum in 2009, as well as reform of the IMF. A burst of 
rapid institutional and policy development was then followed by additional, more incremental 
steps to strengthen the new Board. This rhythm in the construction, strengthening, and 
paradigm maintenance of the FSB in part matches, but extends and deepens, the shift seen at 
the political level of the G20 summits. This is because the FSB community is more cohesive 
and has a particular and unique influence over and role in the G20 policy reform process as a 
whole. The two processes are interlinked, and the FSB and its output are important to the 
creation of the G20-signalled paradigm shift, and to its maintenance. 
 
This chapter’s analysis of the drivers behind the creation, structure, and functioning of the 
FSB draws extensively on interviews with numerous principal actors who participated in its 
creation, and who have experience operating within the FSB, its steering group, and its 
plenary and working groups. Using this type of source material, the analysis hopes to add 
meaningfully to knowledge of the FSB by drawing on scores of personal narratives of the 
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policy process and events surrounding the creation. Utilizing quantitative interviews enables 
the observer to get a sense of how these key actors interpret and construct their worldview, 
how they viewed the events as they unfolded (Merriam, 2002), and the institutional and 
policy choices they supported or rejected. Clearly, the interview material informing this type 
of analysis is subjective and is not composed of hard facts. However, confirmation from 
various sources may increase an observation’s solidity. 
 
The political shift which began in 2008 with the creation of the G20 was accompanied, 
strengthened, and influenced by a new policy consensus and narrative held to strongly by a 
central banking epistemic community that proposed, led, and today still largely directs the 
FSB. The strength of that community is important to the success of the redesign. Since the 
technical expert narrative and policy consensus are key to the process and outcomes, it 
follows their individual and collective narratives matter to the process and outcomes (Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2009) of the events being dissected and analysed. 
 
4.2 The creation of the Financial Stability Board 
 
G20 summitry shows that for the decision makers, ‘it often takes a crisis or shock to 
overcome the institutional inertia and habit and spur them to seek help from an epistemic 
community’ (Haas, 1992a, p. 14). Blyth adds: ‘institutional change only makes sense by 
reference to the ideas that inform agents’ responses to moments of uncertainty and crisis’ 
(Blyth, 2002, p. 251). In the case of the creation of the FSB, a small community joined by 
common experience and beliefs rapidly evolves during the crisis and acts internationally in 
support of a re-regulatory collective state-power-based paradigm shift. In 2008, the central 
banking and regulatory community rushes to support the G20 and to provide the outline of a 
consensus view about the crises’ causes and effects, and its failures and solutions. This 
developing consensus reduces uncertainty and facilitates the paradigm shift in worldview and 
policy prescriptions (Blyth, 2002). The group advises and directly impacts the shape of the 
G20-backed reforms, policy process, and options going forward. This grouping of principal 
central bankers and supervisors should, in fact, be viewed as a distinct epistemic community 
(Haas, 1992a).  
 
Importantly this new consensus only extends to regulatory matters over which the FSB had 
purview.  It does not extend to macroeconomic matters, to matters of national economic 
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prerogative, to imbalances, or to a broader questioning of the market based neo-liberal 
economic model operating in most states of the G20.  
 
4.2.1 Central bankers as an epistemic community forming a new consensus 
 
The central bankers and supervisors who came together to create the FSB in 2009 appeared to 
operate as an epistemic community; prior to the latest crisis, the grouping was perhaps a 
gradually coalescing nascent epistemic community (Kapstein, 1992; Helleiner, 1994). Post-
crisis, they were a community with a largely common experience of crisis management, and a 
common conception of the anomalies that led to the rising crisis, its causes, and a clear sense 
of possible solutions and notions of validity, all of which are prerequisites for a paradigm 
shift to occur and for a new policy consensus to begin to take hold. 
 
This small community facilitated policy convergence, bound by knowledge and expertise and 
experience of common policy problems and solutions (Bennett, 1991; Kingdon, 2011). Once 
policy options became clear, they assisted in efficient top-down information diffusion (Levi-
Faur, 2005), via ties that connected otherwise unconnected communities across geography, 
culture, and political and economic factors (Lazer, 2005). The community—comprised of a 
small number of top central bankers and supervisors whose lives were consumed with crisis 
management during 2007-2008—prepared the ground for international policy harmonisation 
(Holzinger and Knill, 2005). As early as late 2008 and the spring of 2009, the outline of a 
new policy narrative was taking shape.  
 
The G20 set the process of reform going, with an investment of collective political capital. 
There was an ‘alignment of leaders and technocrats’ and, on the actual policy prescriptions, 
‘technical professionals were allowed to figure it out’ (Interview 22, 2012, p. 12). The central 
banking and supervisory community was tasked with identifying the proximate causes of the 
crisis and possible policy solutions. It is not necessary to revisit them all in detail, but causes 
of the crisis include global imbalances driving a credit boom in deficit countries (Smaghi, 
2008); unintended consequences of the great moderation (Gudmundsson, 2008); excess 
leverage in banks (Draghi, 2008; King, 2010; Turner, 2009b); poor risk management  and 
excessive risk taking (King, 2009a); opacity in complex interconnected global securities 
markets, which acted as a risk and panic transmission mechanism for the crisis (Buchanan, 
2013; Gudmundsson, 2008; Weber, 2008); and a failure of supervision and oversight of 
markets and firms (G30, 2009a). Having a common crisis-driven conception of the nature of 
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the failures, it was then possible for the community to coalesce relatively quickly around a 
new paradigm or approach in response to the crisis and its anomalies. 
 
Table 4.1 modifies Kapstein’s 1992 view of the common beliefs of the central banking 
community (Kapstein, 1992, p. 282), and updates it with the post-crisis position. It 
underscores that the central banking community has shared causal beliefs, principled beliefs, 
and, a shared project: the internationally coordinated macro-prudential supervision of the 
system as a whole—overseen by the FSB. 
 
 
Table: 4.1 Shared Beliefs and Common Policy Project 
of the Central Banking Epistemic Community Postcrisis
Shared causal
beliefs
Shared principled 
beliefs
Shared policy project
The economic and financial crisis threatened a collapse of 
the world economy and the global financial system. It was 
driven by excess risk, leverage, opacity in complex 
interconnected markets and firms, and a failure of 
supervision and oversight of firms and destructive 
unregulated markets. 
The international trade and payments system is a common 
good. Central banks should ensure financial stability and 
the safety and soundness of the system.  They should act 
as providers of liquidity and lenders of last resort. Markets 
and firms are incapable of providing system stability.
Internationally coordinated re-regulation of global markets 
and firms utilizing macro-prudential tools and 
mechanisms and increased capital to ensure long-term 
financial stability. Regulation and supervision will focus 
on the stability of the system as a whole and on large 
interconnected individual firms.  
 
Table 4.1 Shared Beliefs and Common Policy Project 
of the Central Banking Epistemic Community Post-crisis 
 
The community thus responded by offering a new consensus which is based on a rejection of 
laissez-faire neo-liberalism’s worshipping of deregulated financial markets. In its place, the 
community moved to champion a series of macro-prudential solutions that address what they 
view as gaps and failures in the previous architecture. We can identify among central bankers 
a broad-based call for a meaningful reassertion of collective state power and for the systemic 
re-regulation of global markets and systemically important firms, in the sense that the calls 
become insistent and consistent from many sources. Actors within the community demand a 
‘rethink of financial regulation’, with an emphasis on systemic risks and regulations across all 
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markets (Noyer, 2008, p. 1; see also Caruana, 2009; Darling 2011). The prior approach is 
seen as having been too narrow (Noyer, 2009). The response would therefore include greater 
macro-prudential oversight of markets and firms and enhanced capital and liquidity standards 
(Draghi, 2008; Turner 2009a), and would address procyclical tendencies (Caruana, 2009; 
Xiaochuan, 2009) and run across the economic business cycle, i.e., apply during boom and 
bust periods (White, 2008). 
 
The FSB move towards financial market reform and stronger global regulation during this 
crisis period is explicitly characterized as a new ‘consensus’ by various sources (Blanchard et 
al., 2012; Constancio, 2010; Smaghi, 2008. p. 3). What is being constructed is a policy 
‘consensus amongst the elite that operates, in first instance, above the fray of domestic 
politics’ (Bennett, 1991, p. 225). Members of the community stress that consensus solutions, 
as specified at the Washington Summit and which would be laid out in still further detail at 
the London and Pittsburgh Summits, would require ‘greater international coordination, 
requiring concerted efforts by international organizations’ (Watanagase, 2008, p.3), and a 
strengthening of the international architecture (Noyer, 2009); hence, the need for a new 
structure or forum to match the ambitious policy goals. 
 
These central banker and supervisory responses show many elements that are indicators of an 
epistemic community. The group exhibits a shared set of causal and principled beliefs and 
notions of validity. From 2008 onwards, the community rapidly developed a common policy 
consensus and enterprise which includes a series of policy responses to the crisis and 
internationally coordinated reforms. As with other such epistemic communities, the actors 
knew each other very well and tended to trust one another (Adler, 1992). They operated as a 
‘network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence’ (Haas, 1992a, p. 3). 
They are deferred to for technical expertise by political leaders, and they, also unlike some 
other communities of experts, have the independent regulatory authority to make policy 
changes in many key areas they identified for reform.  
 
This is what was occurring through the output of the G20 summits and during the financial 
reform process. As with other epistemic communities, the ability of the central banking 
community to seize the policy-making initiative is buttressed by the deference shown to the 
group as knowledge elites to whom the leaders defer, especially in stages one and two of their 
response. The regulatory issues are very complex and technical in nature, and this forced G20 
leaders to turn to the community for advice, as has happened in other cases (Haas, 1992b), 
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sometimes on the basis of incomplete knowledge, which some government officials report 
they later regret (Interviews 13 and 17, 2012). This expert community thus influences the 
debate, provides the technical knowledge, identifies cooperative options and, in this case at 
the very outset, pushes for the creation of an institutional structure that could build collective 
vested interests into the international reform process (Adler, 1992)—the FSB itself. 
 
Crucially, it is the combination of relative clarity on external anomalies and causes, coupled 
to a strong epistemic community and the coalescence around a common policy consensus, 
which increased the probability of a paradigm shift in worldview and linked policy outcomes 
(see Figure 2.1, p.33). 
 
Because this combination is present in this crisis, the re-regulatory shift begins, and this 
community proves to be the most influential transnational policy network below the G20 
level, one key to the creation of a Board that the community would then go on to dominate 
during the first four years of the policy-making process. 
  
The G20 leaders solicited the community’s views and advice, adopted much of it, and then 
delegated responsibility to those actors to monitor progress and carry it out (Haas, 1992a). In 
conclusion, a relatively small group of central bankers and supervisors acting as an epistemic 
community turns out to be crucial to the output of the G20 summitry and related policy 
processes. 
 
4.2.1 Seizing the crisis and reasserting collective state and central bank control 
 
At its most basic, the FSB is created by senior officials from the core as a structural reaction 
to the financial crisis spurred by a belief that policy actions must be taken to address the 
failings of the global financial market system. These actors, and their political leaders, had 
been working feverishly together for months by the summer of 2008 in an attempt to grapple 
with the rising crisis as it developed and intensified (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
2008). They participated in joint meetings, scores of calls, agreed massive currency swap 
deals, slashed interest rates, and took a series of extraordinary national monetary policy 
actions designed to address the crisis (Darling, 2011; Paulson, 2010; Sorkin, 2010). Together 
with finance ministers, central bankers were the defenders of stability and providers of a 
rapid policy response. Moreover, the crisis, as is often the case, exerted a clarifying effect, 
and brought the key actors closer together, simplifying issues, changing perspectives and 
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policy stances, and opening up win sets and speeding decision making and action in 2008-
2009 and since. 
 
Two officials in particular, Tim Geithner and Mario Draghi, appear to be instrumental in the 
FSB’s creation, according to sources. As the crisis grew in 2007-2008, they consulted with an 
ad hoc grouping of senior central bankers and supervisors, for discussions at the margins of 
other official IMF and G7 gatherings to consider the options. The central banking community 
leadership dominated these informal discussions (Geithner at that time was a central banker 
and subsequently became U.S. Treasury Secretary).  
 
The meetings included a ‘who’s who’ list of the world of central banking: The two leaders—
Mario Draghi (as FSF Chair) and Tim Geithner—were joined by Mark Carney, Governor of 
the Bank of Canada; Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS); Philipp Hildebrand, Governor of Swiss National Bank; Mervyn King, 
Governor of the Bank of England; Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central 
Bank; Adair Turner, Chair of the U.K. Financial Services Authority; Axel Weber, President 
of the Deutches Bundesbank; and a few others. The group was almost all central bank 
governors, and many of them now tended to lean in favour of greater international regulatory 
discipline, higher capital, less leverage, more liquidity, and other solutions that, taken 
together, signalled a possible re-regulatory paradigm shift. It is from these deliberations that 
the Board concept emerged (Interview 15, 2011).  
 
The actors saw the crisis as an opportunity for institutional re-creation and international and 
national re-regulatory action, a reassertion of their power and authority over markets and 
firms (Interview 9, 2011). Aside from the evident real economic costs of the crises, failure to 
seize control of the reform agenda could have led to an alternative structure, with the IMF 
taking a larger role in regulatory matters, as occurred in response to the Mexican and Asian 
crises of the 1990s. Instead, by championing a more exclusive Board led by the same small 
group of national central bankers and supervisors, the community’s members kept the 
regulatory policy-making response still within their control, as the functional exclusion of 
finance ministries from the leadership decision-making process from 2009 to 2011 
underscores. This technocratic elite community would be pivotal at the outset and throughout 
the policy responses during 2009-2012. 
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During 2008 and until creation of the Financial Stability Board by the action of the G20 
leaders in London in the spring of 2009, the central banking community, and predominantly 
this small, largely Western, subsegment of it, discussed options. It was clear to many of these 
actors that ‘there needed to be an international group whose remit was to take a top-down 
view of the entire financial system’ (Interview 15, 2012, p. 2). Their solution: A renamed, 
enlarged, empowered FSF to mirror the leadership forum above it. Thus, the epistemic 
community met informally, digested options, and formed a consensus on how to proceed, 
institutionally and in terms of policy choices. In doing so, they ‘seek out the forum most 
favourable to their interests’ (Raustiala and Victor; 2004, p. 280). This forum was a reformed, 
enlarged, and renamed FSF. The FSF itself had been created in 1997 by a former grouping, 
the G22, in reaction to a previous, less severe financial crisis cycle (Cartapanis and Herland, 
2002) of crisis, response, reform, and relapse. 
 
In the autumn of 2008, the central banking community projected these recommendations 
upward as expert advice to G20 leaders desperate for effective policy actions which could 
resonate with their expressed political commitment and real need to reassert collective and 
national state control over markets. The FSB structure that the G20 agreed, advised by the 
central banking community, would prove to be instrumental in the reform process. 
 
The decision was made to change the name to the FSB, since this was seen as being stronger 
than a forum, because, ‘a forum sounds like you are discussing things, a board sounds like 
you are deciding things’ (Interview 9, 2011, p. 4). Making the name change also provided an 
institutional and psychological boost to the reform impetus. It avoided having the same body 
(the FSF) charged with handling the reform agenda. In remaking the forum, the central 
bankers could divert attention from their own culpability in the run-up to the crisis, since the 
focus would be on the new structure and process and not on the prior failures. 
 
Thus, a community from the core states duplicated and slightly expanded the G20 diplomatic 
structure via the creation of the overarching FSB to stand between the G20 leaders, deputies, 
and Sherpas (political operatives) and the standard-setting body (SSB) members (second-rank 
technicians and officials). The former had clear political constraints and lacked the technical 
know-how, but the latter lacked the authority to take robust action. Inserting in the middle a 
leadership body composed only of central banking and supervisory principals could provide 
both direction and authority to national agencies and technocrats, many of whom work for the 
central banks anyway. 
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The same European and North American principal central bankers and supervisors who 
conceived of the Board would go on to serve and lead this new forum. They would charge 
themselves with overseeing a broader, deeper work stream (Interview 15, 2012). With a new 
name and enlarged membership to reflect the composition of the G20 leaders’ forum, the 
Chairman of the FSB, Mario Draghi, who also chaired the predecessor FSF, could swiftly 
press regulatory changes and reforms. Numerous sources note that many of the solutions the 
FSB would propose had been previously identified by the FSF in 2008 (Interviews 9 and 11, 
2011; Interview 12, 2012; see also Smaghi, 2008). Post-crisis, the reforms could be pursued 
with greater international and institutional vigour and more success, with more explicit 
political backing provided by the G20 summit process. Draghi, an accomplished political 
operator, would design a forum that would have many of the characteristics of an institution. 
Over the next four years, it would be further strengthened and solidified in its structures and 
role and become the central new actor in the coordination of international financial and 
regulatory diplomacy. 
 
4.3 The institutional structure of the FSB 
 
Architecturally, the FSB would be a process-driven organization, and it required ‘an 
institutional structure commensurate with its expanded tasks’ (Draghi, 2009, p. 2). Its 
supporters expected it to become a ‘fully-fledged international body’ (Noyer, 2009, p. 4). 
Indeed, its structure at first glance projects solidity and includes five levels of organization 
(Chair, Steering Committee, Plenary, Standing Committees and Working Groups). The Board 
has a larger membership than the FSF, and this necessitates a more than doubling of the staff 
resources and a considerable increase in time commitment and resources from scores of 
agencies and many principal-level officials, backed by a G20 commitment to its common 
goals. The following sections outline the structure of the FSB, and address its strengths and 
limitations. 
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Note: The FSB process reports directly to the G20 summits; it does not report via finance ministries. FSB leadership roles changed in 2013 and now 
include additional emerging market leaders. During the forum’s formative period, 2009-2012, it was led exclusively by North American and European 
central bankers and supervisors. 
OTC = over-the-counter; SC = Steering Committee; TF = Task Force; WG = Working Group. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Structure of the Financial Stability Board 
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Membership: FSB membership includes 36 states, institutions, and agencies, as follows: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., the 
IMF, the World Bank, the Bank of International Settlements, the European Commission, the 
European Central Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the 
Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on Payment Settlement Systems, 
the International Organization of Security Commissions, the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors, the International Accounting Standards Board, and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. 
 
The FSB is larger than the G20 leadership grouping. It has been designed to include key 
financial markets, states, and standard setters that play a role in global financial regulation 
and supervision. Hong Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland, are included because they each 
have major regional or global financial centers. Within these jurisdictions there are also key 
interconnected actors (i.e., they are host to systemically important financial firms and 
institutions). 
 
Chair: The FSB Chair is appointed by the plenary for a three-year renewable term. The 
individual chairs the Plenary and the Steering Committee and oversees the Secretariat. There 
is no formal process of election; instead, there is only an informal ‘sounding out’ of key 
constituencies (Brookings Institution, 2011a). This process allows the most influential states 
to retain control of this post without public disagreements, since the name that is proposed 
will already be the consensus choice of the key states and their central banks by that time. In 
practice, the Chair has wide discretion in the running of the organization, its plenary, and its 
meetings. 
 
The Chair is important to the effectiveness of the organization. A strong, diplomatic, 
consensus-building leader can effect change. A lesser leader might result in a loss of 
institutional momentum and prestige. The first Chairman was Mario Draghi, Governor of the 
Banca d’Italia. Draghi moulded the FSF into the FSB and led the organization in its formative 
period until 2011 and ensured its central role in the post-crisis global architecture. The FSB is 
viewed by participants as Draghi’s creation (Interviews 7 and 10, 2011; Interview 15, 2012). 
Certainly the Board’s success is a measure of Draghi’s diplomatic skill of institutional 
transformation, turning a sub-par FSF into a turbocharged FSB, demonstrating his ability to 
  129
seize the crisis and press for an architectural solution and a series of concrete reforms to the 
benefit of his personal and community institutional standpoint during 2008-2011. 
 
Mark Carney, now Governor of the Bank of England, replaced Mario Draghi in 2011. Carney 
is widely viewed as one of the most influential central bankers of his generation and is well 
known as a consensus builder and an intellectual force. It is notable that Carney played a 
significant role in the reform process (on the Basel III Accord, for instance) and is viewed as 
a hawk; he is not thought likely to back away from positions agreed by the Board and his 
community (Interview 15, 2012), and he has said as much in his clashes with bank CEOs. 
 
Steering Committee: The steering committee is appointed by the plenary, but members are in 
practice recommended, that is to say, selected, by the Chair (Interview 7, 2011). This is 
where the real power lies and where the Chair focuses his or her attention. The Steering 
Committee meets at least four times a year. The size of the Steering Committee has grown, 
and in June 2013 it had 39 members (FSB, 2013). 
 
Chairman Draghi created the Steering Committee at the outset because he wanted a smaller, 
more select grouping to effectively direct and coordinate the work stream (Interview 15, 
2012). The Steering Committee’s formal duties are to promote coordination among FSB 
bodies, review progress in policy development, and carry out the work of the FSB. The 
Steering Committee was created as the key decision-making body in the structure. As the 
committee’s leadership role became clear, more and more FSB members began to demand 
admittance; like any popular club, those outside want in.  
 
From 2009 until the Cannes Summit in 2011, the Steering Committee had no ministry of 
finance representatives. At Draghi’s insistence, it was technocrats only. From the first burst 
of institutional creation until well into phase three of the G20-led process, the leadership of 
the forum was completely in the hands of the central banking epistemic community, and 
dominated by European and North American hawks, i.e., those most supportive of the re-
regulatory macro-prudential shift in worldview. This, it is suggested by supporters, protected 
the forum’s depoliticized technocratic expert nature, strengthening the early regulatory 
response. But the makeup of the Steering Committee caused complaints from leaders and 
finance ministries (Interviews 13 and 18, 2012) whose found themselves with regulatory 
deals (like Basel III) over which they had almost no input, a factor that supporters of the FSB 
agree caused consternation (Interview 7, 2011). 
  130
As a result of demands for inclusion the Steering Committee in 2013 has as many members 
as the original FSB had in 2009. It has gradually expanded since its creation in response to 
repeated successful attempts from those outside looking in to join the decsion making body. 
The Steering Committee retains the central role and is the organ through which the FSB is 
run on a day-to-day basis. It now includes finance ministry officials from the leading G20 
states, which changes its nature away from a technocratic club to one that must now also 
consider national political factors, insofar as they might now block Steering Committee 
decision making. These types of considerations were not uppermost during the first years of 
FSB operation, when only central bankers and supervisors were at the leadership table. 
 
Plenary: The plenary is the final decision-making body of the FSB and operates by 
consensus, although each person has one vote. The FSB Charter does not state how consensus 
is achieved. The Charter only states that all seats have equal rights. The plenary approves the 
work programme of the FSB, adopts FSB reports and recommendations, appoints the 
Chairperson, and decides on FSB membership matters. The plenary takes place twice a year. 
The number of seats a country has in the plenary depends on the size of its national economy 
and financial market. Large powers and emerging economies have three seats, the middling 
powers two seats, and the rest a single seat at the table (FSB, 2009, p. 4). In the case of the 
large states, each state actor is permitted to send a representative from its finance ministry, its 
central bank, and its regulatory agency responsible for financial stability. This ensures that 
the U.S. maintains a large voice and also that Europeans have what some view as 
disproportionate representation (Interview 9, 2011). 
 
Interviews indicate that, in practice, the plenary tends to confirm decisions taken by the 
Chairman and Steering Committee. It is characterized by participants as a rubber stamp of the 
Steering Committee and decisions already agreed by FSB committee chairs—that is to say, 
decisions taken by the core group driving the Board (Interviews 7 and 10, 2011). Participants 
are well aware of their respective economic and political weight within the forum and 
generally defer accordingly to Steering Committee views, especially if they reflect the views 
of a plurality of key state central bankers and supervisors (Interview 9, 2011). 
 
Standing Committees: The FSB has established five standing committees that assist in 
carrying out its regulatory roles. The Chair recommends and the plenary appoints the 
committee chairs, and the chairs then determine who sits on each committee. The makeup of 
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the membership of the standing committees is not publicly disclosed. The committees and 
their responsibilities are as follows: 
 
1. Standing Committee on Assessment of Vulnerabilities: Coordinates work on financial 
stability, systemic risks, and early warning exercises.  
 
2. Standing Committee for Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation: Responsible for 
coordinating G20-directed policy development across all SSBs. It monitors and 
advises on best practice in meeting FSB regulatory standards. The committee oversees 
two working groups on Supervisory Intensity and Shadow Banking. 
 
3. Standing Committee for Standards Implementation: Responsible for conducting 
member country peer reviews and for monitoring state compliance with FSB 
prudential regulatory and supervisory standards. The committee oversees working 
groups on Implementation Monitoring; Peer Review; Non-cooperative Jurisdictions; 
and the Compensation Monitoring Group. The latter is little known, but is potentially 
a major institutional innovation to result from the Cannes Summit (see p. 179, 
Chapter 5). 
4. Standing Committee on Budget and Resources: Determines the resource needs of the 
secretariat, weighing mandates, work programmes, and developing issues. This 
committee did not exist prior to Charter additions at the Los Cabos Summit. 
5. Resolution Steering Group: Addresses the issues related to too big to fail, and 
oversees the working group on cross-border crisis management. 
 
Additional ad hoc Working Groups: Ad hoc working groups can be established by the FSB 
plenary. As of July 2013, there were the following additional ad hoc working groups: Over-
the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives Coordination Working Group, OTC Derivatives Working 
Group, Data Gaps Working Group, and Credit Ratings Agencies Working Group (FSB, 2013, 
unpublished data). 
 
Standard-Setting Bodies (SSBs): The leadership of key SSBs are included in the Board. This 
is an important innovation because it brings under FSB auspices independent sub-state-level 
transnational policy networks that until 2009 tended to operate largely in isolation from one 
another, without proper coordination or communication, each guarding its prerogatives. 
Previously, there was an institution known as the Joint Forum, but it performed inadequately, 
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and had little political capital and little or no ability to actively oversee the work of the SSBs 
or press for collective action. To put it bluntly, these obscure technical bodies hitherto had 
not been coordinated across sectors by state actors. 
 
With the creation of the FSB, that changes. The FSB charter requires it to monitor the G20 
work delegated to the SSBs, drawing these sub-state bodies into structured coordination and 
collaboration driven by the G20 agenda as identified by the FSB leadership. SSBs are 
independent international sub-state forums, but in practice, much of their workload, 
deliverables, and their enhanced relevance are now affected by the G20 tasks they are asked 
to perform. In 2013, the SSBs are, because of the FSB, under much greater pressure to deliver 
and effectively collaborate, according to participants (Interviews 15 and 22, 2012; Interview 
34, 2013). 
 
Regional Consultative Groupings (RCGs): In response to complaints by non-member 
countries that the forum is too exclusive and exclusionary of the majority of states, the Board 
at the Cannes Summit in 2011 created six regional consultative groupings. Each consists of 
12 non-FSB countries (reminiscent of the constituency approach within the IMF Executive 
Board). They are co-chaired by one current FSB member and one non-member of the FSB. 
The latter ‘may’ be invited to attend FSB plenary meetings. The groupings set their own 
agendas, but in general they mirror topics being considered within the FSB (Thorne, 2012). 
 
The RCGs have no formal role in FSB decision making, and it is too soon to gauge their 
impact on the Board. But this is yet more membership creep, and at the very least, it could 
make matters more complicated as more actors demand to be heard (Interview 15, 2012). 
Indeed, once created, such bodies tend to ask for input. If they prove ineffectual, they cannot 
be easily dismantled. From a more positive standpoint, the groupings indicate the Board 
leadership is listening to external complaints about its legitimacy and exclusivity, regardless 
of the new groupings’ actual utility. 
 
The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the FSB: The relationship between the FSB 
and the IFIs is evolving. A wide degree of engagement and overlap in leadership and 
responsibilities can be seen. Many of the principals who drive the G20 and FSB are key 
ministers or central bankers who provide leadership to and control interactions with the IMF, 
for example. Although the IMF is a distinct body, its decisions are, at the most senior level, 
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being made by many of the same individuals and countries wearing different institutional 
hats. The G20-FSB-IMF nexus will be discussed further in chapter V. 
 
Institutional and legal basis for the FSB: The FSB is an institution without a strong legal 
foundation, a compromise necessary to get G20 leaders to agree to its creation in 2009. Thus: 
 
o The FSB Charter is a political statement of intent, not a legally binding document. 
Article 16 of the Charter, states the Charter 'is not intended to create any legal 
rights or obligations' (FSB, 2009. p. 7). 
o The FSB is being provided with legal standing as a Swiss registered 
nongovernmental organization in response to demands for legal certainty from the 
FSB secretariat at the G20 summit in Cannes in 2011. 
o The FSB has no capacity to enter into agreements. It has no privileges or 
immunities, unlike formal treaty-based institutions such as the IMF or the World 
Bank. 
 
In 2013, we see a complex organizational superstructure, but it rests on a still weak legal 
foundation compared to the IMF or the World Bank, but this is the norm for non-treaty 
financial regulatory organizations, compared to those other SSBs, the FSB is instituionally 
strong, not weak. 
 
Secretariat and Resources: The secretariat of the FSB is headed by a Secretary General, Svein 
Andresen. The FSB in June 2012 got a five-year financing agreement with the BIS (Los 
Cabos; 2012). The central banking community is putting its resources behind the Board, 
avoiding the necessity to go hat in hand to national governments at a time when they would 
hardly be likely to well fund a body they do not control. At present, the Board has over 30 
staff (up from 7 in 2009), many of whom are temporarily seconded by national central banks 
and regulatory agencies. Participants suggest Secretary General Svein Andresen has done an 
effective job with very little, and has played the role of coordinator and facilitator to near 
maximum institutional effect (Interviews 7 and 10, 2011). Critics who counter this view 
complain that staff are engaged in empire building and manipulation of the agenda to suit 
their goal, namely the strengthening of the Board and its mandate (Interview 15, 2012). 
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4.4 Dissecting the FSB's structure and operation 
 
The following sections dissect and analyse the Board's structure, its leadership, its legitimacy, 
transparency in its operation, and its strengths and potential weaknesses. 
 
4.4.1 An institutional structure that implies permanence 
 
The detailed and complex institutional structure delineated above is not usually associated 
with flimsy, ephemeral, temporary institutions. To the contrary, it provides signals of solidity 
and structural permanence, with the strong leadership, four tiers of committee structures, a 
direct reporting line up to the G20 leadership summits, and a supervisory and oversight line 
through to the SSBs below. This points to the conclusion that the Western leadership of the 
central bank epistemic community wanted something with permanence and institutional 
weight but took a roundabout way to achieve that goal. In 2009, Draghi created the complex 
structure and control system he wanted and needed to coordinate reform, including a larger 
organization with a strong role for the chair, a chair role in selecting the steering group 
membership, and also in selecting the chairs of both committees and working groups from 
within a small community group. He would get the legal foundation and resource issues dealt 
with later. 
 
The G20 deferred the structural matters to him, and he and his team took full advantage of his 
room to manoeuvre. Subsequent G20 summits in 2011 and 2012 would build incrementally 
on the initial structure. They began to strengthen it and fill in the gaps in the foundations, 
both legal and resource, which remained, advised as always by the supportive central bank 
community. In 2013, the forum appears to be becoming solid and changing into an 
institution, as Noyer implied would take place (Noyer, 2009). 
 
4.4.2 Lack of formal state obligations not insurmountable 
 
Viewing the lack of legal foundations and the absence of a treaty base for the FSB, this 
appears at first glance to be problematic, because it suggests the base of the new structure is 
weak and lacking in the solidity to match the multiple upper tiers and superstructure. But this 
may be less of a problem than it at first appears. As has been observed, the policy makers’ 
imperative was to set the structure up and get the process running and actors committed in 
2009.  Legal matters could come later. 
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Other institutions have been born in this ‘lumpy’ fashion. The World Trade Organization did 
not start as a strong organization with a judicial arm capable of binding all member states to 
its rulings. It was weak for decades, becoming particularly strong only after it superseded the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Jackson, 2008). It is a question of 
perspective. Institutional birth and creation takes time. Not all bodies emerge fully via a 
single binding treaty (as occurred at the Bretton Woods Conference). Notwithstanding this 
evolutionary path, in July 2013, four years after its creation, the FSB does not suffer from a 
lack of policy-making capability due to legal concerns. 
 
While this not a problem in 2013, these formal legal weaknesses may prove troublesome 
going forward, because when the crisis finally abates, as it will, in part due to the work of the 
G20 and FSB, the pressure for collective action and demands for tough implementation may 
fade. Level-one win sets will shrink, and even among the members of this cohesive epistemic 
community, national level-two domestic differences will become more marked and divisive. 
At that point, post-crisis, having the FSB almost totally reliant on outside national drivers for 
its mandate and the strength of its policy output could be problematic. The forum could lose 
focus and strength.  But this is not happening yet. In 2013 the Board is still being built. 
Central bankers are now engaged in paradigm maintenance. Many policies and standards 
being promulgated are not yet complete but are still being backed by most of those inside the 
community in leadership positions. 
 
That could change in the years ahead; if paradigm wars erupt over new standards, the Board 
will be tested. Given its consensus nature, it may not be able to act and may not be effective 
at monitoring the policies already in place should internal strains and differences become 
acute. How the FSB will evolve in the coming years is uncertain, but if the first four years are 
any guide, it will not rapidly lose momentum. Instead, it may, if the paradigm shift is 
successfully defended by the community, become progressively stronger, with foundations to 
match the superstructure in place in 2013. 
 
4.4.3 Dominance by European and North American members of the community 
 
The FSB is driven by its chair and committee leaderships operating in the Steering 
Committee. It is of considerable importance that up until the end of 2012, almost all the key 
roles (Chair, Standing Committee Chairs, Working Group Chairs, etc.) were held by senior 
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central banking and supervisory principal figures from Europe and North America. From its 
creation, almost all the main decision-making roles were held by those who were hawkish 
and supportive of the construction and maintenance of the new re-regulatory paradigm. In 
2013, that changed, and more emerging candidates were promoted, but this occurred only 
after many of the major policy areas had been decided and (in large part) acted upon. 
 
The FSB leadership in the first four years was drawn from Canada, Italy, Norway, Spain, the 
UK, and the U.S.. Central bankers and supervisors less supportive of reform (from France, 
Germany, and Japan, for instance) were excluded from leadership positions in this period. 
This may be selection bias. Draghi and Carney were pushing difficult reforms resisted by the 
doves. Neither would put those who did not solidly support the process in charge of the FSB 
committees overseeing the implementation of those same reforms. 
 
The leadership grouping has considerable discretion to craft the details of the Board’s agenda, 
agreed with the G20, and to determine what is and what is not discussed in committee, to 
fashion draft texts, and to manage the process of debate and negotiation that results in final 
reports and texts, which are sent directly to the G20 leadership summits. 
 
The leadership roles are not just titular. One participant observed about the FSB process, ‘the 
senior people do the work and that is what is remarkable about it’ (Interview 10, 2011, p. 9). 
Decision making is also more effective; as another participant notes, ‘you have all the 
principals at the table and so buy-in is much more readily available’ (Interview 24, 2012, p. 
7). The Board is not driven by anodyne staff position papers generated out of national 
agencies and committees. The end product of key policies often bears the personal imprint of 
the principals themselves. This process contrasts sharply with the methods in larger 
institutions like the IMF. Inside the Board, the chairs of the committees individually drive the 
process and help shape the policy outcomes. 
 
Does geographic bias matter? Participants stressed that the early dominance by European and 
North American leaders was due to their institutional and personal intellectual heft, not 
regional or geographic balance. This rings true. All were and are well-known heavyweights 
within the small epistemic community. But the leadership imbalance, although justifiable on 
an expert-to-expert level, is obscured, and the FSB structure and membership of committees 
are not as a matter of general practice made publicly available. This lack of transparency may 
be to spare the blushes of the G20 states that do not have key roles and committee 
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assignments (Wright, 2011). But it could quite easily be the reverse. The early European and 
Anglo-North American nature of the Board’s leadership could have required a lack of 
transparency ‘precisely because the composition is inappropriate’ (Interview 11, 2011, p. 24). 
Certainly the Board leadership’s skewed early makeup would have been embarrassing if 
exposed to the glare of publicity and possible calls for change, regardless of the actual talents 
of those performing their assigned leadership roles. 
 
4.4.4 Decision making within the Board 
 
Each member of the FSB has a vote, but in practice there is no voting and decisions are taken 
by consensus, with an implicit understanding of who carries the most weight economically 
and in terms of the importance of their financial markets. In this manner, the U.S. and 
Europeans maintain a disproportionate representation and influence on decision making, in 
addition to their already dominant leadership roles in the forum. Practically all substantive 
decision making takes place within the Steering Committee, in the standing committees, and 
in working groups between the meetings of the full plenary (Helleiner; 2010, p. 8; Interviews 
7 and 10, 2011; Interview 15, 2012). This is not surprising: A consensus on particular 
standards should ideally emerge before proceeding to the plenary meeting for formal 
decisions. Only when matters are especially difficult or important would detailed policy 
formulation issues be left to be decided in plenary, since doing so signals a failure of the 
work of the other organs of the Board. 
Developing customary practices within the Board provides room for manoeuvre for the FSB 
chair and his or her senior colleagues, and the absence of a clear definition of how consensus 
must be reached provides flexibility and facilitates the decision-making process as they seek 
to secure agreement (IMF, 2010b). For example, when a standing committee chair finds 
consensus elusive in committee discussions, he or she can decide to fashion a new draft based 
on further consultations and review. In practice, this means that a chair is at liberty to 
construct a consensus drawing on various bilateral approaches and building on the positions 
of key G20 representatives before returning to the committee as a whole (Interview 15, 
2012). 
As a practical matter, informal subgroups of the key member states operate in the FSB 
(Interview 34, 2013). This decision-making reality ensures key state representatives retain 
influence over deliberative outcomes, and this is reinforced when smaller informal 
subgroupings appear to be deliberating amongst themselves to reach deals. This may be a 
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negative. In terms of legitimacy, such sidestepping of full committee or Board discussions 
short circuits the formal structures and systems of deliberation and further concentrates 
influence. But it is also the case that no consensus is possible without agreement among the 
representatives from most powerful G20 states. If this requires some additional diplomacy on 
the sidelines that is the price participants appear willing to accept. These types of negotiating 
tactics and mechanisms, that is, ad hoc informal bilaterals, are used in the much larger 
consensus-based World Trade Organization. They are also seen in the informal soundings 
used within the Executive Board of the IMF. It is therefore not surprising that similar 
practices are evolving within the FSB as ways to advance decision making in the Board. 
4.4.5 The evolving Steering Committee membership 
Responses from interviews indicate that the Steering Committee is the key power centre 
within the FSB (Interviews 7 and 10, 2011; Interview 15, 2012). Its membership was first 
determined by Chairman Draghi, and until late 2011 it was composed exclusively of key 
central bank governors and supervisors, the majority of whom came from Europe and North 
America. In fact, the Board was, at the outset, such a central bank creature that its meetings 
took place (and still generally do) to coincide with BIS meetings, further evidence of the 
dominance of a subgroup within the central banking epistemic community on the Board’s 
functioning. 
 
As previously noted, from 2009 until the Cannes Summit in 2011, there were no finance 
ministry members on the Steering Committee, and thus no explicitly national political voices, 
a factor that technical expert participants report was central to its early effectiveness 
(Interview 10, 2011; Interview 15, 2012) as the engine of reform. This technocratic central 
bank dominance of the Board was in 2011 weakened after the Cannes Summit, with the 
addition of finance ministry officials from France, the UK, the U.S., and a few other states 
(Interview 7, 2011; Interviews 13 and 15, 2012). 
 
Finance ministry officials demanded a larger role after G20 leaders signed the Basel III deal 
in 2010 over which some of them felt they had too little (almost no) input. They belatedly 
realized the accord’s impact on their national banks, and were not amused. A realization of 
the importance of the new accord caused ex-post-facto consternation and led to successful 
demands for a change in Steering Committee membership (Interview 10, 2011; Interviews 13 
and 17, 2012). Ministers felt they left too much to the technocrats and pressed for a larger 
  139
role (Interview 13, 2012). A Steering Committee that had been composed purely of 
technocrats and that was insulated from national political voices was thus forced to change. 
 
Draghi’s defence of his technocrat-only Steering Committee may have been affected by the 
dual role and diplomatic game he played in 2011 as Chair of the Board and then prospective 
candidate for Presidency of the European Central Bank. That is to say, his need for German 
and French political support for the latter may have impacted his willingness to admit finance 
ministry officials to the former (Interview 15, 2011). Even if this was the case, and Draghi 
would never admit it, demands for inclusion from the ministries was such that it is unlikely 
Draghi could have resisted. Had he refused, the influence of the FSB would have faced a 
challenge and a possible downgrading by G20 political leaders. 
 
Looking ahead, finance ministry inclusion within the membership of the Steering Committee 
is bound to change the tone and form of discussion, from technocratic towards more national 
political matters and calculations. Finance Ministry officials, even very senior ones, have 
ultimately considerably less room to deviate from agreed positions than independent central 
bank governors and principal supervisors, who answer to no one above them. Finance 
ministers exhibit political and ideological differences and are also subject to electoral 
pressures. Ministerial motivations and positioning is likely, therefore, to be different 
(Interview 15, 2012). Moreover, in some G20 states (such as the U.S.), ministries are 
explicitly prohibited from determining regulatory decisions. 
 
By securing a seat on the Steering Committee, finance ministry leaders have a new avenue 
through which to influence regulations within their own borders. This potential political 
influence is viewed with concern by some on the Board (Interview 10, 2011). Others are less 
worried. They feel that given how important national legislative action is to continued 
implementation of FSB financial reforms, inclusion of political actors is not wholly negative, 
because governments and legislatures must be supportive of the FSB policy goals and willing 
to legislate to assure proper national implementation of G20-FSB reforms (Interviews 13 and 
15, 2012). 
 
The gradual enlargement of the Steering Committee is a structural and institutional factor to 
watch. It may change the nature of decision making, and not necessarily for the better. Of 
course, it is in the nature of institutional development that there are pressures to grow. Those 
outside want inside. Once inside, FSB members realise the decision-making centre is within 
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another body, so they demand to sit on the Steering Committee. In 2013, the Steering 
Committee includes 39 members from the full membership of the Board (FSB, 2013). This is 
understandable from an individual perspective, but the desire for inclusion in and expansion 
of the Steering Committee could have negative operational effects. As one participant noted, 
‘You have too big a group. In order to be effective, you have to have a smaller group. You 
create the smaller group. It’s effective. All the people in the bigger group want to be in the 
smaller group; now that you’ve moved them into the smaller group, it cannot be effective 
anymore’ (Interview 15, 2012, p. 8). 
 
As the Steering Committee’s size increases, this may make it more cumbersome 
operationally. It eventually could push the Chair to take decision making into other informal 
groupings outside the Steering Committee. If so, this could create a new gap between the 
leadership decision makers and the rest of the Board. So the Steering Committee’s role risks 
being adversely impacted by its own success as it expands to accommodate more and more 
individuals. The reliance on informal subgroups with the membership and organs of the 
Board to thrash out deals is indicative of the effect of expansion in the key decision-making 
organs and committees of the board; as the size of the formal committees and organs increase 
leaders adopt coping strategies that operate outside or parallel to the formal processes. It is 
probable such informal practices may be used more and more if the size of the Steering 
Committee is seen as unwieldy. 
 
4.4.6 Legitimacy and the FSB 
 
The initial and continued dominance of the Board by North American and European leaders 
of the central banking epistemic community who were instrumental in its creation raises 
concerns of legitimacy. In particular, it shows the G20-led decisions directed via the FSB 
continues to be a policy process with control by the old core over the new architecture, 
despite the enlargement of the size of the negotiating table. Compared to the FSF structure, 
however, the FSB is an improvement in legitimacy and authority. 
 
Legitimacy is certainly necessary for the forum to wield authority among and beyond its 
membership, which is essential if the FSB is to be an effective central component of the new 
global architecture. The previous FSF’s membership was far too small to command broad 
legitimacy, respect, and authority from non-member states, and the system was divided into 
rule makers and rule takers (Helleiner, Pagliari, Zimmermann, 2009). 
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Although the FSB remains a relatively exclusive forum, its membership represents 85 percent 
of global GDP, and the Board includes practically all the major financial market regulators. 
Rules agreed by the FSB, if applied consistently, now have the practical effect of being 
global standards. FSB-endorsed standards fashioned by expanded SSBs, under the FSB 
rubric, also have greater weight because the forum ties all member states and their agency 
heads into the standard-setting process, and by extension places pressure on all officials 
involved to adhere to standards they jointly endorse. 
 
The makeup of the leadership of the FSB organs certainly still shows the dominance of the 
advanced core economies in the FSB despite the inclusion of emerging economy 
representatives. But this in part reflects the recognition by emerging economy members that 
those actors have more at stake, that their firms and markets are more developed and 
interconnected, and that these states should of necessity play a larger role in the Board in 
repairing the system. The makeup also means that the crisis management and reform phases 
within the FSB are driven by the Western powers, whose markets and failures caused the 
crisis, with emerging countries playing a supportive but not especially visible leadership role 
within the new formal structure. 
 
Critics are right to demand a larger role for emerging states’ officials. Otherwise, the FSB 
will focus on Western rules applied across the globe, without consideration of other models, 
levels of development, and so forth. Because emerging country leaders are taking a larger 
role in leadership of the G20 summits, this should also begin to translate into a 
correspondingly larger role within the FSB. At the least, in 2013, a larger number of senior 
officials are gradually, on an individual case-by-case basis, being given greater responsibility 
in the leadership structure and in the design of the rules and regulations of a global economy 
in which they will play a larger and larger role. Daniel Tarullo, an FSB member, argues that 
‘a desirable concrete first step is to give emerging economy representatives leadership roles 
in some of the FSB areas of responsibility’ (Bretton Woods Committee, 2010). Tarullo got 
what he wanted: In 2013, the leadership of the FSB began to shift and includes more 
emerging market representatives. 
 
Despite their weaknesses in the leadership roster, emerging country representatives are 
becoming more engaged and assertive, and this trend will likely continue. As that takes place, 
the Board leadership team could alter its leadership makeup to a degree (Interview 10, 2011). 
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While leadership makeup matters, it is not the only measure of meaningful change within the 
FSB. 
 
Since 2009, senior officials from old core and new emerging states have been interacting 
repeatedly within the forum, in its organs, and through the SSBs (which have been enlarged 
to mirror the FSB). This broadening and deepening of linkages of the membership is of value 
in and of itself. One regular participant in the FSB securities-related SSBs states: ‘I know 
many more people in many more markets than I knew just a year ago. I have ... more 
productive relationships with my peers’ (Bussey, 2011). This is a considerable benefit. Buy-
in from national principals and their agencies is secured by their being part of the process. 
These individuals both debate new standards and ultimately must agree to the codes, 
principles, or binding rules, and proceed with national implementation and monitoring. This 
coordination process is multifaceted and additive as agencies and SSBs interact between 
countries and across sectors in a way not seen previously. 
 
Dialogue and the building of networks in non-crisis periods take time to establish. During a 
crisis, without preexisting networks, officials do not know whom to call, and if they do call, 
whether they can trust the officials not to disclose sensitive information, on imminent 
banking failures, for instance. In this important tangible sense, the enlarged FSB and its 
coordination processes materially deepen and strengthen networks and linkages within the 
core and between the advanced and emerging economies. 
 
Until the Washington 2008 G20 summit, individual leaders, ministers, agency heads, and 
senior officials from developed and emerging market economies engaged in international 
regulatory debate via other forums. But this engagement was sporadic and unsatisfactory. For 
instance, at the outset of the financial crisis in 2007, as Northern Rock faltered in the UK and 
non-banks and investment banks in the U.S. shook, communication between core and 
emerging economy partners (such as China) was suboptimal, to say the least, with essentially 
no dialogue taking place. The emerging market leaders were on the outside looking in. Such 
isolation of key officials cannot happen now, because emerging economy central bankers, 
regulators, and actors are firmly part of the G20 and FSB processes. 
 
 
 
 
  143
4.4.7 Does size matter? 
 
This review of the creation and evolution of the FSB shows progressive membership 
expansion. But the extent to which this is a real answer to the legitimacy issue remains in 
doubt. One way to address the current legitimacy gap faced by FSB could be to further 
enlarge it. Paul Martin, creator of the finance ministry G20 process in the 1990s, suggests 
opening membership to all 187 members of the IMF and World Bank (Helleiner, 2009a). But 
this step could negate key reasons for opting for the FSB over the universal IMF: its 
nimbleness, flexibility, and small size. Indeed, global governance and collective decision 
making in general often ‘faces a trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy’ (Trichet 2010a, 
p. 5). If one accepts this, the Board is a considerable improvement and should not be pressed 
to expand much more. But recent changes indicate that is what we are witnessing. Voices 
clamouring outside to get in have been partially successful, with the FSB’s agreement on six 
RCGs. This may go some way to address the complaints of outsiders. It is a small step 
towards opening a wider constituency. But it could just be window dressing: No one is 
suggesting the RCGs will have a direct say on FSB agenda items and policy decisions; if this 
remains the case, then it does not effectively address complaints of illegitimacy. 
 
On balance, it is probable that the 2009 FSB creation and membership enlargement will never 
assuage those that remain on the outside looking in. States excluded from the process still 
view with some distrust demands that they apply G20-FSB standards (Interviews 1 and 6, 
2011), and as a result, opposition to the process can ‘become politicized quite quickly’ 
(Helleiner, 2009a, p. 7). However, demands for yet more seats at the table also need to be 
weighed against a reflection on how the Board functions. If being relatively small and 
flexible are important goals, then gradual expansion may undermine the key reasons the FSB 
was selected for the role in the first place: a desire to avoid the bureaucracy of the IMF and 
the problems universal organizations can present to effective financial policy making. 
Difficult choices regarding legitimacy will remain, and they are made worse when looked at 
in tandem with issues of transparency. 
 
4.4.8 Transparency: A real weakness in the new structure 
 
Compared to the IMF and World Bank, the FSB is a black box. The FSB is not a transparent 
body. There is no requirement for transparency within its charter and practically no role for 
civil society actors or outsiders. The membership of all the various organs is not made public 
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as a general rule; who sits on the working groups is not disclosed. The functioning of the 
Board’s plenary, Steering Committee, standing committees, and other bodies is opaque to 
outsiders. The decision-making processes and resultant policy outcomes are private until they 
are announced as a fait accompli, notwithstanding occasional leaks. Facing this reality, 
external critics have called for governance and transparency changes, including an open 
selection process for the Chair of the FSB (Brookings Institution, 2011b). 
 
As of 2013, only one small alteration addressing transparency concerns has taken place. In 
Los Cabos in 2012, the FSB Charter was changed to include the requirement for a ‘structured 
process for public consultation on policy proposals’ (FSB, Art. 3(2), 2012). For the first time, 
the FSB was required to interact in advance of the policy decisions with interest groups and 
civil society. This small step forward was designed to address the Board’s opacity. But as of 
July 2013, this has not reportedly led to changes in actual practice. It may be too soon to see 
changes, however, because a formalized process is not fully in place. 
 
At present, participants within the structure tend to support continued opacity because they 
believe it is required to get results; keeping the organization relatively small with deliberation 
and disputes private permits better decision-making outcomes. This may be the case. 
Certainly, the major G20 states do not wish to have all their disputes aired or see them subject 
to review by outsiders. It is simpler that way, and less complicated, but legitimacy suffers if 
policy is made in back rooms (Alston, 1997). 
 
Looking ahead, the continued relative lack of transparency in a body engaged in establishing 
standards and best practices across national and global financial markets could negatively 
impact the Board’s broader legitimacy with national legislatures and civil society. To 
suspicious outsiders, this lack of transparency and accountability, this type of elite closed 
network, can have the smell of ‘a vast technocratic conspiracy’ (Slaughter, 2001, p. 347). 
 
Opacity may suit the G20 leaders during a crisis, but it may be harder to promulgate effective 
regulatory standards if the process remains obscure. Policy making may be easier in small 
private groups but the output can be harder to defend from external critics. It is difficult to 
build coalitions in support of global standards when the process of arriving at those standards 
is highly exclusive and not properly understood. An exclusive process controlled by the few, 
even one, ostensibly engaged in furthering the general public good—supporting systemic 
financial and economic stability—may be weakened by its own limited nature. 
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New international forums as they evolve and mature need to secure support from the general 
populace, and to do this they need to be reasonably transparent and open to public 
understanding, scrutiny, analysis, critique, and cross-examination. After the initial reformist 
burst of its creation during the crisis, now four years later, the Board needs to articulate its 
role and its mission to the wider public, market participants and voters. As the FSB secures a 
stronger legal institutional foundation with dedicated resources, its leadership needs to 
become more open and more comprehensible to external observers regarding its membership, 
procedures, processes, and outcomes. 
 
The FSB publishes its charter and its final policy output. That is about the extent of current 
transparency, and it is insufficient. It also needs to publish its full membership (including all 
committees and working groups), and establish general principles and standard approaches to 
public consultation and interactions with civil society. This much should be demanded by 
outsiders, whether from the financial sector or civil society, more generally. 
 
It is probable that the FSB’s creation by the central banking community is a handicap in this 
area. This is a community of members and supporters that are used to operating in private and 
prefer general obscurity, despite their individual and collective power over markets. Central 
banks tightly limit their transparency and rarely reveal their thinking prior to policy decisions. 
In this case, the community norm leans hard against openness. But by being a largely closed 
elite forum and system of decision making, the Board may damage the legitimacy of the 
process and its output in the medium to long-term. If policy makers do not properly articulate 
the reasons behind policies, even if they are perhaps rightly thought necessary for future 
financial stability by those charged with taking action, they will be vulnerable to attack from 
national and international lobbies that may have little interest in stability and more interest in 
private profit over public good. 
 
Issues of legitimacy and transparency will continue to arise and remain to be addressed in a 
manner that partially satisfies critics. The Board leadership is addressing complaints over 
legitimacy via gradual membership creep. But this expansionary impulse must balance a 
desire for greater inclusiveness with the need to retain the effectiveness which comes with a 
smaller size and more flexible mode of operation. On transparency, very small steps are being 
taken to tackle the forum’s relative obscurity, an obscurity which could undermine necessary 
support from the other stakeholders and actors as well as the public. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
The creation of the FSB is perhaps the singular institutional triumph of the G20-led process. 
From out of the crisis, a new coordinating body was born, an institution in outline and form 
which has been strengthened progressively from 2009 through 2013. The process was not 
solely the masterstroke of the G20 leaders who backed the move. Mario Draghi also played 
an early instrumental role. Those interviewed for this research are clear about Draghi’s 
centrality to the birth of the FSB. He quickly understood the need to enlarge the FSF (which 
he chaired). Supported by his own epistemic community of like-minded central bank 
governors and principal supervisors, he seized the opportunity that the crisis offered to pursue 
his own (and the community’s) reform agenda and to defend their centrality in the reappraisal 
that began in 2008.  
 
Draghi and his community made a clear power play to defend their position in the reform 
response. The same bankers who had not seen the dangers of the ‘great moderation’, those 
from the core of the advanced economies, grasped control. This cohesive epistemic 
community was deferred to by G20 leaders as experts and constructed a coordinating 
mechanism that reflected their goals and their biases. In taking charge, this ‘consolidated the 
position of central banks as leaders of the regulatory agenda as well as the monetary agenda’ 
(Interview 9, 2011, p. 9). 
 
Through the creation of the Financial Stability Board, Draghi pushed aside the IMF and took 
control of the re-regulatory policy agenda, ensuring this universal institution would be 
downgraded in the regulatory architectural redesign, to the consternation of those outside the 
new club. Today, much more power is in the hands of this community and the central banks 
as a group than previously, a triumph for Draghi and his collaborators who constructed a 
Board designed to their specifications, that would operate for its first years, from 2009 to 
2013, largely beyond effective external scrutiny, led by its Chair who knew what he was 
aiming for and who could rely on his allies. 
 
The research findings presented here demonstrates the new forum was structured in a way to 
ensure maximum speed and control by the Chair; Draghi then selected the leaders himself 
and determined (from 2009 through the end of 2011) who would serve on the Steering 
Committee. It is no accident that the leading roles were and remain held by those of Draghi’s 
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colleagues (and now Mark Carney's) who are highly supportive of the move to re-regulate, of 
the macro-prudential policies required facilitate that, and of this paradigm shift that the 
community adopted as their common project. 
 
The following chapter will demonstrate that, having created the Board to maximise the 
community’s own objectives, Draghi, Carney, Trichet and other leading technocrats rapidly 
addressed the common agenda and specific goals that they themselves had designed and 
secured backing for from the G20 in 2008 and 2009. These policies would differ in strength, 
area to area, but they would collectively add to the solidity and regulatory reality of the 
paradigm shift in the policy consensus commenced in 2008-2009 and led by the Board and its 
pivotal community. 
 
The FSB as a coordinating forum is a considerable structural and institutional improvement 
over its predecessor. Its creation forms part of the concrete re-regulatory paradigm shift seen 
after the crisis. The Board’s increased size and greater structural complexity indicates a rapid 
crisis-driven jump from a small talking shop into a nascent international institution at the 
centre of the new architecture of international financial diplomacy.  
 
The crisis response resulted in a technocratic consensus, a new re-regulatory narrative and 
paradigm shift, and a concomitant burst of institutional creation and policy making followed 
by more gradual steps. Since its creation in 2009 the structure has been built upon with 
progressive incremental changes addressing functions, standing and resources. Its creation as 
the central coordinating body for global financial regulatory reform amounts to a third order 
change (Hall, 1993). In 2013 the FSB is maturing fast backed by hawks from the western-
dominated central banking epistemic community whose members debated its creation, 
advised the G20 on its structure, and then went on to lead the board from 2009 until the end 
of 2012. 
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Chapter 5. The Financial Stability Board and Key Policy Outcomes 
 ‘The general contractor of the reform process’.  
(Interview 22, 2012, p. 8) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses Financial Stability Board (FSB) policy outcomes. The FSB’s success 
is driven by a particular, stronger, consensual paradigm and narrative and policy consensus 
agreed after rapid policy convergence (Bennett, 1991) by key state actors, and within a 
relatively small group of North American and European central banking technocrats leading 
the reform process who form part of a cohesive epistemic community (Haas, 1992a) and who 
act as the vanguard of the reform movement (Interview 24, 2012). This elite expert epistemic 
community championed the creation of the FSB, and this same relatively small group of 
principals took control of the leadership of the forum from 2009 through the end of 2012, 
before broadening the leadership roster to more emerging country officials in 2013. During 
phases one, two, and three of the evolution of the G20, this community moved to implement 
a complex, multi-tiered, internationally coordinated financial reform agenda that they 
fashioned or alternatively tasked to other standard-setting bodies (SSBs). These policy 
outcomes form the concrete realization of the paradigm shift in the policy consensus that the 
technical community embarked upon in reaction to the financial and economic crisis of 2007-
2008. 
 
Policy making and implementation is where the FSB regulatory heft is measured, where G20 
political capital matters, and where the existence or not of a common narrative amongst the 
community of technical actors can have direct impact on the actual policy outcomes. Where 
reforms are led and emerge out of this elite expert community they are markedly stronger, 
strengthened by the common policy consensus and convergence within the FSB, backed by 
the G20, and by the regulatory power of the former in key processes of implementation and 
oversight. The central banking community’s control is behind the FSB’s most successful 
reforms, which show a rejection of the previous laissez-faire neo-liberal financial 
deregulatory paradigm and the adoption of a new worldview in which financial markets and 
firms would be internationally and nationally re-regulated, principally by national agencies 
overseen by the leadership within the small FSB community. 
 
This chapter will demonstrate that in two specific policy areas there has been a third-order 
(Hall, 1993) change, a paradigm shift in approach by the central banking community. These 
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areas are (1) the coordinating function of the FSB itself as an institution in the making; and 
(2) the adoption and implementation of a macro-prudential approach (via the Basel III 
Accord) to the supervision and oversight of the financial system as a whole and of major 
banks and systemically important financial institutions, in particular. 
 
In other policy areas, the output will be seen to be more mixed and less substantial because 
the policy process is impacted by a number of factors. The policy process can be negatively 
affected by disagreement within the G20 and the FSB membership over the narrative in a 
policy space, i.e., the lack of a cohesive policy consensus, the inherent complexity of the 
policy area and a lack of existing control mechanisms over national legislative and regulatory 
levers, or failure of the FSB to press existing SSBs to depart from historically obstructionist 
stances in which policy norms clash rather than converge (Interview 10, 2011). The research 
will suggest that the further the FSB leadership is from actual policy design and regulatory 
responsibility, the more limited its ability to counteract domestic-policy-driven centrifugal 
forces propelling the G20-FSB consensus apart, adversely impacting level-one and level-two 
win sets, particularly in phase three, when tensions and discord and greater divergence 
amongst state actors, is seen. 
 
On balance, the policy output of the Board will be seen to be effective in a number of reform 
areas. But the Board’s impact is still circumscribed because it is a state-based, consensus-
driven beast, reliant on the willingness of participants to agree to a consensual policy 
narrative, to identify desired policy actions and outcomes, and (importantly) to deliver on 
implementation and monitoring. Viewed individually, the height and breadth of a particular 
discreet policy reform act or wave fluctuates from substantial, to moderate, to very minimal. 
Viewed as a single international project, the FSB epistemic community increased the 
amplitude of international and national regulation of financial markets and firms. Taken as a 
whole, the Board’s policy actions are indicative of the paradigm shift signalled by the G20 in 
2008-2009. 
 
5.1.1 A policy reform matrix 
 
In order to make a spatial judgment of the reforms and to visualise the directional movement 
in the policy landscape, the chapter includes a heuristic policy reform matrix (Figure 5.1) to 
capture the major policy actions of the FSB. The matrix contains four quadrants, and each 
policy reform is located within this topography. Reform measures are categorised as moving 
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from ‘very weak’ to ‘extremely strong’ on the X axis, and ‘strongly nationally based’ to 
‘strongly globally harmonised’ on the Y axis. 
 
The matrix will be used to illustrate the policy movement from 2009 to 2013 of various 
components of the G20-mandated and FSB-coordinated reform agenda. It is a graphic 
representation based on judgments as to the directional shift of policy actions seen. As each 
area is analysed in the chapter, its movement on the matrix will be identified and the degree 
of shift being seen will be highlighted. Finally at the chapter’s conclusion all policies being 
discussed will be placed together providing as sense of the total overall directional movement 
of the policies under consideration.   
 
Policies will be colour coded on the chart as follows:  
 
 Green - Third order paradigm shifts 
 Orange - Second order shifts 
 Blue - Advisory only 
 Red - No shift or deterioration 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it briefly lays out the FSB’s mandate. Second, the 
nature of the FSB approach to financial reform is addressed. Third, the chapter reviews and 
assesses the overall coordination, cooperation, and monitoring role performed by the FSB 
nexus of international policy coordination. Fourth, the chapter analyses areas of relative 
success and contrasts those with weaker outcomes where less progress has been evident. 
Finally, the chapter includes a brief assessment of the early warning and other mechanisms 
designed to monitor the FSB policy output and improve supervisors’ ability to identify future 
boom and bust cycles.  
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Figure 5.1 Policy Reform Matrix
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5.1.2 Defining success 
 
Since this chapter judges the efficacy and success of the FSB policy-making process, it is 
necessary to define success. 
 
Success is the accomplishment of an aim or purpose. Here, success is defined as the extent to 
which G20-FSB-directed policies result in stronger globally agreed harmonised results that 
may increase financial stability and resilience and mitigate future systemic risks to the global 
economy. In this research, the success or failure of Board policies must be judged on a 
subjective basis and measured against agreed timelines, the current state of implementation in 
key countries, and the possible future effectiveness of the reforms as proposed and enacted. 
 
This key issue of compliance will be developed further in the chapter. Ultimately, a 
determination of success or failure is analytical. It is a judgment based on the actions of key 
players, their motivations, announced positions, and observed outcomes, and how this affects 
global regulatory harmonisation and promotes financial stability. 
 
5.2.The FSB mandate 
 
The FSB’s mandate contains a series of broad objectives, which fall into three categories.  
1. Coordination and information exchange: The FSB is charged with overseeing the 
collaborative work of national financial authorities and international SSBs with the 
goal of aiding in the development, promotion, and implementation of effective 
regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies and best practices. This 
coordination and cooperation role is a central part of the Board’s mission as facilitator 
of the policy process (FSB, 2012: Art 2(1) b, d, and e; Art 2(2).). 
2. Macro-prudential policy tools and mechanisms: A large part of what the FSB is 
tasked with relates to the monitoring and design of policy to enhance financial 
stability and resilience and mitigate future systemic risks to the global economy 
arising from markets and firms (FSB, 2012; Art 2(1) a and b). 
3. Early warning, mutual assessment programs, and peer review mechanisms designed to 
identify, anticipate, and address future systemic risks: The FSB is required to ‘assess 
vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system’ and to recommend regulatory, 
supervisory, and related actions needed to address systemic risks (FSB, 2012; Art 2(1) 
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a). The Board is also required to support contingency planning for cross-border crisis 
management and resolution, particularly with respect to systemically important firms 
(FSB, 2012; Art. 2(1) c, f, g, and h). 
Mandate changes: The Charter allows the FSB to make additional recommendations to its 
members on policy issues and leaves open the possibility of a more expanded mandate. Thus, 
Article 2(i) empowers the FSB to ‘undertake any other tasks agreed by its members in the 
course of its activities and within the framework of the Charter’ (FSB, 2012, Art. 2j). This is 
open-ended and somewhat weak in formulation. It does not, for example, empower the FSB 
secretariat to determine new tasks and areas of focus; consensus amongst all members will be 
required to create further areas of responsibility. 
5.2.1 Compliance 
The FSB Charter is strikingly silent on the enforcement of agreed common standards. It 
instead must ‘promote members’ jurisdictions’ implementation of agreed commitments, 
standards and policy recommendations through monitoring, peer review and disclosure’ 
(FSB, 2012; Art. 2.(i)). However, in practice, the charter’s apparent weakness does not 
completely bleed through into a weak and worthless approach by those actually charged with 
overseeing the monitoring and compliance process. To the contrary, one of the more 
influential FSB Standing Committees handles policy implementation and monitoring 
(Interview 22, 2012; see also Bluestein, 2012). 
The form of the compliance mechanism used in each case is impacted by the strength of the 
community leading and controlling the process and the degree of agreement on the policy 
goal; it is not solely determined by the weakness of the Charter itself. There are instances 
where compliance and monitoring is relatively robust, and also examples where monitoring is 
less impressive and derivative of past practice. Looking just at the FSB Charter gives an 
incomplete picture of compliance and monitoring; some FSB-led practices appear to send a 
different, more subtly substantive message. 
5.3 The FSB approach to international financial regulation 
 
The Board, as the G20’s financial reform coordinator and facilitator, collectively strives to 
secure the goals agreed by the G20 leadership. To understand the policies proposed, agreed, 
and implemented, it is useful to briefly consider the nature of the regulatory approaches used 
since their form, content, and structure can impact effectiveness (Raustiala, 2005; Victor, 
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1997). At one end of the legal spectrum are binding legal treaties between sovereign states 
that result in specific obligations for each state signatory party. Examples of this type of 
agreement include the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Agreement, and the World Trade 
Organization agreement. In such cases, states bind one another via legally enforceable 
treaties, with the state leaders signing and committing their governments to specific 
obligations they contain. These documents are recognised as international law. The 
agreements are viewed as contracts (Raustiala, 2005) between state parties. 
 
Non-state parties (such as the FSB or SSBs) cannot commit their governments to contractual 
agreements; they have no standing to do so. None of the policy output produced by the FSB 
on behalf of the G20 has the direct force of international law. The FSB operates by securing 
agreements based on pledges from participants. The pledges are not binding as treaties. 
Pledges are the default mechanism of international agreements across the globe, from 
regulatory agreements to human rights accords (Brilmayer, 2006).  
 
Pledges are ‘most common in areas of technocratic cooperation’ (Raustiala 2005, p. 600). 
The substance addressed by agreements composed of pledges can vary from deep to shallow. 
But, overall, agreements composed of pledges tend to have greater depth and complexity than 
binding treaties that are limited and declaratory in nature (Brilmayer, 2006; Raustiala, 2005; 
Victor, 1997). When faced with uncertainty, state negotiators create more win sets and 
greater depth (i.e., content) by committing to non-binding pledges. Not all pledges are deep in 
content or successful in their goals. The Copenhagen Accord on climate change is an 
example of weakness and is a pledge-based agreement (Rogelj et al., 2010). 
 
The pledge-based approach seen in the FSB process shows sub-state actors lacking the formal 
creating agreements, grappling with complex policy issues backed by a fluctuating policy 
consensus while understanding the need for broad-based internationally coordinated 
nationally implemented accords. Not all FSB pledge-based agreements are similarly 
successful. 
 
The FSB community, where they control the levers of policy making and implementation, 
and when this is underpinned by a particularly strong internal policy consensus and narrative, 
can secure qualitatively more robust, stronger agreements with greater impact internationally 
and nationally. Such agreements are not directly legally binding. But they can usefully be 
described as ‘rules’ to which all participating states and sub-state actors commit. Such rules-
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based accords can have a major impact on international markets and actors. They are the 
product of the FSB acting as the key transgovernmental network of experts and other SSB 
networks acting on the FSB’s behalf. These rules constitute the output of this latest ‘next 
generation of international institutions’ and transnational bodies (Slaughter, 1997, p. 196). 
 
Within the FSB context, a more robust rules-based approach is the exception, not the norm, 
and requires a strong consensual narrative and community viewpoint. Where the policy 
consensus is less robust, when the FSB does not control implementation, or where national 
level-two processes and legislative negotiations impact negotiations, the output may instead 
utilise principles (sometimes also called best practices, standards, or attributes). 
 
A principles-based approach is one in which the policy makers identify high-level principles 
or best practices and refrain from prescriptive rules. Despite the apparent weakness, this 
approach can be the best alternative option policy makers have in certain cases. Principles-
based approaches allow reforms to be identified, agreed, and pursued within divergent 
national legal and cultural settings (Griffith-Jones, Helleiner, and Woods, N. (eds.), 2010, 
2010; Raustiala, 2005). This approach avoids trying to determine detailed rules ex ante, 
permitting further negotiation and trial and error in implementation (Raustiala and Victor, 
2004). National agencies and banks can determine how to achieve the goals set. These 
accords must rest on trust if they are to be effective (Black, 2008), and on a perception by 
state signatories that some reputational damage may occur if they fail to comply (Downs and 
Jones, 2002). 
 
In analyzing the FSB policy output, the research identifies tension between a rules versus a 
principles approach in many areas of FSB work. The particular regulatory form chosen 
depends on the extent to which the common anomalies are recognised. It depends on the 
strength of the epistemic communities involved. It also depends on the degree to which a 
community or clashing communities defend or shift the policy consensus, assuming there is a 
consensus. These different approaches to agreements and accords are reflected in the 
positioning of the policies on the matrix. Where rules are enhanced, clear, and being applied 
in most G20 countries, the policy at issue will be seen to move diagonally and upwards left to 
right across the matrix, i.e., becoming stronger and more globally harmonised and consistent. 
Where policy areas are left with nonbinding principles, patchy application, and weak 
monitoring, the policy will move a smaller distance (if at all) within the matrix. 
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5.4 Coordination and information exchange 
 
The FSB is tasked with coordinating and improving the information exchange and dialogue 
among SSBs, member finance ministry officials, central bankers, supervisors, and IMF 
officials, on the issue areas identified by the G20. The FSB plays the key role in facilitating, 
monitoring, and reporting on all work streams resulting from the G20 process. The FSB 
leadership does not in all cases produce the regulatory recommendations themselves. Other 
SSB representatives also produce deliverables under the aegis of the FSB, its standing 
committees, and working groups. The FSB leadership then monitors progress, reports on 
outcomes upwards to the G20, agrees next steps, and provides a venue for discussion of the 
continuing work streams. 
 
The FSB has a multitier upward reporting and monitoring superstructure. This is new and 
significant because it puts pressure on SSBs and national regulators to act to complete the 
G20 tasks assigned to them and to monitor adherence to agreed standards and report this to 
the Board’s leadership and G20 summits. In return, SSBs get an elevated status, as scores of 
senior regulators drawn in participate in the policy process internationally. The SSBs and 
their national officials play a bigger role in the policy process and are more closely connected 
to decision-making processes than previously, and this is gradually binding together disparate 
actors, pressing for uniformity and accountability in application of agreed standards, best 
practices, principles, or rules by members. This is an exercise in considerably enhanced peer 
pressure, via policy dialogue and reporting systems (FSB, 2010c, 2010d), rather than 
compliance mechanisms. 
 
5.4.1 Stronger lines of communication and control 
 
Participants see the level of upward reporting through the FSB structure as an innovation and 
stronger than the previous processes with multiple layers (Interview 7, 2011). In the structure, 
policy development can, for example, proceed as follows. 
 
Output from an SSB (responding to the G20-FSB direction) is passed to FSB Standing 
Committees or Working Groups (policy review and monitoring). This then goes to the 
Steering Committee (providing direction), and onwards to the FSB Plenary. This process is 
overseen and managed by the FSB Chair. Periodic reports are finally sent up to the G20 
leaders summits, which can supply political pressure, when needed. Thus, there is policy 
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development, monitoring, and reporting pressure on SSBs and national agencies from 
multiple FSB actors, and monitoring and pressure from the G20 and FSB leadership through 
the structure and policy process. 
 
In contrast, the prior structure was truncated, weaker, and less effective. Each SSB operated 
independently. They were linked to other SSBs via the Joint Forum, but this was a body with 
a weak mandate and no power or authority. SSBs did not feel pressure in this structure, and 
they did not report via a direct chain to a body composed of principals and on to a broader 
grouping of national political leaders at summits. Pre-crisis, SSBs had fewer clearly 
coordinated policy goals and timelines, and were under relatively little political or 
institutional pressure to deliver. 
 
This contrast indicates the new structure is qualitatively stronger and can exert more 
coordinating pressure, and direction on the collective FSB-SSB output. This view is 
supported by principals engaged in the new structure who see the FSB direction and 
coordinating process as a significant innovation and an increase in intensity of the dialogue. 
A senior U.S. participant observed the forum has been, ‘invaluable in coordinating and urging 
SSBs to move forward with their work’ (Bretton Woods Committee, 2010). An EU 
Commissioner and participant applauds the G20-FSB process for facilitating a ‘constant 
dialogue at the technical level’ (Barnier, 2011). Former European Central Bank President 
Trichet stressed that the process ensures, ‘an unprecedented degree of international 
cooperation in regulatory matters’ (Trichet, 2010a, p. 5). Another observer finds that the FSB 
leadership corralled together diverse constituencies and delivered a sense of shared purpose 
(Interview 28, 2012). 
 
Through the FSB, the G20 gets closer to achieving an enhanced, institutionalised, regularised 
system of international coordination and cooperation on financial regulation amongst a much 
larger grouping of regulators than hitherto existed, building on existing networks, structures, 
and SSB processes; the structure and operation of the forum and the coordination 
mechanisms essential to the reform project. 
 
In 2013, the FSB is acting as the general contractor of financial reform (Interview 22, 2012) 
for the G20. It is fostering closer state-to-state international cooperation and coordination 
than existed in the past. It dominates the SSBs it oversees, interlinks, and directs these forums 
and includes them within the state-driven re-regulatory process. The intensity of the dialogue, 
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the number of actors involved, and the multifaceted nature of the discussions are 
quantitatively greater and qualitatively better. The breadth and depth of the work streams 
handled by the Board’s organs from 2009 onwards have been considerable. Led by Mario 
Draghi, (and since 2012 Mark Carney), the Board grasped the opportunity to closely 
coordinate the G20 financial reform agenda in 2009, and it has yet to let go. 
 
Providing a regular venue for these discussions is not a minor matter and helps improve post-
crisis information coordination and exchange among officials. The process and the constant 
engagement reinforce the transgovernmental policy networks and linkages between G20-FSB 
states and amongst senior SSB national agency officials. This has tangible and intangible 
benefits. Although the SSBs remain independent, their current workload, and enhanced 
relevance are the result of their being brought within this FSB chain of communication and 
collaboration below the G20. In 2013, SSBs are under pressure and, according to participants, 
they have been ‘raising their games’ (Interview 22, 2012, p. 15) and are being forced to more 
effectively collaborate (Interviews 15 and 22, 2012). 
 
As the forum at the centre of the re-regulatory reform drive, the Board is today highly 
influential as a venue, not as much as an institution; it is not yet quite that strong. But as the 
locus for interstate regulatory diplomacy, one within which North American and European 
central bankers and supervisors dominate, it is performing the coordinating role more 
effectively than previous mechanisms and forums. 
 
Placement in the policy reform matrix: This facet of the FSB’s role is a process, not a policy, 
but due to its importance it appears in the matrix as an outcome. ‘FSB Policy Coordination’ 
moves from ‘very weak’ and ‘regionally harmonised’ (under the smaller exclusionary, 
ineffective FSF structure) to ‘weak-to-strong’ and to above ‘weakly globally harmonised.’ So 
the coordination function moves diagonally upwards from the bottom left quadrant towards 
the middle of the top left quadrant, a significant improvement over previous coordinating 
mechanisms. On balance, this movement may actually understate the nature of the forum’s 
coordination role. Without the high-level coordinating role which the FSB provides, the 
reform process as a whole would be handicapped and harder to achieve. It constitutes a third 
order change. 
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Figure 5.2 Movement of FSB Policy Coordination on the Policy Matrix
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5.5 A significant macro-prudential policy shift 
 
In London, in April 2009, the G20 leaders called on the FSB, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), and other SSBs to ‘reshape our regulatory systems so that our 
authorities are able to identify and take account of macro-prudential risks.’ (G20, 2009a, p. 4) 
At the Pittsburgh Summit later that year, the leaders added that macro-prudential policy must  
‘help prevent credit and asset price cycles from becoming forces of destabilization’ and that, 
moreover, there must be ‘an adequate balance between macro-prudential and micro-
prudential regulation to control risks, and to develop the tools necessary to monitor and 
assess the build-up of macro-prudential risks in the financial system.’ (G20, 2009d)  
 
Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the term ‘macro-prudential’ was largely absent 
from central banking literature in Europe and North America. Since then, the concept has 
become a buzzword, signalling a new policy approach to financial stability and global 
markets. Macro-prudential policy ‘Seeks to develop, oversee, and deliver appropriate policy 
response to the financial system as a whole rather than focusing on individual institutions or 
certain economic measures in isolation. Macro-prudential policy aims to enhance the 
resilience of the financial system and to dampen systemic risks that spread through the 
financial system.’ (G30, 2010, p. 13) 
This concept represents a paradigm shift in the Western central banking supervisory 
approach, from one predominantly focused on the stability of individual institutions (so-
called microprudential oversight) towards a focus on the stability of the financial system as a 
whole. Until the crisis in 2007-2008, there was ideological resistance amongst central banks 
and supervisors from advanced western economies to view the financial system as 
increasingly interconnected and vulnerable to asset booms and busts, and to contagion effects 
that could amplify individual firm-level decisions into damaging systemic events. A wilful 
blindness existed despite strong historical evidence that banking crises had become 
progressively more frequent and severe (Allen and Gale, 2007; King, 2011a), the result of the 
deregulatory mindset and worldview that coalesced after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971 (Helleiner, 2010). If and when actual busts occurred, then and only then 
might actions be taken at the margins to halt a resulting recession. 
Alan Greenspan, a disciple of Ayn Rand, author of Atlas Shrugged, a controversial economic 
libertarian work of fiction (see Gold, 2010), and past Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
System, infamously repeatedly refused to intervene during the upswing of the credit boom 
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cycles. Unlike other U.S. Federal Reserve Chairmen of the past, such as William Mchesney 
Martin or Paul A. Volcker, Greenspan refused to ‘take the punchbowl away just as the party 
gets going’ (Manikew, 2007). Instead Greenspan, and his replacement, Ben Bernanke, opted 
to clean up after the party was over and everyone awoke suffering from terrible global 
hangovers. 
Post-crisis, central bankers relatively swiftly adopted a new, largely uncontested, worldview 
and narrative centred on backing a macro-prudential approach, which views asymmetric 
supervisory and monetary policy as exacerbating booms and busts, and as excessively 
procyclical. Post-crisis, a plurality in the community subscribed to the belief that central 
banks should have a new job—i.e., restraining inflation and helping ensure financial stability 
by smoothing out destructive extremes of asset price booms and busts (Cooper, 2008; Prasad, 
2011). Participants such as Blanchard, Smaghi, and Constancio recall this as an important 
shift in the consensus (Blanchard et al., 2012; Constancio, 2010). 
Building on this narrative consensus, the FSB and the BCBS sought to design and agree 
macro-prudential tools which would be applied consistently throughout the economic cycle 
(such as higher capital, liquidity, and leverage standards), and variable tools that could be 
triggered during the cycle as asset bubbles begin to develop (such as countercyclical buffers), 
a demand made by one of the most ardent critics of the pre-crisis excesses (Rajan, 2010, pp. 
161-162). In recognizing and constructing policies meant to deal with booms, busts, major 
market failures, and potential future systemic risks and excesses, the central banking 
community was ipso facto rejecting the prior laissez-faire neo-liberal deregulatory 
worldview. The policy is the reverse of a hands-off deregulatory norm: It is a multifaceted re-
regulatory stance and series of policy solutions. 
The recognition of the importance of systemic macro-prudential oversight may have been 
new in London and Washington, but it was old news in Asia. Asian states had been using 
these tools since the crisis in the 1990s (Borio, 2006; Kawai, 2011; Shirakawa, 2012). But in 
the West, macro-prudential policy remained, at this stage, ‘a theory yet to be proven in 
practice’ (Bretton Woods Committee, 2010). The Basel III Accord is the product of this shift 
in the West. It is arguably the most important financial regulatory reform in the post-crisis 
period produced by the G20-FSB process and is of a third order in magnitude. The accord is 
the strongest policy expression of the new re-regulatory paradigm, one in which financial 
markets and systemically important firms (especially large banks) are constrained by tougher 
rules and limits on risk taking. 
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5.5.1 Basel III - the high point of the regulatory reform wave 
The central banking and supervisory community, led by the FSB, came out of the crisis with 
a consensus that higher capital of a more liquid and tangible form was essential. The crisis 
showed previously permitted functional capital levels were woefully inadequate (at 
approximately 1 percent) and totally insufficient given the maturity transformational nature 
of banking. A new Basel accord was needed. It would prove to be the most important piece of 
financial regulatory reform post-crisis. Commenced at the behest of the G20 leadership in 
April 2009, negotiations were completed and a deal agreed by the Seoul Summit in 
November 2010. In contrast, Basel II took 15 years to complete and was never implemented 
by all signatory states (the U.S. never fully implemented it). 
The crisis response was driven by the FSB leadership. The key community leaders also met 
and debated the new standards within the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
(GHOS) (Bair, 2012; Interview 7, 2011; Interview 24, 2012). The central bank and supervisor 
principals in the FSB galvanised the BCBS, which was composed of the FSB leaders’ 
deputies, who were under clear direction and pressure from their own institution’s principals, 
most of whom were in relative accord on the necessity of this paradigm shift on capital and 
supervision, but argued over the magnitude of the shift. 
5.5.2 Capital: How much is enough? 
Because there was little internal debate within the central banking FSB and BCBS 
membership over the need for increased capital minimums, due to the common agreed policy 
narrative which saw a lack of capital as a root cause of the crisis, the reform debate in 2009-
2010 centred instead on metrics, on the level and type of capital required, and the length of 
the phase-in period, not on whether higher capital was required. The Basel III Accord 
resulted from intensive FSB-BCBS negotiations and pitted those arguing for a tough 
approach (higher capital, tougher definitions, and a short phase-in) against those in favour of 
a weaker response (lower base capital levels and a long phase-in). The battle is one of hawks 
versus doves (Interviews 5 and 7, 2011). 
Negotiations and discussions took place in the FSB, in the GHOS, in BCBS formal processes, 
and in informal discussions at the margins of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
meetings in 2009 and 2010 (Interview 7, 2011). Just as the conceptualization of the FSB 
occurred in informal and formal meetings, so too, agreement on the Basel accord was 
facilitated by a series of informal gatherings supporting the formal process. 
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On one side of the debate were the hawks, including central bankers from Switzerland, the 
UK, Spain, the U.S., and emerging markets. Philipp Hildebrand, then Chairman of the Swiss 
National Bank, pushed for high base capital levels (Interview 7, 2011). UK regulators, 
including Adair Turner, Paul Tucker, and Mervyn King, were also unambiguous in their 
support of higher capital standards. Spanish central bankers, who already applied relatively 
strict prudential oversight and banking regulations domestically on big banks, also pressed 
for a strong accord, joined by Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS. Canada’s Mark 
Carney was also supportive of tough core standards (Interview 19, 2012). 
Within the U.S., the view was more complicated. Leaders in the U.S. Treasury, the Federal 
Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) all strongly supported higher 
capital standards (Bair, 2011, pp. 257-64; Geithner, 2011; Tarullo, 2011b, pp. 2-3). But the 
principal bank regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which was led by a 
Republican (Walsh, 2011), sided with banks and resisted higher standards. Congress, 
meanwhile, switched from pro-reform under the Democrats to hostile to regulation under the 
Republicans in 2010. 
On the other side of the debate were the doves, arguing for a weaker accord, including 
German, French, and Japanese central bankers and supervisors (Bair, 2012, p. 260). Each 
country had its own reasons. German supervisors worried that too strict a Basel III deal on 
capital could adversely impact their Landesbanks and other German financial institutions that 
could need major capital infusions to comply with a new accord. French regulators, 
meanwhile, viewed the financial crisis as an America disease transmitted nefariously to 
Europe, and feared the impact on their large universal banks. They therefore argued in favour 
of lower capital minimums. Both countries’ banks were in a weak capital condition post-
crisis and were heavily exposed to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis that erupted in 2011. 
Japan, although its banks weathered the storm well, sided with the doves. 
Importantly, emerging market voices were strongly in favour of higher capital. European and 
North American hawks were backed by tough stances from Singapore, Hong Kong, China, 
and India (Interview 7, 2011; Bair, 2012, p. 263). Emerging-country FSB members were in 
agreement with the general aims of the Basel III Accord. In fact, Asian states had been 
implementing similar policies for years (G30, 2010); China and key Asia G20 emerging 
countries viewed the new accord as a move towards, not away from, their own policy 
proscriptions (and national regulatory approaches) of tighter state control over the financial 
sector. They were content to go along with standards lower than their own domestic position. 
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In this manner, the new Western paradigm and consensus moved towards the emerging 
countries’ position on capital and liquidity. 
The end result was a multifaceted accord with a significant increase in minimum (risk-
weighted) capital levels coupled to a long phase-in period. It was a compromise which gave 
something to both sides. Influential and persuasive roles were played by Mario Draghi as 
Chair of the FSB, and Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, who 
helped bridge the gap between the hawks and the doves, pushing the latter towards a deal 
(Interview 15, 2012). The agreement finally unveiled was, according to Geithner, ‘critical to 
making the financial system more stable and more resilient’ (Geithner, 2011, p. 4). Trichet 
called it ‘a cornerstone of the new regulatory system’ (Trichet, 2010b, p. 3). Caruana lauded 
its ‘fundamental strengthening – in some cases, a radical overhaul – of global capital 
standards ... [which] deliver on the core of the global financial reform agenda’ (Caruana, 
2010, p. 6). The Basel III components are as follows and are summarized in Chart 5.2: 
 A qualitatively strengthened definition of risk-based capital and an increase in the 
minimum level of core equity capital from 2 percent to 4.5 percent. 
 A conservation buffer, to absorb losses in periods of stress, of 2.5 percent of risk- 
based capital, for a total minimum of 7 percent. 
 The adoption of a countercyclical buffer of zero to 2.5 percent, to be increased 
when an economy is booming and drawn down when an economy contracts 
(based on the Spanish model). 
 A capital surcharge (of zero to 2.5 percent) levied against the world’s largest 
banks (so-called global systemically important financial institutions [GSIFIs]), 
depending on size, risk, interconnectedness, and other factors which raise these 
institution’s riskiness to the system as a whole. The capital used would be 
common equity capital (BIS, 2011), a victory for those seeking real equity rather 
than other less liquid forms of contingent capital. 
 A leverage ratio of 3 percent to capture risk behaviour and to monitor and limit it. 
Constraining leverage is key. As Turner observes: ‘There is simply no good 
theoretical argument or empirical evidence that we need to run banking systems 
with anything like as highly leverage as over recent decades’ (Turner, 2011 p. 6). 
A leverage ratio seeks to address this. 
 A liquidity coverage ratio, to address the need for highly liquid assets in times of 
credit shortage. 
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 A net stable funding ratio to provide further strength to the institutions when they 
face stress. 
 
 
Note: GSIFI = global systemically important financial institutions. 
Figure 5.3 Basel III Components 
The Basel III Accord resulted in increases in capital over the previous regime—up to a 7 
percent base (a 4.5 percent common equity and a 2.5 percent capital conservation buffer) 
from a 1 percent functional level pre-crisis (Carney, 2011; Caruana, 2010). It was hoped that 
this sevenfold increase in base capital would strengthen firms and reduce risk taking, and thus 
also reduce the severity of boom and bust cycles in the future. 
The accord included further capital requirements such as the countercyclical buffer, to be 
built up during periods of excess credit growth associated with increases in system-wide risk 
and drawn down in periods of stress. It includes a ‘GSIFI surcharge’, which was very 
contentious (Interview 7, 2011), requiring the largest firms to hold more core equity capital, 
up to 2.5 percent extra normally, with an additional 1.0 percent for firms that grow 
excessively large despite supervisory warnings. International banks fought hard against the 
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GSIFI surcharge, but failed to halt the drive for higher capital for the largest firms. Total risk-
based and common equity capital will amount to more than 10.5 percent by January 1, 2019. 
Taken together, the provisions are a declaration by regulators that the very largest financial 
interconnected and complex institutions pose inherently more systemic risk to the global 
economy (Drehmann and Tarashev, 2011; Haldane, 2010a; Haldane and May, 2011). This 
view amongst politicians and regulators has solidified since 2010 (Bair, Brown and 
Huntsman, 2012; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2012; Haldane, 2012b). 
Other mechanisms to provide further stability and resilience against firm-level risk-taking 
behaviour include a leverage ratio, a liquidity coverage ratio, and a net stable funding ratio. 
These tools are designed to complement the effect of higher capital. Limits on leverage will 
add a brake on risk taking. Liquidity and funding ratios are designed to ensure that when a 
credit crunch occurs, banks have resources available to continue to operate and fund 
themselves (they did not possess sufficient liquid assets in 2007-2008). When and if these 
firms take excessive risk, the new tools and mechanisms should aid in raising supervisory red 
flags in advance of systemic problems. 
5.5.3 A paradigm shift takes shape 
The Basel III Accord’s provisions are concrete evidence of the qualitative (type of capital) 
and quantitative (an order of magnitude of capital) shift in the re-regulatory paradigm led by 
the hawks in the FSB leadership. The deal is not, according to backers of the accord, 
tinkering at the margins. It is imposition of collective and national supervisory authority over 
global banks by a central banking epistemic community led by principals in the FSB. The 
accord marks the reassertion of state power over regulation of global financial markets and 
firms. It shows a rejection by FSB technocrats of the extremes of laissez faire neo-liberalism. 
For regulators, its signals the end of the deregulatory and self-regulatory era that started in the 
1980s and gathered pace in the 1990s  For the G20, but especially for the FSB and BCBS, the 
accord is the apogee of the reformist wave and paradigm shift. It is a focussed regulatory 
shift. It does not extend to macroeconomic matters and does not imply a wholesale rejection 
of neo-liberal economics. 
The accord, and its implementation were possible because the central banking community 
showed a common understanding of the failings and anomalies in the previous worldview. As 
the pivotal expert epistemic community, they agreed a new common macro-prudential policy 
consensus. Based on this shift, the Basel accord was agreed. The combination of recognised 
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anomalies, a strong epistemic community, and a shift in the policy consensus permits this 
third-order policy shift (Hall, 1993), as per Figure 2.1, Chapter, 2, p. 33. The expert-
fashioned accord was deferred to by the G20 leadership, which signed off on the accord over 
which they had essentially no input, angering some of their finance ministries (Interview 10, 
2011; Interview 17, 2012). 
The negotiation required elite policy convergence (Bennett, 1991), followed by coordinated 
top-down policy diffusion (Levi-Faur, 2005) via the FSB mechanisms to implement its 
provisions. The policy making was led by the officials from Europe and North America 
supported by leading emerging countries’ representatives. The accord and its implementation 
mechanisms are potentially stronger and more robust because the policy actors are 
independent regulators. During phases one and two of the G20’s evolution as they designed 
the policy, level-one win sets existed between national negotiators (on capital, leverage, and 
liquidity); these were exploited in 2009-2010 without reference to level-two domestic 
lobbies; the firms are excluded from the process by the FSB negotiators acting as the leading 
distinct transnational network and expert technical community in the process. 
5.5.4 Pledges with international reach 
The central bank epistemic community, through the Basel III Accord, committed to an 
agreement whose form and structure is a relatively robust pledge-based agreement, one that 
was then backed by the G20 leaders at Seoul. It is not a treaty or contract resulting in binding 
state-to-state obligations. It is a pledge-based agreement and its depth, breadth, and 
complexity are clearly visible. Nonetheless, the accord has some of the effects of a binding 
text, albeit one ultimately enforced state by state. Critics of ‘soft law’ suggest that because 
this type of agreement does not result in legally enforceable contracts, their effect on states is 
less valuable (Raustiala, 2005, p. 581). This is not entirely convincing. Sub-state actors would 
not engage in the detailed complex negotiations if they did not result in what the actors and 
their community view as important multilateral obligations which will be nationally enforced 
state by state. Hence, the heated arguments over implementation, and the raised voices when 
one or another state is alleged to be failing in its obligations. 
Markets and investors clearly believed the signals the Basel III Accord pledges sent. They did 
not wait for legal certainty and full implementation before reacting to the accord. Banks that 
are failing to reach the accord’s capital standards even years in advance of formal deadlines 
are being hit hard negatively by investors. Gradually, a hard law effect, via national domestic 
rules and regulations, will occur in many states, but there is naturally a delay between when 
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an international accord and its pledges are inked and when these turn into hard law enforced 
by each state’s regulators. In summary, Basel III showed the negotiators trying to construct 
the strongest agreement possible given their limitations as sub-state actors, drawing on their 
community worldview and narrative, their strength as the dominant transnational expert 
network and epistemic community in global finance, and their roles as independent national 
regulators. 
5.5.5 Taxation not prohibition 
Basel III opted for taxation instead of prohibition (Haldane, 2010c). The accord is highly 
complex, and this raised concerns over implementation, gaming, and arbitrage opportunities 
(Haldane, 2012b). The accord’s provisions operate as taxes on banks’ future behaviour. But 
taxes can only achieve their goal if the rules are clear and they are applied with vigour. As 
Haldane states, ‘keep it simple. Complex control of a complex system is a recipe for 
confusion at best and catastrophe at worst’(Haldane, 2010a, p. 13). The complexity of the 
markets, of the multinational banks and their businesses, and of the country-to-country 
application of the Basel III standards, may allow firms to work around them to minimise the 
impact of these new rules or engage in regulatory arbitrage.  
Basel III’s designers decided against prohibition of systemically risky behaviours, an 
approach which would set out clearer lines of what can and cannot be done by major banks 
and financial firms. Because of the problem of arbitrage (i.e., tax avoidance) discussed above, 
clear prohibitions can work better. The U.S. Glass-Steagall Act, drafted after the Great Crash 
of 1929, set the rules which contributed to decades during which there were many fewer 
systemic banking crises in the U.S. because major commercial banks were prohibited from 
the investment banking and securities businesses, and capital mobility was also restricted 
(Haldane, 2010b; Perino, 2010). Properly designed, applied, and supervised prohibitions are 
relatively easy to enforce; well understood by both sides; and less prone to avoidance, 
arbitrage, or manipulation by the regulated. 
Although Basel III is a major innovation and large in scope and impact, by opting for taxation 
and against prohibition, negotiators risk players gaming the system and engaging in arbitrage 
in the future. According to critics, the level of taxation was too low and based on risk-
adjusted capital (Admati and Hellwig, 2013), a factor which may have pressed many policy 
makers to reach for Basel-plus national regimes. 
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The decision to select taxation and not prohibition shows the outer edge of the paradigm shift 
and the limitations of the policy consensus within which the FSB community and its leaders 
operate. The FSB community did not consider more radical and simpler structural reform 
solutions offered by heretics from within their own ranks. Alternative narratives and solutions 
were never really considered, showing what is kept off the agenda, i.e., nondecisions 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Strange, 1986), are important because options are thus limited 
and solutions circumscribed, influencing outcomes to what is socially possible and acceptable 
(Lukes, 1974). 
More ambitious structural reforms were not seriously considered or allowed onto the G20-
FSB agenda. Thus, a narrow banking structure was out of the question (Kay, 2009; Kotlikoff, 
2010). A utility banking structure was never seriously entertained (King, 2009b). A Tobin 
tax, i.e. a tax on every financial transaction (Clark, 2011; Turner, 2009a), which could reduce 
risk in complex trades and markets, was rejected because the U.S. would never agree to such 
a tax (a tax of this type was passed into law by the Eurozone states acting as group in 2012). 
Other even more radical solutions, such as a switch from process- to performance-based 
regulation, was also off the table (Blanchard et al., 2012). 
Notwithstanding the above, Basel III is still a paradigm shift in macro-prudential supervision 
of major banks. Viewed in the G20 political context, a policy shift is of necessity limited by 
the strength of policy consensus and of the community behind it. The policy outcome cannot 
exceed the new consensus. Once the accord is in place and the long phase-in is agreed, the 
central banking community then changes gear from paradigm construction to paradigm 
implementation, defence, and maintenance. 
5.5.6 The cost of Basel III 
In the third phase of the G20 process, and following on from the deal on Basel III, 
reemerging domestic lobbies began to attack the policies being enacted to implement the 
paradigm shift, seeking to weaken Basel III’s application. Domestic interests, especially the 
banks, did not impact the level-one talks in 2008 and had only marginal influence in 2009 
and through 2010. But these lobbies took up arms against the Basel III implementation 
process and raised questions about the impact of the accord. A push against the deal and 
efforts to weaken its provisions and impact on the ground began. Critics warned banks faced 
a huge capital shortfall (Masters and Baer, 2010). Many banks needed to raise more capital to 
meet the Basel III standards. 
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BIS data estimated that the average common equity capital ratio of internationally active 
banks was 7.1 percent compared with the Basel III minimum requirement of 4.5 percent. 
Nonetheless, for all banks to reach the 4.5 percent minimum, BIS estimated an additional 
€38.8 billion was required. To reach the full 7 percent target, i.e., including the capital 
conservation buffer, they estimated that a further €485.6 billion was needed (BIS, 2012) at a 
time when the total profits after tax and prior to distributions of all globally active banks 
monitored by the BIS was only €356.6 billion during 2010-2011. 
Responding to the capital demands of Basel III, Bank CEOs from Goldman Sachs, Standard 
Chartered, Citigroup, Barclays, and others, bemoaned the alleged ill effects of Basel III on 
the rate of global growth (Guerrera and Pimlott, 2010; Guerrera and Tett, 2011). JPMorgan 
CEO Jamie Dimon, the most powerful banker in the world post-crisis, alleged the new accord 
could actually slow the recovery (Sorkin, 2011) and that the standards could stifle a weak 
economic rebound. The general claim was that the standards were too high—that the capital 
requirements were too onerous, too restrictive, and too costly for the global economy. But 
such complaints are self-interested; the lower the capital standards are, the higher the 
permitted leverage, the greater the risk, and the larger the compensation packages of CEOs 
themselves. Bankers’ claims of global economic damage must, therefore, be viewed with 
some scepticism. 
Just how costly Basel III will be in the long-term from a macroeconomic perspective relies on 
Miles’ Law: Where you stand depends on where you sit (Miles, 1978). Central bankers and 
regulators do not see the standards as onerous. According to the BIS, each percentage point 
increase in the capital ratio causes a median 0.03 percent decline in GDP, relative to the 
baseline (BIS, 2010). This is a very small price to pay for increased economic stability. 
Turner agrees, underscoring that ‘the adverse costs of even very rare banking crises are so 
great as to outweigh any marginal growth penalty resulting from higher equity ratios’ 
(Turner, 2011, p. 6). Admati et al. back the central bankers, maintaining that increasing bank 
equity is not expensive, and suggesting that much is ‘fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak’ 
because the risk premium paid (i.e., the cost of capital) must go down, not up, if banks have 
more equity (Admati et al., 2011, p. 1; see also Haldane, 2010a), with more equity capital, as 
much as 25 percent non-risk-adjusted capital, being ideal (Admati and Hellwig, 2013). 
 
Key policymakers predicted large economic gains from the Basel III deal. Carney estimated 
that the new standards would be worth savings of US$10 trillion in global output due to the 
avoidance of future financial crises (AFP, 2010), i.e., the future potential costs avoided by 
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higher capital requirements are massive. So while banks CEOs bewailed the supposed 
burdens upon their bloated institutions, central bankers and regulators viewed Basel III as a 
major and relatively cost-free improvement. In fact, the central bankers’ actions since then 
suggest that some in the central banking community felt they should have gone even further. 
 
5.5.7 Basel-plus - national add-ons are seen 
 
Since 2010, the actions of the more hawkish central bankers suggest that the deal struck in 
Seoul could have perhaps been even tougher. Many have moved towards ‘Basel-plus’ 
arrangements, which add to, rather than subtract from, the standards agreed by the G20-FSB-
BCBS. These actors viewed the accord as the minimum, believing actual capital levels should 
be still higher. Miles et a.l thus argued that a 19 percent capital requirement would be optimal 
(Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano, 2011; see also Mallaby, 2011). Bank of England Governor 
Mervyn King warned that ‘even the new levels of capital are insufficient to prevent another 
crisis’ (King, 2010, p.12), suggesting only very much higher levels of capital, levels which 
would be seen by the industry as wildly excessive most of the time, would prevent the next 
crisis (Guerrera and Pimlott, 2010). Adair Turner agreed and observes, ‘in an ideal world, 
equity ratios would be set much higher’ (Turner, 2011, p. 16). U.S. regulators also agreed, 
urging full speed ahead, and the higher the better (Bair, 2011; Sorkin, 2011).  
 
The global compromise contained in the Basel III Accord left many hawkish central bankers 
and supervisors reaching for more, not less, capital. The Vickers Commission Report for the 
Bank of England recommended a higher capital requirement for the largest British banks of 
10 percent minimum (Vickers, 2011). The Swiss National Bank applied capital requirements 
of 19 percent (Swiss National Bank, 2010). Chinese authorities set varying capital levels as 
high as 11.5 percent (China Daily, 2011a). The U.S. Federal Reserve also acted, demanding 
application of Basel III by the end of 2013 by U.S. banks and adding Basel-plus leverage 
requirements (Crittenden, 2013). 
 
These national ‘Basel-plus’ rules show instead of a race for the bottom, the policy 
convergence is an upward swing in standards in jurisdictions overseeing most of the largest 
banks in the world, demanding higher capital, liquidity, and other measures, in line with what 
Drezner has suggested (Drezner, 2001). The above add-ons do not negate the FSB process. 
Rather, the Basel III standards are the minimum, not the maximum. States retain the ability to 
apply ‘gold-plated’ standards. Clearly central banking hardliners think the benefit of higher 
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standards worth the potential business lost through arbitrage. A Basel-plus renationalization 
on top of the global harmonization of capital standards is seen. This is a mixed outcome for 
champions of a single regulatory approach globally. But it also shows the extent to which 
there has been a strong regulatory policy shift towards still higher capital since the accord 
was signed in Seoul. 
5.5.8 Intended and unintended consequences 
Markets are demanding banks apply the Basel capital requirements immediately. Stronger 
players are trumpeting their return to levels of capital at or above the Basel III standards. Less 
healthy firms, in Germany and France, instead complain loudly of the burden of applying 
multiple layers of new capital minimums too quickly, and are engaged in a rush to sell assets 
to raise capital, i.e., they are shrinking lending. This has alarmed political leaders especially 
in France who fear further unintended economic consequences (Interview 13, 2012) from the 
rapid forced deleveraging underway. It is perhaps correct that weaker banks should 
recapitalise, rebuild or, if necessary, shrink or go out of business (Miles, 2009; Miles, Yang, 
Marcheggiano, 2011). Thus, the effect of the Basel III Accord is being felt in advance of full 
implementation by 2019. Implementation still matters, however, and vigilance on consistency 
of the Basel minimums will be important because of the relative complexity of the regulatory 
taxation system adopted. 
5.5.9 Consistent implementation and monitoring is key 
Given the decision by Basel III’s designers in favour of taxation and against prohibition, the 
full potential of Basel III can be achieved only if G20 and FSB member countries and regions 
work within the global process and fully implement the minimum standards (Walter, 2011). 
Consistent implementation of the new minimums is essential if the global harmonisation of 
the new standards is to be a success. Firms should be unable to avoid the regulations that 
should ideally be nondiscretionary and clearly enforced (Rajan, 2010). The medium-to-long- 
term efficacy of Basel III, and by extension the strength of this main facet of the paradigm 
shift, depends on monitoring implementation and on national enforcement of the new 
regulations so as to minimise regulatory arbitrage opportunities. 
Leaders inside the FSB understand the importance of monitoring and reporting of 
implementation, and as a result the process they have put in place is new and stronger than 
previously. Historically, BCBS did not make judgments on national compliance with past 
accords. There could be harping and soto voce complaints but no compliance action or up-
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front naming and shaming of fellow regulators. The pre-crisis process was informal, less 
institutionalized, and tended to rely on discussions in which supervisors avoided placing 
direct blame for failures on their counterparts elsewhere. Not anymore. Now, post-crisis, the 
FSB and the BCBS below it are engaged in a potentially meaningful reporting and 
compliance process, making judgments on national regulatory actions, pro or con. This is a 
significant change, according to observers and participants (Interview 34, 2013). 
To achieve this, the FSB and BCBS have constructed a three-tier reporting process: level one, 
timeliness of adoption; level two, regulatory consistency observed; and level three, ensuring 
consistency of outcomes. The process of oversight is being paid for by the BIS (Interview 34, 
2012). The reporting, country-by-country, is sent directly via the FSB to the G20 summits on 
a semiannual basis. This process is qualitatively different from past practice and is more 
meaningful. Pressure to apply the consistent standards is seen. Thus, the FSB October 2012 
compliance report took direct aim at failures in consistency in implementation in the EU, the 
U.S., and Japan (BIS, 2012), pressing for changes on all sides. These judgments are public. 
This arguably places greater pressure on the miscreants to improve their implementation and 
compliance. It also empowers the regulators themselves against domestic opponents, because 
the former can use complaints from the FSB to strengthen their position against the latter. 
This form of detailed monitoring—of naming and shaming of those states that do not, in the 
Committee’s judgment, measure up—is ‘unprecedented’ (Interview 27, 2011, p. 13). It has 
never been done before by the BCBS. This underscores the commitment of the central 
banking community to make the accord work and is echoed by the uncompromising language 
on implementation used by the principals, such as Stefan Ingves, Chair of the BCBS, and 
Mark Carney, Chair of the FSB. 
This is policy paradigm implementation and maintenance in action. The leaders of the FSB 
and BCBS who agreed the accord fashioned a new compliance and monitoring process that is 
better than the previous nonjudgmental, weaker reporting regime. The FSB leaders know 
implementation matters. A refusal to judge others’ failures is no longer an option. Clearer 
judgments in the G20 reporting process ensures not only the naming and shaming of 
laggards, but also moves towards the gradual establishment of norms and customs of 
adherence and, ultimately, potentially stronger compliance with the rules over time, which 
through repeated reporting may become widely understood and better applied. 
In this process, the FSB community leaders moved to a defence of the agreed policy 
paradigm shift contained in the Basel III Accord via stronger compliance and monitoring 
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mechanisms. This more rigorous reporting and compliance structure is also evidence of the 
strength of the FSB-BCBS expert epistemic community, its policy consensus, and its ability 
to bind and press its own membership in a way not seen in other policy areas. The community 
is holding itself to norms it agreed and via mechanisms it controls. Failures will be regularly 
reported upwards to the G20 summits. 
Placement in the reform matrix: The Basel III Accord is the most significant policy reform 
initiated by the G20 and FSB designed to re-regulate the international financial system and 
the banking sector. It was driven by the leading epistemic transnational expert community, 
which itself directs the FSB reform process. This community created pledges and constructed 
monitoring and compliance processes. Once fully implemented, the accord may result in the 
FSB overseeing nationally enforced binding standards. Compared to previous accords, the 
new accord is more robust and could be potentially more effective in enhancing financial 
stability and mitigating systemic risk. 
Given the relative strength of the Basel III Accord, with seven to over 10 times the previous 
core capital levels, its wider base in terms of coverage; and its multiple other facets, tools, 
and new compliance processes; the accord is pictured on the matrix as moving from ‘very 
weak’ to ‘strong’ and above ‘weakly globally harmonised’, from left to right and upwards 
across the policy matrix landscape. The policy shift is the most dramatic of any areas tackled 
by the G20 advised by the central banking community, and constitutes a third-order change 
and paradigm shift in technical financial regulatory policy. 
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Figure 5.4 Movement of Basel III on Policy Reform Matrix
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5.6 Clearing of OTC derivatives 
 
The lack of regulation of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market acted as a major 
transmission mechanism and a contributor to the 2007-2008 crisis (FCIC, 2011). As the G20 
in Pittsburgh observed: ‘the crisis demonstrated the potential for contagion arising from the 
interconnectedness of OTC derivatives market participants and the limited transparency of 
counterparty relationships’ (G20, 2009d). This massive unregulated market added layers of 
leverage, obscured risk, and transmitted contagion when the credit crunch began, and 
investors either demanded payment of Credit Default Swaps. The securities contributed to a 
system where large financial institutions were not only too big to fail, but too interconnected 
to fail (Gensler, 2010, 2011). The derivatives market was unregulated then, and today it 
remains a huge potential transmission mechanism for booms and busts, worth US$638 trillion 
in notional value in June 2012 (BIS, 2013). 
 
Post-crisis, the G20, central bankers and regulators signalled a resolve to deal with OTC 
derivatives. In Pittsburgh, the G20 leaders agreed: ‘All standardized OTC derivative contracts 
should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared 
through central counterparties ... non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher 
capital requirements’ (G20, 2010d). All G20 states agreed to adopt OTC derivatives 
regulation by the end of 2012, a potential strong second-order change. The G20 and FSB 
agreed to regulate a vast part of the global financial marketplace that until this juncture had 
no oversight or regulation at all. This would not prove to be easy; those who called for 
regulation in the past, such as Brooksley Born, had failed (PBS, 2009). 
 
Fashioning a globally consistent regulatory structure for derivatives, as demanded by the G20 
and as urged by the FSB epistemic community, would be complex, and the outcome would 
also demonstrate a dynamic touched upon at the start of this chapter: The greater the policy-
making distance between the FSB as coordinator and the actual national policy makers in a 
market, the greater the chance of disputes, the greater the likelihood of a suboptimal 
narrative, and the weaker the regulatory hold the FSB would have over the final policy 
outcome. As a result of these differing dynamics, although the policy being implemented is a 
real and marked improvement, the reforms have been undermined by domestic interests. FSB 
success in this case is only partial, and the reforms are of a second-order magnitude. 
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5.6.1 Consistency and a minimum of exemptions 
 
In order to be a success, the derivatives reforms should capture a majority of derivatives 
contracts within OTC Central Counterparties (CCPs) and exchanges if it is to significantly 
enhance potential market stability. To succeed, the FSB needs the U.S., the U.K., the EU, and 
Japan to agree comparable regulatory standards and parameters (since these are the most 
important markets). In addition, to secure their goal, the FSB-supported OTC derivatives 
regulation needs to ensure practically all derivative contracts are standardised, trade via 
transparent Central Counter Parties (CCPs) and require similar margin collateral for riskier 
nonstandard trades (so-called skin in the game). If successful, standardization of most 
derivatives contracts and use of exchanges for contracts could impact the gaming of the 
system and help ensure stability. In general, the larger the number of exemptions from the 
proposed rules, the greater the opacity of the market, the less liquid it may be, the more 
inefficient it could be, the more prone to shocks and crises it will continue to be in times of 
stress, and the less it can be considered a success. 
 
As of September 2013, the original completion deadline of end-2012 had not been met by all 
FSB jurisdictions, but a great deal is in place in major markets. Market infrastructure is in 
place in most markets, and the implementation of global clearing CCP mechanisms is 
underway. In the European Union, regulations on derivatives and CCP trade repositories are 
in place. Japan, too, passed the main OTC legislation and regulations, in 2012. In the U.S., 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted a number of the necessary final rules (FSB, 2012a). Hong Kong 
is not far behind. The U.S. and the EU have agreed their approaches and to recognize each 
other’s standards as equivalent (Trindle and Fairless, 2013). To be clear: FSB states missed 
their self-imposed deadlines, but the process is a long way towards completion and states 
have built entirely new regulatory structures relatively swiftly in the face of concerted 
resistance from banks and brokers. 
 
The goal of the reform: ‘All standardized over-the-counter derivatives should benefit from 
central clearing’ (Gensler, 2010).  Forcing most if not all derivatives through CCPs is still 
being resisted with some success by banking and broker dealers. Achieving a functioning 
commonality of approach and a minimum of exemptions requires resistance by regulators 
against pushback from bankers, dealers, and end users, all of whom have sought to weaken 
the stringency of the FSB-supported OTC CCP reforms.  
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Banking industry proxies maintain most derivatives should remain custom products and be 
excluded from the new transparency, oversight, and CCP requirements on the basis that the 
securities are complex, bespoke, and not amenable to standardisation. This logic is flawed 
and is akin to suggesting that because cars are complex, each customer should be sold a 
custom-built vehicle, with no measure of standardization, price discovery, or safety and 
reliability (i.e., risk) data being available to the consumer. This is rent seeking behaviour by 
the banks. It is in the banks’ interest to maintain an opaque marketplace where information 
asymmetry between seller and buyer is the norm, as per Ackerlof’s Lemon Law (Ackerlof, 
1970). The 2013 EU case against banks for OTC market fixing in this space is evidence that 
banks know this and sought to block reform (Chee, 2013). 
 
Because of the pressure by the banks on the regulators, a number of types of derivatives have 
been excluded from the G20 OTC derivatives regulation. The exclusions include derivatives 
bought by industrial end users, and foreign exchange swaps and forwards transactions 
(Gensler, 2010). The former exclusion is directed at companies that buy or sell derivatives to 
hedge commodities used in the normal course of their businesses, such as multinational 
manufacturing firms or airlines. The latter exclusion, applying to foreign exchange 
derivatives and forwards, excludes US$4 trillion in transactions every day from stricter 
regulatory oversight by supervisors (BIS, 2012). The U.S. Treasury defends its decision, 
maintaining it is driven by the ‘distinctive characteristics of these instruments’ (U.S. 
Treasury, 2011). Not so, according to the critics; instead, the decision simply ‘invites more 
trouble’ in the years ahead (New York Times, 2011). 
 
The FSB-led OTC derivatives policy shows the limits of the FSB-led control over a policy 
outside their area of regulatory responsibility. The central banking epistemic community 
understands this to be a major problem area and one where action is needed, but they passed 
the responsibility down to the SSBs (in this case, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions [IOSCO]). This SSB is younger, larger (in terms of membership), weaker, and 
less cohesive than the FSB-BCBS nexus (Interview 34, 2013). The IOSCO does not, 
therefore, exhibit the same strength as an epistemic community, nor are its members 
(securities regulators) as strong institutionally and domestically. The IOSCO is being forced 
into action by the G20, it is not leading the action. The OTC policy response also requires 
major new legislative and national regulatory action, both of which are opportunities for 
level-two domestic interests to intervene and impact the policy process. These dynamics 
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result in a more mixed, less robust outcome monitored by the FSB and implementation is not 
being dealt with in the same detailed manner as the BCBS-overseen process for Basel III. 
 
The monitoring and compliance process in the OTC derivatives space consists of semiannual 
reporting of the status of implementation by G20 states through the FSB standing committee 
process (FSB, 2012b). But the reporting stops short of qualitative judgments on actual 
implementation. The procedure does not evaluate the nature of regulations implemented by 
G20 states. It merely determines whether states have self-reported and enacted regulations as 
per FSB commitments. This reporting may still have a reputational effect of pressing 
members of the community to comply (Downs and Jones, 2002). Monitoring also adds 
pressure to adhere to the deadlines and timelines. But the FSB OTC process does not 
determine the actual strength and consistency of the national laws and rules, resulting in a 
weaker process. 
 
To conclude, these markets were hitherto completely unregulated. In 2013, laws and 
regulations are in place in all the major markets, which should result in a great deal more 
transparency, internationally coordinated OTC regulation, and capital margins for the 
widespread use of custom products, in this key part of the shadow banking sector. Prior to the 
crisis, these steps were not feasible because resistance from vested banking and broker 
interests was simply too great. The current status of a partial implementation of OTC 
derivatives reforms is a significant development—a high second-order change (Hall, 1993) 
even if the final outcome appears unsatisfying and remains less than a complete success.  
 
Placement in the policy reform matrix: The FSB OTC derivatives policy shift in the matrix is 
considerable but still limited. It moves the left-hand ‘very weak’ up towards ’weakly globally 
harmonised’ on the right. This is a high second-order (perhaps borderline third-order) change 
because this is a new policy approach, not just an adjustment of an existing policy, and is 
therefore not strictly incremental change. However, exemptions are being seen. Because of 
these exemptions the danger remains that significant obscured systemic risk can still exist 
within these markets and the massive global casino they represent. Regulators and 
participants still confront a continued lack of market transparency. Perhaps in the short term, 
risks will not precipitate crises because the market for these complex securities has yet to 
rebound. But if the markets recover and if they remain opaque and illiquid, then the risks 
inherent in them will resurface. 
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Figure 5.5 Movement of Derivatives Policy on the Policy Reform Matrix
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5.7 Compensation, bankers’ pay, and bonuses 
 
The G20 charged the FSB and BCBS with addressing compensation after contentious debate 
at the Pittsburgh summit between the French and Germans, who wanted hard and fast rules, 
and the UK and especially U.S. leaders, who opposed action. The FSB turned to the issue at a 
time when some national governments and agencies had already commenced unilateral action 
(FSB, 2010a). The FSB, BCBS, and central banking community was responding to an 
apparent but contested linkage between many years of rapid increases in financial sector pay 
(FCIC, 2011; Johnson and Kwak, 2011), increased leverage, perverse incentives, excessive 
risk taking, outsized profits, and naive investors unaware of the dangerous actions of firms’ 
management. Given the split (Europe versus America) over the subject, the FSB sought to 
deal with the issue via a principles-based approach (Bolton, Marhal, and Shapiro, 2010). 
 
Compensation is the clearest example of the internal FSB tension between a rules-based 
approach and a principles-based approach used by members. The latter is selected when FSB 
leaders differ markedly on approach, as is the case with compensation. When matters are too 
complex for rules, principles are the remaining option. But the approach also tends to indicate 
a lack of strong FSB agreement on the policy narrative on causes and solutions as is the case 
in this policy area. In France and Germany, bankers’ high compensation and bonuses were 
believed to have been a causal factor in the crisis; in that case, hard rules can be used to limit 
such excesses. In the U.S., officials, more ideologically sympathetic to bankers, did not agree 
compensation played a major factor in the crisis, maintaining it is not the job of regulators to 
decide compensation systems and levels in a market economy. Given this split the FSB 
defaulted to a principles approach. 
 
The FSB, decided to monitor the application of the Principles for Sound Compensation 
Practices (FSF, 2009). The principles are either banal or high-level depending on one’s view 
and are a first step (Ferrarini and Ungureanu, 2010). They include agreement on a need for a 
board-level remuneration committee as an integral part of an organization’s governance 
structure; a possible limit on variable compensation as a percentage of total net revenues; that 
pay should be aligned with risk; when a firm’s performance declines, so should bonus 
compensation; a recommended deferral (at least three years) of 40 to 60 percent of bonus, 
with a substantial proportion awarded in shares or share-linked instruments; the inclusion of a 
claw back provision where unvested payments can be taken back from the employee if the 
performance of the of the firm declines; and a ban on employees hedging their own 
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compensation or taking out insurance to sidestep the compensation changes. The principles 
are largely uncontroversial and it is left to national supervisors to decide whether to enshrine 
them in national regulatory or legislative language. 
 
To date, jurisdictions have implemented the principles using a mix of light supervisory 
oversight (the U.S.) and enforceable regulation and law (the EU). The precise type of 
supervisory or regulatory approach depends on the equilibrium between the various domestic 
interests in play and the country (or region’s) cultural preference. The light supervisory 
approach has led to complaints of gaming the system. Some firms’ personnel, such as 
employees at Goldman Sachs Inc., are accused on actively avoiding FSB compensation 
principles, demonstrating the weakness of a supervision and principles-only approach (Dash, 
2011). 
 
EU states took a regulatory route made more robust via enforceable EU law on compensation 
and bonuses. The EU codified a number of the principles as minimum requirements within 
European law, and in 2013 the EU (backed by strong German support) placed an absolute cap 
on bonus levels. Individual G20 states have also issued national implementing regulations or 
incorporated the principles and standards into existing law, with supervisory guidance 
illustrating how the rules should be met (FSB, 2010a). 
 
5.7.1 Monitoring and enforcement: A real and meaningful shift? 
In this policy area, exceptionally and paradoxically, despite the tension between the U.S. and 
the EU, monitoring and enforcement has advanced further than any other from a structural 
and institutional standpoint. First, the policy area has periodic monitoring and thematic peer 
reviews and reporting as per other policy areas, through the FSB standing committees and up 
to the G20 (FSB, 2012c). This has required G20 states to survey actual compensation practice 
of systemic banks and report the comparative data through the FSB thematic review. But this 
is far from all. 
5.7.2 A new dispute settlement procedure 
The clash between those who wanted further thematic reviews and those who sought to close 
the sensitive subject down proved institutionally productive. A compromise result secured by 
the FSB leadership saw the creation of the first formal dispute settlement procedure within 
the G20-FSB architecture. 
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Under the 2012 Bilateral Complaint Handling Process FSB (FSB, 2012a), members can use a 
mechanism for judgments on compliance if they believe they are at regulatory disadvantage 
due to inconsistent implementation of the compensation principles.  
 
The complaint process has a judicial ring to it. A supervisor lodges a complaint on behalf of a 
firm, details the complaint, specifies the target firm that undertakes such practices, the home 
jurisdiction, lays out the nature and magnitude of the disadvantages, and the individuals i.e., 
senior executives and their compensation packages) concerned. All these steps (and many 
others) delineate a procedure that is legalistic in its construction and approach. A 
Compensation Monitoring Contact Group, composed of national experts with regulatory 
responsibility for compensation, meets under the oversight of the Standards and 
Implementation Standing Committee, and determines the outcome (i.e., makes a judgment) 
on a complaint and whether there has been inconsistent implementation of the compensation 
principles and standards. If there has been inconsistent implementation that will be brought to 
the attention of the firm’s supervisor. If failures are seen, they will be ‘Verified and addressed 
as needed via bilateral exchanges among national supervisory authorities’ (FSB, 2012a, p. 
15). 
 
The dispute process has not yet been triggered (Interview 34, 2013), but over time it could 
generate decisions on inconsistent implementation of agreed FSB compensation principles 
and standards. The FSB indicates that it expects that such firm-specific cases will provide 
more clarity on the application of the standards across jurisdictions. This is a potentially 
significant FSB institutional process. It is the first dispute settlement mechanism in the new 
architecture, and it has some similarity to the World Trade Organization dispute settlement 
process, which is judicial (Jackson, 2004, 2008). Those in the leadership inside the FSB 
recognise this mechanism to be a potential innovation (Interview 24, 2012). Yet, because it is 
so new, the change has received little external notice or analysis. It is clearly an area for 
potential future study and analysis as complaints and judgments are made. 
 
What this innovative new dispute settlement approach demonstrates is FSB leadership 
reaching to create institutional strength from an internal central banking dispute. A clash over 
the application of compensation principles results in the creation of a quasi-judicial complaint 
process. Yet again, FSB policy action, this time paradigm maintenance, benefits from the 
strength of the epistemic community leading change, even here, where there is a dispute.  
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Placement on the policy reform matrix: The observer will see the FSB policy action on 
compensation as moving left to right across the matrix from ‘very weak’ towards  ‘weak’ and 
to ‘weakly globally harmonised’. Over time, this policy may move it further still into the 
‘strong’ category, as per the arrow indicating future movement. At present, this policy melds 
principles with a new untested dispute procedure and is a second-order change. In 2013 it is 
untried. But it is a potentially significant dispute settlement procedure. On the other hand, 
there are divergent national approaches, from supervisory in the U.S. to regulatory in the EU, 
and this could weaken the overall global effect, especially if no cases are lodged using the 
dispute settlement procedure. 
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Figure 5.6 Movement of Compensation Policy in Policy Reform Matrix 
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5.8 Regulating shadow banking 
‘Shadow banking’ refers to unregulated financial markets in which firms and investors 
provide bank-like services of credit intermediation (i.e., extending credit) and maturity 
transformation through alternative means such as money market funds, complex securities 
markets, structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and special purpose entities (SPEs), hedge 
funds, private equity, and the overnight repo market (FSB, 2011a, 2011b; Gorton, 2010, 
2012). Lenders and borrowers transact bank-like business but outside the regulated 
commercial banking space, with no prudential oversight and no capital to strengthen the 
system. The size of shadow banking markets is massive. In 2011, it was estimated at US$67 
trillion, or equivalent to 111 percent of the G20’s GDP (FSB, 2012d, p. 3). 
 
The crisis demonstrated that these markets and the actors within them could be potentially 
dangerous if the combination of a firm’s actions, size, leverage, and interconnection to others 
(especially commercial banks) in the financial system resulted in contagion and creating 
systemic risks to the wider economy (Maclean and Nocera, 2009). 
 
At the Seoul Summit in 2010, G20 leaders tasked the FSB with building a framework to 
address the potential systemic risks posed by the shadow banking sector. They tasked the 
FSB Task Force on Shadow Banking (Chaired by Adair Turner from 2010 to 2012) to 
develop recommendations. The FSB-BCBS community hoped to contain the risks of the 
shadow banking sector indirectly by discouraging and/or restraining commercial banks from 
entering shadow sector activities via mechanisms like onerous capital charges for risky assets 
(in Basel III), and avoid aggressively regulating the entire shadow sector. There was also a 
more prosaic reason for a delay. Key FSB policy makers within this small community have 
only so much technical and intellectual bandwidth. It is simply not possible for the limited 
number of leading FSB figures to target all regulatory failings and all gaps simultaneously. 
So they dealt with the most pressing issues in 2008 and 2009 (bank capital and regulation), 
and in late 2010 focused on shadow banking. 
 
The task force report in October 2011 concluded central banks and supervisors should cast 
the net wide in terms of what non-bank activities they were monitoring, but also 
simultaneously to narrow the focus (FSB, 2011d) to the systemic actors and activities dealing 
with maturity transformation, liquidity transformation, risk transfer, and leverage, which 
posed most serious risks going forwards. This FSB analytical framework implies in the future 
particular actors and markets in the shadow banking sector may be subject to greater scrutiny, 
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not greater regulation. Should firms and markets grow in size and interconnectedness to an 
extent they pose a risk to the wider economy, then regulation could still follow. But if 
supervisors can see what is going on within markets, and inside large systemically important 
firms, they can (it is hoped) make an informed judgment about future systemic risk and the 
need for reporting or possibly action. The Task Force recommended a series of high-level 
principles for monitoring the shadow banking system, which set out matters of scope, 
process, data gathering, monitoring innovations and mutations, and regulatory arbitrage 
issues to be considered by national regulators. 
 
In this instance, a principles approach was seen as more appropriate for a number of reasons.  
First, what poses risk in one country within the shadow banking sector may be entirely 
different in another. In the U.S., an unregulated non-bank housing sector was the source of 
contagion. In another G20 country, the conditions may be entirely different and the risks may 
emerge in other financial industries. 
 
Second, what is of concern today may diverge from what is most dangerous tomorrow—the 
next black swan of Taleb’s imagined night time terrors (Taleb, 2010). The FSB is, therefore, 
seeking to aid domestic supervisors with frameworks for the analysis and understanding and 
measuring future risks. These are tools, not rules. 
 
Third, since prohibition of shadow banking activity is off the table as a regulatory approach 
within the FSB, the only way to aid central bankers in getting their arms around these 
markets is via a general scoping process aiding national deliberations and determinations of 
who and what may pose systemic risk in a market at one point in time. 
 
Fourth, it is national supervisors who must identify and regulate the actual shadow banking 
firms and look into their risk-taking activities. The FSB has neither the manpower nor the 
necessary crystal ball to do so. So a framework for a common understanding of what factors 
to consider in making the decisions is the default. The FSB does not want to create moral 
hazard by implying responsibility for all actors in yet more and more financial markets. So 
they seek to be vigilant and yet specific and focused in their actions, as Turner’s Task Force 
urged them to be. 
 
Placement in the policy matrix: The shadow banking sector had never been regulated 
previously, so the current position on the matrix reflects this: It is placed in the far left lower 
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quadrant signifying ‘very weak’ standards. Since the task forces’ recommendations are not 
supposed to be applied but are instead to provide analytical guidance to policy makers, they 
cannot be said to move the policy forward to a great degree, and movement across the 
landscape is therefore not seen at this time, even though analytical frameworks and tools are, 
of course, needed and potentially valuable. 
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Figure 5.7 Shadow Banking on Policy Reform Matrix
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5.9 Too big to fail 
 
Of all the policy areas still of concern to supervisors and central bankers, the most vexing and 
intractable is ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF). G20 leaders, central bankers, and supervisors since 
2008 have chanted a mantra: All banks, however large, interconnected, and complex should 
in principle be able to fail, or go bankrupt, in an orderly fashion. Systems already exist in 
some G20 states to permit small-to-medium size banks to fail; from 2007 to 2013, 482 banks 
failed and were closed by the U.S. FDIC without systemic problems (FDIC, 2013). The 
problem rests not with the minnows, but instead with the whales, the RBSs, the Citigroups, 
and the UBSs of the banking world.  
 
The world’s largest banks play significant roles in the economy and financial system, through 
maturity transformation, in credit extension, in their roles as market makers, and as 
counterparties in markets across the globe. They are highly interconnected across borders and 
amongst themselves, creating intertwined relationships and complex contractual links 
difficult to untangle in normal times, and especially during crises, when these giants are most 
likely to be at risk of collective collapse in part because of those interconnections, as 
happened during 2007-2008. The consequences of such collapses were viewed as simply too 
damaging to the commonwealth. It was not just that a particular bank might be TBTF, but 
also that in the heat of the crisis there were too many to fail (Brown and Ding, 2009).  
 
Since the crisis, another mutation of the phenomenon that underscores the seriousness of the 
TBTF problem has been seen in the HSBC case. The bank was accused by the U.S. of 
widespread systemic breaches of money laundering, antiterrorist, and sanctions laws in the 
U.S. Evidence showed the alleged huge scale of violations aided and abetted by senior 
management and legal counsel. Ultimately, HSBC paid a US$1.9 billion fine for its acts 
(Rushe and Trenor, 2012), but it was not prosecuted. U.S. and UK regulators concluded that 
if HSBC was prosecuted, the firm would collapse, and the economic damage was ruled too 
great. HSBC became the first bank deemed ‘too big to prosecute’ (Wilson, 2012). 
 
Post-crisis supervisors in the FSB stress TBTF must be addressed. However, a strong faith in 
the need to end the moral hazard that comes with TBTF does not make it a policy reality. In 
fact, since 2008 there has been greater sector consolidation, reinforcing TBTF, not a 
lessening of this trend. Moral hazard still exists and is worse than it was in 2007. Investors 
today know just how far governments will go: very, very far indeed. Ratings agencies 
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underscore this by giving these TBTF firms credit ratings up to three notches higher than 
their competitors who do not get the TBTF moniker because of the continued implicit 
government guarantees, and this is worth up to US$83 billion for U.S. banks (Lopez, 2013), 
and tens of billions of dollars a year to banks in other G20 states (Caruana, 2011; see also 
Haldane, 2012b). The biggest firms at the end of 2012 are larger, more dominant, and more 
systemically important, suffering from moral hazard and in receipt of G20 government 
guarantees, explicit and implicit. 
 
The FSB moved, in response, to increase the capital tax on large firms, to add countercyclical 
buffers, to add a surcharge on systemically important financial institutions, and to include the 
right to levy a further 1 percent if the firm is taking excessive risks, and the leverage and 
liquidity requirements need to be seen in light of the TBTF problem. The aim is to tie down 
TBTF institutions and ensure their own liquid capital is available in times of crisis, so no 
state bailout is necessary in the future. 
 
5.9.1 Resolution regimes and living wills 
Two additional methods of attempting to address TBTF include the creation of resolution 
regimes whereby firms might be wound down and dismantled without damaging the financial 
system, and the creation of 'living wills' to explain how the particular firm can be dismantled 
in a crisis. The G20 and FSB at Seoul in 2010 stressed: ‘All jurisdictions should undertake 
the necessary legal reforms to ensure that they have in place a resolution regime which would 
make feasible the resolution of any financial institution without taxpayer exposure to loss 
from solvency support while protecting vital economic functions’ (G20, 2010b). FSB 
members continue the work on the features of effective national resolution regimes for 
financial institutions, including non-bank financial institutions, and have published the Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes. Multiple SSBs overseen by the FSB are working 
on this area including the BCBS, IOSCO, and the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS). Once complete, this work will be the equivalent of a best practices or 
principles approach to this complex issue. This area of extreme legal complexity means 
principles or ‘key attributes’ are, it is said by supporters, the only real option available to FSB 
policy makers as a means of gradually pointing the way towards harmonization of disparate 
legal approaches. 
 
The FSB and national supervisors are also using living wills to strengthen firm-level focus on 
risk before a collapse. Under the living will process, major financial firms are required to lay 
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out how they would be dismantled in the event of their failure. This requires executives to 
assess the nature of their business activities and the risks associated with different practices 
and mechanisms for dealing with those risks and the firm’s possible failure. This self-
examination is positive. Boards and management must examine their frailties and consider 
the implications of their business decisions. Supervisors also benefit from getting a fuller 
picture of how a firm might be unwound from the firm’s management. But living wills are no 
panacea, and the maintenance of the living wills must be an ongoing process if they are to be 
meaningful; a single report sitting on a shelf gathering dust will be of little use six months 
hence. It is also reasonable to ask how much of a firm’s management resources should be 
dedicated to planning for their death rather than focused on innovation and growth. 
 
Notwithstanding both above FSB work streams, on resolution and living wills, the different 
legal systems of bankruptcy, of contract law, and commercial law make closing or allowing a 
large international bank to go bankrupt extremely difficult, or, more likely, impossible. For 
example, Citigroup operates in 100 to 160 countries (the firm itself cannot supply a definitive 
number); it owns major banks in emerging economies such as Mexico and Brazil and has 
subsidiaries, assets, and liabilities scattered across the globe. Are the mechanisms in place 
today to allow Citigroup to fail? Certainly not. 
 
The FSB TBTF response indicates the complexity of the issue and demonstrates negotiators 
groping their way forwards to agreements absent solid legal and related foundations. In this 
area FSB members have a consensus, but it is a weak and nationally conflicted one. FSB 
actors agree that TBTF is a menace and should be addressed. But they cannot agree on robust 
steps forward for each state because each player seeks to defend its models of banking and 
finance and national financial market peculiarities and differences. The UK defends the City 
of London and its national champions. The French support their universal banks. The 
Germans back particular firms and state-owned banks, and so on. Scores of these banks are 
systemically important and thus too large or too systemically important to fail. 
 
On both of these policy responses, had the FSB tried for a binding agreement or a rules-based 
approach, lacking a strong consensus, they would get no agreement, and international 
negotiations would be stymied. So FSB leaders grappled with the complexity of TBTF trying 
to address the structural and the institutional weaknesses of the evolution of these massively 
complex interconnected international financial institutions (Haldane, 2010a, 2012c, 2013) 
with advisory documents, and thus win sets do still occur. 
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5.9.2 Working within the limits of the new paradigm 
 
The FSB approach to TBTF points to the outer limits of the paradigm shift within the FSB 
and the extent to which key actors operate inside self-imposed consensual boundaries within 
which the policy solutions are made. The new policy consensus does not extend to all options 
and all possible solutions. The need for consensus rules out logically superior solutions which 
are not politically viable. The simplest and most effective solution to TBTF and resolution 
regimes is completely off the table—namely, limiting bank size (Johnson, 2012; Onaran, 
2013) and if necessary breaking up the biggest banks to address the systemic risk they cause. 
 
Some insider outsiders, such as Mervyn King and Paul Volcker, have suggested such break-
ups or size limits (G30, 2009a; King, 2009b). The have been joined by other policy makers 
(Bair, 2012; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2012). But these voices are raised well outside 
the community consensus. Break-up has a logical appeal and its simplicity avoids the need 
for aggressive complex regulations (Haldane, 2012b, 2012c). Such solutions, which are 
potentially lower cost and easier to implement, are outside the policy consensus. Instead, the 
policy options selected are more intrusive, more complex, and perhaps less effective. Break-
up is off the agenda because in all states, the size, power, and influence of the major financial 
firms are such that opposition to downsizing remains the consensus, even though the 
regulatory paradigm has shifted. So taxation (i.e., capital charges) is preferred instead of 
prohibition (based on size and other factors). 
 
In conclusion, the supervisory community is attempting to address TBTF, but they are falling 
short of real solutions. An inability to confront size and complexity head-on via limits to 
banking activities or a break-up of the banks leads to a series of nonbinding advisory 
processes, which, while perhaps the best option of a bad bunch, are far from optimal. 
Allowing big banks to fail remains a dream, not a reality. Even if legal resolution regimes and 
living wills structures are in place, could national governments allow a bankruptcy of 
Citigroup or RBS to happen? Would they be allowed to fail? The answer is probably not. 
Regulators intuitively recognise this; hence, the piling on of additional international and 
national Basel-plus regulations that have the effect of charging higher and higher taxes on 
such banks for the privilege of scale and implicit guarantees, hopefully making their business 
less profitable and less risky. 
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Placement in the policy reform matrix: Central bankers and supervisors are focused on TBTF, 
resolution regimes, and living wills. It is all designed to allow large firms to fail without 
unacceptable collateral damage and public costs. But they are not close to finding a solution. 
Basel III and the GSIFI surcharge is increasing capital markedly, but not enough to make size 
a prohibitive economic cost so as to spur firms to significantly downsize. In fact, for stronger 
firms, the dynamics of the market operate in the opposite direction. There is pressure to grow 
and merge, and the political influence of the firms themselves halts relatively simple, serious 
steps which might address TBTF. Reformed antitrust laws could break up the behemoths, as 
was done in the ATT case or with Standard Oil in an even earlier era, but these options are 
ruled out by the policy-making community; it is restricted by the limits of the new paradigm. 
In 2013, global banks remain, as Haldane notes, like male elephant seals on a beach: hugely 
powerful but highly vulnerable (Haldane, 2012b). So TBTF does not move a distance 
diagonally left to right in the policy matrix; instead, it slips backwards, notwithstanding the 
advisory efforts of the FSB leadership. 
 
On resolution regimes and living wills, the progress in terms of discussion and national 
actions to force this type of ongoing reflection by boards of financial firms is occurring, and 
this is a positive but limited outcome. Both policies remain some distance away from globally 
harmonised principles or a rules-based approach. So the movement in the matrix is again 
limited in scope, although larger for living wills, since every systemically important bank 
must now have a self-destruct manual. 
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Figure 5.8 TBTF, Living Wills and SIFI Resolution Regimes Movement on the Policy 
Reform Matrix
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5.10 Accounting standards 
 
Right from the start of the G20 process, leaders underscored the need for a single set of 
improved, high-quality global accounting standards, and they had looked to the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
to complete their work on this by the end of 2011. But this was a policy-making pipe dream 
rather than a reality. No substantive progress has been made on reconciling U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
 
This is due to different stances between the U.S. and EU over standard setting, but this time it 
is not a principles versus rules argument but a direct clash of one set of rules versus another. 
The U.S. pays lip service to the need for a single global accounting standard, but in reality 
views the IFRS (overseen by the IASB) as excessively dominated by UK and French 
officials. Each party defends its own entrenched, long-standing system of accountancy and 
each is resistant to agreement on a global standard. As with all things related to accounting, 
matters are extremely complex, and different standards are applied on many issues in the U.S. 
and EU, resulting in major firms having to report their accounts in each system. Hence, there 
is some demand for change. Below the global firms, however, there is no agreement on the 
need for such reforms; in fact, there is defence of each side’s status quo and a clash of 
accounting paradigms and different policy positions, not pressure for convergence. 
 
The failure to act on G20 and FSB demands may also be in part because, while a significant 
complicating factor, accounting standards in the U.S. and European Union were not seen by 
the policy-making community and central bankers as a major causal factor in the crisis. 
Accounting rules did amplify the swing during the crisis period. For example, mark-to-
market accounting—the requirement to value assets very frequently—often daily—and adjust 
accordingly—boosted profits on the upswing as assets constantly were revalued upward, and 
hastened the collapse when toxic assets were repeatedly revalued as being worth less and 
less. Accounting standards on both sides of the Atlantic were procyclical, and accounting 
practice allowed firms to obscure risks taken and the dangers they faced. But the issue was at 
its base viewed by central bankers leading the process and crisis response as one of a credit 
boom gone bust. The existing standards’ differences were only contributory, not causal. 
Effective, prudent supervision could have made a greater difference. The pressure for change 
in these rules is just not enough to overcome internal resistance. The leadership of the G20 
and FSB was focused elsewhere, on other macro issues. Finally, central bankers leading the 
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FSB do not control this policy area. Neither accounting SSB is as tightly bound into the new 
structure as other SSBs. Only the IASB is inside the FSB structure as a member. Arguably, 
the pressure for reform is weaker outside the coordinating structure overseen by the FSB; i.e., 
the FSB can resist pressure and is less exposed to it because the organization is not directly 
part of the process. 
 
Placement in the policy matrix: Accounting standards will remain ‘strong’, because they are 
binding within their respective jurisdictions, but are only 'regionally harmonised' within the 
matrix, given the lack of progress on this important but second-rank policy area. Neither the 
G20 nor the FSB appears able to force reform. It is not worth the political effort for the 
former, and the latter has no regulatory power to do so, with the U.S. accounting SSB sitting 
outside the structure and not properly integrated in the manner of the BCBS and IOSCOs. 
Finally, powerful national level-two interests, the accounting lobbies and firms used to 
existing practice, defend their own standards. Thus, we see national paradigm clashes, not a 
consensus on reform among standard setters. 
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Figure 5.9 Accounting Standards on the Policy Reform Matrix
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5.11 Early warning exercises, the mutual assessment program, and peer review 
 
'What you see coming is never quite what gets you, it is the stuff that you 
can’t see coming that gets you'. 
(Bretton Woods Committee, 2010) 
 
This section will comment briefly on the early warning exercises, mutual assessment process, 
and the review processes. These FSB roles overlap with IMF roles and surveillance functions, 
and as such the efficacy of surveillance is addressed fully in Chapter 6 within the context of 
the role and operation of the IMF. 
 
5.11.1 Early-warning exercises 
 
The FSB was tasked by the G20 in November 2008 with coordinating with the IMF and 
monitoring the global economic outlook and providing early warning exercises. The early 
warning exercises are designed to assess low-probability but high-impact risks to the global 
economy and to identify policies to mitigate them, and they integrate macroeconomic and 
financial perspectives on systemic risk. They are not new. The IMF has been conducting 
similar modelling for years, without making a difference to country practices. Conceptually 
they may appear a good idea, but operationally they are difficult to make work. This is an 
exercise in attempting to institutionalise contrarianism—to empower a small number of 
analysts to raise the alarm, to take contrary positions, which may prove unfounded, 
repeatedly during booms and in normal times. Are such cries of wolf taken seriously by a 
policy-making and investor community which has shown an ability time and time again to be 
deaf to purveyors of bad news in boom times? Ask Nouriel Roubini, or Raghuram Rajan, 
both economists that raised the alarm prior to the crisis. Such voices are usually ignored. 
 
Nonetheless, the FSB-IMF is attempting early warning exercises. Analytical tools that raise 
red flags and economists that ask the right questions when the next boom begins are useful.  
They might assist in alerting the supervisory community and the boards of financial firms to 
be more vigilant, to worry, for instance, more about overperformance instead of 
underperformance (G30, 2012). Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons institutional, 
psychological, and cultural, a majority will not see the next crisis coming until it is too late. 
The research found no interview subjects who were confident that early warning exercises or 
IMF surveillance could detect the next crisis and warn people in a manner they would pay 
attention to. 
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5.11.2 The Mutual Assessment Process and peer review 
 
Early in G20 summitry, FSB members agreed to participate in a Mutual Assessment Process 
(MAP) and to ‘undergo periodic peer review using amongst other evidence the IMF/World 
Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program Reports’ (FSB, 2009, p. 9). The MAP and peer 
review process is overseen by the FSB, but it is staffed in coordination with the IMF, which 
has the mandate and resources to undertake much more detailed surveillance than is possible 
via the FSB process. 
 
By 2013, the FSB-related work on MAP had slowed. It was conceptualised as an FSB review 
of compliance with IMF standards and reports, but it was resisted by IMF officials who 
viewed a FSB role as duplicative, which it was, and interfering, which it might have been 
(Interviews 22 and 34, 2012). Asking the FSB to perform additional surveillance of IMF 
surveillance reports did not prove useful for FSB officials, who have moved away from the 
process, conceding implicitly that the IMF should lead in this area. Why the MAP in this area 
was supposed to be more effective than a wide-ranging IMF surveillance reporting involving 
scores of people and much larger resources is unclear. There was no requirement for FSB 
members to act on the views expressed in a MAP, so there was no real sustained evident 
pressure. 
 
In contrast, FSB thematic peer reviews continue and are viewed by participants as useful. 
This reporting compares standards application (for instance, on compensation, risk 
disclosure, governance) across all G20 states in a way which highlights differences but stops 
short of making judgments on effectiveness of implementation. Each review compares 
implementation across the FSB membership by states and key actors. At most, the thematic 
review process has a modestly positive impact, in two ways. First, it pressures the national 
supervisory authorities to explain how they are complying or plan to comply with the 
standards, and some jurisdictions (not all) react with gradual moves to implement the 
standards. Second, it involves surveying the actual practices across the globe as to how states 
and actors (in the case of compensation) apply agreed standards internally; this might have 
resulted in modest improvements in internal procedures since those surveyed knew the 
regulators could share these results if sufficiently alarmed (FSB, 2010a). 
 
Despite this, thematic reviews cannot achieve a great deal. They are, in the end, just brief 
surveys and self-reported results to a small staff at the Board. The author participated in the 
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Thematic Review on corporate governance, and it amounted to a brief reporting exercise with 
no compliance aspects. Moreover, the FSB data gathered is indicative, not qualitative; it is 
self-reporting of status, not an assessment of actual practice by supervisors and firms (and is 
much weaker than the Basel III process). An FSB review does not make judgments as to 
actual efficacy; instead, it is an indication of whether regulatory or supervisory initiatives are 
underway to implement the principles and standards (FSB 2011b, 2011c). G20 countries are 
not being assessed on the actual application or implementation. 
 
There is little evidence peer reviews embarrass or shame regulators who fail to act. The 
reviews make no determination that state X’s application is effective while state Y’s is not. 
Reviews make no judgments, implied or otherwise. At best, therefore, the reviews are a status 
report, a modest prodding of each FSB member to report regarding particular standards 
implementation. Perhaps the very act of having to report to the Board may be modestly 
helpful. The reviews can provide gradual soft pressure, but they are not enforcement. Smaller 
countries may be embarrassed into taking action. Key actors in larger markets, such as the 
U.S., the UK, or China, can still ignore them after reporting to the Board, just as they do with 
IMF surveillance. 
 
Looking at the nature of the Board as a Westphalian forum dominated by powerful state 
actors (albeit technocrats) and driven by a power-based consensus with no independent voice 
or mandate of its own makes it improbable the Board can publish critical monitoring or peer 
review reports of key states, their actions, or failures to act. Differences may be papered over, 
avoided, or set aside. If this type of conflict avoidance happens (and it has in the past), 
rigorous reporting will not be seen. Supervision and oversight needs to be independent and at 
times forthright. It is unlikely the FSB can speak truth to power when such reports are being 
written by and agreed by its members supported by (not led by) a small seconded staff in a 
relatively weak institutional position. 
 
The above discussion of FSB monitoring processes demonstrates that when FSB members 
lack a particularly strong consensus, or where they do not control an area of policy, this 
results in weak monitoring. A problem within the FSB Charter is exposed: its failure to create 
any obligations and enforcement duties for signatories. A state’s commitment on standards, 
therefore, can be still be an exhortation with little perceived obligation to comply, especially 
if there is weak consensus amongst the community of technocrats tasked with executing 
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implementation; all know little will occur if states ignore FSB reporting of a failure to adhere 
to agreed norms or standards. 
 
Finally, this type of reporting instead of compliance is made more problematic because of the 
total lack of transparency of the Board itself. The Board’s operations and decision-making 
processes are opaque and inscrutable. Advocates maintain opacity allows free and frank 
exchanges during the reporting process. But external observers cannot judge whether critical 
observations are aired and addressed or instead covered up and ignored. Supporters of the 
FSB hope for adherence driven not by compliance mechanisms but by the creation of new 
international norms of behaviour. They hope to form norms similar to customary 
international law. According to Helleiner, this is a ‘hardening of the soft law quality of the 
pre-FSB regime’ (Helleiner, 2010; p. 9). It is indeed possible for standards to gradually 
achieve the effect of law if enough states adopt them within their borders and adhere to them; 
but if this does occur, it will be a slow process. 
 
Placement on the policy reform matrix:  MAP and peer reviews are new but relatively weak 
reporting instruments that only marginally impact policy implemnation via the mechanisms 
of peer pressure. There is little evidence that the EWEs will be effective. These policies do 
not amount to enforcement processes. As surveillance tools they appear on the matrix but at 
this stage are “weak” and the policies move only slightly across the matrix. 
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Figure 5.10 EWEs, MAP and Peer Review Movemnt on the Policy Reform Matrix
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5.12 Conclusion: Strong policy requires a strong consensus to be made real 
 
Ideas and narratives determine the boundaries of financial regulatory policy making and are 
essential to our understanding and analysis of the relative success or failure of the FSB and its 
policy output. This chapter shows that the output of the FSB varies from strong, to weak, to 
insufficient. The process is impacted by the extent to which that community has a collective 
recognition of systemic weaknesses and failures, the strength of the epistemic community in 
the policy space, and the extent to which a community adopts a new policy consensus and 
narrative to underpin the policy response. When all three factors are in place, a paradigm shift 
or third-order change is possible (Hall, 1993). When they are not, lesser outcomes are seen. 
 
5.12.1 Policy coordination at a new level 
 
A key output of the G20-FSB reforms is a process one with policy implications: the creation 
within the FSB of a more effective means of policy coordination and cooperation. The FSB is 
the general contractor for regulatory reform,  and is central to the policy output. Without an 
effective coordinating mechanism whose structure and leadership fosters collective action 
towards common goals, the implementation of policies is harder to achieve. Compared with 
its predecessor, the FSF, the FSB’s coordination is more effective, multi-layered, deeper, 
broader, and more dynamic. It is arguably a third-order shift in policy coordination at the 
international level, and thus can be considered a paradigm shift in international financial 
regulatory coordination. 
 
In 2013, the Board has many of the characteristics of a permanent organization, with a 
growing staff, new resources, and a legal basis. The Board has structural components and 
processes that support coordination and cooperation and facilitate direction and policy 
convergence, through the agency of the Chair, Steering Committee, Standing Committees and 
Working Groups, and the Plenary. The Board is the principal venue for intensive engagement 
by key central bank governors, supervisors, and finance ministry officials, who lead the 
forum and direct their deputies in other subsidiary FSB committees and SSBs. Below the 
leadership strata, the Board demands the commitment of hundreds of other officials through 
its working groups, work streams, and in national policy implementation. The FSB is the 
concrete expression by the G20 and particularly the central banking community’s shift in 
financial regulatory narrative. FSB participants are clear there is a qualitative and quantitative 
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improvement over past practices and mechanisms (Barnier 2011; Bussey, 2011; Tarullo, 
2009, 2010; Trichet 2010c). 
 
As the venue for the central coordination of the collective policy response, the Board 
succeeds where past forums failed or underperformed. The success rests on the demonstrated 
commitment of the Board’s European and North American leadership coupled to the backing 
of the G20 political leadership throughout phases one, two, and three of the crisis response. 
Demands from those inside (to join the steering group) and those outside (to be better 
consulted via the Regional Consultative Groups) are reflective of that success. 
 
The commitment of North American and European leaders to the Board’s processes also 
signals the recognition by a declining hegemon and its allies of the need for a broader 
backing for their policy goals, albeit altered by the new worldview and paradigm. A politics 
of inclusion (Germain, 2001) and this functional cooperative mechanism—the FSB—is 
essential to engender cooperation and deliver desired policy outcomes. 
 
5.12.2 Macro-prudential policy, the Basel III Accord, and the policy consensus 
 
The Basel III Accord is the maximal response by the community of independent central 
bankers and supervisors acting through the FSB and BCBS. Their response—the adoption of 
a series of macro-prudential central bank policy measures and tools contained in Basel III—is 
recognised as a shift in the policy consensus by some of those present (Blanchard et al., 2012, 
Constancio, 2010; Smaghi, 2008). That consensus shift and the independence and strength of 
the central banking community behind it made it possible to secure a relatively strong accord 
in 2009-2010. 
 
The accord’s various measures, together, constitute a third-order paradigm shift in financial 
regulatory policy. The accord marks the rejection of laissez-faire neo-liberal beliefs by the 
technical community. It signalled the reassertion of collective state power and regulatory 
authority over markets and banks. It is a new (to Western policy makers) approach to 
supervision and oversight of markets and firms. Basel III is the central core of the reform 
wave that started in 2009 and which continues today as paradigm defence and maintenance.  
 
Its importance to the FSB community is underscored by the strong implementation measures 
created to support it. In this case, the community’s collective narrative and new policy 
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consensus supports a more meaningful compliance and monitoring regime amongst their own 
membership. This results in an FSB-BSBC process which, for the first time, can make actual 
judgments on national implementation and regulation. This is not a small matter. Neither the 
FSF nor the BCBS previously had such a role. It is an example of the expert community 
engaged in paradigm maintenance and defence against those who might fail to implement 
properly. It is  a recognition that the accord’s implementation is essential to the new 
collective re-regulatory policy consensus and paradigm shift that has begun.   
 
But is the accord enough? Critics think not. Wolf has called Basel III the mouse that did not 
roar and suggested ‘tripling almost nothing does not give one very much’ (Wolf, 2010). In 
this, Wolf is joined by others calling for higher capital requirements (Admati and Hellwig, 
2013). This chapter has shown that many of the accord’s strongest supporters would have 
ideally wished for higher standards, and many of these hawkish central bankers have gone on 
to apply Basel-plus national requirements. Perhaps the accord, had it been struck later, after 
the slew of banking scandals that occurred, could have been stronger. Given the opposition, 
such an outcome is doubtful. 
 
The G20 and their central banking epistemic community experts were right to rush to reach a 
deal quickly. The negotiating win sets that opened up post-crisis in 2009 had to be exploited. 
Better to press an accord with the crisis still fresh in central bankers’ minds and when the 
bank lobby was cowed by events and G20 leadership was strongly engaged than to drag out 
negotiations over a longer time frame, which could have permitted level-two win spaces to 
shrink and domestic pressures against a deal to rise. 
 
From a purely practical and diplomatic standpoint, it was better to strike a politically possible 
deal than to reach for too much and get nothing or less in return. Having secured the deal, 
with backing from emerging countries and their leaders, the FSB community is now 
defending the macro-prudential paradigm through stronger implementation. Nonetheless, the 
use of taxation measures rather than prohibitions remains a weakness that is indicative of the 
outer boundaries of the paradigm shift. Continued vigilance will be needed to avoid a return 
of gaming and, hence, the importance of the implementation process in the future. It is too 
soon to make a final judgment on the fluid process of implementation. 
 
It is also too soon to gauge the full effect of Basel III (implementation will not be complete 
until 2019), but it is reasonable to view the accord as the highest point in the financial 
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regulatory paradigm shift. Because of the strength of the initial accord, its multifaceted 
nature, and the improvements in the monitoring regime, this policy moves the furthest within 
the landscape of the policy matrix. 
 
5.12.3 The further away the FSB is from control, the less uniform the process 
 
When the FSB central banking community leadership is further away from the direct 
responsibility for policy creation and implementation, the output can be more mixed and 
‘lumpy’, that is, the national application of G20-FSB agreed standards can vary to a greater 
degree and monitoring can often be less effective.  
 
The analysis of the OTC derivatives reforms demonstrates this dynamic. Agreement at the 
G20 and FSB leadership level is not quite matched by the policy outcome from the national 
legislative and regulatory processes. Progress in this policy area has been substantial. Where 
previously there was no national regulation of derivatives, today all major G20 jurisdictions 
are implementing CCPs, margin requirements, and greater market transparency. But where 
new legislative and regulatory action was needed, state-to-state, domestic pressures and 
lobbies are applying pressure and seeking exemptions, undermining the goal of trading 
substantially all derivatives via CCPs. This contrasts with the Basel III example in which 
FSB leaders, as independent supervisors, were unencumbered by any need to consult level-
two interests (i.e., the banks) during the drafting process of the accord in 2009-2010. 
 
In the OTC derivatives space, the FSB had to pass the regulatory process down to the IOSCO 
as the oversight and coordinating SSB; the central bankers do not have regulatory 
responsibility in this area. The leadership of the process is thus removed from the actual 
policy making and the IOSCO, and its sub-state officials, are institutionally less powerful and 
hence less able to force the pace of change. This area consequently has a less robust 
monitoring process, with reporting but no judgments on the strength of respective regulatory 
fixes. As a result, the policy moves less distance in the policy matrix. 
 
5.12.4 Compensation principles and institution building by stealth in the FSB 
 
The FSB leadership in one case produced an important innovation in the face of disputes. 
This was achieved in the implementation of FSB compensation principles and practices 
across G20 states. Implementation differences led to complaints by various private sector 
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actors of unfair practices by their rivals. The FSB leadership reacted by constructing a 
bilateral disputes settlement procedure with a quasi-judicial role, creating potential 
institutional strength out of weakness. The new procedure has yet to be tested (as of 
September 2013), but it is potentially institutionally significant (Interviews 24 and 34, 2012). 
 
The construction of an FSB institutional compliance and judgment process,  may strengthen 
the FSB, moves away from mere reporting towards judgments, precedent setting, and the 
creation of customary practice. The policy moves in the matrix towards being weakly 
globally harmonised in the matrix, but there is clearly potential, once the dispute settlement 
procedure begins, for the policy to become stronger and codified. This is an example of 
institution building by stealth, led by the central banking community. 
 
5.12.5 FSB standards and the limits of the regulatory paradigm shift 
 
Some areas where ostensible agreement exists, have less promising outcomes, for instance, 
on the need to end Too Big To Fail which seems almost impossible to solve. This is due to 
the complexity of the area, and because the issue rests at or beyond the limits of the paradigm 
shift. As a result, the FSB community wrestles with the issue via resolution regimes and 
living wills, but in reality, the largest banks would not be allowed to fail, so the impact of the 
advisory policies remains weak and unsatisfying, and the position of TBTF deteriorates in the 
policy matrix rather than improves. The TBTF case demonstrates that the FSB consensus, as 
with any paradigm once in place, limits the options considered by the community. Thus, the 
break-up or regulatory limiting of the largest banks is not considered. Such a simple option is 
off the table because the FSB community consensus considers them heretical. 
  
5.12.6 No consensus and paradigm conflict means no progress 
 
Finally, there are also circumstances in which the G20 demands action, on new global 
accountancy standards, for instance, where the G20 and FSB leadership supports the goal. 
But there is no consensus below the G20-FSB level, and neither leadership party controls or 
oversees the standard setters in this case. Here, the differences between the two communities 
are just too large to bridge, i.e., Putnam’s level-two disputes result in no win sets, and no 
progress is possible. 
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5.12.7 Gauging success in FSB policy making 
 
Looked at as a whole, the FSB policy making has advanced international regulatory reform 
considerably on many fronts, as shown in the policy matrix (Chart 5.11). The general 
movement diagonally upward left to right across the landscape implies improved globally 
harmonized standards are being created. The FSB, its processes, the Basel Accord,  
derivatives regulation, and compensation standards all move across the lanscape in a positive 
direction and are the most significant shifts. But the policy results are of varying strengths, 
with TBTF and related policies much weaker. Moreover in September 2012 the policy 
process is still underway, and the policies are still subject to attack. 
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Figure 5.11 The Landscape of the Policy Reform Matrix 
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The FSB-led reregulatory paradigm shift underway is still limited.  It does not extend to 
macroeconomic matters outside the regulatory reach (or beyond the consensus within which) 
the technical community operates.  It does not imply the neo-liberal economic ideas have 
been overturned, only that the laisisez faire deregulatory strain of thinking has been rejected 
by the central banking community and its supporters.  
 
Have the policy changes been a success in making the markets more stable and less prone to 
crises? It is too soon to determine. In September 2013, the observer may be viewing this 
reform process from a contorted perspective and angle, riding on and up against the wave, 
with not all of it visible at a glance. The reform process is not over. Many policies remain to 
be fully implemented, and definitive judgments as to the final success of the output cannot be 
made. In the G20-FSB reforms, one is ‘witnessing an extended process rather than the result 
of a single moment.’ (Helleiner, 2010, p. 625) ‘We are in the early stages of a reformation of 
finance.’ (Haldane, 2012d, p. 2) 
 
The FSB expert community is still constructing the reforms, strengthening the regulatory 
paradigm, and defending it against opponents, backed by the G20 summitry, and despite 
some visible weakening of political consensus in the third phase of the G20’s evolution. 
 
Are the reforms enough? It depends how you view the reform wave. The G20 and FSB 
community has to deal with political and diplomatic realities. They are working within the 
new consensus that delineates the limits of the policy-making space. But key institutional and 
policy reforms are much more robust than would have been possible absent the galvanizing 
effect of the crisis. The FSB would not have been created, a body that now plays the key 
coordinating role. Basel III and its monitoring functions would not exist. Other reforms are of 
varying strength, but all add to the amplitude of the wave of the re-regulatory paradigm shift. 
Looked at as a whole, the policy reforms are evidence of a real and potentially lasting shift. 
 
Four years after the start of the process, the FSB reforms are driving bank deleveraging, 
requiring capital raising, pressing down on the excesses seen pre-crisis through market 
mechanisms, and changing firm-level strategies and practices. This suggests a possible 
cultural shift in how banks are viewed and how they should conduct their business. If these 
cultural changes take root, they will strengthen the new re-regulatory policy paradigm. Is this 
window dressing or for real? Once again, looked at individually, such cultural changes may 
seem paltry. But viewed in totality, they may perhaps indicate the financial reform process is 
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being strengthened by adjustments to cultural norms and practices in global markets and 
amongst individuals firms, country to country, market to market. If that proves to be the case, 
this would be an indicator of the strength of the re-regulatory consensus and new paradigm as 
it is converted into regulatory policy and into economic, political, and cultural outcomes. 
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Chapter 6. Reform of the IMF: The G20 Takes Charge 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the steps taken by the G20 to reempower the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in response to the global economic crisis that began 2008. That process had 
several strands. Of most importance, the G20 agreed to massively increase IMF resources, 
and the chapter dissects how and why the G20 re-energised the IMF and sought to better 
equip it to act in its traditional lender-of-last resort role and as an essential conduit for 
stabilising flows of funds to states in crisis. 
 
G20 summit diplomacy also resulted in a number of relatively modest evolutionary 
governance and voice reforms that have had the effect of drawing emerging countries back 
into a stronger commitment to an IMF within which their role and voice would also be 
potentially more influential. Taken as a whole, the IMF reforms will be seen to be 
incremental, first- and second-order reforms, emblematic of a slow gradual rebalancing of 
power and influence away from the old core and towards the emerging countries within an 
existing structure and organization. Reform of the IMF is an important facet of the global 
regulatory redesign, even though the IMF is not the key player. Unlike other parts of the 
regulatory architectural redesign galvanised by the G20 post-2008, the reforms in the IMF 
case suggest reluctance by G20 states and the IMF staff to make more major post-crisis 
changes. 
 
As the G20 leaders and their technocrats took charge and drove reform at the IMF, they went 
only so far. Coming out of the crisis the IMF would be a stronger, more relevant institution, 
but it would not be at the centre of the financial reform architectural redesign. Rather, the 
IMF would be driven by the G20 leadership and have only a marginal role in financial and 
regulatory reform matters. Compared to other new structures designed by the states leading 
the response to the financial and economic crisis, the IMF would not be at the heart of the 
policy response. Despite this apparent demotion, the G20 memberships’ collective 
recommitment to the IMF (especially emerging countries’ recommitment) is still noteworthy, 
particularly given how weak and irrelevant the IMF had become prior to the onset of the 
2008-2009 crisis. 
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The G20-led reform of the IMF would make it once again a relevant, better-financed, 
marginally reformed organization, tasked with assisting in the collective macroeconomic and 
financial response to the crisis. The G20 used the IMF to channel financing from states with 
excess surplus reserves to those states in crisis, swiftly but with conditions, to achieve 
identified common goals. The IMF’s resource boost, internal reforms, and policy changes 
depended on G20 summit deals among somewhat reluctant advanced economy leaders and 
more eager emerging-country leaders intent on seizing a greater degree of control over the 
IMF in return for their money. 
 
But memories of past perceived IMF failures in the 1990s lingered and as a result the IMF 
was pushed to become to a degree subservient to the G20, to serve the G20 agenda and 
objectives. Today, compared with the other actors—the G20 and the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB)—the IMF has a ‘limited role and visibility’ (Beeson and Broome, 2008, p. 393). 
Why is this? It is because the IMF performed poorly before the crisis and lacked legitimacy. 
In the end, ‘it comes down to a failure of the IMF, a failure to identify the crisis, and a failure 
to act’ (Interview 19, 2012, p. 1). G20 actions would ensure that, in 2013, the IMF is 
reinforced as the global lender of last resort to states facing balance-of-payment crises. The 
IMF once again has an important macroeconomic crisis-fighting role to play but it is not in 
the lead. 
 
Reforms mark a gradual evolution of the IMF away from one led and dominated by U.S. and 
European officials, as the balance of state power shifts within the institution and emerging 
countries demand a larger role, albeit haltingly, and with many discordant voices. Ultimately, 
the G20 reforms should result in an institution that more closely mirrors changes in the 
relative economic power and importance of developed and emerging countries. But it will 
take time for these reforms to alter the nature of the organization and its culture, ideology, 
practices, and policy stances. Taken together, the reforms amount to first- and, at most, 
second-order changes (Hall, 1993). 
 
This research suggests there has been no paradigm shift inside the IMF, in its central neo-
liberal economic ideology, in its lending practices, or in its operation. Despite the 
organization’s past failures, there has been no real rejection of existing ‘truths’, no revolution 
from within, and no adoption of a new approach to IMF macroeconomic oversight and 
management of the global economy. There is no evidence of a fundamental reappraisal of the 
IMF’s mission, overall ideology, or functioning. Despite the IMF’s pre-crisis mistakes, the 
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number of anomalies was not enough to force a major shift in worldview amongst the staff or 
state shareholders. The research found an internal policy consensus successfully resisting 
change. The community view within the IMF is neo-liberal, creditor-focused, firmly power-
sensitive, member-driven, and remaining internally ideologically resilient. 
 
Today, the IMF remains an organization staffed by officials largely supportive of the neo-
liberal worldview professed by key states representatives, echoed by a staff of like-minded, 
similarly trained economists (Chwieroth, 2007). This is the case even as, at the very top, the 
French leadership pushes the IMF to adjust its view of the merits and speed of austerity and 
the merits of capital controls policies to halt capital flight (in Europe at least). 
 
The IMF is a member-driven organization, and the member states’ refusal to take more 
radical reform steps shows their diverging national positions and the limits of the G20 policy 
consensus on the future role of the IMF. The IMF serves its creditor members’ interests first, 
and its lending and surveillance work reflects this reality, and neither will change with any 
rapidity. IMF shareholders control the rate of policy evolution, operating within an existing 
institutional structure, driven by national political and economic concerns. Unlike examples 
described elsewhere in this research (see chapter 5), the IMF is adjusting but not 
fundamentally altering its nature and ideology.  
 
6.2 Background  
 
The history and evolution of the IMF has been discussed in detail by many authors (see Babb, 
2007; Bluestein, 2001; Fischer, 2005; G30, 2009a; Helleiner, 1994; James, 1996; Kenen, 
2002, 2007; King, 2006; Peet, 2010; Thacker, 1999). At the IMF’s creation in July 1944, 
representatives of 45 countries agreed on a framework for the international monetary system, 
to be established after World War II. Delegates saw a need for collective institutions tasked 
with ensuring a stable international monetary system that would protect and promote a 
market-based alternative to the Soviet Union (Beeson and Broome, 2008). This market 
system would be a regulated one characterised by limited capital flows and currency markets 
managed by governments to maintain stability (Ikenberry, 1992). A regulated system was 
championed by the U.S., the U.K., and their allies in Europe. It was anchored by the U.S. 
dollar pegged to gold and managed in concert by the key IMF shareholders. The IMF was a 
key part of the U.S.-led embedded liberalism of the period (Helleiner, 1994; Ikenberry, 1992; 
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Ruggie, 1982) and it proved ‘extraordinarily successful’ (Gilpin, 2001, p. 234) in fostering 
postwar economic stability and growth. 
 
6.2.1 The end of the Bretton Woods system and the beginning of market fundamentalism 
 
The managed exchange rate system delivered decades of postwar stability and ensured there 
were very few banking and financial crises (King, 2011a). Ultimately, in the early 1970s, the 
Nixon Administration decided not to keep the dollar-to-gold window open at US$35 per 
ounce; the Administration sought greater individual national economic policy room to 
manoeuvre, something that was not possible if the U.S. continued to act as the anchor of the 
global international monetary system (Gowa, 1983). 
 
U.S. abandonment of the managed exchange rate system commenced a period characterised 
by the progressively rapid liberalization and growth of the global financial system, of 
complex markets and capital mobility, and an increased frequency of crises and volatility 
(Hoogveldt, 2011). This was underpinned by an emerging adjusted neo-liberal political and 
economic ideological worldview that provided ex post justification for the global financial 
market changes underway (Patomaki, 2011). This paradigm came to eventually dominate 
policy, academic economics, and financial markets as the established orthodoxy in the 
decades prior to the 2008 crisis (Beeson and Broome, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa, 2010a; 
Subacchi, 2008; Turner, 2011). 
 
The IMF responded to the liberalisation and deregulation of the international monetary 
system with alterations to its mission. It stressed the balance-of-payment support it could 
provide to the weaker states funded by creditors at the core (led by the U.S.) together with the 
supposedly even-handed surveillance advisory role delivered to its membership. In pivoting 
towards individual country surveillance, the IMF may have partially lost sight of the global 
financial stability role that it was still meant to play. In focusing on an advisory role, the IMF 
faced countries that often did not wish to listen.  
 
Although the U.S. had abandoned the gold standard, it continued to dominate IMF decision 
making (supported by the U.K. and other advanced states). The U.S. backed a developing 
neo-liberal laissez faire, pro-capital, pro-conditionality worldview known as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Williamson, 1993, 2004) by its backers or as ‘market fundamentalism’ (Stiglitz, 
2008) by its critics, which had been under construction by the IMF for decades prior to the 
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1990s (Babb, 2007).  The 10 policy prescriptions of Williamson’s Washington Consensus 
underpinned an ideological approach which assumed that states and central banks must 
ensure the financial markets function with as few barriers as possible, that client states of the 
IMF (borrowers) had to ‘stabilize, privatize and liberalize’ (Gamble, 2009, p.85). During this 
period, the IMF staff and leadership, as well as other major international institutions 
(including the World Bank), internalised this economic and ideological stance as the new 
orthodoxy. Critics such as Sachs (1999) and Stiglitz (2002, 2008) pilloried this Anglo-
American policy prescription, arguing that it sought to apply one-solution-fits-all to states 
regardless of their level of economic development, culture, or economic model. It would take 
a series of linked economic crises to shake the legitimacy of this IMF worldview—crises that 
led many IMF member countries to essentially abandon the institution and look elsewhere for 
their future national financial stability and prosperity. 
 
In the 1990s, the Mexican, East Asian, and Russian financial crises brought the lending 
policy conditionality and political bias underpinned by the ideology within the IMF into 
stark, unflattering relief. Currency and balance-of-payment or capital account crises in 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand were dealt with by the IMF 
with variants of the orthodox solutions of tax increases, government spending cuts, interest 
rate rises, the floating and devaluation of currencies, and demands to rapidly liberalise 
markets. In some especially egregious cases, such as South Korea, the IMF included 
requirements that were especially controversial, such as demanding the wholesale 
restructuring of South Korea’s major industrial conglomerates (Bluestein, 2001), calling into 
question its export-driven economic growth model. The staff and the Western leadership of 
the IMF were seen to be challenging East Asian capitalist development. It was a straight 
paradigm clash between Eastern and Western development models (Gills, 2000). 
 
During and after these multiple country crises, the IMF was accused of ‘being used by the 
U.S. and its allies as a vehicle to achieve [their] own ends’ (Meltzer, 2000). The IMF and the 
Washington Consensus solutions it demanded in this key period in the 1990s were 
condemned for aggressively pressing counterproductive conditionality on Asian and other 
states (Stiglitz, 2002). Of course, not all agreed with this view (Fischer, 2005; Rogoff, 2002; 
see also Kaufman, 2010). 
 
Leaders of the East Asian states that faced national economic calamity largely agreed to the 
policy demands of the IMF and the affected countries rebounded, most with IMF financial 
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support. But severe damage was done ideologically and politically to the organization’s 
credibility. East Asian leaders, deeply angered by the IMF’s policy solutions, took steps to 
ensure they did not face the same choices again. The events of the mid-1990s proved to be a 
paradigm clash, between the Asian viewpoint, led by Japan, and the U.S. and IMF’s 
ideological position (Wade, 1996). The result was a negative one for the IMF; its legitimacy 
was greatly weakened instead of strengthened by the scale and hostility of the clash of 
economic ideologies and models. Asian states responded by moving away from the Bretton 
Woods paradigm (Kapur and Webb, 2007). 
 
Emerging market countries that could do so engaged in a rapid build-up of central bank 
reserves as self-insurance against future market volatility and capital flight (Chin, 2010). This 
move exacerbated imbalances and drove down global interest rates, contributing to a search 
for yield amongst investors and fuelling asset booms in the U.S. and Europe. Member 
countries’ self-insurance activity also pushed the IMF into increasing irelevance, and the 
organization’s value to its membership dropped precipitously as the member countries moved 
to stop relying on the IMF for funding in crisis situations. 
 
6.2.2 An organization facing an existential crisis 
 
By the mid-2000s, the IMF was a hollowed out and greatly weakened international financial 
institution. It was suffering from a gaping legitimacy deficit. It was seen as an institution run 
by the few at the core to the periodic detriment of those at the periphery. Emerging-country 
leaders were leery and highly critical of the IMF because of its lending history, the effect of 
conditional medicine dispensed, their underrepresentation within the institution, the policy 
biases evident in the U.S. and European domination of the Executive Board decision-making 
processes, and the related IMF staff ideology. Many governments, most notably Argentina 
and Brazil but also Algeria, Bulgaria, and Uruguay, made clear their dislike of the IMF’s 
internal balance of power and policy making, by repaying loans ahead of schedule (Swann, 
2007). This was indicative of the emergence of real funding alternatives, as well as changes 
in investment flows as seen, for example, in China’s increasing lending to and investments in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
By 2007, the IMF had only one remaining large borrower: Turkey. With almost no members 
borrowing funds, and with its income depending on interest payments from these loans, the 
organization confronted a negative projected income of 59 million SDRs (IMF, 2007a, p. 7), 
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and layoffs commenced. The late Andrew Crockett, former General Manager of the Bank for 
International Settlements, was tasked with finding a solution. He recommended selling a 
portion of the IMF’s gold reserves to generate sufficient income to keep the doors open on 
Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC (IMF, 2007b). 
 
Prior to the 2008 financial and economic crisis, the IMF’s mission was seriously in doubt. It 
was an organization in decline with few supporters and was suffering an ‘existential crisis’ 
(Eichengreen, 2007, p. 153). In fact, it was unclear whether the world needed the 
organization anymore. Such was the general prevailing wrongheaded paradigm about the 
stability and strength of global financial markets and firms that few observers identified the 
danger of a major black swan event (Taleb, 2010) or fat tail risk in 2006-2007. ‘Serious 
people were asking whether [the IMF] should be closed down’ (Eichengreen, 2009). What a 
difference a global crisis makes. 
 
The case for reform of the IMF, for increased resources, and improvements to governance has 
been recognised by many observers (BIS 2008; Eichengreen, 2007; Griffiths, 2010; G30, 
2009a; IMF, 2009c; Kenen 2007; King 2006; Thimann, Just and Ritter, 2009; Truman, 2006 
and 2009). But until the 2008 financial and economic crisis, support for reform was largely 
lacking in national capitals of the principal shareholders (except the U.S.). The severity of the 
2008 crisis clarified thinking on the need for reform. It forced a convergence of positions and 
pushed level-one negotiators together. It opened up level-one and level-two win sets 
internationally and domestically (Putnam, 1988) that did not previously exist. It made 
agreements by the G20 leadership possible on reform that would have previously been 
impossible. A recapitalization of the IMF would be needed in order to prevent the crisis from 
becoming a painful, prolonged global economic contraction, i.e., another Great Depression. 
 
6.3 The G20 Takes the Lead 
 
The post-2008 history of the IMF is one in which reforms are directed by the G20 leaders 
agreed by the leadership of both advanced states and emerging countries acting in concert 
seated around the same table for the first time. This dynamic, in which the G20 leaders’ 
forum sets the broad reform agenda, reforms the IMF, and in effect determines the IMF’s 
objectives, is clearly seen in the output of the summits. 
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The G20 forum today provides de facto leadership of the IMF via the summits’ and 
members’ dominance in the International Monetary and Finance Committee (IMFC), a role 
previously held largely by the U.S. and its allies from the West. G20 summitry appears to 
drive IMF reforms. Indeed, the G20 summit decisions signal a modified collective narrative 
adopted by the G20 on the utility of the IMF, an emergent adjusted policy consensus 
comprised of: 
 
1. An implicit agreement on a modified, improved, but simultaneously diminished, 
position of the IMF within the global architectural superstructure; 
2. An agreement on considerably increased IMF resources; 
3. An agreement on modest governance changes and adjustments in the relative power 
of emerging market countries within the IMF itself to reflect global macroeconomic 
realities; and 
4. An agreement on modest adjustments to the IMF’s surveillance role. 
 
This evolving G20 policy consensus on the IMF’s position and role does not, taken as whole, 
change the nature of the institution in the short to medium term. Rather, it shifts the IMF’s 
position in the regulatory architecture and changes the makeup of its creditor base and 
decision-making processes. These architectural, resource, and governance reforms are first- 
or at most second-order changes. The internal surveillance policy adjustments are themselves 
so incremental as to not constitute anything more than first-order changes (Hall, 1993). 
 
6.3.1 The G20 dominates the new architecture 
 
The new G20 consensus on the IMF leads to an outcome that places the IMF below the G20 
in the new architectural superstructure, and, for matters related to financial market reform, 
side-by-side with the FSB (see figure 3.1, p.79). The G20, in this schema, is dominant in a 
manner not seen in the case of the G7, which did not, stand at the top of the ‘as was’ 
superstructure. The G7 met and pontificated on macroeconomic matters, usually 
ineffectively. Its members would occasionally intervene on currency issues (with the Plaza 
Accord, for instance). But the G7 was and is a loose grouping; its summit communiqués are 
famously vague and rarely result in actions. 
 
In contrast the G20 summitry in phases one and two was more assertive in its application of 
collective state power to common problems. Importantly, the G20 is also backed by and 
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supported by the coordination process overseen by the technocrat community in phases one, 
two, and three. The G20 sits as the apex of the new architecture, assisted by the FSB in its 
reforms and an IMF that is downgraded in the hierarchy.  
 
Previous financial crises responses were led by the IMF supported by the U.S. and G7 allies 
(such as the Mexican crisis or Asian crises). They concerned the failings of the emerging 
countries, and the U.S. and its allies left the IMF to dole out the conditional medicine. In 
2008 and since, this has not been the case. This crisis occurred within the U.S. and Europe, 
those leaders were not about to defer to the IMF for their remedies. Instead, the G20 leaders 
determined the resources, roadmap, and required outcomes in close consultation with the IMF 
and other actors (such as the European Central Bank). The IMF was then put to work in 
support of the G20 goals. 
 
As G20 leaders moved to strengthen the IMF during 2008-2009, they thwarted an attempt by 
the IMF’s managing director to take the lead role in financial reform. The Strauss-Kahn–
Draghi letter of November 2008 should be read in that context (IMF, 2008a). It was a victory 
for the G20 and their central bank governors and technocratic elite in the struggle with the 
IMF leadership over who would direct financial reform below the G20. It is notable that a 
similar clash, between Andrew Crockett, first chair of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 
and Stan Fischer, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, as heated but less significant 
institutionally, also took place when the FSF was created in 1999 at an earlier time of crisis 
(Bluestein, 2012). In 1999, Fischer won, and the IMF continued to lead global financial crisis 
management. That did not happen in 2008. 
 
At its most basic, G20 leaders and their central bankers did not trust the IMF in 2008 to take 
on responsibility for financial reform. The G20 actors viewed the IMF with continued 
suspicion, given its past failures, and did not believe it had the right skill set to deliver on 
regulatory reforms. Therefore, leaders and central bank governors maintained control, with 
the latter strengthening their policy roles and prerogatives and emerging from the crisis 
stronger not weaker, even though they, too, had failed to see the economic crisis before it hit. 
 
In 2008, the IMF-FSB clash was less of a struggle and more of a pushover because there was 
no likelihood that G20 leaders would hand over the financial reform agenda to an institution 
that national leaders and central bankers viewed with suspicion; saw as being bureaucratic, 
and highly dysfunctional (Interview 24, 2012); or saw as simply not suited to the task of 
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financial regulatory redesign (Interview 20, 2012). Neither advanced nor emerging-country 
leaders would agree to trust financial reform to a universal institution they each mistrusted for 
their own, different reasons. 
 
Post-crisis, G20 decision making and summitry appear to provide the intellectual and policy 
lead to the IMF’s own agenda (Interview 20, 2012). The IMF has reacted by structuring its 
own internal decision processes and work programme to produce results in advance of the 
G20 summit timetable so as to maximise its impact and influence. The pressure is not 
unidirectional: The rotating G20 Presidency pushes and pulls against demands from other 
members and the IMF. Large states such as the U.K. and the U.S. can and do control the 
policy and summit declaration writing process during their Presidency, and have to alter their 
positions based on demands from other leading G20 states (as in Washington, London, and 
Pittsburgh). Not so on IMF reforms, which in phases one and two saw reforms driven by the 
leading states. The IMF was largely on the receiving end of G20 policy directions. 
 
The dynamic is not the same with emerging-country G20 Presidencies. During these 
summits, smaller states are, aided by the IMF leadership and staff, but in a manner that also 
pushes the IMF’s own agenda (Interview 20, 2012). In Toronto and Seoul, smaller G20 
Presidency states played a weaker role with respect to other G20 states, and they also do so 
with respect to the IMF; the IMF leadership simply has more resources and more levers to 
pull to influence outcomes in a way that a weaker G20 Presidency is unable to match. Despite 
this, it would be wrong to conclude that the IMF staff is in a strong position vis-à-vis its G20 
members who act in leadership roles for the IMF. They are not. 
 
Leadership of both the G20 and IMFC is often the very same political figures wearing 
different hats for back-to-back meetings which are hosted by the IMF, acting in an ad hoc 
secretarial role (the G20 has no permanent staff). After summits conclude, the G20’s impact 
continues to be felt. Below the level of the IMFC, within the Executive Board of the IMF, the 
G20 representatives dominate this consensus-based, decision-making body at the top of the 
IMF (Interviews 14, 19, and 20, 2012). 
 
6.4 The G20 and IMF Resources 
 
G20 leaders from 2008 through 2012 would agree an almost 400 percent increase in funds 
from shareholders, advanced and emerging. This constitutes a major recommitment of 
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members to a strengthened IMF. To get there would require much negotiation, debate, and 
manoeuvring around the increases. Successive managing directors would push for increases 
in resources, but the engine of reform is clearly provided by G20 leaders via the summits 
rather than being driven by the IMF itself. The G20 would agree to multiply the IMF 
resources and let the IMF get back to work as lender of last resort for countries in extremis. 
The resource increases would come in waves in response to the peak of the crisis in 2008, the 
post-crisis reform movement in 2009, and the Eurozone crisis during 2011-2012. The 
resource demands and commitments are impacted by national domestic interests and by 
economic and political constraints that also affect the extent to which collective action is 
possible by IMF member governments. 
 
Overall, the G20-led IMF resource increases do permit a modest growth of emerging-country 
influence within the IMF, but they do not produce cultural or institutional paradigm shifts 
inside the IMF. The funding reforms could ultimately alter the functioning of the IMF, and 
eventually its internal ideological stance, lending actions, and surveillance behaviour. 
Although it is too soon to see concrete evidence of this at present, interview results suggest 
that a gradual power shift has begun as the balance of creditor shareholder power. The G20 
moves, taken as a whole, are an important part of the global response to the crisis addressing 
the immediate financing needs of members whose economies were worst hit by economic 
crises. The G20 recapitalization moves include numerous resource injections: 
 
 At the 2009 London Summit, the G20 agreed a tripling of the current funds 
available, up to US$750 billion, including US$500 billion for the New 
Arrangements to Borrow (NAB); total NAB commitments ultimately provided 
were 370 billion SDRs, or US$565 billion (IMF, 2009d). 
 G20 leaders agreed to the 14th quota review in December 2010, amounting to a 
doubling of SDR quotas to 476.8 billion, or US$733 billion (IMF, 2010d). 
 In response to the Eurozone crisis, G20 leaders and the IMFC agreed a further 
US$461 billion in boost to IMF resources, in Los Cabos, Mexico in 2012 (IMF, 
2012b). 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates part of the increase in funds provided by members to the IMF in 
response to G20 summit decisions, broken down by total resources, usable resources, and 
uncommitted usable resources available to the IMF from 2002 through April 2012. Prior to 
the crisis, usable and uncommitted usable resources were almost identical because member 
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states were not borrowing from the IMF, hence its crisis of mission and its operating deficit. 
The leap in all three categories of funds in 2009 is a result of the London Summit 
commitments. As resources jumped during 2009 through 2012, borrowing also increased in 
response to crises. (Note: The figure does not include the full 14th review quota increases or 
the US$461 billion in further financing in response to the Eurozone crisis. Once in place, the 
total resource increases amount to a jump of close to 400 percent from pre-crisis levels.) 
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Figure 6.1 IMF Financial Resources and Liquidity Position to 2012 
 
‘The G20 is best when it is brokering resource deals at the highest levels and thrashing out 
compromises’ (Interview 19, 2012, p. 3). IMF resource commitments agreed by the G20 are 
of that type—big picture, headline numbers suited to summitry and periods of crisis and rapid 
collective governmental policy response. The increase in resources for the IMF, enables the 
IMF to provide balance-of-payment support for solvent member countries seeking to buttress 
their financial position against the crisis and liquidity concerns. Mexico and Poland, for 
example, received funds via the Flexible Credit Line. The IMF has also provided funds to 
support states actually confronted by imminent financial and budgetary crises such as Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, via traditional IMF lending programmes. 
 
6.4.1 Diplomatic manoeuvring and IMF resources 
 
The agreement to increase IMF resources involved at the outset leadership from the core, as 
well as significant support and input from emerging countries. Then-U.K. Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown played a leadership role in London in 2009 in pushing for a deal on IMF 
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finances aided by others, notably U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, who insisted on 
the higher, US$500 billion, NAB figure ultimately agreed at the summit (Interview 5, 2011; 
Interview 12 2012; see also Brown, 2010). Japan also acted as a major source of funds 
(Interview 32, 2012). Emergency NAB funds committed in 2009 broken down by contributor 
(in billion SDRs) show the still important role of the core: U.S. - 69 billion; Japan - 69.9 
billion; Germany - 25.3 billion; France - 18.6 billion; U.K. - 18.6 billion. The enhanced 
financial role played by emerging countries is also clear: China - 31.2 billion; Brazil - 8.7 
billion; Russia 8.7 billion; India - 8.7 billion (IMF, 2012a). But it is still a minority stake in 
this IMF resource boost. 
 
In 2009, leaders in the G20 acted swiftly and collectively. Major states from the core and 
emerging countries stepped forward and did so at low risk to their sovereignty, since they 
would not be borrowers but creditors (Kaya, 2012). In the midst of the crisis management and 
reform phases of the response, leaders, advanced and emerging, agreed on the need for 
additional resources and, within that, on the financial, economic, and diplomatic necessity of 
including emerging countries’ cash and recommitment to the IMF, since the former needed 
cash and buy-in from the latter.  
 
The pressure of the collective crisis created a policy convergence and consensus on resource 
reforms. Leaders in Washington and London looked over the cliff into the abyss of financial 
collapse, and they knew they had to act, and act fast. Normal level-two domestic concerns 
appear to have been overridden by clear level-one goals that overlapped and intersected at the 
moment of greatest peril. No one could afford to return home from London without a major 
deal (Interview 5, 2011; Interview 17, 2012). 
 
The London Summit saw the emerging countries take a larger role as creditors to IMF 
programmes. This was a power play by emerging countries within the organization, as well as 
a recommitment to an organization they had previously disdained. Emerging-country leaders 
understand that the larger the creditor, the greater the influence. The larger role for emerging 
states also reflects the relative fiscal weakness of advanced economy member states in 2009 
and since, with the largest currency reserves residing in the emerging countries’ central 
banks; in China and Saudi Arabia, for instance. 
 
The IMF resource increases were backed by the U.S., which sought, not for the first time, to 
change the balance within the IMF Board and governance process. The U.S. backed the NAB 
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increases, the recapitalization via the 14th quota review and a doubling of SDR quotas, and 
an increase in the votes held by emerging-country Executive Directors. This was in line with 
longstanding U.S. policy preference to gradually rebalance the financing and the power 
within the IMF (Interview 12, 2012) away from an excess representation of Europeans on the 
Board.  
 
Since 2010, additional cash infusions have been more difficult to achieve. The sovereign debt 
crisis in the Eurozone, which worsened in 2011 and 2012, created considerable tensions 
within the G20 over how to provide yet more finance for the IMF. Demands for further cash 
occurred at a time when the G20 leaders’ policy consensus had frayed and they were no 
longer in accord over whom was to blame for the latest phase of the economic crisis, what 
should be done, and just who should pay the bill. Disagreement rather than a policy 
consensus was seen in and on the Eurozone. A strong common policy narrative was lacking 
even as all agreed that a Eurozone collapse, multiple unmanaged sovereign defaults, had to be 
averted. In this manner dissension and disunity in phase three was fuelled by conflicting 
national interests. 
 
The U.S. and others took a strong line that Europe must deal with its own crisis, that the Euro 
is a reserve currency, and the EU states have the resources, political and fiscal; they should 
act first (Interviews 14, 19, and 21, 2012; see also Blackenden, 2012). The U.S. position 
reflected domestic realities; a split Congress would not vote on further IMF funding before 
the 2012 presidential election. Although U.S. officials indicated they would not block a deal 
financed by others, initially U.S. negotiators had no win-space because domestic opposition 
meant U.S. officials lacked an overlap between their level-one and level-two positions. 
Divergent international and national negotiating concerns could be seen amongst other IMF 
states, as well. 
 
Europeans were opposed to additional finance from emerging countries if this meant an 
additional quota and voice shifts in the IMF; i.e. a loss of institutional influence and  power; 
level-one blocking issues in Putnam's terms (Putnam, 1988) (Interviews 20 and 21, 2012). 
The U.S., also balked at any immediate additional watering down of their voting power, 
arguing they would be, after the 14th review, underrepresented (Interview 17, 2012), given 
the size of their economy as a percentage of global GDP, a credible complaint supported by 
others (Interview 32, 2012). 
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Emerging countries faced their own political and domestic constraints. Leaders reportedly did 
not wish to commit yet more cash to the advanced countries’ economies without clear 
changes in quotas and votes; level-one negotiating concerns (Interviews 16 and 21, 2012). 
Emerging countries were resistant to financing bailouts of European states even as their own 
economies slowed and required action, because their populaces viewed the bailing out of rich 
Europeans as a bad use of funds, a level-two domestic political concern that impacted 
positioning and win sets (Interview 21, 2012). 
 
Ultimately forced by the pressure of the external economic crisis, continued widespread 
market volatility, panic, growing yield spreads between the Eurozone core and the periphery, 
and a recession in Europe, i.e., a still deepening crisis of global impact, US$461 billion in 
additional funds was agreed by the G20 and IMF in Los Cabos. This was a success for both 
the G20 and IMF, although the total was less than Managing Director Christine Lagarde’s 
maximum demands (Interview 30, 2012). The cash came predominantly from Europe 
(US$200 billion-plus) as exceptional bilateral financing, which addressed U.S. demands that 
Europe bail itself out. 
 
Funds from IMF members did not involve additonal quota increases that would have required 
governance changes opposed by the U.S. and Europeans. No cash came from Canada or the 
U.S. (Harding and Jones, 2012); neither had the domestic room to manoeuvre. Overall, the 
deal reinforced an IMF firewall with EU cash, avoided further immediate fights on 
governance, and sidestepped the problem of zero financing available from the U.S. On 
balance, Los Cabos delivered a nuanced deal with a large additional resource boost which 
was sensitive to the negotiating constraints faced by all the players at that stage. 
 
To conclude, the resource increases and associated political jockeying had different phases, 
driven by the nature of the crisis, first global, then concentrating in the Eurozone, and its 
oscillations, as well as diplomatic and domestic policy drivers. In extremis, the G20 process 
worked well in both 2009-2010 and 2012. Major resources injections were provided to the 
IMF as governments reacted to the crisis and began to reform the global architecture. Yet 
more funds were provided during a period of increasing disunity, as diverging national 
demands began to complicate matters and fracture the G20 policy consensus and coordinated 
crisis response. 
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6.4.2 A lot more cash but no paradigm shift 
 
IMF resource injections, are not evidence of a paradigm shift or third-order change within the 
organization, because the IMF’s lending policies and objectives, practices, or orientation in 
reaction to events before, during, or after 2008 remain essentially the same. This is in contrast 
with the more aggressive FSB shifts, which are overarching in their scope. The G20 simply 
provided the IMF with more fuel and pressed the IMF accelerator; it would get back to work, 
using essentially the same policy instruments that were in place. 
 
The increased funds re-energised the organization (Eichengreen, 2009), but the organization 
began lending without major changes in its policies and approach. Giving the IMF more 
money to do what it is supposed to do—bail out countries facing balance-of-payment or 
currency crises—does not constitute a third-order change. Today, it is back to business as 
usual, with a bulked-up IMF. Nonetheless, several tentative observations and conclusions can 
be made, drawing on the considerable existing academic work on IMF lending programmes 
as to how the new funds will be used by the organization, one with a gradually changing 
leadership and balance of power. 
 
6.4.3 Lending to friends and allies first and foremost 
 
Research on IMF lending processes demonstrates its dynamics and shows that politics and 
economics intrudes into the lending process, with substantial influence being seen by major 
shareholders (Steinwand and Stone, 2008). Lending can be impacted by the political 
persuasion of the country in question (Bird and Rowlands 2001; Stone 2002). The likelihood 
of receiving a loan can be affected by various factors including the recipient state’s political 
and economic linkages to the U.S., as well as its relative size and Executive Board 
representation in the IMF (Barrow and Lee 2005; Thacker 1999). 
 
The conditions attached, and the type of loan monitoring are both affected by the country’s 
ideological linkages to the U.S. (Williamson, 1994). Linkages are seen between IMF lending 
decisions and the actions of states, their membership in the UN Security Council, or voting 
correlation with the U.S. and EU at the UN (Dreher and Vreeland, 2008; Thacker, 1999). 
Research suggests that the degree of enforcement of conditionality is impacted by the size of 
the borrower and its closeness to the U.S. (Steinwand and Stone 2008). Military links and 
geopolitical links also impact decisions on loans and their sizes (Reynaud and Vauday, 2008; 
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Thacker, 1999). Thus, IMF lending criteria can be seen to be bound up in maintaining U.S. 
influence and global hegemony. 
 
Other critical academics suggest the IMF lending policies process is not only biased but also 
actually negative and counterproductive for countries in crisis (Sachs and Radelet, 1998; 
Stiglitz, 2002). Critics see IMF lending policies as excessively draconian and an instrument of 
U.S. foreign policy (Beeson and Broome, 2008; Gills, 2001). This has led many, including in 
the recent past numerous IMF shareholders, to view the IMF as a tool of the U.S. and 
Western Europe. At this juncture, although the G20-led resource increases come in part from 
emerging states, this does not imply existing lending biases will disappear, at least in the 
short to medium term. Instead they may gradually evolve. 
 
Currently, eligibility criteria to access the US$500 billion in emergency NAB funds agreed in 
2009 exclude most African and many Latin American countries. Instead, the funds are 
flowing, as was the obvious intent, to key and peripheral states in the Eurozone. 
Precautionary lending is going to Mexico and Poland, and emergency and standard lending 
programmes are being applied to Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. All are allies of the 
major IMF shareholding states. 
 
It is likely no coincidence that key IMF member creditor states have banks that are 
overextended and exposed to losses and possible bank failures within those same markets 
(Buckley, 2012). The IMF loans serve to protect the banks of key U.S. and European 
members of the IMF. The US$461 billion in firewall funds agreed in 2012 will of necessity 
predominantly go towards attempting to halt the crisis in Europe. That is what is intended. 
Although the Los Cabos Declaration states additional funds may go to any state that needs 
them, in a nod to frustration from emerging market creditors, the reality is that the funds will 
mostly be spent in Europe. 
 
In the handling of the Eurozone crisis and lending, it is possible to see existing biases in 
effect. Closer allies of the U.S. and main European creditors get softer treatment (Ireland, 
Portugal). Other states, viewed in a more hostile manner, get IMF deals that are harder to 
swallow (Greece and Cyprus). If Spain were to apply to the IMF for a programme, its 
conditions would likely be moderated by its importance to the EU and the U.S..  
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How the evolving new internal balance of resources and of shareholding power will impact 
the IMF and its lending policies is hard to judge. But viewed as a whole, existing research 
implies that the new funds will be directed towards allies of the leading IMF shareholders, 
both old and new. In other words, the breadth of possible recipients may change, but not 
necessarily the background reasoning and decision making. Despite the probable slow nature 
of changes in lending policies and the list of borrowers, the post-crisis move by emerging 
countries to secure a larger shareholding in the institution is still significant. It indicates 
emerging countries, in particular Brazil, China, and India, have determined that a refinanced, 
empowered IMF is strategically important to them and their international economic policy 
goals. This is concrete evidence of a G20 IMF policy consensus that includes emerging states 
in a growing leadership role in the organization and of their recommitment to a body of 
which they were previously highly critical. Measuring power shifts can be done by looking at 
changes in resource commitments, and in the IMF, creditors get all the respect.  
 
Evolutionary change is underway even though a shift in the ideology or lending worldview of 
the institution itself and the staff is harder to detect. Emerging countries will continue to 
demand a larger share in the institution, as well as enhanced influence, authority, and power 
within the consensus-based structure, in return for their cash and political capital. 
 
It is possible that the number of countries considered for lending support will shift and evolve 
over time, as policy preferences of emerging creditor countries impact lending behaviour by 
the IMF and its staff, but it is too soon to observe this empirically. If such effect is present, it 
is obscured by the severity of the crisis in Europe and the requirements for support of the 
Eurozone states.  
 
If emerging states become marginally more assertive of their rights, the degree to which new 
creditor states will diverge from the conservative creditor mindset and general support for 
conditionality (flexibly applied as regards one’s allies, of course) in lending is unclear. 
Emerging market countries as major creditors could husband IMF funds in a similar 
protective and self-supporting manner, as is currently the case for the U.S. and Europe. 
Interview evidence suggests that emerging-country representatives in the IMF have pressed 
for tougher conditionality when faced with the crisis in the Eurozone countries, signalling 
they are not about to lend their resources to rich (non-client) states without strict conditions 
(Interview 20, 2012). How the newly assertive emerging countries would react when lending 
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to their own client states in Latin America or Africa is less clear. Perhaps their stance could 
be different in such cases. 
 
In conclusion, the resource increases are significant in their magnitude. The IMF is once 
again a properly financed, relevant institution. The increased resources are indicative of G20 
leaders recommitting to the IMF, especially emerging state leaders, who seek, in return 
increased influence within the organization. Evolutionary change is underway, but it is not 
yet visible in the lending behaviour of the institution. However, when the above resource 
increases are combined with the governance and voice reforms also agreed by the G20, the 
direction of evolutionary change can be seen more clearly. 
6.5 The G20 and IMF governance: leadership, voice, and votes 
The governance, voice, and vote changes agreed by the G20 constitute a potentially important 
rebalancing of power and influence within the IMF. The reforms are another concrete 
manifestation of the IMF’s evolutionary move away from developed states and towards 
rapidly growing, central-bank-reserve-rich, emerging-country member states. Viewed at the 
end of 2012, the governance reforms do not constitute a paradigm shift, but are instead 
second-order changes at best. Only with a further shift to emerging-country votes and 
leadership within the IMF (and this could take many years) might this be a potential 
paradigm shift for the institution, its worldview, and policies. In 2013, the G20-mandated 
reforms have not yet resulted in significant alterations to the functioning and management of 
the institution. The adjustments are incremental because each government plays the 
diplomatic game, within the existing institutional structure to their own maximum national 
advantage. 
 
Unlike the crisis-driven dynamism seen in the FSB, in the IMF the game is played by the 
existing rules and is informed by political factors, priorities, and drivers of the national 
finance ministries. Amongst IMF national representatives there is a political and diplomatic 
process defined by a desire to defend one’s own position and prerogatives, and little 
willingness by the IMF shareholders to make more major changes. Governance reform is 
limited by the willingness of advanced developed states in the G20 (especially in Europe) to 
support an emerging member country power shift inside the IMF. 
 
This is why greater power shifts are not seen: Americans and Europeans do not want more 
significant reforms at this stage. There are three facets to the IMF governance reforms agreed 
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by the G20: (1) open competition for the position of IMF Managing Director; (2) a 
reallocation of two Executive Board seats to emerging countries from European states, and 
the use of elections to the Board in the future; and (3) an increase in the Board voting shares 
of emerging countries, elevating China to become the third-ranking position in the Executive 
Board, and bringing India and Russia into the top 10 creditors within the IMF. 
 
The governance reforms now underway may eventually change the leadership and possibly 
the nature of the IMF, its ideological tone, and its institutional functioning, and turn it 
gradually away from an organization whose decision making, policies, lending, and actions 
are dominated by the lead shareholder, the U.S., and its allies in Europe. They constitute real 
but incremental first- and second-order changes. Overall, the reforms’ impact on the balance 
of power and policy-making dynamic within the organization may be more significant in the 
long-term than the short to medium term. 
 
6.5.1 Leadership matters 
 
Until the G20 agreement on the selection of the IMF Managing Director, the post had always 
been selected by European states. This arrangement lacked legitimacy and was an 
anachronism (Truman, 2011). Given the G20 decision to open up the contest, an opportunity 
for a break with the past arose with the arrest, detention, resignation, and political banishment 
of Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn in 2011. The ensuing contest pitted French 
Finance Minister Christine Lagarde against only one heavyweight emerging-country 
candidate, Agustin Carstens, Governor of the Central Bank of Mexico. 
 
Europeans backed Lagarde and drew others to their candidate amid complaints that ‘a stench 
of colonialism is wafting around’ (Reuters, 2011). But Europeans were always going to back 
their own, regardless of the open nature of the contest. Crucially, emerging countries failed to 
agree on one candidate. Brazil refused to support Carstens but offered no alternative. Russia 
backed a candidate from Kazakhstan; China and India were silent. The U.S. signalled it could 
support an emerging market candidate but no sufficiently strong candidate was offered. In the 
end emerging-country bickering fatally undermined their chances of securing the leadership 
slot (Interview 31, 2012; see also Reuters, 2011). Lagarde exploited the split amongst non-
European votes drawing China to her side (China Daily, 2011a), assuring she would win. 
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The failure of emerging countries to grasp the opportunity was their own fault. They did not 
back a common candidate and played their hand poorly. Unlike the Europeans, who operate a 
system of close economic diplomacy on a daily basis via European Union mechanisms, 
emerging-country states do not have a long history of multi-state diplomacy and trust. They 
come from different positions and ideologies and can have strong rivalries, making agreeing 
to common positions very difficult. 
 
The election contest for the top job at the IMF demonstrates that emerging countries may be 
desirous of making changes to the power dynamic within the IMF, but they have yet to learn 
how to cooperate effectively to seize the leadership. Securing the Managing Director role 
could have been a major victory and could have helped hasten the evolution of the 
organization and its policies away from an excessive European bias (Interview 31, 2012). A 
new leader from outside the core would have buttressed other reforms, and sent a clear 
message that it was no longer business as usual, been able to impact the selection of senior 
staff and the tone set at the top. 
 
Lagarde’s performance since the contest shows leadership does matter. The influence of two 
back-to-back French Managing Directors, as well as senior officials including Olivier 
Blanchard (IMF Chief Economist), can be seen in adjustments to the organizational policy 
stances including a more sympathetic position vis-à-vis stimulus over excess austerity in the 
Eurozone (Jones, 2012), and a marked shift on the usefulness of temporary capital controls in 
times of crisis (IMF, 2011e). These adjustments do not mean the IMF is abandoning its 
ideology, but they do underscore that leadership matters. Mishandling the leadership race 
meant emerging countries failed to grasp the opportunity of Strauss-Kahn’s disgrace. 
 
As a result in 2013 there is an ‘interregnum in global governance—an extended transitionary 
phase’ (Chin, 2011). For the IMF to move from the beginning of the end of the old order 
within the organization towards the eventual birth of the new requires the election of an 
emerging-country Managing Director. That will occur only if the newly assertive emerging-
country shareholders offer better candidates and cooperate. Only then can they maximise 
their institutional and policy impact and make a more permanent mark on the institution and 
its worldview. 
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6.5.2 Votes and voices within the IMF  
 
The Executive Board of the IMF has general control over the Managing Director and the 
organization (IMF, 2008b). The Board is composed of 24 national representatives of the 
membership. Leading shareholders each have one seat and the smaller states are grouped into 
constituencies, with the Board role rotating amongst the constituency members. Each 
member of the Board has a percentage of votes determined by a quota formula. An 85 percent 
majority is required for any decision. The U.S. has veto power because it alone has more than 
15 percent of total votes.  
 
Table 6.1 shows the G20 shifts via the 14th quota review 6 percent of voting share from 
advanced to emerging countries (IMF, 2010c). Once fully in place this heralds a small but 
important change in the balance of power in the IMF Board. .  These changes are not yet 
implemented. As of September 2013, not all states have ratified agreed reforms, with the U.S. 
Congress still to ratify the voice and votes reforms. 
 
After this change leading emerging countries will have just under 15 percent of the votes, so 
the U.S. veto remains intact. China is now the third-largest player after the U.S. and Japan. 
Brazil, India, and Russia each join the top 10 major players within the Board, as creditors and 
voting powers. 
 
As part of the IMF governance reforms, Europeans agreed to relinquish two of their seats on 
the board; prior to this they had six Executive Directors and eight Alternative Executive 
Directors (29 percent of the total). The voice reform therefore only marginally changes the 
overrepresentation of Europeans on the board. 
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Country Post-2010 
Reform - Total % 
Voting Block for 
Each Major 
Shareholder 
 
Increase/Decrease 
% Voting Share 
United States 16.479 -0.248 
Japan 6.138 -0.087 
China 6.071 2.265 
Germany 5.308 -0.495 
France 4.024 -0.262 
United Kingdom 4.024 -0.262 
Italy 3.016 -0.138 
India 2.629 0.292 
Russia 2.587 0.201 
Brazil 2.218 0.504 
Source: IMF, 2012. 
Table 6.2 IMF Executive Board Voting Share Changes 
 
Table 6.1 shows the continued dominance of the U.S., the EU states, and Japan in the IMF. 
Note that with the reforms, emerging countries can potentially have greater influence. This is 
particularly the case if Japan were to align itself on occasion with the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa) and move away from its perennial support of U.S. goals. If 
this unlikely scenario were to happen, a new block could have an effective veto on Board 
decisions. This has yet to occur in the Board; it would be foolish to say it could never occur, 
but internal board processes seek to avoid such head-to-head clashes. 
 
Looking ahead, in the medium term, after the 15th quota review, in 2014-2015, emerging 
creditor nations could conceivably have more than 15 percent of the votes, still a minority 
stake, but a slowly growing one, because of future adjustments in SDR share. If so, this 
would be enough to counter the current U.S. veto on the Executive Board, which would be a 
potentially significant power shift and one which could diminish U.S. influence in the Board. 
But this shift can only happen if emerging countries begin to show cohesiveness in policy 
positioning as a group. To date, this has not occurred. To the contrary (Interview 31, 2012), 
emerging-country leaders are generally disinclined to cooperate to their mutual collective 
benefit. China’s goals are at odds with those of Brazil. India is no friend of China. Emerging 
country dissension is the norm not cohesion. 
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6.5.3 Consensus decision making maintains U.S. power 
 
While voting weight matters, Board members report that votes are almost never taken 
(Interview 17, 2012). Since practically all decisions are arrived at by consensus, issues that 
do not have the required 85 percent backing do not get sent to the Board (Interview 16, 
2012). Informal soundings before decisions avoid the explicit use of the U.S. veto, but also 
avoid direct clashes with new coalitions. This process and the balance of power allows the 
U.S. to still largely control the agenda; when you carry a big stick (veto), you do not need to 
use it. Currently, the Board consensus almost always includes the U.S. and Europeans. As 
with the selection of the Managing Director, for this to change, emerging countries would 
have to create new coalitions of interests with either Japan or the Europeans. As of 2013, 
there is little or no evidence they have done so. 
 
It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the nature of the organization means there is no 
change in the decision-making process; senior current and former officials interviewed for the 
research indicate that gradual changes are being seen in how the Board works. Emerging 
countries, especially the larger players ‘are contributing much more to the debate’ in the 
Board (Interview 20, 2012, p.4). Other members understand their current and future 
importance to the IMF. They are ‘much more visible, influential in the discussions’ 
(Interview 6, 2011, p. 4). 
 
These countries are taking steps to boost their profiles. For example, China has elevated the 
seniority and quality of the officials sent to the IMF, and they are more actively contributing 
to the consensus that is developed within the Board (Interview 20, 2012). The effectiveness 
of the emerging-country voices, individually and collectively, depends on a mix of power 
politics and the personnel. A higher SDR voting total means those voices are taken seriously; 
when combined with senior national representation, emerging countries can be more 
persuasive than the smaller European states, whose power is diminishing (Interview 20, 
2012). Thus, the 14th quota review, even before fully in place, has a modest impact on the 
IMF. 
 
6.5.4 Governance: A slow march towards meaningful change 
 
An evolving core group of creditor nations will continue to control the IMF (Fratanni and 
Pattison, 2004; Truman, 2010). Today, as in the past, key shareholders exercise ‘bloc holder 
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power’ (Kahler, 2006, p. 259). The realities of the power politics in the IMF mean that 
proposals for more radical reforms will amount to very little, whether they are centred on 
strengthening the autonomy of the Board (De Gregorio et al., 1999), halving the Board’s size 
(van Houtven 2004), consolidating the Euro area seats into one representative (Bini Smaghi, 
2006; see also Leech and Leech, 2005; Truman, 2006), or making the Board nonresident 
(Interview 24, 2012). 
 
G20 leaders have only marginally reformed the governance of the IMF. They are not about to 
engage in a sudden burst of further reformist zeal such as they undertook with the creation of 
the FSB. The forced clarity and policy convergence caused by the heat of the 2008-2009 
crisis has dissipated, and national goals and interests have returned and resurfaced. Further 
governance reforms, other than the next quota review are unlikely. IMF vote and voice 
reforms and their limited scale do not suggest a paradigm shift in governance of the IMF has 
occurred. Instead, slow evolutionary change is circumscribed by an existing worldview 
within which negotiations and deal-making take place. 
 
Operating within this institutional framework, foreign and finance ministries of advanced 
states gave up just enough to move the reform process within the IMF forward—the U.S. 
willingly and Europeans reluctantly. Emerging countries got small but meaningful changes to 
their quotas and votes in return for their recommitment to an institution they had largely 
abandoned prior to 2008. Each side benefited. The U.S. and Europe needed emerging market 
cash and political backing of the institution. Emerging states wanted an IMF that would begin 
to reflect new geopolitical and economic realities.  
 
Post-crisis, the IMF governance reforms will have a gradual impact on the functioning of the 
institution over the medium to long-term. The Brazilians, Chinese, and Indians can play the 
long game. They have an enhanced role within the IMF today. That role and emerging 
countries’ authority and influence can only grow. But it will take many years before the full 
impact of the shift in the balance of power within the IMF becomes apparent and explicit. 
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6.6 IMF Surveillance, the Mutual Assessment Process, and Early Warning Exercises 
‘Surveillance is like a private detective sitting in a parked car observing 
what is going on through a pair of binoculars’. 
(Interview 19, 2012, p. 6) 
 
When dissecting a crisis, communities, actors, and the victims of the crisis wish to understand 
what went wrong and how to prevent a future reoccurrence. They debate and analyse, 
consider options, and then hope to learn from the mistakes. This is a natural process of 
critical reappraisal. The G20’s approach to IMF macroeconomic reporting and surveillance 
reform follows this same pattern. Changes in IMF surveillance policy, the mutual assessment 
programme, and early warning reforms agreed by the G20 leaders since 2009 are designed to 
improve IMF macroeconomic reporting, bilateral country surveillance, and systemic risk 
analysis. The reforms are incremental, first-order changes; there is more reporting and there 
is some change in focus, but the reforms are not a significant reordering of IMF policy or a 
paradigm shift in overall approach. 
The G20 leadership and summit declarations are clear on the importance of surveillance. In 
2009, in London, they pledged to: ‘candid, even-handed, and independent IMF surveillance 
of our economies and financial sectors, of the impact of our policies on others’ (G20, 2009a, 
p. 3). Each summit since London has reiterated the importance of surveillance. The following 
discussion and analysis will show that the actual outcome of the adjustments to IMF reporting 
and surveillance may still amount to only marginal, first-order changes, at best; powerful 
creditor shareholder states do not listen to advice from the IMF the current ‘reforms’ do not 
change that reality.  
The G20 summits sought to reinforce the IMF’s ability to analyse and critique member 
countries’ economic, fiscal, monetary, and regulatory polices and external effects via support 
for a new Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD) (IMF, 2012c). The ISD focuses, again, as 
did the 2007 decision before it, on spillover effects of major economies on other states in the 
global economy. There are three related mechanisms, two new and one existing, that are 
meant to secure the goal of better surveillance. They are: 
 
1. The Mutual Assessment Process (MAP): Agreed by G20 leaders at the Pittsburgh 
Summit in 2009, it is designed to ‘evaluate the consistency of G20 polices and 
frameworks with members shared growth objectives’ (IMF, 2011d, p. 2). The MAP is 
managed by the IMF and the FSB. 
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2. Early Warning Exercises (EWEs): In November 2008, the G20 asked the IMF and the 
FSF/FSB to collaborate on regular EWEs. They are meant to assess low-probability 
but high-impact risks to the global economy. 
3. IMF Surveillance: Existing IMF surveillance policies and practices (Article IV 
reviews, Financial Sector Assessment Programs, Review of Standards and Codes). 
6.6.1 The Mutual Assessment Process 
 
The MAP agreed in Pittsburgh required the IMF to report periodically on G20 
macroeconomic policies and to use IMF technical help to assess ‘whether policies pursued by 
individual G-20 countries were collectively consistent with the G-20’s growth objectives’ 
(IMF, 2012d). This amounts to more reporting at the behest of the G20, but little meaningful 
output in terms of policy impact. The IMF staff re-purposes its global bilateral and global 
macroeconomic analysis and spillover assessments to comment on G20 country economic 
policies. The IMF views the MAP as a form of normal country technical assistance. 
 
The IMF is being forced by the G20 summits to respond to demands for reporting and for 
technical assistance to the G20 summits. But institutionally is a somewhat reluctant 
participant. IMF leaders do not want to serve the G20 rather than its wider membership. That 
is to say, there is little desire within the IMF to act as a reporting mechanism for the G20 
(Interview 1, 2011).  The political reality, however, is that the IMF cannot avoid the G20 
demands and must respond, albeit reluctantly. In addition, what the IMF is being asked to do 
is hard to deliver. 
 
As chapter 3 showed, there is no G20 consensus on global macroeconomic policies. G20 
leaders agree to the importance of balanced and sustainable growth, but what that means to 
each national leader is different and a matter of repeated dispute at the summits, especially in 
phase three. In practice, the new reporting under MAP may make observations and press 
particular issues, but it has little impact; there is no mechanism to force a change in national 
creditor country policies as a result of the MAP. EWEs face similar challenges. 
 
6.6.2 Early Warning Exercises (EWEs) 
 
It is very difficult to provide early warning of crises. It requires an ability to see the black 
swan, to sound the alarm, and to be taken seriously even if the particular black swan you saw 
on that occasion might be an illusion. A MAP risk assessment is provided in confidence to 
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the IMFC twice a year (IMF, 2010d, 2010e), designed to highlight emerging risks. There is 
low probability, however, that the IMF, in collaboration with the FSB, working on global 
macro and financial risks, respectively, will be able to warn of the next crisis. 
 
Although the MAP and EWEs add to the IMF’s reporting responsibilities and to their 
surveillance of systemic risks and trends, the impact will be minimal. G20 states are 
enmeshed in yet more reporting exercises with the IMF, from the traditional Article IV 
reports, to Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) to the MAP, and EWE 
discussions. But how valuable these additional surveillance exercises are is unclear. 
 
6.6.3 Surveillance: weak then and weak now 
 
Looking at the history of the IMF’s surveillance leads to the conclusion that post-2008 
surveillance reforms may not be terribly effective, may not identify crises as they develop, 
and may not be taken seriously by leading state powers within the institution. Surveillance, 
bilateral, thematic, global, or otherwise, remains a weak tool. Available evidence and the 
interviews conducted for this research, indicate continued weaknesses in the IMF’s 
surveillance system, and the first- and second-order changes made by the G20 and the 
demands regarding MAP and EWEs. 
 
Academic work on the factors impacting IMF surveillance underscores the weak nature and 
susceptibility of the process to both bias and political economy factors (Fratzscher and 
Reynaud, 2010). IMF macroeconomic surveillance is often overly optimistic, and generally more 
effective if the state was a borrower and not a creditor (Lombardi and Woods, 2007). IMF advice 
can prove to be drastically wrongheaded and miss red flags, as it did prior to the East Asian Crisis 
of 1997 (Sachs and Radelet, 1998). 
 
More recently, the IMF’s own ex post dissection of events before 2007-2008 noted that it 
‘provided few clear warnings about the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the 
impending crisis before its outbreak’ (IMF 2011a, p. 1). Take, for example, the IMF’s 2006 
Global Financial Stability Review. The report focused on the derivatives markets but parroted the 
then-dominant conventional policy narrative stating that these instruments ‘enhance the 
transparency of the market’s collective view of credit risks maximizing the efficiency of the 
market, market discipline, and market stability’ (IMF, 2006, p. 51). That turned out to be wildly 
off the mark. In a similar vein, its Article IV bilateral surveillance of the U.S. and the U.K., 
published shortly before the financial crisis, endorsed the light regulatory stances, policies, 
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and financial practices that fostered the rapid growth of complex financial instruments which 
contributed to the crisis and its severity when it occurred. An IMF source noted that had the 
IMF conducted FSAPs for the U.K. and the U.S. prior to the crisis, they would not have 
raised the alarm (Interview 19, 2012), because the IMF was ill-equipped to be contrarian and 
followed the existing flawed policy consensus on the merits of self-regulation and financial 
liberalization. 
 
In this manner the IMF staff remained wedded to a neo-liberal stance prior to the crisis. They 
could not see what was rapidly approaching. Instead, they chastised more cautious 
conservative supervisors and central bankers. A senior central banking source recalls how the 
IMF criticised Australia and Canada for being too conservative and risk-adverse in the 
supervision of their banking systems (Interview 19, 2012), urging them to liberalise and lift 
the onerous weight of regulation from their financial sectors. Of course, the conservative, 
prudent supervision in those markets turned out to be more effective, and those economies 
weathered the crisis better than most. 
 
6.6.4 A neo-liberal institution and staff resistant to change 
 
A key reason for the repeated failure of IMF surveillance is the nature of the IMF as an 
institution and the consensus ideological narratives within which IMF reporting takes place. 
Institutions and their ideologies and policy narratives are resistant to change. IMF senior 
staff, most of whom are U.S.- or European-trained PhD economists from a few elite schools, 
are generally of a neoclassical, neo-liberal mindset. They are part of the same community. 
They operate in the same circles. They adhere to similar ideological and policy assumptions 
(Chwieroth, 2007; Peet, 2010) as regards (until very recently) the desirability of the 
liberalisation of capital controls, for example. Although the IMF does not constitute its own 
epistemic community, the staff and the leadership do operate within and defend their own 
policy stances. As such, IMF surveillance reporting is constrained by the limits of the 
tarnished Washington Consensus, albeit adjusted slightly to reflect French leadership at the 
top. 
Certain positions are not considered legitimate because they reflect neither the beliefs of the 
staff nor the demands of the IMF membership; they fall outside the parameters of the policy 
debate and paradigm within which problems and possible solutions are dissected and 
scrutinised. That is not to say staff views are monolithic within the IMF. Disputes and turf 
battles exist, between for instance, the global macroeconomic staff focused on financial 
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markets reporting and the bilateral reporting staff, the former being more critical of country 
behaviour than the latter, who can become ‘captured’ by their clients to a degree. But such 
disputes still take place within the established ideological and institutional framework. There 
are few arguments over the validity of the overall ideological and economic approach. There 
is a neo-liberal stance based on the still operative facets of the Washington Consensus which 
is held to by staff members. 
This limits what is considered by the economists, what they will comment on, and the 
conclusions they may draw from their analysis. Capital market liberalization, capital 
mobility, and flexible exchange rates are championed. Privatization and unrestrained growth 
in financial markets are supported. Capital controls and limited convertibility were, in 
contrast until 2012, off the table, as were limits on financial market scope and firm activities. 
In other words, the ideological views of the IMF staff impact the outcome and output of the 
whole reporting process, including the identification of potential systemic risks central to 
their broader financial stability mandate. 
This type of mindset is what led critics to accuse the IMF of having an ‘addiction to neo-
liberalism’ (Buckley, 2012, p. 102; see also Vines and Gilbert, 2004), ‘on the grounds of faith 
rather than the foundation of proven science’ (Peet, 2010, p. 116). The tenets of this 
economic worldview blocked out alternatives as effectively as an addict refuses changes to 
their behaviour and drug of choice. As previously discussed, the extremes of this neo-liberal 
stance are what alienated East Asian states after the crises of the 1990s. 
 
The IMF staff, as a group, is still supportive of a type of disciplinary neo-liberalism (Gamble, 
2009) in which the conditionality of the Washington Consensus plays an important part. 
Today, this approach continues to be evident in the IMF’s policy stances (Chwieroth, 2007). 
It is seen in its surveillance reporting, and in the prevailing deregulatory narrative the IMF 
has internalised. Outsiders may critique this worldview as being wrongheaded, but those 
inside the institution are not paying attention. As a result, the community makes repeated 
mistakes of judgment and analysis. This tough conclusion is not just that of its critics 
(Stiglitz, 2002), but also of the IMF’s own Independent Evaluation Office’s post-crisis 
dissection. It reported that the staff suffered from ‘“groupthink” intellectual capture and 
inadequate analytical approaches’ (IMF, 2011b, p. 17). To outsiders, ‘it is now obvious that 
this dominant ideology was wrong’ (Turner, 2012, p. 53). Turner may have recognised this, 
but it is far from clear that the IMF as an institution and its staff do. 
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6.6.5 Powerful states resistant to IMF lectures 
 
As if conducting long-distance surveillance using ideologically distorted binoculars was not 
bad enough, IMF surveillance advice is also adversely impacted by the importance and power 
of the member country being analysed, in a similar manner as was observed for IMF lending 
policy and practice. The larger the country, the greater the bias, and the more likely IMF 
surveillance is to be ineffective (Maurini, 2010). Article IV consultations of politically 
influential states tend to be more supportive, and play better in the markets (Fratzscher and 
Reynaud, 2010), and IMF surveillance policy reflects political economy bias in the outcomes. 
Surveillance of allies is often defensive in tone, i.e., it protects the larger borrowing states and 
close allies of the U.S. and Europeans from criticism instead of acting as a neutral arbiter of 
policy actions and outcomes for the global macroeconomy. 
 
The G20 IMF reforms require all states to submit to FSAPs for the first time, and this is a 
small step forward; the U.S. and China had until then refused to participate. In practice, 
however, whether these key states will pay much attention to the conclusions of either global 
macroeconomic reports or FSAP reports, and whether such reports are sufficiently rigorous, 
i.e., whether the staff is capable of asking probing questions and drawing critical conclusions, 
notwithstanding the G20’s exhortations, is doubtful. 
 
Surveillance reporting is visibly adjusted due to political pressure. China refused to undertake 
an FSAP prior to the crisis, and this was not pursued by the Board or staff. Pressure was also 
seen elsewhere. In China’s 2006 Article IV report, the IMF is silent on the management (or 
manipulation) of the value of the Yuan, and the report fails to address this distortion and 
resulting imbalances. This caused the late Mike Mussa to excoriate the IMF and its work, 
despite being a former IMF Director of Research. He wrote: ‘The application of Fund 
surveillance to China’s exchange rate policy constitutes gross misfeasance, malfeasance, and 
nonfeasance by the Managing Director and more generally by the IMF’ (Mussa, 2007, p. 5).  
 
This pattern continues. The China FSAP, finally completed in 2011, is also an exercise in 
conflict avoidance and weak IMF surveillance reporting. The draft report excised a reference 
to the Yuan being ‘substantially’ undervalued. Chinese pressure forced this key change and 
also caused the removal of a footnote that estimated an undervaluation at up to 27 percent. 
The Chinese-demanded expurgation was supported by Brazil, and was opposed by a 
dissenting but silent U.S. representative on the Board (Reuters, 2010). This is naked state 
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power politics in action within the IMF Board and displays the limited efficacy of 
surveillance reporting on large creditor states, according to current and former IMF officials. 
China is not an isolated example of ideological, political, and economic bias, and of 
pandering to powerful members by the IMF and its staff. 
 
Even when surveillance is occasionally on target, the reaction differs depending on to whom 
it is addressed. Officials note that smaller states tend to bend to the IMF demands more; their 
reputation is at stake and it matters more to them what the organization thinks and says 
(Interviews 22 and 24, 2012). On target reporting can be ignored by members, especially main 
creditor states, according to former officials (Interviews 14 and 31, 2012). This was the case in 
the 1990s, as the IMF investigators noted: ‘In no case would it be right to claim that the Fund had 
more than a marginal occasional impact on national policy decision making processes’ (IEO, 
1999, p. 48). 
 
This remains the case today. As Raghuram Rajan, incoming Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
India, states: ‘Some of the largest industrial countries see themselves as more sovereign than 
others, and their politicians brook no interference in their own domestic policies’ (Rajan, 
2008, p. 114). For example, Gordon Brown, Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer and then 
Prime Minister, was a vocal champion of the IMF, the IMFC, the FSF, and international 
economic diplomacy. But the cheerleading only went so far. A national IMF official recalls 
that Mr. Brown often intervened and objected if IMF staff reports sought to raise relatively 
mild concerns over the management of the U.K. economy and its financial sector prior to the 
2008 crisis (Interview 14, 2012). 
 
Refusal to listen is still seen. The 2012 IMF World Economic Outlook warned leaders of a 
further global slowdown and of macroeconomic dangers ahead caused by excessively rapid 
austerity. The U.K., for instance, was urged to balance austerity with tax increases to better 
achieve its budgetary goals (IMF, 2012e). But the U.K. dismissed the Managing Director’s 
advice as incorrect and unwanted. So the long history of the creditor states ignoring IMF 
advice continues unabated. Although in 2013 IMF general macroeconomic advice, 
particularly on the need for a better balance between austerity and growth, has taken a 
different tone, the audience of key leaders in creditor states ignores the advice. 
 
So even where the IMF succeeds in identifying a risk and seeks to warn the membership, a 
relatively rare occurrence in itself, major creditors often refuse to hear the message or 
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demand that the advice be excised from the final report released to the public. As one actor 
notes: ‘It has powers of persuasion that are more limited the larger the country’ (Interview 22, 
p. 7). As a result of these political and power-related limits, it is questionable whether the 
latest G20-led efforts will deliver real concrete national policy improvements. 
 
6.6.6 Can improved IMF surveillance deliver? 
 
Strengthening surveillance, as the G20 is attempting to do, is understandable and even 
desirable. A crisis demands action, so some modest policy adjustments and reforms are to be 
expected. The IMF is the only institution with the staff and resources to carry out such 
detailed surveillance reporting and to publicise the risks to the global economy as they 
develop, if, and this is a big if, they can identify them in advance. 
 
Demands by the G20 mean surveillance has been adjusted in its focus towards spillovers and 
possible threats to stability, but it is likely to continue to be inadequate, weak, and ineffectual. 
It will give the powerful a pass and weak borrowers the stick. The MAP processes 
demonstrate this continued procedural weakness. Countries report on agreed G20 goals. But 
what one country may view as a good response (more stimuli in the U.S.) another may view 
as the wrong solution and opt for the reverse (more austerity in the U.K.). Nonetheless, both 
these countries report on their actions as part of the MAP, and the IMF makes no meaningful 
judgment on the appropriateness of one policy versus another in their reporting process. 
 
If the IMF leadership and staff leans slightly towards stimulus versus austerity, under French 
leadership from Lagarde and Blanchard, the impact is still limited. The U.K. government 
took no notice of IMF macroeconomic advice illuminating the dangers of yet more austerity. 
The IMF in 2013 warned against excessive austerity in Greece and Portugal, advice that was 
discounted by European leaders, especially the Germans. European creditor member states 
were not listening, as the IMF macroeconomic advice ran counter to their own national policy 
narrative, which holds that austerity will lead eventually to economic growth and rejects the 
need for further stimulus. 
 
Increased surveillance reporting and a renewed focus on spillovers will not fundamentally 
change powerful member states’ policy decisions, even as the power balance within the IMF 
evolves because of the governance changes previously discussed. Creditors and their allies 
(albeit a broader group) remain in charge. The staff’s pliability and the internal ideology of 
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the IMF will reflect this even as it slowly evolves, over a generation at least, to adjust to 
policy positions and the inclusion of an intake of emerging market economists perhaps less 
wedded to the neo-liberal school. 
 
At its most basic, in the absence of enforcement options, all you have is adjustments to 
existing monitoring and reporting processes. This is the case for the IMF as it is for many of 
the FSB’s areas of endeavour. So G20 leaders opt for yet more reporting, again relying on the 
IMF staff with de facto G20 oversight via the IMFC and Executive Board. In the short term, 
for a limited period after each crisis, surveillance may become more pointed, a little less 
pliable, and a little less anodyne, as national officials are chastened and IMF staff 
emboldened to be more critical. 
 
This happens in the national context: Witness the tougher capital and oversight stances 
adopted by central bankers and supervisors across much of world. A similar effect is seen 
within the IMF in their analysis of the current merits of austerity in the Eurozone. But 
because the IMF has few enforcement levers (except in the case of borrower nations), such 
changes in tone will tend to be impermanent. The further away one recedes from the crisis, 
the less stringent the analysis may eventually become. 
 
6.6.7 Warning? What warning? 
 
As to warning of the next crisis, few have any expectations of future success. Numerous 
senior current and former IMF officials and national representatives interviewed for this 
research were in agreement: The IMF is not equipped to identify or stop the next crisis 
(Interviews 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, and 30, 2012). This is a frank admission of the weakness of 
surveillance and early warning processes, old and new. If so, IMF staff may yet again 
perform poorly as the key macroeconomic lifeguard on the lookout for the next freak wave of 
the financial system. Thus do national and IMF officials prepare the way for the next IMF 
failure and their subsequent disavowal of national or institutional blame. According to this 
view, you cannot see the black swan coming (Taleb, 2010). In the run-up to a crisis, it is not 
what you see that gets you, it is what you cannot see that gets you (Kohn, in Brookings 
2011). The IMF, it is said, lacks the capability to anticipate major crises (Berg, Borensztein, 
and Pattilo, 2005), and IMF surveillance, early warning systems have failed in the past, and 
they will fail again. 
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In that case, G20-demanded changes in the surveillance arena will produce only marginal 
benefits. They are an example of first-order incremental changes within an existing paradigm, 
policy consensus, and IMF processes.  
 
This chapter has shown that you cannot place the blame for current and future surveillance 
failures solely on the resistance amongst IMF staff to conduct more rigorous reporting or to 
question their own internal community worldview. The IMF is membership-driven. Powerful 
creditor states call the shots. Their representatives agreed the IMF reforms, but they went 
only so far. There was no improved enforcement of surveillance and reporting. Nonborrowers 
and large creditor states can and do still ignore advice offered. The IMF is still left without 
the tools to address global imbalances, despite that being enshrined in its founding articles. 
 
6.6.8 Surveillance and imbalances 
 
Fundamentally, G20 summits resulted in only marginal surveillance reforms, because the 
leaders cannot agree on real enforcement powers for the IMF. They increased funds 
massively, but leaders refused to give new enforcement levers of any strength to the IMF.  
Crucially, they could not agree on the major outstanding problem facing the international 
monetary system after the crisis, namely what to do about global imbalances. 
 
Massive imbalances helped create the conditions that caused the 2008 crisis, and the 
imbalances persist today. But as Chapter 3 made clear, disputes over global imbalances and 
what, if anything, the G20 should do about them, are a repeated area of tension, discord, and 
disunity. There is no G20 policy narrative consensus on global macreconomic imbalances. 
Voices were raised in Pittsburgh. Fingers were pointed and blame laid in Toronto. Arguments 
got yet more strident in Seoul. The discord continued during the French Presidency and the 
Cannes Summit. The Los Cabos Summit came to no major breakthroughs. Instead, we have 
small data and reporting changes and agreements to continue work in this area. 
 
Lacking an agreed narrative or policy framework at the G20 level, the IMF is left with 
enhanced reporting, because real tools to control imbalances that contribute directly to 
financial crises cannot be agreed and are unwelcome in the creditor capitals of Beijing, 
Brasilia, Riyadh, or Berlin, even as they are demanded by a weakened debtor economic 
hegemon in Washington, DC. The failure to grasp real reforms on surveillance and global 
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imbalances is caused by a resistance by staff, but more so by the lack of agreement over a 
common policy narrative at the G20 leadership level. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
As late as fall 2007, the IMF was viewed as increasingly irrelevant. Advanced countries 
controlled the organization, as they had since its creation. Emerging countries had 
abandonded the IMF’s solutions and funding, and instead built up their own precautionary 
reserves as insurance against future crises. The organization’s raison d’être was seriously 
questioned. But the economic crises of 2008 created win space and room to reform the IMF. 
The G20 took the lead and increased the resource base by almost 400 percent. The G20 
agreed quota and governance changes began, slowly, to change the nature of the organization. 
In this sense, the IMF can be said to have had a good crisis. It is in 2013 once again the 
global lender of last resort for countries facing balance-of-payment or financial crises.  
 
6.7.1 The G20 forum and its states are dominant 
 
This chapter underscores that, post-crisis, the IMF is being led and directed to a great degree 
by the G20 forum, through the summit process and via G20 member dominance in the IMFC 
and Executive Board. The leadership grouping is larger than in the past and more 
representative (than the G7), but this still results in tension among the universal institution, its 
leadership, and non-G20 members, and those states that dominate via the G20 process. That 
tension is here to stay (Interviews 6, 2011; Interview 16, 2012) so long as the G20 sits atop 
the new global financial regulatory architecture. 
 
6.7.2 No paradigm shift inside the IMF 
 
Unlike the effect of the crisis on the central banking community, and through the creation of 
the FSB, the events of 2007-2008 did not shock the IMF and its staff out of their existing 
worldview. Instead, the institution, its functioning, its staff, and the consensus policy stance 
and ideology within which they operate appeared resilient and resistant to this huge 
exogenous shock. To be sure, the organization was pilloried for its failures by critics and by 
its own Independent Evaluation Office postmortem. But, post-crisis, the IMF consensus 
remains largely unaffected. As a result, policy reforms are weaker, incremental, and set 
within the existing institutional framework. This indicates that an institution can effectively 
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resist recognition of severe anomalies, even those clearly visible to critics, if the critics are 
too few in number or external to the organization. This failing is not specifically an IMF one, 
but is also seen in other institutions and policy fields. 
 
6.7.3 G20 states avoid major reforms 
 
Looking at the G20’s policy consensus and approach to IMF reform and the actual policy 
outcomes seen, the picture is one of agreement on incremental changes within the existing 
institutional structure. G20 states were not willing to make major changes within the IMF, a 
defence of national prerogatives and positions was seen and, as a result, only modest reforms 
were begun in 2009. 
 
At the Executive Board level, the same power-based rules apply in decision making, in 
lending policy, in the conditionality applied, and in the willingness or refusal of creditor 
states to listen to the surveillance advice being offered by the IMF staff. There is the 
maintenance of a creditor, a membership-driven mindset, and a reluctant reform stance from 
the leading G20 members reflective of their own national goals acting within the diplomatic 
and institutional framework of the organization. 
 
Since there is no G20 consensus for more dramatic IMF reforms, staff will not move far from 
neo-liberal lending practices, or from their deferral and understandable sensitivity to major 
creditors and their allies. They will not act counter to their worldview or the expressed 
positions of leading shareholder states on the Executive Board and amongst the membership. 
 
6.7.4 An IMF re-capitalised as the G20 responds to the crisis 
 
The nearly 400 percent increase in total IMF resources shows the G20 at its best when 
confronted by the crisis, and demonstrates the continued state power dynamics and 
differences in play over IMF quota reforms. In extremis, in Washington 2008 and in London 
2009, all G20 leaders understood the need to act. Leaders agreed massive infusions of 
bilateral funds backed by advanced and emerging countries. The crisis concentrated minds 
and forced convergence (Interview, 21, 2012). It created win sets internationally and 
domestically; all understood that a failure to act would severely negatively impact all those 
sitting at the table. Financial shock and awe was needed and was delivered by Brown, 
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Geithner et al. Emerging-country leaders also committed resources on a scale not previously 
seen. 
 
Quota increases were agreed in 2010 and near completion in 2013. They were supported by 
the U.S. and emerging countries and agreed to but resisted by the Europeans. As the crisis 
continued and mutated into a Eurozone sovereign debt debacle, however, the collective 
commitment to yet further resource increases weakened. A further shift in power within the 
IMF was opposed by the U.S. and the Europeans. Ultimately, the crisis was of such severity 
that a deal was done that delivered a further US$461 billion in bilateral funds with no 
changes in the balance of power. 
 
So on resources for the IMF, the G20 delivered, in the extremes of a crisis, during phases one 
and two, and even in phase three as dissention among G20 states reemerged. But the deals 
done had each player defending their own national political, diplomatic, and economic 
positions, jockeying and adjusting according to crisis and their own demands. As to lending 
policies, it is reasonable to expect that IMF lending practices will not change markedly 
because of this huge cash infusion. Currently, the funds continue to be directed at allies of the 
main creditors. Conditionality is still seen, and is somewhat more sympathetic to borrowers 
that are allies (Mexico, Poland, Portugal), than those perceived as being troublesome outliers 
(Cyprus, Egypt, Greece), as demonstrated by demands that Egypt remove bread and petrol 
subsidies in advance of any new emergency loan (Coleman, 2013). Lending continues to be 
driven by the demands of key creditors, and is yet to be visibly impacted by the emerging 
countries. On balance, this may be because their goals are largely in line with those of the 
advanced economies; that is: Stop the crisis in Europe. 
 
6.7.5 Votes and voices change, but slowly 
 
Emerging countries not only committed more resources, they also are seeing their votes and 
voices increase within the IMF. The reforms are also incremental second-order changes; that 
is, a small (still to be completed) increase in quota-related voting weight, two fewer European 
seats on the Executive Board, and an open competition for the leadership of the IMF. The 
changes show that the IMF is being forced to evolve by G20 decisions. But the pace of that 
evolution will only proceed as swiftly as advanced countries permit; witness their refusal to 
further adjust quotas in response to the need for a financial firewall for the Eurozone. 
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At the Executive Board level of the IMF, gradual evolutionary changes are being observed. 
The voices of the smaller European states are more muffled and less often raised. Interview 
sources stress that key emerging-market representatives have a correspondingly louder voice, 
and their views are given great weight in the deliberations and consensus decision-making 
process. Some emerging-country players are more effective than others (Interview 5, 2011; 
Interviews 17 and 21, 2012). The Board remains a highly political place, and all are acutely 
aware of the quota and vote balance, with the U.S. still being primus inter pares, although 
votes almost never occur (Interview, 17, 2012). Because of the consensus nature of the 
process, the influence of a country also rests on the personal and diplomatic skills of the 
individual in question, and therefore not all representatives are equally influential (Interview 
5, 2011; Interview 21, 2012). 
 
Over time, there may be a gradual shift in the Board’s key voices and their relative influence. 
Indeed, emerging countries are staffing their representations at the Board (and at the senior 
level within the IMF), with more influential national figures; for example, the current Deputy 
Managing Director, Min Zhu, is a former Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China. 
When a country has a great deal more cash and political capital committed, the stakes are 
higher and the IMF roles are viewed in a different light domestically and internationally. 
 
As the emerging-country voices are raised in the Executive Board, there may be gradual 
changes in the applied power of emerging countries on lending policy, but this will take time 
to become clearly evident, since lending choices may eventually change as the list of client 
states is widened to include the client states of Brazil, China, India, and Russia. It is quite 
possible that new creditor nations will guard their resources and resist a weakening of loan 
conditionality. But it would be a stretch to assume that IMF lending activity will remain 
unchanged as power within the Board adjusts, and modest changes in the makeup and lending 
approach may therefore gradually be seen. 
 
6.7.6 The role of emerging countries 
 
To become maximally effective, emerging countries in the IMF must become, on occasion, 
more assertive and cohesive as a group. At this point, this is not being observed. Witness the 
failure of emerging countries to coalesce around and agree a joint candidate for Managing 
Director. In this important instance, emerging countries failed a test of maturity and 
farsightedness. It would have been better for Brazil, China, and India to agree on a candidate 
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and seize the leadership. But instead, emerging-country leaders bickered and split while the 
Europeans quickly coalesced around Lagarde, ensuring she would win. This shows that 
emerging countries share one thing in common but that other interests may not coincide. 
 
The next major test for the emerging countries will be whether they can plan ahead and back 
a single candidate when Lagarde finishes her term. This chapter has underscored that 
although the IMF is now being directed by the G20 forum and summitry process, leadership 
does matter. Emerging countries need to grasp the next opportunity to lead the IMF and to 
begin altering the IMF’s policies and tone, much as Lagarde and her staff have done. 
 
As to the possible ideological evolution within the staff itself away from neo-liberalism and 
towards economic views espoused by emerging countries, to date there is little evidence of 
such changes. It is too soon to have occurred or to be observable. It will take years for new 
economists to come on staff and rise in seniority and influence, who might collectively 
exhibit a more diverse economic mindset and worldview. At this point, just how much staff 
turnover will impact the lending mentality of the institution cannot yet be judged and it will 
require a cultural change in recruitment of IMF staff and will by definition be a slow process. 
 
As emerging countries take a gradually larger role, they will take greater ownership of the 
institution. They may gradually change it as well as support its continued global 
macroeconomic relevance, albeit in a subsidiary supporting role to the summitry-driven 
direction supplied by the G20 leadership. 
 
A recommitment does not mean emerging countries are placing their political and economic 
capital only with the IMF. Aware of the IMF’s past failings, China is investing bilaterally 
across the globe. For example, the China Development Bank, which invests both 
domestically and internationally, particularly in Africa, held US$984 billion in assets in 2011, 
up 50 percent from 2008 (Ho, 2012). This is more than three times the total assets of the 
World Bank, which stood at US$314 billion in the same year (World Bank, 2012). Emerging 
countries have also announced the creation of a new development bank, with US$50 billion 
in seed money (McGroarty and Maylie, 2013). So emerging surplus creditor countries are 
recommitted to the IMF, but they are keeping other options open. They will not again be 
placed in the position of relying solely on the IMF. 
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Compared with the period before 2008, the recapitalised and reformed IMF is an 
improvement. Leading emerging countries have a larger monetary and political stake in this 
still key, reformed, but also downgraded global financial institution—one that they had 
almost totally abandoned prior to the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
As these rising states take a greater share of, and assume influence over, the running of the 
IMF, it is unclear how these key actors will use their new authority and power. Will it be 
purely to defend national prerogatives, or will it also be in support of resilience of the 
international monetary system? It is too soon to tell. Critics, usually from advanced 
economies, ask whether China is ready to lead, with the implied answer being ‘no’. But 
perhaps the timeline most are looking at is too short. It may take at least one or two decades 
(and a change in Managing Director) before the degree and nature of the change in leadership 
balance, and any ideological shift becomes more fully apparent. 
 
Looked at from another perspective, in the short to medium term the U.S. got what it wanted 
as a declining hegemon; that is, re-engagement in the existing Western-designed structure by 
emerging countries. 
 
6.7.7 A diminished likelihood of paradigm conflict – For now 
 
With the new resources and the shift in votes and voices, the U.S. secured one of its long-
standing policy goals via the G20 using IMF reform: A closer reintegration of the leading 
emerging countries into the international institutional regime of rules and systems within the 
IMF. The U.S. used the crisis to push the Europeans to agree to a diminution of their voice 
and power. The reforms are modest. But by drawing leading rising emerging states and the 
leaderships back into a commitment to the IMF, which they had previously viewed highly 
negatively, the U.S. potentially prolongs its influential leading position within the institution. 
 
The reforms draw emerging countries back into an institution and processes which contains 
existing norms and ideological biases in favour of the U.S. and its allies. Viewing IMF 
reforms from the perspective of the U.S., it may have thus succeeded in strengthening 
existing norms, rules, and systems of international cooperation, all of which the U.S. itself 
designed after World War II (Steil 2013; Subramanian, 2011). In this way, U.S. policy 
makers view drawing emerging states further into an altered international superstructure of 
cooperation, coordination, and negotiation as beneficial, because it cements the structure of 
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the system even as relative U.S. power slowly declines.  In the short to medium term this 
reinforces rather than diminishes American power. 
The reforms, therefore, avoid or postpone head-to-head hegemonic competition or paradigm 
conflict of the type seen between the U.S. and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s within the World 
Bank (Wade, 1996). More severe conflict outside of the existing norms and rules of 
institutions could be disruptive and destructive of the international system; far better for such 
disputes to take place within the G20, the IMF, the IMFC, and IMF Executive Board. 
In the short to medium term, the continuity provided by a modified but largely unchanged 
IMF with its neo-liberal policy stance still in place in 2013 reinforces American power rather 
than diminishing it. The U.S. gave up votes and allowed modest changes in the Board in 
quotas in exchange for continuity within international institutions, instead of the prior risk 
that emerging countries would continue to spurn the IMF. 
In this, the Chinese and Indians may also be playing a long game. Indeed, major reforms and 
ideological changes within the IMF have historically taken decades to effect; it started 
managing a fixed exchange rate system; decades later it switched to surveillance and 
advocacy of the Washington Consensus. The rising powers can afford to wait it out. In the 
meantime, the U.S. and the Europeans prolong their influence and have, via G20 decisions, 
reinforced an institution that was previously distrusted by emerging-country leaders. 
6.7.8 A surveillance disappointment 
 
G20 states recommitted to the importance of IMF surveillance during the summits, but as 
individual actors they also understand the limits to the process and are ready to disregard 
surveillance. IMF surveillance reform shows the tension between the goal of reinforcing the 
IMF and a general G20 desire to limit its ability to meddle in the domestic economic and 
fiscal policies of key states. As a result, surveillance reforms are disappointing, first-order 
changes. There is more reporting, more analysis, but little evidence that the new surveillance 
processes will permit the IMF to speak truth to power, assuming it grasps the ‘correct’ truth 
and if one in fact exists, or would be listened to by major creditor states, such as the U.S. or 
China (Interview 20, 2012). 
 
The research finds the contrary: Reporting will not likely make a marked difference in the 
policies and actions of key member states. The job which takes up the lion’s share of the 
IMF’s resources will continue to produce mediocre results, amenable to adjustment by 
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leading states or simply ignored when they see fit to do so. Smaller states, and borrowers, can 
and will pay attention when the IMF makes a judgment call on their economies; they have to 
or risk negative market reactions and lending outcomes. Not so the major creditor states. 
 
6.7.9 Early warning no panacea 
 
‘New’ early warning processes—really, a rebranding of the existing processes—are similarly 
unlikely to result in major national policy changes. No IMF figures interviewed believe that 
the organization will successfully sound the alarm in advance of the next global economic 
and financial crisis. To have a chance of doing so, the IMF would have to embed within the 
institution contrarian voices permitted to shout ‘crisis’ in a crowded macroeconomic space 
repeatedly, and often erroneously. This is almost impossible to do. It certainly cannot be done 
within an institution which has resisted change to its worldview, even when faced with severe 
unexplainable anomalies linked to a neo-liberal ideology and groupthink that contributed to a 
failure to warn about the imminence of the most severe global economic crisis since the Great 
Depression. 
 
It is not that it is impossible to see the black swan ahead. It is, instead, that when an existing 
policy paradigm and narrative remains strong and cohesive amongst its adherents inside the 
IMF, that change is slow and incremental. Roubini, Rajan, White, and others did see the 
black swan ahead. They were right, but they were too far in advance of the community 
worldview to be heard and listened to seriously, and instead such views were discounted. 
 
In the future, if the policy and ideological alarm is raised too soon, it will be ignored by the 
IMF, which still holds to a modified Washington Consensus and creditor mindset as its policy 
narrative. If and when warnings are raised in the IMF outside of clear global crisis conditions 
that clarify minds and forces action, it is unlikely that officials in Executive Board offices of 
major creditor finance ministries will listen.  
 
As the work of Kuhn (1962), Hall (1993), and others on paradigm shifts makes clear, only 
when a sufficient number of recognised anomalies and failures occur which call into question 
the validity of the existing worldview and the usefulness of its main assumptions, does a 
progressively critical mass of actors adjust their positions. Only then do competing ideas 
move from the realm of the improbable and become a credible alternative reality and 
worldview. 
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Such a tipping point, a paradigm shift, did not occur within the IMF. This is despite the 
inclusion of more critical emerging-country voices within the IMF, and despite gradual 
changes in the policy stance over austerity versus stimulus, and on capital flows that have 
been possible under French leadership. At the time of writing, in late summer 2013, there is 
no alternative macro model being discussed inside the IMF, only smaller adjustments to 
existing policy and practices. Remarkably, the global crisis of 2007-2008 was not severe 
enough to cause a shift in the community view. A reform of the global international monetary 
system was not attempted and no shift is seen. 
In conclusion, G20-led IMF reforms have been relatively modest, first- and second-order 
changes. There has been no ideological or policy paradigm shift within the institution and 
within its policies. The reforms are the result of the interaction between reluctant G20 
leadership and a cohesive, resistant neo-liberal IMF staff. The outcome has nonetheless 
reinforced the redesigned international financial architecture, albeit altered to reflect the 
IMF’s no longer leading role in crisis fighting. Today the IMF stands better resourced and 
with a significant buy-in from emerging countries, which did not exist prior to 2008, and 
whose presence within the leadership of the IMF is likely to be felt more and more in the 
years ahead. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This research analysed the response of leaders and central bankers from advanced and 
emerging countries as they responded collectively to the most severe global economic and 
financial crisis in over 70 years, with a burst of crisis management, architectural and 
institutional creation, and a series of significant regulatory policy reforms to financial 
markets and firms across the globe. The research found a crisis-induced narrative shift 
amongst political leaders, and especially technical leaders, away from an emphasis on market 
authority and towards a reassertion of state authority. 
 
This is not the first cycle of boom and bust, of a response involving crisis management, 
reform, redesign, and a return to disunity. National cycles of financial crises and shifts exhibit 
similar phases. But in this case, the height of the wave of economic crisis and the 
concomitant wave of crisis response by G20 leaders and the central banking community 
appears to be of greater amplitude, indicative of a rarer event, a paradigm shift in the 
consensus policy and international regulatory framework and in the architectural and policy 
response. This is what Hall found takes place, namely, ‘long periods of continuity punctuated 
occasionally by disjunctive experience of paradigm shift’ (Hall, 1993, p. 291; see also 
Wilson, 2000, p. 427; Gould, 1990). This research demonstrates that severe crises can ‘act as 
turning points in the governance of international financial markets’ (Helleiner, 2009a, p. 1). 
This crisis created space for a financial regime change (Wade, 2008). 
 
This research identified the beginning of a paradigm shift, a rejection of tenents of laissez-
faire neo-liberalism and its replacement with a state-led, collectively coordinated redesign 
and re-regulation of financial markets and firms within a new architecture. It is not a full 
global economic paradigm shift (i.e., a rejection of neo-liberal economic solutions overall) 
but is rather at this stage a financial regulatory phenomenon. The narrative shift started at the 
peak of the crisis in 2008, it was supported by the G20 leaders and driven by the central 
banking community. At the London Summit in 2009 the re-regulatory policy narrative and 
reforms were laid out in detail. The rapid policy evolution this signalled is still underway in 
2013. It faces criticism, and is stronger in some policy areas and weaker in others. But the 
shift in regulatory worldview, and the policies this led to are potentially lasting, and it is 
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reasonable to conclude that there will not soon be a return to the unbridled unregulated global 
markets and firms of the pre-2008 era. 
 
The new era is characterised by a reassertion of state power over markets and firms, of the 
application of enhanced macro-prudential regulation and supervision designed to buttress the 
financial stability of the system as a whole, of major markets, and of the world’s largest 
banks and financial firms. This shift will not be easily abandoned or deconstructed. Instead, it 
is being defended by its technical creators and their community.  
 
At this early stage, five years into the crisis response and regulatory redesign, research 
conclusions must of necessity remain tentative. As such, additional work on the height, 
breadth, and depth of the reform response and its components will need to be done in the 
years ahead. Observers will need to revisit the functioning of the reformed G20-Financial 
Stability Board (FSB)-International Monetary Fund (IMF) architecture as it operates to make 
further judgments on the shift’s long-term impact and solidity of the paradigm shift. Each 
policy area and each sector will merit continued close analysis to judge whether the totality of 
the reforms are fully implemented and greater temporal distance from the crisis and response 
is possible. 
 
7.2 Responses to Specific Research Questions 
 
The following addresses the specific research questions raised at the beginning of the thesis 
and the conclusions that can be drawn from an analysis of the material. 
 
 How should the observer view and understand the construction of the new global 
financial regulatory architecture commenced by leaders and their proxies in 
response to the 2007-2008 crisis? 
 
In answering this core question, the research examined the shift in ideas, the emergence of 
the G20 and its summitry, the creation and actions of the FSB, the reform of the IMF, and the 
outer limits to the paradigm shift and process of altered financial regulatory construction. 
 
The research identified the political and diplomatic dynamics during three phases in the 
G20’s creation and evolution: crisis management, concrete reform, and a return to dissension 
among leading states. The research provided evidence of a narrative and paradigm shift made 
  257
by leaders during 2008-2009 that signalled a major alteration in approach to the regulation of 
global financial markets and firms. This shift amounted to a third-order change (Hall, 1993) 
in the overarching narrative away from laissez-faire neo-liberalism. Leaders and technocrats 
backed a re-regulation of global markets and signalled the end to the previously dominant 
paradigm of deregulation. 
 
An elite-driven consensus forced a paradigm shift in response to the crisis in its first acute 
phase and in the reform response that immediately followed. The strength and breadth of the 
policy adopted as a result was impacted by this narrative shift among the technical elite 
central banking epistemic community. 
 
It can be viewed as a series of related Kuhnian narrative waves, as per Figure 7.1, which 
shows the financial crisis wave in 2008 producing a rapid convergence of diplomatic (G20 
level), economic (at the G20 and state-by-state-level), and technical (at the collective central 
banking and regulatory level) policy consensus and narratives which rapidly rise and peak at 
the London Summit in 2009. At that key juncture, all three policy narratives supported one 
another, in phases one and two of the crisis response. These narrative waves converge and 
support action by the G20, the creation of the FSB and the reform of the IMF. But overall the 
paradigm shift remains limited to re-regulatory aspects of lassez faire neo-liberalism. 
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Figure 7.1 The 2008–09 Financial and Economic Crisis and Policy Consensus Waves
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The findings presented here indicate that, after 2009, the economic policy wave dissipated, 
with disputes arising between Keynesians and ‘austerions’ (Krugman, 2012), only for the 
economic consensus to re-form in a smaller wave as leaders sought a Eurozone deal in 2012. 
The diplomatic G20-led wave also weakened in phase three as dissension returned. In 
contrast, the technical regulatory policy wave, supported by the key central banking epistemic 
community in the FSB, was and is the most resistant to erosion. This research showed that 
this new technical policy consensus and its community exerted a positive upward pressure on 
the diplomatic state-to-state narratives and on the work stream agreed in the G20 summits. 
Neither this broad, multifaceted consensus policy shift nor the convergence seen during 
2008-2009 would have occurred without the crisis. 
 
Subjects interviewed used the evocative imagery of being on a cliff, of looking into the abyss, 
of having no alternative. It was found that G20 leaders acted swiftly and in a manner that 
previous G7 and G8 summitry could not have achieved. A related conclusion is that the G20 
forum has permanently supplanted these smaller, less legitimate groupings; these groupings 
continue to meet but now are less relevant; major global economic and financial regulatory 
decisions are now a G20 matter (Subacchi, 2009). 
 
A ‘unifying’ effect of the crisis at G20 summits was identified in this research, where deals 
were secured in phases one and two, and even in extremis in phase three. It is also 
particularly seen at the FSB technical level, where national central bankers reached accord on 
level-one goals due to enlarged win sets, and could, to a greater degree, disregard normal 
national level-two goals. It was even observed to a lesser degree in negotiations over IMF 
resource boosts, reforms, and institutional evolution. 
 
This research on the G20 summitry identified a financial crisis understood and modified 
Putnam-style two-level game process (Figure 2.2, p. 40). The severity of the financial and 
economic crises initially pushed national negotiators together. Both level-one and level-two 
goals converged, or, alternatively, level-one goals overrode level-two goals as negotiators 
temporarily disregarded short-term national concerns. The economic crisis enlarged win sets 
and new agreement possibilities. It increased the chance of breakthroughs that, in the absence 
of a crisis, would not have been politically possible. As would be expected, once the 
immediate severity of the crisis dissipated, win sets shrunk, and national level-one goals 
began to diverge and level-two goals once again interfered with efforts to extend the scope of 
the reforms contained in the new paradigm. 
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The research presented here showed that once a paradigm shift occurs, it still has limits 
imposed upon it by the boundary of the scientific knowledge it includes or—in this case—the 
extent of the financial regulatory worldview and consensus it reflects and rests upon.  
 
The shift does not extend to global macroeconomics or national poltical economy matters. 
The new consensus does not include a rejection of neo-liberal economic ideas, even as many 
(but not yet a majority) in the community question their validity. 
 
In addition this research found that even after a paradigm shift in regulatory ideas has begun, 
and policies that reflect the new stance are being promulgated, critics will remain vocal, and 
the shift’s validity from place to place, policy to policy, will be tested. Copernican theory and 
Galileo’s empirical discoveries were resisted mightily by the Catholic Church after that 
scientfic paradigm shift. Similarly, today many bankers and their fellow travellers resist the 
new re-regulatory and macro-prudential paradigm, especially as it is first being promulgated. 
In other words, the regulatory consensus and paradigm shift is underway, but its application 
via new policies is resisted by some and continues to be challenged. 
 
This research also found that the consensus narrative and policy shift does not grow at the 
same rate in all dimensions or at an exponentially rapidly expanding rate. In this case, the 
crisis response produced a consensus and a sudden burst of action (during 2008-2009) 
followed by a more gradual rate of reforms (during 2010-2013), with the later evolutionary 
changes being based on and taking place within the limits of the new re-regulatory policy 
paradigm. This finding is in line with Hall’s conception of paradigm shift in the economic 
sphere and the three different orders of change seen, as applied to the international crisis-
driven process in this case. 
 
A third-order paradigm shift is visible in some key fields, such as international coordination 
and macro-prudential regulation, indicative of the shift underway. These changes are 
followed or accompanied by a high second-order shift in other areas, such as derivatives 
regulation. Finally, in the midst of a paradigm shift, there are weaker first-order changes 
(such as that on ‘too big to fail’). This is how a paradigm shift in ideas is made real: policy by 
policy, step by step. Some are strong responses, others less so. 
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 Is there a reassertion of Westphalian state power in the global economy via the G20 
and FSB, and how has the power of key state actors been affected by the growth in 
importance of the G20 and FSB? What role are emerging market players 
performing? 
 
The creation and actions of the G20 are at base a rejection of the previous Anglo-Saxon 
laissez-faire neo-liberal deregulatory paradigm. There was a transnationalisation of state 
authority over global financial markets and private sector financial actors. There is a 
reassertion of collective state soft and hard power over global financial markets, firms, and 
actors. The policy implementation underway throughout the G20’s and FSB’s recent history 
amounts to the extension of state power through new and reformed institutions and 
internationally coordinated regulation. 
 
This research demonstrated that the G20 summitry and FSB processes were essentially a 
Western project addressing Western failings led by North Americans and Europeans from 
2008 to 2012. Leaders from Europe and North America retained control of the design and 
financial reform process, notwithstanding a partial handover of technical leadership in 2013. 
Even as more actors joined, the structures were fashioned formally and informally by those at 
the core. The agenda was and is driven by a small number of actors in this community. 
Today, even for those inside the process, as in Animal Farm, all are equal but some are more 
equal than others (Orwell, 1946). 
 
At the G20 level the response is underpinned by a cohesive and predominantly Western elite 
expert epistemic community of central bankers and supervisors clear on the causes and 
possible solutions. The community engaged in ‘the creation of collective meaning’ and 
fashioned a new policy narrative (Adler and Haas, 1992, p. 369). The central banking 
community exhibits the defining features of an epistemic community: a shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a 
common enterprise (Haas, 1992a, p. 3). The crisis created the shock which overcame 
institutional inertia, and major shift was possible. 
 
This research illuminated that the Western central banking community provided expert 
advice and was deferred to by G20 political leaders desperate for actionable reform. The G20 
delegated the policy reform process to the same community. The size of the community does 
not matter—it was quite small, an international elite; it is what is done with the power and 
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policy influence that counts (Adler and Haas, 1992, p 380). The research demonstrated the 
technocratic nature of the elite community and the community’s cohesiveness; its small size 
and strong leadership facilitated the rapid post-crisis policy-making process, especially in 
phases one and two. 
 
In 1992, Kapstein observed that central bankers were ‘not yet an epistemic community’, but 
they were acting increasingly like one (Kapstein 1992, p. 267). Partly as a result of the crisis, 
this same group has clearly matured and in 2013 can be said to be the dominant international 
epistemic community addressing global financial regulatory reform. The research has shown 
the nature of this opaque, particularly powerful elite community and the effect the crisis had, 
further increasing the concentration of decision-making and policy-making power within a 
small (albeit marginally enlarged) number of individuals. This small, closed community 
conceived the FSB, led the FSB, and dominates the decision making. Backed by the G20 and 
through the FSB, this community acted to address the crisis and to defend their centrality and 
prerogatives in the policy-making process. As a result, the central banking community 
emerges greatly strengthened, despite having collectively failed to see the impending 2007-
2008 crisis. 
 
The common policy narrative amongst central bankers and supervisors was not monolithic. 
There was dissension from the new consensus and some opposition to the aggressive re-
regulation of banks via new macro-prudential policies. Some actors leaned more towards the 
community position (and away from national positions), and others (a much smaller group) 
stood behind their national positions. This conclusion is in line with the work of Mitchell et 
al., which finds that national differences are evident and expressed in expert communities to 
varying degrees (Mitchell et al., 2007, p. 762). 
 
Despite these differences, the community as a whole agreed to the shift, to re-regulation, and 
to the macro-prudential approach. Chief negotiators in 2009 converged on their level-one 
goals. They disregarded their level-two constituents (that is, national commercial banks). 
Instead, they agreed the application of the community’s state re-regulatory reforms. FSB 
leaders pursued their ‘own conception of the national interest in the [now crisis-altered] 
international context’ (Putnam, 1988, p. 457). 
 
Emerging market principals are not missing in this reassertion of state power and the 
summitry process. Indeed, emerging countries supported the shift in worldview, which was in 
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line with their domestic approaches, and today they are gradually increasing their influence. 
But they did not play a major role at the beginning of the process. As they individually take 
over the presidency of the G20, and lead parts of the FSB technical process, however, they 
are starting to impact the outcome and shape its contours. It is probable that their influence, 
and their confidence in applying that influence, will continue to grow as the G20-FSB-IMF 
reforms mature. This is only a prediction as to the long-term consequences of the alternative 
crisis narrative and institutional changes constructed by the elites in the first acute phases of 
the crisis. 
 
 Are there parallels to be drawn from the cycles in past national financial crises and 
responses and the rise of the G20 and FSB? 
 
There are parallels with national episodes of financial crises, which also often result in cycles 
of crisis management, reform, and relapse. The difference in this case is the magnitude of the 
crisis and the observed response and reform wave. Actors’ responses in this crisis resulted in 
a new narrative concept of what was required for systemic stability the institutional and 
policy tools needed to implement this (pricipally via the FSB and, to a much lesser extent, the 
IMF). As with national ideological shifts, because the G20-FSB response involved a 
paradigm shift, it may be more durable and resistant to erosion. But the cyclical nature of the 
process suggests the shift also has elements of eventual impermanence. Just as national 
ideological shifts do not last indefinitely, so too the current shift may eventually be 
challenged. So the cyclical process of crisis, response, and relapse will continue. At best, the 
frequency and amplitude of the cycle may be altered by the reform response in 2008 and 
since then, but a judgement on this cannot be made until the new structures are tested by a 
future global crisis. 
 
 Can we gauge how effective the G20 and FSB are as forums and in their broader 
policy goals – that of enhancing economic and financial stability?  
 
The research found that the G20 was relatively effective in the crisis management phase and 
in providing support and political capital for the reform agenda in the reform phase. Even as 
public tensions rose amongst G20 leaders in phase three, the leaders were still able to act, and 
they backed deals (such as the Basel III accord, fashioned by their technocrats) and 
institutional changes (to the FSB). But the cyclical nature of crisis response and the informal 
nature of the G20 results in a reactive process, not one which retains its intensity as calm 
  264
returns. The impact of the later summits has been less marked, and the G20 is somewhat less 
effective now than in the heat of the crisis. This policy process and outcomes can also be 
viewed as a series of interlinked waves, as shown in figure 7.2 (these policy waves are linked 
to and supported by the G20 and technical narratives waves discussed previously and shown 
in figure 7.1).
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Note: TBTF = too big to fail. 
 
Figure 7.2 Policy Reforms as Waves
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Figure 7.2 shows the various policy responses analysed in the research as a series of related 
Kuhn/Hall waves. None would have occurred without the crisis as the precipitating event. 
Each wave’s height depends on whether the response is a first-, second-, or third-order shift. 
The peak of an initial policy response occurs at the summit, when the G20 agrees a common 
policy goal; thus, not all policy reforms begin simultaneously. The size and temporal 
durability of the crest of each wave depends on the outcomes as judged thereafter. Thus, the 
central banking institutional FSB response and the key Basel III reform are the strongest and 
most sustained waves. Other responses vary in height, strength, and durability, with TBTF 
(too big to fail) and accounting standards being the least impressive of all. 
 
The research findings show that the FSB’s creation and evolution resulted in a significant 
qualitative and quantitative improvement amounting to a third-order change in international 
regulatory coordination; a paradigm shift in coordination. The Board, its community, and 
leading Western voices exert an upward pressure on all policy outcomes, as per figure 7.2. 
Participants involved in the process recognise this. The research demonstrates that the central 
banking epistemic community was and today remains pivotal to the paradigm shift and policy 
coordination that facilitates and underpins the reforms and their national implementation. 
 
Hall noted that ‘policy makers are likely to be in a stronger position to resist societal [in this 
case banking] interests when they are armed with a coherent policy paradigm,’ (Hall, 1993, p. 
290). The central hypotheses and principal finding of this research is that this is what is 
occurring in the FSB policy-making process. Given a series of recognised critical anomalies, 
the stronger the epistemic community in policy making, and the stronger the new policy 
consensus, the more significant the resulting paradigm shift may be and the greater the 
strength of the concomitant policy outcomes that may occur (this is also pictured in figure 2.2 
p. 33).  
 
This leads to the conclusion that if the central banking community, which has undergone an 
paradigm shift, controls the policy levers and determines policy outcomes, then the form of 
policy response and its robustness, that is, its success, in terms of potentially insuring greater 
future financial stability, is enhanced. In contrast, when the FSB leadership is separated from 
the policy process or where other weaker less cohesive SSBs and communities are driving the 
outcome, it is likely to be less robust, in large part because the policy narrative and consensus 
may also be flimsier in such cases. In other words, increased dissension amongst elites 
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produces a weaker policy implementation and also curtails innovation of further global 
regulatory reform policy overall.  
 
It was found that as Figure 7.2 shows, the strength of policy outcomes varies. At one extreme 
there is the relatively robust response designed and dictated by the lead central bank 
community. Other policy outputs are less strong and indicative of disagreements amongst the 
G20 leaders, within FSB and amongst other policy-making communities over aspects of the 
policy narrative. In some cases, even with general agreement on goals, complexity and 
cultural differences intervene to undermine the outcome. In other cases, no agreement is 
possible at all because the national technical policy-making communities do not agree and 
block movement despite G20 demands that they act. 
 
The research indicates that in addition, national private vested interests (level-two actors in 
Putnam’s sense), have a fluctuating impact on the policy waves. At the peak and immediately 
following the crisis, the level-two interests are disregarded and least influential. During the 
crisis, they are not impacting the immediate policy response waves in 2009. But as the crisis 
wanes national level-two interests have a greater negative impact on the waves’ amplitude 
and duration; the outcome can be first limited to first and second order changes.. 
 
These findings of different policy outcomes as a result of a paradigm shift are in line with 
Hall’s conception of first, second, and third orders of policy change, all of which can take 
place within a new paradigm. This research presented here also shows that policy narrative 
and material factors interact, i.e., that ideological shift and policy outcomes are influenced by 
power relationships and technical community relationships, where some have greater 
influence than others around the same negotiating table (Porter, 2011, pp. 14-16). 
 
What is also visible is the continued (though somewhat altered) asymmetric structure of 
global power within the paradigm shift identified here. The dominant powers of the previous 
paradigm still retain overall dominance in the new paradigm. In this important sense, there is 
structural continuity within the institutional and policy changes produced by the crisis and its 
elite responses. The paradigm shift is limited to certain areas (principally financial and 
regulatory), in which consensus was possible among the elite technocratic community, and 
where the dominant community was more able to effectively address the acute phases of the 
crisis. 
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In 2013, and at this point in the re-regulatory paradigm shift and resulting policy reform 
process, a final definitive determination of success as regards economic and financial stability 
is not possible and would be ill-advised. International paradigm shifts take time to become 
fully visible. Further, research will be needed to determine the final scope and effect of the 
new constructs and architecture on financial stability. 
 
But a potentially significant directional shift toward stronger harmonised global standards is 
visible when the policies are each placed in the policy reform matrix (figure 5.11, p. 208). 
The matrix shows a shift in regulatory policies as a whole toward stronger, more globalised 
processes and solutions. Each particular policy reform moves a different distance—and on 
occasion backwards or down the chart—within the landscape according to its particular set of 
influences and pressures. What is clear is that the old policy consensus is gone. The new 
consensus is being contested as it is being formed in response to that paradigm shift.   
 
Epistemic policy evolution, according to Adler and Haas, has four phases: innovation, 
diffusion, selection, and persistence (Adler and Haas, 1992, p. 373). At this point, innovation 
is clearly visible. The community framed the problem and defined the issues. They engaged 
in policy diffusion and coordination through the FSB structures. The same community largely 
selected the policies that expressed the G20 leaders’ collective interests, defining the reform 
agenda as a whole. The crisis created an opening—an ideal time, to make this major shift. 
What has yet to come fully into focus is the element of persistence—i.e., the long-term 
strength of the different policy elements of the new paradigm backed by the lead epistemic 
community. 
 
The epistemic community members are the architects of the shift, but it is still being 
contested. National lobbies resist it to varying degrees. This is to be expected; there will 
always be clashes of national interests and divisions and divergent goals, underpinning the 
power relations within the G20. The research findings indicate that the community has, 
however, been able to fashion a common stance and consensus that can defend the new 
paradigm and which can go beyond individual national positions and seek collective goals. 
 
 What challenges and limitations do these forums face as they move from crisis 
management to financial reform to confronting new tensions and a return to 
disunity? 
 
  269
The research findings show that the G20, in phase three of its evolution, confronts the outer 
limits of the paradigm shift. Remaining macroeconomic issues, which range from global 
imbalances to currency and reserve management matters, to the future of the international 
monetary system, remain outside the boundaries of the new policy. As such, disputes and 
discord within the G20 occur as national paradigms and growth models clash rather than 
converge. This should come as no surprise. History since the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
agreement in 1971 includes numerous global macroeconomic disputes (creditor versus 
debtor, exporter versus importer) of this type. The research finds that the new re-regulatory 
consensus has limits; it neither extends to contested issues related to global macroeconomic 
balances or currency policies nor encompasses issues of national economic policies or 
models. The G20-FSB-IMF architecture process confronts other institutional and legitimacy 
challenges, as well. 
 
Within the limits of this new worldview, legitimacy matters (Aslund, 2009; Brookings 
Institution, 2011b; Elson, 2011; Vestergaard, 2011), and the research identified a continuing 
tension within the G20 and FSB structures between the desire for efficacy and demands for 
enhanced legitimacy. Critics complain, and the research presented here shows that the G20 
and FSB are exclusive, exclusionary, opaque, and (especially in the case of the FSB) little 
understood by outsiders. The structures are a reversion to interstate power diplomacy and 
away from the use of universal institutions, including the IMF. The research highlighted the 
tension between those inside exclusive forums which are fast and flexible (Slaughter, 2001), 
and those outside who prefer universal institutions in which they have a voice, but which by 
their nature tend to be slower, less responsive, more bureaucratic and hidebound. These 
complaints are a reaction to the further increase in the concentration of global decision-
making power in relation to the financial system, and away from universal treaty-based 
institutions. 
 
The research found that G20 leaders and the central banking community prefer these 
exclusive structures. They reflect G20 members’ distrust of the past performance of universal 
institutions, especially that of the IMF, a distrust that resulted in the IMF being blocked in its 
attempt to lead the response in 2009. The exclusive construction also reflects the central 
banking community’s highly secretive approach to policy making. The G20 and FSB forums 
are also an artefact of the nature of crisis response and rapid reform. In a crisis, leaders seize 
what they believe to be most effective in securing their own goals, engage in crisis 
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management, and press reforms. Only later do leaders turn to issues of transparency, 
openness, and inclusion, because these are subsidiary concerns. 
 
Accusations of illegitimacy will continue. Supporters of universal treaty-based institutions 
were never going to support the G20 and FSB processes, except as a temporary crisis 
management tools. The research shows G20 and FSB members are resisting, and will not 
soon agree to, a process whereby the two forums slide toward ever wider membership. 
Despite this tension (or rather perhaps because of it), the forums are slowly becoming 
marginally more inclusive as a result of external pressure. 
 
The FSB is affected by demands for further institutional evolution. As the most successful 
institutional expression of the new re-regulatory worldview, it faces pressure to enlarge and 
respond via the expansion of the steering committee membership and creation of the 
Regional Consultative Group. Its structure is also becoming more formalised, and may 
become less flexible in the process. As the Board evolves, its mode of operation and 
processes will further develop. The danger is that if this goes too far, via membership creep 
and formality of process, some elements of the Board’s efficacy may be sacrificed in the 
name of legitimacy, transparency, and inclusiveness. 
 
 How was the IMF affected and reformed in response to the crisis and what role 
does it play in the new architecture? 
 
There are three principal findings related to the IMF. 
 
First, the IMF was not in the lead in the response to the crisis, as was the case in prior 
financial crises in the 1990s and earlier. In 2008, the G20 and the FSB seized that role, and 
the leaders’ forum is now the agenda setter on global macroeconomic and financial 
regulatory matters, advised by the central banking community. In this important sense, the 
IMF has been demoted structurally within the global architecture. Smaller states would prefer 
a return to the centrality of universal institutions in financial crisis management and a greater 
use of the IMF in the crisis response process. The research concludes that this is unlikely to 
take place. The IMF will not take a lead role in financial regulation and crisis response going 
forward; it will be a conduit for funds, but it will be only one player at the table, as was the 
case in the negotiations over the US$461 billion Eurozone firewall. Notwithstanding this 
structural demotion, the crisis was a good one for the IMF. It went from near irrelevance to 
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being refinanced and reformed thanks to agreements articulated within and via the G20 
process. In this manner, this exclusive political summitry paid real dividends for the IMF.  
 
Second, the IMF’s political leadership internally did not (unlike G20 leaders and their 
technocrats) undergo a paradigm shift in worldview. Instead, smaller first- and second-order 
incremental changes were made to the IMF’s existing policy stances. The research concludes 
that a French-modified Washington Consensus still operates inside the IMF amongst its staff 
and its key finance ministry shareholder representatives in the Executive Board acting as 
creditors. Previous suggestions of the possible birth of a new IMF development paradigm 
(Gore, 2000) were then and are now premature. It will take many more years for an internal 
economic and ideological shift to take place inside the IMF; in 2013, there appears to be little 
desire for such a change within the organization. The research also finds that this 
continuation of aspects of the Washington Consensus occurs within the new regulatory 
paradigm. 
 
Third, the reforms agreed, on resources, votes, and voice, were nonetheless effective in 
drawing the emerging states back into greater support of, and engagement with, the IMF. 
Countries that had abandoned the IMF have recommitted to the organization and are 
increasing their engagement. This is a significant development given the near irrelevancy of 
the organization prior to the crisis. The reforms strengthen both the IMF and the position of 
the U.S. within the organization, an outcome preferable to conflict and clashes outside the 
existing structures between the U.S. and China, in particular. 
 
 Does the phenomenon that led to the sudden emergence of the G20 and FSB—a 
robust reassertion of state power—complicate their further evolution post-crisis? 
 
The reform response and the cycle within which the paradigm shift took place is dialectic. 
The crisis response and reforms seen in phases one and two of the G20’s evolution helped 
restore economic and market confidence and relative calm. At that point, the collectively 
applied G20 state power which made the process effective in the first two phases reverts to 
national positions, divergent goals, and demands in phase three. This discord acts as a block 
to a further extension of the regulatory worldview to other areas of global macroeconomic 
dispute, and the outer boundaries of the paradigm are reached. The G20 process relies heavily 
on state-to-state power relationships within a consensus-based forum. It has no momentum of 
its own, in contrast with treaty-based organizations with distinct mandates. The G20, 
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therefore, is more dependent on commitment, engagement, and agreement amongst states, 
and this may be lacking post-crisis. 
 
What mitigates this to a degree is the robustness of the FSB structures and the agenda at the 
level below the G20. The FSB interlinkages between independent sub-state actors and the 
system of policy-making coordination and monitoring they include, exhibits elements of 
institutional strength that may partially counteract the political and national state-power-
driven centrifugal forces pushing actors apart once again at the G20 level. This is already 
happening. It was seen in Seoul (2010), where a public currency war at the summit did not 
stop the G20 from signing the Basel III accord. Disputes in Cannes (2011) and Los Cabos 
(2012) did not halt the FSB technical policy-making processes, although G20 leaders were 
simultaneously arguing over issues beyond the limit of the paradigm. 
 
In this third phase of the G20-FSB response, the policy-making community has moved to 
paradigm maintenance and defence, which suggests a willingness to protect their new 
creation from attacks and to strengthen the FSB as the key forum. The technical central 
banking community continues to construct the institutional underpinnings of the new 
paradigm, showing their active support for the Board’s continued evolution as the concrete 
expression of the new international regulatory and cooperative architecture. This is paradigm 
maintenance and construction in action. It is institutional evidence of the gradual evolution of 
the forum and of its policy mechanisms, even as the speed and intensity of the reform process 
slows in phase three. Some steps are small, others are larger; taken together, they demonstrate 
that institutional evolution continues to underpin the reform process even in 2013. 
 
The reformed architecture appears relatively robust. But the possibility of failure of the new 
institutional structure cannot be fully discounted. It remains possible that dissension may 
result in a breakdown in practice, that is, a failure to consolidate the new system of state 
authority, of transnationalised state authority over globalised financial markets and private 
sector actors. 
 
 What do the reform responses in the G20, FSB, and IMF cases signal for the future 
evolution of the global financial architecture? 
 
The operation of the G20 forum and its technical progeny, the FSB, has altered international 
economic and financial diplomacy and drawn in the rising powers; they no longer need rely 
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on occasional invitations to meetings. This is a meaningful shift in power relations—a 
recognition of the decline of U.S. hegemony and a rise of the new powers. 
 
Yet, the creation of the leaders’ forum by the United States also ensures that it extends its 
influence over the consensual process. It is clear that in the new financial regulatory 
architecture, certain states, leaders, and their technocrats matter more than others. So the 
economic and diplomatic impact is one of change, but also one of continuity. The research 
finds a significant element of asymmetry in the global power structure. The redesign of the 
regulatory system still preserves both key aspects of ‘Northern hegemony’ over the global 
economic system and, in this way, the perpetuation of a strategy for Western global 
hegemony. 
 
The crisis has elevated the status of certain emerging country challengers and the 
counterhegemonic forces amongst emerging powers. This may have long-term implications 
which cannot be predicted. Including rising powers in the architecture and policy processes 
prolongs Western hegemony. It postpones a direct paradigm clash with the rising powers. 
These rising powers may begin, as a result, to act as more enthusiastic system supporters, or 
they may force the rate of evolutionary institutional change. It is too soon to judge. 
 
7.3 The Challenge Ahead 
 
Internationally significant paradigm shifts in economic or financial regulatory policy 
narratives are rare events. When they occur, they are gradually reflected thorough policy 
changes of varying magnitudes. Just such a shift in the internationally coordinated financial 
regulation of global markets and firms commenced in 2008-2009 and is still under way in 
2013. In the years ahead, observers will need to watch for evidence of a consolidation, a 
continued cementing of re-regulatory policies that implement the underlying narrative and 
ideological paradigm shift. 
 
In 2013, the G20, central bankers, and national regulators have seized back control over 
global financial markets, and they are collectively and individually driving the policy agenda. 
It is still early in the process and the final end result of this burst of institutional and policy-
making action remains somewhat unclear. At this stage, the observer is too close to the wave 
of reform and the shift in worldview to fully comprehend its scope. Participants continue to 
ride the reform wave as individual surfers on the new paradigm. The old previously dominant 
  274
deregulatory framework has gone; a new re-regulatory paradigm is emerging but its full 
impact will only be properly understood in the years ahead. 
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